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ABSTRACT
Political Culture and Political Development:
An Analysis of the Institution Building Process in Iran
(May 1981)
Ali

Asghar Masalehdan,

Whittier College

6. A.,

M.A., Kent State University, M.U.A.

,

Boston University

Ph.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by: Professor Anwar

H.

Syed

This inquiry is an attempt to observe the relationship in Iran

between political culture and political development through the building
of political

institutions.

For political development to be initiated,

suggests Lucian Pye, three basic forces of social change--equality

capacity and

di

fferenti ation--are necessary in the society.

Sociali-

zation is generally achieved through inter-generational communication,

impulse control as transfer of personal duties, and role training.

While the first two agents are regarded as primary, highly personalized,
and relatively unstructured relationships, role training is secondary

and can be influenced by the existing institutions through mass com-

The approach of this inquiry

munication, schools and other processes.
assumes that 'development'

in

its ultimate form requires two symbiotic

elements for it to be attained and maintained.
as

'software'

and 'hardware'.

'Software'

They are referred to

are the social

prerequisites

composed of sociological, cultural, psychological and political conditions which result in the production of
'Hardware'

are the material

a

skilled human element.

and physical elements that the human
vi

element utilizes to achieve the desired end--i.e., growth
and development.

'Software'

is

the focus of this inquiry with special

attention

to norms and values that promote political development.

The inquiry is divided into three main parts.

Part

I

deals

with political culture, the prevailing political institutions,
and the

discussion of the individual in the Iranian socio-political framework.
Temporal powers in the absence of the Hiaden Imam are considered ille-

gitimate by Shiah doctrine.

Conflict existed between the aspirations

of the Pahlavi monarchs for hegemony and the ulama (clergy) who see

themselves as the link between the ummah (the community of believers)
and the Hidden Imam.

The domination by the Pahlavi monarchs of the

three separate but equal branches of the government, as envisioned by
the Constitution of 1906-07,

left the political institutions of the

nation weak and dependent on royal grace.

The Shah was thus guarantor

of performance and responsible for all shortcomings.

This frustrated

the traditional balanced tension of the political web system of the

country.

Consequently, the Shah was neither able to gain the support

of tne modern and thus democratic elements of the country nor legitimacy

from the traditional and religious-minded segment of the population.
develop-

A further problem facing the insufficiency of political

ment in Iran was the individual himself.

Famialism is seen

as

the main

pattern of social relationships and the basis of one's identity.

individualism seen in Iranians

is

a

The

primarily negative trait not con-

ducive to the establishment of social contracts which would promote
vii

responsible individuals.

Insecurity in interpersonal
relationships

is

seen as a major problem facing
the society.

Textbooks as socializing agents
are the theme of Part
educational system caused little
motivation for change to

conducive to political development.
tivity, personal

a

II.

The

value system

Lacking are rationality, objec-

integrity, initiative or responsibility
as the end

results of the educational process.

The educational system prepares

the students to exist in the
prevailing socio-cul tural mold of the

nation.

Despite the fair representation of
entries in textbooks enumer-

ating hard work, achievement, self
discipline and similar values, the

methods of teaching and learning, as
well as the bulk of the entries in
the textbooks, seem to have changed
little from those of the traditional

maktab system.
to prevail

Memorization, instead of analytical understanding
seems

in schools.

Part III deals with transmission of values and
norms from

parents to students.

Data analysis shows that the parent and student

orientations seem to concur to

a

substantial degree.

Parental education

seems to be the most significant determinant of student's
socio-political

orientation, but has

a

different impact on the parent's own orientation

which at times seems to be contrary to that of the student's.

Family

income and place of residence, which are influenced by parental
level of

education, also somewhat influence the student's orientation.

The

students and parents remain traditional in their outlook, despite even
high level of education.

High level of political inefficacy and distrust

of government are found among parents and students with socio-economic
vi

i i

status influencing the degree of such orientations.

Female students

were found to be somewhat more open-minded and democratic
in their outlook than their male counterparts, due to the fact they are
often from

better educated, more cosmopolitan and more prosperous families.
The prospects of development of 'software'

in Iran suffer from

severe socio-cul tural as well as political inadequacies.

To even begin

to consider the prospects of development of human resources, basic

attention must be paid to the changes vital to transformation of
nation from traditional mode to

a

transitional stage.
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INTRODUCTION

Some Introductory Remarks

This present undertaking began in 1977 as an inquiry
into the

prospects of political development in developing countries
with

emphasis on the Iranian experience.

Needless to say, the developments

of the past few years would have been an exacting and
trying time for
any student of area studies whose subject evolved into new
circum-

stances overnight.

Although the focus of the inquiry remained

constant, new elements entered into consideration, including, but not

limited to, failure of political development in the past, the Shah's
fall

and his impact on socio-political

development in Iran.

of the inquiry was broad to begin with, including

of political culture and political

a

The scope

three-layered study

institutions, textbooks as social-

izing agents, and inter-generational socialization process.

The

evolving issues made the undertaking into this voluminous work for
which

I

beg the patience of the reader.

A Framework for Analysis

With the desire for development among the emerging nations of
the world following World War II, theoretical groundwork for the

actualization of such goals began.

All

the approaches were different.

They were concerned with such issues as capital formation,
1

2

technological change and increase in productive
capacity.

Clearly the

theories of development were all one dimensional
in their economic

orientation and policy focus.

Furthermore, they remained incognizant

of how the traditional societies functioned.

Their theoretical pre-

occupation with the economic approach as means to
the end and as the
only viable methodology for economic development
was not shared by many,

particularly those outside the discipline.

In

the Middle East such

modernizing individuals as Gamal Abdul-Nasser^ of Egypt, Michel
Aflag^
of Syria and Ahmad Kasravi^ of Iran thought fundamental
changes

requiring social transformation were

a

prerequisite for development.

Total systems approach and development as a multi-dimensional
process
of social change also had proponents in the west.

Among economists,

Walt Rostow proposed his "stage" approach to economic development."^

Although his approach included sequential stages including "take-off
into self-sustained growth," it suffered from "disregard of the need
to isolate key behavioralistic relationships which determine the path

of the system."^

Other prominent theoreticians promoting the multi-dimensional
approach to the concept of development are Daniel Lerner,^ Edward
Shils,' Bert

F.

Hoselitz,° Max Millikan, and Donald Blackmer.

These

academicians include political, sociological, anthropological, and
psychological, in addition to economic conditions as determinants of
total system development.

Furthermore, they emphasize the development

of the above mentioned conditions as prerequisites for economic devel-

opment to reach the stage where
growth.

a

system can maintain self-sustaining

3

Bert

Hoselitz, as early as 1951, recognized the need
for

F.

a

multifaceted approach to economic development by
posing the following
questi on:
Does economic development mean only a change in
certain
aspects of overt behavior, notably the acquisition of
new
skills or the exercise of new forms of productive
capacity,
or is it accompanied by or contingent upon more
basic changes
in social relations and even the structure of
value and
beliefs of a culture?"!"!
His response was that:

Economic development
implies a rapid, and in a
sense, revolutionary process which, if it is to take root
in a society, must penetrate widely and deeply and hence
affects the social, structural and cultural facets of a
society.
In other words, economic development consists not
merely in a change of production techniques, but also, in
the last resort, in a reorientation of some special norms
and values
Any analysis of economic development
which is to be fruitful and complete must include a set of
propositions relating changes in production techniques to
changes in values. '2
.

.

.

....

As far as political

scientists are concerned, the end result

of changes in values is a reorientation of political norms that would
be conducive to political

development.

With the rising interest in

political development, the academicians have elucidated on the process,
and, as

a

result of differences in experience and approaches, there are

numerous theories and frameworks.

Lucian Pye lists 10 divergent defin-

itions and approaches to the idea of political development used by
social scientists during the last quarter of

a

century.

Pye notes

tnat there are three themes which are basic to most of the theories of

political development.^'^

differentiation.

They include equality, capacity, and

"

"

4

The theme of equality entails "mass participation
and popular

involvement in political activities."

This is practiced by both demo-

cratic and totalitarian systems through mass
mobilization.
the idea of equality infers that "laws should
be of

a

uni

Furthermore,

versalistic

nature, applicable to all and more or less impersonal
in their operation."

Lastly, equality assumes that "recruitment to political
office

should reflect achievement standards of performance and not
the
ascriptive considerations of

a

traditional social system."

Capacity, as the second major theme, "is related to the output
of

a

political system and the extent to which the political system can

affect the rest of the society and economy."

Capacity is closely

associated with governmental performance and the conditions that
affect such performances.

The idea of system capacity primarily

"entails the sheer magnitude, scope, and the scale of political and

governmental performances."

Furthermore, it entails "effectiveness and

efficiency in the execution of public policy" and
"rationality in administration and
pol

i

cy

a

is

related to

secular orientation toward

.

The final theme involves the "differentiation and specialization of structure" in a system.

"Increased functional specificity of

the various political roles within the system" is an obvious result

of differentiation and specialization.

Pye notes that "differentia-

tion is not fragmentation and the isolation of the different parts of
the political system but specialization based on an ultimate sense of

integration.

5

The foregoing themes, as Pye himself
suggests, do not "assert
any particular philosophical orientation
or theoretical framework" but

"isolate those general characteristics of
political development which

seem to be most widely held and most fundamental
in the general
thinking about problems of development."^^
Thus, to initiate political development in

a

society, norms and

values which are held to be conducive to its
realization would have to

become major forces of social change.

Political or civic culture is

the environment in which agents of socialization--i
.e.

beliefs,

,

"attitudes,

and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political

process, and which provide the underlying assumtions and rules
that

govern behavior in the political system" ^^--exist.

Socialization
(1)

is

basically achieved through three agents:

intergenerational communication;

fer of personal duties; and (3)

(2)

impulse control, as trans-

role training.

The first two agents

are regarded as primary, since they, according to Edward Dawson and

Kenneth Prewitt, are "highly personalized and relatively unstructured

relationships. "^7

Role training, however, could be influenced by the

existing institutions instilling beliefs in children through mass communication, schools and other processes.
The role of socializing agents becomes instrumental in social

change when it is viewed in light of the foregoing conceptualization.
To attain

a

be achieved.

total system development, political development must also
Its

realization requires system transformation and social

6

change--i.e., family, peers, school--become crucial
in realization of
the desired end.
In short,

the approach of this inquiry assumes that
"develop-

ment" in its ultimate form requires two symbiotic
elements for it to
be attained and maintained.

called software and hardware

For reason of simplicity, they will be
.

Software refers to social prerequisites

composed of sociological, cultural and psychological, as well
as
political conditions which result in the production of
element.

a

skilled human

Hardware, on the other hand, refers to the material and

physical elements that the human element utilizes to achieve the

desired

end— i.e., economic

growth.

It illustrates that it is not

possible to attain economic growth without first acquiring the software

prerequisites and that the possession of software will ultimately be

translated into economic growth.
Thus, software emerges as the most crucial of the two elements.
The focus of this inquiry will be on this social element with partic-

ular attention to norms and values that promote political development.

The theoretical approach, however, does not promote

socio-cul tural and political orientations.

a total

change in

It provides and insists on

some continuity of the traditional socio-cultural norms but with an

emphasis on rationality and objectivity within the perspective.

Thus,

the inquiry will deal with software that are deemed to be preconditions

of development.

Although political development with emphasis on political
institutions and the role of socialization in the process of change are

7

the main focus of this inquiry, methodological

approaches used by

socio-psychological and sociological studies have been
utilized to
underline their relevance to this concept of software.

For example,

certain socio-psychological norms advanced by David
McClelland have
been found to correlate positively with economic
development.
include:
look.

""^

They

role differentiation, universal ism, and rationality
in out-

These same norms are also put forth by Lucian Pye as the
major

determinants of political development.

The Case Study

.

The Iranian revolution during 1978 and early 1979 which led to
the replacement of monarchy with an Islamic Republic has been per-

ceived by many as

— an

a

turn away from "modernization" and "development"

attempt to return the nation to the Middle Ages.

Such an asser-

tion is fueled by false accounts of the planning and development

process in Iran during the past twenty-five years by the Pahlavi
regime.

It is unconvincing that development and modernization could

cause revolution.

It is

precisely social stagnation and lack of

development that trigger uprisings and cause revolutions.

To argue

that the Iranian revolution was against modernization, one must first

prove that the Shah's regime was

a

modernizing force.

In

light of the

above conceptualization, the discussions in the following chapters will

demonstrate the lack of social development, in particular political
development, which is so crucial in attaining total system development.

8

It was

the government's stated goal for Iran
to reach the same

level of economic development as West Germany
and Japan within a

quarter of

a

century and to become one of the five most
developed

nations on the globe.
in Frances

Fitzgerald's words, as "imported pieces of modern
technology

--a hotel, a hospital,

pieces on

Economic development, however, was perceived,

a

a

steel

monopoly set.''^^

mill-set

up around the country like the

The country also depended on imported

foreign managers and technicians to run and maintain
these pieces of

imported technology.
On the other hand,

the insufficiency of planning in the country

was caused by lack of a system of checks and balances by the
legitimate

institutions whereby "all important numbers, proposals, and judgements
could be exposed to criticism before decisions were made."

The insti-

tutions that could exert external influence on the process of planning

were "extremely weak" and were not given "much recognition. "^1
Furthermore, plans devised by the central government to bring the
country to the threshold of economic development were devised by

"relatively small group of economists and engineers

a

who had little

or no regard for the development of socio-political infra-structure.
In James A.

Bill's words, "what the Shah ha(d) done, in effect, ha(d)

been to encourage enormous economic change and some social change in

order to prevent any basic political change. "^^

Thus, political and

social constraints remained on the system.

The system remained

traditional and absolutist in its outlook.

The political system of the

nation basically consisted of weak institutions built or maintained by

9

the Shah to support and legitimize his
rule.

Although the country had

the oldest existing constitution in the
Middle East, it, nevertheless,

was nothing more than a superflous document.

It was often ignored by

the Shah or, on occasion, was utilized to
serve his purposes.

Although

the Constitution clearly delineated the
roles of the branches of the

government with separation of the executive,
legislative and judiciary
branches, the Shah personally was the omnipotent
power controlling all
three branches.

In short,

the Iranian political process had been

signified, on the one hand, by the extreme weakness of its
institutions
and, on the other, by the dominant control of the
Shah of all its

actions and procedures.
None of the three themes outlined above--equal i
ty
and differentiation--were maintained by the government.

,

capacity

Instead of

a

rational system of planning, there were grandiose and ostentatious

projects.
a

The situation was best pointed out by Amir Taheri, himself

pro-government journalist, who wrote that "an accumulation of discon-

tent with tight control, over-centralization, lack of sufficient open

debate and

a

general feeling that corruption and inefficiency together

with arrogance have struck bureaucracy.'

The economic boom for the

few on the top had caused economic dislocation for the many on the
bottom.

greater.

The economic gap between the rich and the poor was becoming
The promises and hopes that had been instilled by the Shah

and the government could not be fulfilled.

Instead, corruption was

rampant and the system could not be maintained effectively.
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Although the Iranian revolution caught
the West, particularly
the United States, by surprise, the
general social and political dis-

content was evident as early as 1976.

By 1977, even political

repression was unable to slow the rising tides
of anti-government
sentiments.

The revolution of 1978-79 was only the
logical conclusion

to an arrogant system of government that
through co-option, corruption,

and repression had withstood the growing social,
political and economic

pressures.

The swiftness and the ease with which the Shah's rule
came

to an end showed the absence of a reliable base of
power from which he

could rule, despite having been regarded as the ruler of "the
island
of stability" only a year before by President Carter.

The success of

the revolution, furthermore, showed the ineffectiveness of the insti-

tutions which gave lip service to democracy and the Constitution, while

simultaneously aiding the legitimacy of tne monarchy and the rule of
Shah Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi.

The control of the monarch over the

Iranian political institutions rendered them dependent and, thus, to
the polity they were illegitimate and not credible.

As a result,

the

existing institutions were not able to legitimize actions or processes
of the government.
In short,

this present inquiry will attempt to analyze all the

relevant political institutions in respect to their impact on the
political process of the nation.

The case study of Iranian political development is further

elucidated by inquiry into the socialization process which was
attempted through textbooks.

Governments have often used the

n
educational system for purposes of role training
and value transfer.
Since the educational system in Iran is under
direct government control,
it is in a position to disseminate
norms and values favorable to its

objectives through teaching materials, namely
the textbooks.

Text-

books are one of the best examples of such
efforts, since certain

virtues or attitudes can be stressed in the form
of stories, prose or
poetry.

Furthermore, the analysis of the textbooks allows
researchers

from the outside to observe and analyze the norms
and values approved
for dissemination by the government to the students.

The quality of

such values and norms in relation to the diffused support
and approval

for political

institutions is of particular interest to political

scientists.
As the political

system attempts to intervene in the sociali-

zation process through educational systems and mass communication by

instilling highly personalized and relatively unstructured values,
norms, and beliefs in children, there is simultaneously the intergen-

erational transmission of values over which the government has no
control.

Family is the agent best able to influence and instill

personalized and unstructured values in children.

In the final

segment

of this inquiry, attempts are made to study the values and orientations

attained by high school students after eight years of education under
the influence of socialization norms which the Ministry of Education

had emphasized in the textbooks.

The analysis will display the level

of support or lack of it for the Shah's government during the rel-

atively calmer days of early 1978.

This is followed by the analysis
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of the values and orientations of
the parents

and

the students with

and eye to finding similarities and
differences between the two, and

of the influence that intergenerational
transmission of values has on
the process of political change.

Contents of the Inquiry

.

This present study is divided into three
main sections.

Sec-

tion One deals with political institutions
and is composed of three

chapters.

Chapter

I

deals with the Iranian political culture and
the

position that the institution of monarchy had
attained within the
cultural framework.

The chapter also deals with weaknesses and criti-

cism of the institution of monarchy.

Chapter

II

is

basically concerned

with the prevailing institutions during the Pahlavi
monarchy-- their
strength and weaknesses.

Chapter III discusses the concept of individ-

ualism and its place in the possible course of political developments.
Section Two is composed of two chapters and deals with the
Iranian educational system as an agent of political socialization.

Chapter IV deals with the foundation of the modern educational system
in Iran and its

Chapter
school

V

is

Farsi

relevance to the process of political development.

basically the content analysis of elementary and grade
texts used during the Shah's regime, with an eye to the

major norms and values implicit in the readers.
Section Three is composed of five chapters and is composed

basically of the results from the analysis of parent-student data.

Chapter VI is concerned with the theoretical framework for the analysis
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of intergenerational transmission of
values.

Chapter VII deals with

public policy attitudes of respondents in
regard to the role of govern-

ment and the level of socio-political
toleration.

Chapter VIII

discusses political participation, dealing
with the respondents

interest in passive and active political
participation and their
level of political efficacy/inefficacy.

dents'

Chapter

Chapter IX consists of respon-

attitudes to items delineating political
trust/distrust.
X

is

the discussion of the socio-cul tural orientations
of

the respondents and its impact on their political
perspectives.

Fianlly, the discussions are concluded with

a

summary of the

analysis and an examination of the findings in relation to
the stated
thesis.

.

.

FOOTNOTES

^Gamal Abdal-Nasser, Egypt's Liberation
(Washington:

1955).

^Michel Aflag, Fi Sabil al-Ba ath al-Ara bi
(On the
to Arab
^^^^ ^°
^^^"^
^ road
^
Renaissance), (Baghdadl
]953Y.
.

-^^"^

1336 sh/1957)/^'''^'''

^What is Revolution),

(Tehran:

Ihe_j tages of Economic Growth: A Non-Co mmunist
Cambridge University Press, 1963)"!

M
y^]h
Manifesto
(New York:

^Gustav Ranis, "Economic Growth," Encyclopedia of Social
~"
Sciences vol III, p. 415.
_

,

^^^"^'^^

incoN
1958)

Lerner, The_Passing of Traditional Society (New York:

—

^Edward Shils, Political Development in the New States (the

Hague:

1966).

^Bert F. Hoselitz, "Non-economic Barriers to Economic Development," Economic Development and Cultural Change vol. I,
(1952), pp.
,

8- 21

^Max Millikan and Donald Blackmer, The Emerging Nations (Boston:

—

1961).

"lOlucian Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston:
and Brown, 1966), p. 33.

llBe rt Hoselitz,

p.

Little

8.

12ibid.

^\ucian Pye,

33-45.

pp.

^^Ibid., pp 45-48.
^^Ibid.
1 fi

Sciences
^

Lucian
,

vol

W.

Pye,

XII,

p.

"Political Culture," Encyclopedia of Social
218.

'^Edward Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt,

(Boston:

Little, Brown and Company, 1969),
14

Political Socialization ,
p.

100.

9

David McClelland, T he. Achievi ng Socipty
(Princeton^^rinceton.

ton University Press,
1

Times

,

igeiTT^^TTTt^ig:

Pye, As sets of Political

Prinrp
Prince-

DevPln pmpnt, pp. 45.48.

^^Frances Fitzgerald, "The Shah Discovers
His People,"
tupie,
i>|ew
New
(December 11
1978).
,

21

George Baldwin, Planning and Developme nt
in
Iran ^tJaitimore
(Baltimore
^^^-^
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967),
191!
p!

^^Ibid.,

p.

192.

'""^

(Winteri979),V^327:
24

.

cited in James

A.

Bill, p. 331.

-tei^ilAtfairs

PART

I

POLITICAL CULTURE AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

16

CHAPTER

I

POLITICAL CULTURE AND TRADITION

Political institutions have become an
inseparable part of the

process of political development.
political

In Samuel

Huntington's words,

institutions enable the more "complex and heterogeneous"

societies to maintain order and aid in establishment
of the political
community.

Political institutions develop as

result of competing

a

social conflicts and of "the gradual development
of procedures and

organizational devices for resolving those disagreements."

In short,

only simple societies can exist without "highly
differentiated political

institutions."

The more complex

a

society becomes, the more it

demands action and maintenance by political institutions.^
ton's assertion of the significance of political

Hunting-

institutions

immediately gives away, in many modernizing societies, to

a

sense of

confusion and schizophrenia on the part of the political leadership.
The problem, also recognized by Huntington himself, involves the

dichotomy between the concept of constitutionalism inherent in the

development of political institutions and reformism which often

contradictory to the will of the majority in
society.

a

is

traditionally oriented

A prerequisite for modernization is consolidation of power

and creation of an effective bureaucracy.

Thus, modernization not

only requires "a shift in power from regional, aristocratic, and
17
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religious groups to central secular,
national institutions, but also
the centralization of authority in
a single individual within
those

institutions."

The endeavors of

modernizing monarch, however, are

a

opposed by the religious and aristocratic
opponents whose independence

would be seriously challenged by

strong central authority.

a

To pre-

serve the traditional balance of power
within the nation and their

privileged position, as traditional as they may
be, their interests

eventually would lead them to promote modern ideals
of liberty and

constitutionalism and

a

could potentially attain

representative form of government whereby they
a

position of influence vis-a-vis the monarch

and his ambitions of reform and political modernization.^
This dilemma of reformism vs.

phenomenon.

is

not a recent

Huntington uses several examples, among them Alexander

of Russia, Mahmud

Hungary.

constitutionalism

II

of the Ottoman Empire, and Joseph

II

II

of Austria-

These reformist leaders tried to introduce changes into their

realms by attempts to subordinate the traditional mode of the society.

Joseph

II

promoted secularism in place of the overwhelming influence of

the church.

Among many reforms, he instituted equal protection of the

law to all, opened up the civil

service to all citizens, and issued

a

kind of land reform whereby the peasants would own their own lands and
keep most (70 percent) of their income.^

Mahmud

II

decided on centralization of the political power in

his own hands and thereby became "the sole source of authority in the

Empire."^

Such quests often led to the dispossession of power from the

traditional political sector-- i .e.

,

the nobility and the church groups—

^
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to a central

national bureaucracy.

often proved unpopular.

Reforms from above, however,
most

The opposition often took the form
of

a

constitutionalist movement whereby the
powers of the monarch would be
restrained.
Opposition to Sultan Abdulmajid, Mahmud
II 's successor
and also

with

a

a

reformist monarch, hoped to replace "the
Ottoman absolutism

constitutional system" and, in doing so,
enlisted the support

of the clergy.

It was argued that the Sultan's
reforms had displaced

the traditional order and had ignored
the religious laws and regulations.

It was also argued that the Sultan
should re-establish the

representative bodies that had been abolished.

Tzar Alexander

II

confronted similar sentiments when his

reforms began to undermine the influence of the
aristocracy.

nobility asked for
ial

power.

a

The

national assembly with the aim of limiting imper-

In short,

opposition to reforms in many instances took

the posture of "modern liberalism and traditional
pluralism."

der

II

Alexan-

opposed constitutionalism since he believed it was intended to

establish an oligarchical political system which would not have served
the interests of the serfs in Russia.'^

Huntington recognizes the dilemma of
is

a

reformist monarch who

caught in the contradiction that while the institution of monarchy

remains highly traditional, his policies are modernizing.

scribes centralization as vital for reforms.

He pre-

He suggests that in the

face of an opposition by vested interests, which utilizes the combination of modern constitutionalism with traditional pluralism,

a

reform-

ist monarch should enlist support from both traditional and modernized
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sources.

Tnree of these support sources are
bureaucracy, the middle

class, and the masses of population
which benefit from the reforms
of
the monarch.
A fourth support source,
Huntington suggests, could be

from outside the boundaries of the
political entity in the form of

support by

a

foreign government.^

Huntington's stipulations are quite
interesting, particularly
due to their apparent failure in
maintaining the Shah's political

fortunes.

A guick glance at the Shah's political
approach reveals that

he may have been moved by Huntington's
prescriptions because he did

attempt to enlist the support of the middle
class, the bureaucracy and
the farmers.

As will

be discussed,

such

a

strategy proved largely

unsuccessful due to the socio-cul tural and political
context from

which the Shah operated.
It is with an understanding of the existing
problems facing the

developing nations that aspire for political development,
but whose
efforts are thwarted by the traditional elements inherent in
such

societies that this present inquiry attempts to search for the significance of education on development of political values that would aid

modernization.
first demands

A discussion of the Iranian political system, however,
a

historical analysis, particularly with reference to the

impact of religion on the political process.^

Religion and Political Culture.

The impact that the ulama (Arabic word for the high clergy)
have had on modern Iran has little parallel

in other Middle Eastern

s
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countries.

UJama were instrumental in promulgation of
the Constitution

of 1906-07^° and then were supportive
of Mohammad-Ali Shah when he

opposed it in 1908-09 J

1

Promotion of monarchy in 1925 by the ulama,

instead of republicanism as first entertained
by Reza Khan, was
essential in establishment of the Pahlavi dynasty.

The ulama were

again in the forefront of Reza Shah's
opposition, denouncing his

authoritarianism and anti-Islamic undertakings.
In essence,

the Islamic tradition does not distinguish
between

the political

and religious life of the community.

the political

and the spiritual

Mohammad was both

leader of the Moslems.

The tradition

was followed by the four Rashedeen Caliphs (632-661
A.D.). the Ummay-

yeds (661-750), and the Abbassids (750-1258).^'^

Soon after Mohammad'

death however, a rift developed as to the "rightful" successor
to the

Prophet.

The Shiah espoused the institution of

Imamat

,

whereby

descendants of the Prophet, through his daughter Fatima and her husband
Ali, were upheld as the legitimate heirs to the Prophet.

claimants to

Imamat were espoused,

Although many

the doctrine that became dominant

and subsequently the state religion in Iran during the Safavid period

(1502-1722) was Ithna-ashari

(belief in twelve imams).

Imam is

a

title

for the man who is the divinely appointed guide of the community.
is

acknowledged as the first imam.

son, Hassan, became the imam.

younger brother, Hussein.

Ali

At his death (661 A.D.), his eldest

He was succeeded at his death by his

Hussein's rivalry with the Ummayyed Caliph,

Yazied, and his martyrdom by the latter'

s

troops in Karbala in 680 is

regarded as the most significant event in Shiah history.

^
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Imams

became "the symbol of recurring demands
for Utopian

justice and equality. "^^

The succession of imams continued
until Mahdi,

the twelfth imam, disappeared in infancy.

In Shiah doctrine he lives

and continues as imam though he is hidden
from view.

known as gheybat-e-Kobra (The Great Occulation)

The doctrine of Occultation has had

development of Shiah political philosophy.

a

.

This situation is

^

profound impact on the

In Hamid Algar's words,

"To the Imam alone, divinely protected
against sin and error, belongs
all

the legitimate rule.

The political vocation of the Imams was con-

tinuously frustrated and with the occultation

.

.

.

even the possibil-

ity of the legitimate exercise of power disappeared
from the world. "^^

The Ithna-ashari doctrine, thus, legitimized no true
authority while
the Imam was hidden.

The "shadow of illegitimacy" bound all worldly

guests, in particular those related to government.

This inescapable

and necessary illegitimacy of the state has remained the
fundamental

element of Ithna-ashari political doctrine.
In short,

as

a

result of the doctrine of Occultation, the Shiah

political culture was inherently one of lack of respect, contempt,

and/or opposition/non-cooperation towards constituted political authority.

Nevertheless, there existed
of temporal powers.

In W.

a

justification for the existence

Montgomery Watt's words:

Those who believe in the hidden Imam are not required to do
anything in the immediate future, not even to work for any
particular reform. At the same time it is implied that the
regime is not perfect, and the way is left open for action
at some future date.
Such an attitude might often be
politically harmless, but there lurked in it a potential

1
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danger
A change of circumstances might
suggest to the
adherents of the movement that the time
for action had
come
Although the establishment of Shi 'ism as
the state religion by
the Safavids in the 16th century was

"the essense of Shi 'ism demands

a

a

contradiction in terms since

minority status for its adherents who

are in opposition, often quiescent but
unyielding, to de facto author-

ity." 2
II

It,

nevertheless, gave rise to two fundamental elements:

(1)

Iran became the homeland for the Shiah and
was "inalienably associated"

with it; and (2)
of ulama.

it served as the departure point for
the existence

Thus, under the Safavids began "an official
clergy, exclu-

sively concerned with legality and jurisprudence,
to such

a

point that

original Shi 'ism, in its essense, gnostic and theosophic,
has, so to
speak, to hide itself. "^^

The ulama served

a

direction to the community.

practical function as the guide in giving
"The ulama were," in Algar's words, "in

a

limited sense, intermediaries between the community and the (Hidden)
Imam."

In addition to belief in God and Prophet,

shared by all Moslems,

the Shiah was required to believe in Imamat , presently embodied in

adherence and loyalty to the Hidden Imam.
Imam, the mujtahids

In

the absense of the Hidden

(the most learned and pious of the ulama )

"provided

II

immediate guidance in matters of practice.

Consequently, the commun-

ity divided "into those who may act according to their own judgement
(

mujtahid ) and those who must accept the judgement of others

(mugallids)".

^

of mujtahids

promoted by the Usuli ulama

,

The concept of

i

jtehad (competence in religious law)
,

was opposed by the Akhbari

.
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school.

Mhbari^were

the dominant theological school
from the fall

of the Safavids to early Qajar, during
the 18th century.

They asserted

that religious competence was within
the authority of Imams.

They

refuted the utility of nujtahids and
vied to restrict the role of
clergy "both doctrinally and practically."

with using

a

The mujtahids. were charged

Sunni process of rationalism, embodied
in the concept of

a£l (exertion of the reason) instead of the preferred
na^I (transmitted
doctrine).

The Akhban controversy is the major attempt
from within

the ranks of the ulama to suppress the
role of the mujtahids

,

particu-

larly in their function as the legitimate
source of guidance and thus
the link between the Hidden Imam and the Ummah
(community of
bel ievers

)

With the exile of Mirza Mohammad, the last well known
Akhbari

,

to the holy shrines in Iraq in the 1820s, the last
vestige of Akhbari sm

was removed from Iran.^^

Baghir Behbahani

Some two decades earlier, Agha Mohammad

(1705-1803) had uprooted the Akhbari influence from

the shrines in Iraq.

The success of the Usuli

ulama in suppression of

the Akhbari doctrine enabled the "institution of mujtahid

and to lead the community in the period of Qajar rule."
the Usuli

to survive

Furthermore,

insistence on the concept of the link with the Hidden Imam

"provided for

a

greater flexibility of the doctrine and

continuous leadership of the believers. "^^

a

living,

The predominance of the

ujama in the life of the state during the Qajar period (1779-1925) was

further enhanced by the twin elements of weak Qajar monarchs whose
political power hardly reached

beyond the boundaries of their
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capital, and the oft mentioned concept
of '-illegitimacy of the
state"
in the absence of the Hidden
Imam.
In fact, according to the
dominant

Usuli doctrine, the monarch, like his subjects,
was required "to
submit to the authoritative guidance
of

a

mujtehid and in effect to

make the state the executive branch of
ulama authority. "^8
theoretical duty, however, was seldom
realized.

Instead

a

This

tension

remained between the monarch and the ulama
which at times gave way to
open hostility.

This was best exemplified by the Tobacco
Rebellion of

1891 when a fatwa

(religious decree) was given by the nations's
leading

mujtehjds against the use of tobacco in any form
since it had been
given as

a

monopoly to

a

British firm.^^

The forbidding of the use of

tobacco compelled Nasser al-Din Shah to revoke
the monopoly of the
Imperial Tobacco Corporation.
in

Furthermore, the participation of the ulama

the Constitutional Revolution is also regarded
as

a

further attempt

by the clergy to limit the power of the monarch.
It has been only during the present century that titles
have

become popular among the clergy.

Prior to the Twentieth Century,

Sheikh and Mulla were the main titles used by the Shiah clergy.

The

multitudes of titles and their inclusion in the names of the clergy
results in much confusion since the titles that were used by marga-

taghleed only
humble clergy.

a

few decades ago are presently used by some of the more

The following is a somewhat general categorization of

of titles that are presently used by the Shiah clergy:
At the lower end of the scale is the mullah, an Islamic
priest or preacher.
The term is also the generic name applied
to Moslem clergyman
generally.
.

.

.
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The more learned mullahs are
called hoiatole^lam
roughly meaning "vicar of Islam."
They ^THiufflf^en
who have completed higher theological
courses nd can
some expertise in religious law.
Next comes the ayatollah or
"reglection of Allah "
These holy men are regarded as
authorities on religious
law
teach advanced theological courses
and receive major
donations from the faithful.
then ayatoVlahs, multiplied so rapidly
that an
appellation was required
During
'thri^^r/^'H^'^'^'j'^
the last few decades) a few of
the most learned, pios and
''''' of
or

Lst

^

•

.

.

...tollaL^

grand^a;^tS^?a^T'

Presently mMja-taghJeed are referred to
as ayatollah al-ozma

Although there still remains

ayatplMs

a

.

dispute as who the more prominent

or ayatollah al-ozma are, clearly
Ayatollah Khomeini and

Ayatollah Seyyed Kazem Shari atmadari are the
most eminent among them.
The ulam have hardly been

a

homogeneous group.

Binder has

distinguished three different orientations among
the ulama during the
first two decades of the present century.
The first group adjusted their allegiance to whoever
was in power.
The second group compelled the enactment of
constitutional provisions prohibiting legislation contrary
to the ruling of the general agency, as represented
by five
officially designated mujtahids, and they also prevented
Reza Shah from establishing a republic.
It was the third
group that became the most vigorous reformers, changing
their turbans for hats and taking government jobs, or going
into exile for extremist political activity.
One of the
latter, Sayyid Zia al-Din, led the coup that eventually
put Reza Shah in power. 32

Following the abdication of Reza Shah and as

a

secular and anti-clerical policies, the ulama opted for
control of the affairs of the state.

reaction to his
a

greater

The young Mohammad-Reza Shah,

eager for help and support from any quarter, cooperated with them and
it was during this period that Qum flourished as a main seat of the
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ulama, competing with holy shrines
in Iraq as the center of
Shiah

activity.
With the new shah in control of
the political situation, his

attempts at secular modernization
caused
and the government to develop.

a

new rift between the clergy

The conflict, percipitated by the

announcement of the six point referendum,
including land reforms and

emancipation of women, reached its zenith
during the June 1963 riots
during which many were killed.^^

The government contended that the

clashes were caused by reactionary elements
who opposed the reforms

undertaken by the government.

The religions opposition, however, based

their opposition to the Shah on his dictatorial
and undemocratic rule.
The reforms did in fact threaten the position
and influence of the

clergy and other traditional centers of power.

The reforms when imple-

mented would expand the central government's reach
to all levels of
the society and thus undermine the position and influence
of the

traditional forces.

For example, the mandatory standardization and

use of textbooks by the Ministry of Education gave the government

free hand in selection of topics to be included in the readers.
such, the government gained

a

a

As

position of influence in effecting the

socialization process of school children.

The Literacy Corps, as

a

fundamental basis of the Shah's reforms, was to replace the traditional
modes of education, generally Quaranic, with

secular education.

a

clergy, in the statement of Ayatollah Brujerdi

,

The

had indicated their

OA

opposition to land reforms.

Although it was pointed out by the

supporters of the clergy that the ulama did not oppose land reforms

in
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PmcMe,

there was perhaps some element of
fear that the

vac|f

(religious endowment) lands may be included
in the reforms.

Although the clergy are sometimes
referred to as an institution, the term may cause some confusion,
particularly when compared
to the Roman Catholic Church or even
Protestant churches.

above, the uiama are not a homogeneous
group.

As noted

They are not organized

along established hierarchical patterns
with one of the ulama as the

supreme leader.

The ithna::ash^ Shiah, by the virtue
of UsuJl doc-

trine, which upholds the ulama as the
intermediaries between the

Hidden Imam and the ummah

,

establishes

a

foundation for ijtehad

(competence in religious law) through which the ummah
is provided with

immediate guidance in religious practice.

These religious guides came

to be known as marja- taghleed (source of
immitation).

was neither appointive or elective.

A marja- taghleed gained such

status through piety and competence in Islamic law.

follwing caused as

a

The position
a

The popular

result of his puplic fame would dictate his pos-

ition as a marja- taghleed

.

Such a process, however, often resulted in

the existence of several marja-taghleed at any given time.

Only

a

few

marja- taghleed had universal preeminence, and they were acknowledged as
such by the overwhelming majority of the Ithna-ashari Shiahs as their

marja-taghleed
As

in

.

Qajar period, there were clergy who were courted by the

monarch and in return gave their support to the regime and its policies.
Such clergy had gathered around the Imam Jumeh of Tehran (the formal

leader of ulama in any given town who also lead the Friday prayer).
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The Pahlavi monarchs, like the
Qajar monarchs, had reserved the

appointment of

imMtJi^

as

their perogati ve. ^5

jhe more prominent

of the ujama, however, resided
in Qum and Mashad and pursued
an inde-

pendent line from that of the government.

Ayatollah Khomeini, one of

these ulama, bitterly opposed the Shah
and the institution of monarchy.
The Shah reportedly had denounced the
ulama who had resisted submission
to his rule and had called them
parasites.

reacted by noting, "Am

I

a

Ayatollah Khomeini had

parasite, and men like me such as (Ayatol-

lah) Burujirdi, who was sixty thousand
tumans

(over $8,500) in debt

when he died, or these students who survive
on
tumans (less than $5) a month?

a

stipend of thirty

Or are you, 0 Shah, the parasite, who

has erected towering palaces and filled foreign
banks with your untold

wealth?"^^
The Shah's frontal attack on the ulama was contrasted with
his

frequent and well publicized trips to the holy Shiah shrines
within
the country.
in Mecca.

He also travelled to the most holy of the Islamic shrines

A picture of him the white shroud, praying in Kg ba ,

prominantly displayed in many shops and offices.

On formal

was

occasions

of salaam (audiences where representatives of the nation paid homage to
the Shah), the ulama were ushered in first to the royal presence to

display the high regard of the monarch for the institution of religion.

Attempts were made to represent to the public eye

a

cohesive bond

between the Shah and the ulama in order to legitimize the Shah's rule
as

one in conformity with Shiah doctrine.

became

a

Although such pretensions

part of the tradition of royal salaams

,

there never was

a
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cohesion between the clergy and the
court.37
in

uUma participating

The

salaam ceremonies were usually
those who had gathered around
Dr.

Imami, the

Imam^JL^

of Tehran.

distance from tne court. 38

The independent ulama kept their

fact, the Shah seldom visited Qum

which was only ICQ miles south of
Tehran but was
ulama and

a

center of opposition to his rule.

January 1979, it had been

a

full

a

stronghold of the

When he fled Iran in

twenty years since he had been in Qum.

Modernization and Political Culture

.

Nasser al-Din Shah, who ruled Iran during the
second half of
the 19th Century, had made three trips to
Europe and had embarked on

some measures of westernization in Iran,
particularly in the early

years of his rule.

The first railroad was built and the first tele-

graph lines established in Iran during his reign.

He also undertook

some political changes in his administration, namely
the establishment

of the first cabinet whose members were directly responsible
to the

person of the Shah.

The Shah was also influenced by the thought of

Mirza Malkulm Khan, whose writings and thoughts were of some influence
on the Constitutional Movement.

Mirza Malkum Khan (1834-1914), born

in the Julfa district of Isfahan,

studying political science.

spent most of his youth in Paris

Mirza, who purportedly had converted

to Islam, after his return to Iran enjoyed the confidence of the Shah

and became a member of his dowreh (circle of confidents) .^^

Mirza

espoused political and economic reorganization of Iran along Western
lines.

His modernization concepts were first spelled out in his
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^<ltlbche::i^^^

(1858).

According to Hamid

Algar, the first mention of sanun
(law) in its sense of law, in
modern
Persian literature, was in this book.
In KUabche::^^^
Mirza

Malkum attempted "to define the essential
functions of the state and
to regulate the relation of its
component organs."

In his

Daftari

Qanun (1883), Mirza proposed the codification
of the Shari'a (religious
law)

to make it "the law of the state in
the same way" that the states

of Europe have codified their laws and
drawn up

a

Quran for them-

selves."^^
While in Europe Mirza Malkum Khan had also learned
of the

Freemasonary movements and their impact on the French
Revol ution.
So, on his

return to Iran he had established a 'pseudo-masonic
lodge'

called Faramoush khaneh

(House of Forgetful ness

) ,

hoped to propagate social and political teachings.

through which he had

Naser al-Din Shah

was led to believe that Faramoushkaneh would result in his members

being morally bound to the throne by having sworn fidelity
to the Shah

who had become the Grand Master of the lodge.

By 1861, however,

Shah had become suspicious of the aims of Mirza.

the

Fearing the growing

number of secret societies, he forbade the continuation of the society.
Mirza's political and social activities, however, surfaced in the form
of Majma-i Adamiyat (League of Humanity) which became a center of

dissemination of news and ideas.

Many leading citizens, including the

clergy, purportedly had joined this group and several were among those

elected to the first Majlis in 1906.^^
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Due to the perceived excesses of
the Shah, the last decade of
the 19th Century experienced

of the monarch.

a

move to curtail the authoritarian
rule

While the religious elements feared
the reforms and

Westernization that had already been
undertaken by the Shah, the
liberals urged faster and more radical
reforms.

The Tobacco Protest,

as noted above, was the first major
challenge of those who wished to

limit the powers of the Shah.
set in motion
1906-07.

a

Nikki

The successful outcome of the challenge

movement that bore fruit in the Constitution
of
Keddie asserts that it was exactly such
threats of

Westernization or "Western-inspired secularization"
that inspired the
ulama to partake in the constitutional movement,

he notes that the

ulama were partly led "by their belief that it
would further enhance

their power" to support

a

modern consti tuti on.

minded clergy, led by Sheikh Nuri

,

The traditional

believed that they could influence

the outcome of the constitutional movement by making
Sharia
tial

part of the new constitution.

Keddie'

s

a

substan-

assertion, in fact,

supports Huntington's assumption, discussed earlier, which
stipulates
that the traditionalist elements in countries ruled by reformist
monarchs tend to support

a

constitutionalist framework embodied in the

precepts of "modern liberalism and traditional pluralism."^''
The Constitutional Movement was not free from foreign influence

while the British implicitly supported the movement, the Russians
opposed it and gave their support to the Qajar monarchs.
of little surprise to see the Constitutionalists stage

a

Thus it was

sit-in at the

shrine in Rey in 1904 to demand the dismissal of two pro-Russian
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ministers, Amin ol-Doleh and Ala ol-Doleh,
and to see the establishment
of the House of Justice. ^8

When Mozafa al-Din Shah's
(1896-1907)

promises concerning liberalization
were not kept, some 15,000 merchants
in July 1906 converged on the
British Legation in Tehran and
staged
a

sit-in on its grounds.

The clergy, on the other hand,
undertook

procession to the holy city of Qum.
iMozafar al-Din Shah,

It was

reluctantly, on August

a

under such pressures that
5,

1906 granted a consti-

tution.

Following the success of the Constitutionalists,

a

rift between

the ulama and the Western- inspired
Constitutionalists developed.

The

dispute was briefly muted by the promulgation
of the Supplementary
Fundamental Law in 1907 that recognized Shiah Islam
as the state

religion and promised

a

council composed of five mujtahids to super-

vise over legislation to ensure that all laws passed
were in accordance

with Islam. 50

This submission to the will of the ulama fell far short

of the expectation of such previously leading members of the
Constitu-

tionalist Movement at Sheikh Fazl-ol-lah Nuri who began to turn

Mohammad Ali Shah (1907-1909) against the Constitution and Majlis.

Mohammad Ali Shah, who had become the Shah following his father's death,
sought to reinstate the authoritative rule of the kings.

He had the

support of the Russians and the Russian trained Qazak soldiers of his
army.

It was

in June

1908, that, with the Shah's acquiescence. Colonel

Liakhov, Commander of the Qazak forces, shelled the Majlis.

The coup

had the support of Sheikh Nuri and other anti-constitutionalists.
was on the triumphant return of the Constitutionalists to Tehran in

It

34

in

1909, and the exile of Mohammad-Al

i

Shah to Russia, that the
Sheikh

was arrested and hanged for treason
and for attempting to stop
the

constitutional process in the country.
Sheikh Nuri had insisted that the
constitutionalists adopt

Sharia (the Law of Islam) as the law
of the state while many of the
leading ul^ama, Mulla Mahmmad-Kazem
Khorasani, Mulla Abdullah

Mazandarani, and Hajji Mirza Hussein Khalili
Tehrani

,

all

residing in

Iraq, contended that "consistent
implementation of the Sharia was

impossible during the continued occulatation of
the Imam."^^
Nuri

5^^.^^

considered neither the monarch nor the people as
sovereign but

lent his support to Mohammad-Al

i

Shah when he found the nation

"threatened with Western secularism.

The events during the first

decade of the Twentieth Century and the recent Iranian
revolution led
by Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini have many similarities.

Ayatollah

Khomeini, by his insistence on the establishment of an
Islamic Republic,
has demonstrated his contempt for Western inspired
secularism and his

belief that the Sharia affords tne best possible framework for an
Islamic Iran.

53

Ayatollah Khomeini's approach, however, differed from

that of Sheikh Nuri since the Ayatol

1

ah appealed to popular support for

the establishment of his "Islamic Republic," once again confirming the

stipulation that the traditional political elements vastly utilize
"modern liberalism and traditional popularism" to confront secular

socio-political movements.
In analysis of the socio-political

tradition in Iran, it is

fundamental to recognize the impact of Shiah thought on the political
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perspective of the citizens.

While ignoring the influence
of Shiah

tradition on the political process of
the country, analyses instead
often focus on the criticism of
Iranians for their cynicism,
basic
disloyalty to the state, resentment
towards authority, antiintellectual ism, and scorn for conventional
morality.54

Amin Banani

goes even further and criticizes
"inept monarchs (who) chose to share

their power with the assembly of Shiah
divines" thus leading to paralysis of "every source of cultural
Iran. "5^

vitality and intellectual vigor in

Thus, the concenpt of "illegitimacy of
state" in the absence

of the Hidden Imam seldom enters
analyses of the political process in
Iran by political scientists.

The monarchs during the past century

have rare^y utilized the bond between the
ulama and the people for

national development schemes.

Instead, they have sought to use the

ulama and religion for personal gains.

In

1924-26, Reza Shah partici-

pated in mourning processions during Ashura to allay
the fear of the
"^Q*""^

the public so he could accede to the throne, while
Mohammad-

Reza Shah in the early parts of his reign tried to gain
the favor of
the ulama for his rule by courting them.

Both monarchs, however, at

the height of their power ignored the enormous support and the legiti-

macy that the ulama

,

at least the moderate ones, could give to their

rules and the support to their reforms and modernization schemes.
a

Such

cooperation may have been possible if the conduct of the affairs of

state had taken into consideration some Islamic-Shiah precepts.

Mohammad-Reza Shah, instead, deployed religous symbolism and
of divine mission for his rule to gain legi timacy.

a

sense

The Shah even had
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visions of building "the faith in
the way the Prophet really
meant the
religion to be,"57
-g^^^.^^
^^^^ ^^^^
^^^^^^

between the state and religion did
not lie in the Islamic precepts
but
in the Shiah tradition of
mina::ash^ doctrine. It is worth noting
that it is this doctrine of "illegitimacy"
of temporal powers that is

related to mystic allusions which suggest
"that the inner light

important than the law. which is described
as the shell.
shell

is broken and the kernel

is

is

more

Once the

taken out, one is apt to become

somewhat careless about the care of the
shell. "^^

Although Sufism has

not been confined to Iran, nevertheless,
it is held as the "supreme

manifestation of the Persian mind in the religious
sphere. "^^
The above analysis depicts the historical
conflict between the

state and all institutions emanating from this temporal
power and the

community of believers led by the ulama in the
absence of the Hidden
Imam.

Based on such

a

tradition, the Constitution of 1906-07 was only

to be tolerated but was not to replace the Laws of
Islam.

Such a

tolerance on the part of the community did not support nor give
legitimacy to political institutions that would have been the natural

outcome of the implementation of the Constitution.^^

seemed to be

a

lingering contradiction between Shiah tradition and the

theories that espoused secular political development.
as

Thus, there

In

other words,

long as there was no social, cultural or institutional change,

there could not be any real development of political institutions.

Despite the dichotomy between the concept of political state
and the Ithna-ashari doctrine, there is

a

wealth of literature on the
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conduct of statesmanship by monarchs.

iiasatnameh by Khawjeh Nizam-al-Mul
Iskandar.61

There is

a

k

The most important of these
are
and

Musnameh

by Kaikavous ibn-

strong tradition demanding
responsibility from

the person of the king while
exacting subordination from the
community
to a "just"

earth.

king.

A just king was regarded as
the shadow of God on

Wayne Untereiner on the obligation of

a

ruler and the ruled

within the Iranian political perspective
declares:
The primary responsibility of a good
political authority
was to do 5ood things (not only political
things) for the
people (as determined by the political
authority).
In
return, the people would appreciate what
the authority
did for them, and in consequence would
support the
political authority.
In order to carry out this political
responsibility, political authority must lead the
people
and clarify the public will, providing the
people with
supervi sed guidance and outlining popular
duties 62
.

Thus, the wholesale criticism of the cultural
tradition of the

country for all the shortcomings of the development
of political
institutions and of the citizens for their political inefficacy
is

rather unjustified.^^

During the past fifty years, the activist

reformers, in Huntingtonian guise, who espoused transformation
of traditional societies into modern political states, were less than
sincere
in their stated goals.

upheld as

a

Reza Shah, the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty,

modernizing monarch by Huntington,

did not attempt to

create political institutions nor did he surround himself with distin-

guished advisors.

His son, Mohammad- Reza,

later lamented his father's

style, noting his narrow and undistinguished circle of advisors as
"one of the few mistakes my father made."^^

ulated

a

fortune through

a

Reza Shah instead accum-

mixture of forced gifts:

"cheap
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acquisitions and expropriations,"
mostly in land.

Marvin Zonis states

that by the time of Reza Shah's
abdication the royal holdings
were
2,000 villages with approximately a
quarter of a million peasants
"in
the direct service of His
Imperial Majesty ^ua landlord."
Thus it was
not surprising to learn of
peasant revolts following Reza
Shah's abdication calling for restoration of
their properties.

For
Iran,

a

proper analysis of the need for
political development in

it is essential

to add the additional

socio-economic condition of the country.

dimension of the present

The socio-economic stratifi-

cation of the nation, accelerated
during the past quarter of

a

century,

resulted in the expansion of the middle
class and thus intensified the
demands on the political system.

At the turn of the century, some 80

percent of the population lived in rural
areas.

Agriculture and

related works, as recently as 1960, accounted
for 28 percent of the
gross domestic product.

areas^9

Today, half of the population live in urban

agriculture accounts for only nine percent of the
gross

domestic product,

although nearly 40 percent of the national labor

force is employed in this sector.^""

The agricultural sector since 1960

has realized the slowest rate of growth per
annum compared to the other

sectors of economy.

While agriculture had achieved

a

five percent

growth rate per year between 1970 to 1976, industry,
trade, constuction
and transportation had gained a growth rate of
6.6, 14.4, 15.3 and 18.4

respectively.
While income per capita had grown from $176 per year in 1960 to

over $2,000 in 1977, its distribution was far from equitable.

While

farm families in places such as Baluchistan Province subsisted on $200
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per year, the wealth of the economic
elite of the nation grew to
phenomenal proportions.
These developments have further
increased
economic stratification in the nation,
resulting in different or even

opposing demands on the political
system.
The middle class, or, as James A.
Bill Calls it, the

"professional-bureaucratic intelligentsia,"
influenced by Western-style
education and secular tendencies and
exposed to varying degrees of
Western philosophies, prefers

a

more open political system with
little

of the dogma present in the traditional
systems. ^4

jhis concept of

liberalism, however, is immediately confronted
by at least two contra-

dictory principles; on the one hand, the
concept of traditional

pluralism and the promotion of Sharia used by the
ulama and their
supporters to offset Western secularism, and, on the
other hand, the

authoritarian rule of kings, espoused by Shah Mohammad
Reza Pahlavi.
These three principles, moreover, have found

a

common opponent in the

Marxian ideology adhered to by the more radical
elements of the intelligentsia.

The political history of Iran during the present
century

can best be analyzed in retrospect to these four
principles.

The

political history of the nation, furthermore, for over half of the

period since the inception of

a

constitutional government in 1906, has

been manifested in the direct and personal authoritarian rule of two

monarchs, Reza Shah and Mohammad-Reza Shah.
to discuss

Perhaps it would be best

the development or lack of development of political

insti-

tutions in relation to the political style of these two monarchs

contrasted against the political process envisioned by the constitution
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A discussion of the institution
of monarchy at this juncture
would

provide us with an instight for
the following discussions on
political
institutions.

Monarchy

.

Although

a

constitutional monarchy was proclaimed
through the

Revolution of 1906, it remained elusive.

The shahs following the

Constitutional Revolution, very much like
the ones before the revolution, were eager to rule rather than
to reign.

Muzafar al-Din Shah

had reluctantly given in to the demands
of the Constitutionalists.

Following his death in December 1906, his
son, Mohammad-Ali Mirza,
became the Shah.

Mohammad-Ali Shah had high religious sentiments
and

was greatly influenced by the religious
opponents of the Constitution.

Freedom of press led to editorials that abused and
made mockery of the
Shah and his friends, agitating the sovereign
and shocking his personal
vanity.

Furthermore, both Russia and Britain had become restless
at

the independence of the Majlis, particularly when
it rejected

joint Russo-British loan in November 1906.

a

proposed

The loan was part of

a

larger scheme to bring the Iranian government under total
Russo-British
control.

The new Shah had appointed, as his financial advisor, Shapshal,

who was opposed to the Constitution.

The Constitutionalists were sus-

picious of Mohammad-Ali Shah's aims.

In anticipation of his hostility

to the Constitution,

the deputies in the Majlis had asked him on three

separate occasions to swear fidelity to the Constitution.^^

The

monarch, during this 18 month period of uncertainty, had the support of
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such circles as the anti-Constitutionalist
clergy, exemplified by

Sheikh Fazi-ollah Nuri, and the
Qazak brigade led by Colonel
Liakov.
The Shah ordered the bombardment
of the Majlis building on
June 3, 1908,
and thus ended the short-lived
experiment with democracy.

Tne ensuing
national uprising by pro-Constitution
anjomans (societies), most vocal
in Tabriz,

Isfahan and Guilan, finally forced
the abdication of

Mohammad-Ali Shah on July 16, 1909,
after
is

13 month civil war which

a

commonly known as "the lesser autocracy."

Ahmad Mirza, Mohammad-Ali

Shah's 12 year old son, was pronounced
shah and Azed ol-Mulk, the head
of the Qajar tribe, the regent. ^6

Mohammad-Ali Mirza, nevertheless,

attempted to regain the throne two years later
in 1911, with support
from his brother and several

defeated in

a

loyal

friends.

His supporters were

battle near Varamin and Mohammad-Ali Mirza once
again

fled back to Russia where he remained.
The political turmoil beginning with the bombardment
of the

Majlis building lasted well after World War

intervention in Iranian internal affairs.

exacerbated by foreign

I,

The division of the country

into zones of influence by Brittain and Russia,

the invasion of the

country by the Ottomans, and the establishment of

a

pro-German govern-

ment in Kermanshah in the west hardly expedited the process of govern-

ment as envisioned by the Constitution.

As

a

result of the Bolshevik

Revolution, Russia's intervention in Iranian internal affairs was

greatly

reduced.

This, however, resulted in

to intervene in Iranian domestic politics.

Ahmad Shah gave his support to

a

a

freer hand for Britain

It culminated in 1919 when

British proposed treaty in which Iran
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would become

a

colony of Britain all except in
name.

The treaty,

however, was withdrawn in the face
of economic considerations
in
Britain and international opposition to
its enactment by France,
the

Soviet Union and the United States.

The treaty was repudiated by the

Fourth Majlis as its first order of
business in 1921.
Iranian political posture took
led by Seyyed Zia al-Din Tabataba-ye,
a

Qazak brigade led by Reza Khan.

a

a

new dimension following

a

coup

journalist, with help from

Seyyed Zia became the prime minister

while Reza Khan was given the title of
commander-in-Chief.

Within

a

few days, Reza Khan became Minister of
War and thus took complete

charge of the army.

Malek-ol-Shoara,

a

leading historian of the

period, notes that Reza Khan, prior to the
coup and during its first
days, was used by Seyyed Zia and was not
the power behind it as some

have suggested.

first cabinet.

'^^

Reza Khan was not even included in Seyyed Zia's

Nonetheless, Reza Khan soon found himself in an oppor-

tune position with the only military organization—

i

.e.

,

the Qazak

brigade--at his disposal.''^
Seyyed Zia's reforms immediately earned him the wrath of the

aristocracy and the nobility.

Within

a

month of his accession to

power, almost all notable people were either under arrest or in exile.

Seyyed, as

a

consequence, was deposed by the combined forces of those

opposed to him and sent to exile three months after the success of
coup

d'

etat.

Reza Khan assumed the post of Minister of War in the

cabinet headed by Qavam-al-Saltaneh,^^ himself

a

member of the nobility.
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Reza Khan pre-occupied himself
with reorganization of the
army,
putting down local revolts, and
expanding the central government's

authority to all parts of the country.

minister in 1923.

He assumed the post of
prime

Ahmad Shah, following the
appointment, left for

Europe from which he never returned.

Ata-Turk proclaimed

a

During the same year in Turkey,

republic and ended Ottoman rule.

was hoping to copy the success
of Ataturk,

republic in Iran.

wished to establish

The clergy, in particular, opposed
such

which they saw the foundation of
on October 31,

Reza Khan, who

1925,

a

secular state.

a

a

plan in

Finally, the Majlis,

voted to transfer the monarchy from
the Qajar to

the Pahlavi dynasty with Reza Khan
as its founder.

Reza Shah was basically an uneducated
soldier who had little

patience for the legal niceties of the
constitutional process.

In

Amin Banani's words, Reza Shah "embodied
the impatience of men of
action with the endless debate of the
articulate reformers and revolu-

tionaries

....

He proceeded to immediate and practical
goals."

Banani also notes that Reza Shah was moved by
three basic desires:
(1)

"A complete dedication to the cult of national
ism-statism;"

(2)

the "assertion of this nationalism by rapid adoption
of the material

advances of the West;" and (3)

"a breakdown of the traditional

of religion and a growing tendency toward secularism."

power

Although it

is

stated that Reza Shah tried to emulate the West and adopt Western

inspired ideals, 82 his adoption of

work remained superficial.

a

Western style adminstrati ve frame-

Bureaucratic achievements were due more to

fear of the Shah's wrath^^ than to

a

coherent and responsible
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administrative system.
harshly dealt with.«^

Those who opposed him or differed
from him were
Thus, the cronies that remained
around Reza Shah

were rarely people of high
intellectual ability and were not
able to
give him a proper political-economic
perspecti ve. ^5
In dealing with
the depth of political and
administrative modernization in the
nation,
it suffices to note that on the
day of Reza Shah's forced
abdication

by the invading Allied forces
the administrative fabric of the
nation

disintegrated.
Reza Shah's approach demonstrated his
disregard for Islam and

Shiah doctrine.

On a few occasions prior to becoming
the Shah,

in

attempts to please the devoted and gain their
support, Reza Shah had

employed the institution of religion to further
his goals.
his accession to the throne,

Following

Reza Shah's hostility to Islam and ulama

was displayed in attacks on the shrines of Qum in
1928, and of Mashad
in

1935.

While in the shrine in Qum, the Queen Mother had
inadver-

tently let her veil down which resulted in her
denouncement by the

officiating clergy.

The very next day Reza Shah, at the head of

a

column of troops and two armoured cars, entered the shrine
without

taking his boots off and "thrashed" the mulla.

Following the forced

unveiling of women in 1935, there was an anti-government demonstration
in Mashad.

When the demonstrators took refuge in the shrine, the

troops were ordered inside where many were killed.

Reza Shah's dis-

regard for sanctity of holy shrines, discontinuation of many processions during the mourning month of Moharram, and discouragement of

taziyeh (religious plays) earned him the animosity of the clergy and
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the faithful. 87

His forced unveiling of women,
an anti-Islamic act,

made most Iranian women housebound.

Shah's modernization is noted by
Ann

The superficial nature of
Reza
K.

S.

Lambton.

She stated that

while Reza Shah's modernization
had displaced traditional values,
it
had failed to generate new values
in their place.
In her words, Reza
Shah had not succeeded in creating
an atmosphere in which "the unim-

paired faculties of the people could
find scope in effective and
creative social action. "^^
On his abdication, Reza Shah
appointed Crown Prince Mohammad-

Reza as the new monarch.

The allied occupation and the new Shah's

inexperience gave grounds for re-establishment
of the constitutional
process and an effort was made by the Majlis
to concentrate the political

power in its own hands.

The British, according to Peter Avery,

had used every means possible to downgrade
Reza Shah's rule and to

encourage the restoration of

a

constitutional monarchy.

During the

occupation years, however, the occupying forces continued
to pack the
Majlis with their sympathizers in their respective
zones.
The Shah, meanwhile, observed and learned.

His popularity had

reached its zenith following the Soviet withdrawal from the Azarbaijan

provinces in 1946, where

a

Soviet backed government had declared its

autonomy from the central government in Tehran.

The ensuing propaganda

portrayed the return of Azarbaijan to the motherland as

a

result of the

Shah's efforts and of his leadership of the armed forces.

The Shah's

entanglement with the Nationalists, led by Dr. Mossadegh, reversed his
popularity with the public.

The problem arose when Dr. Mossadegh,
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appointed prime minister in April
1951, asked the Shah to
relinquish
the post of commander-in-chief
of the armed forces to him.
The

ambi-

guity over the details of where
the power of the prime minister
ended
and that of the monarch began
had been a point of contention
before,
during the premiership of Qavam.^l
Dr. Mossadegh, with the
immense

popularity gained as

a

result of his opposition to the
Anglo- Iranian

Company and its nationalization,
was willing to challenge the Shah.

Oil

In fact,

his disdain for the Pahlavi
dynasty was well

known. ^2

On his

request, the Shah had sent the Queen
Mother and Princess Ashraf, the

Shah's twin sister, into exile soon
after his appointment as prime
minister. 93 Dr. Mossadegh's popularity
with the clergy and the mer•

•

chants began to falter following his
miscalculations about the American

response to his demands and the ensuing
economic downturn as the conflict with Britain over oil was prolonged.

Meanwhile, Dr. Mossadegh,

in the eyes of many concervative
circles, was becoming too close and

too dependent on the Tudeh party to stay
in power.

Following the abortive coup led by the pro-Shah
officers on

August 16, 1953, the Shah fled the country and most
organizers of the
coup, namely General Fazl-ollah Zahedi
19,

,

went into hiding.

On August

however, with material and planning support by the CIA,
with the

help of the armed forces loyal to the Shan, and with
the backing of the
mobs led by south-Tehran chagukeshan (knife wielders) paid
by CIA

agents. Dr. Mossadegh's government was overthrown by night fall.^^

Although the Shah returned to

a

welcome in the Tehran airport on August

22, the American assistance in restoring him to the throne led him to
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be portrayed as a foreign puppet.

His popularity with the
public,

particularly the nationalists, took

a

downturn from which he never

recovered.

^-^^

^° '^^^e by.

need for social reforms. ^6

Upon his return, the Shah spoke of
the
The political approach of the Shah
during

the next 25 years of his rule seems
to have some grounds in the model

prescribed by Samuel Huntington.

As described briefly before,

Huntington prescribes four channels of
support for
monarch who is up against
ition.
a

a

"modernizing"

a

combination of liberal-conservative oppos-

Although there are some who would consider
the Shah

greater number, perhaps, would disagree with such

a

a

reformer,

contenti on.

The Shah's "reformist" policies, as will be
discussed shortly, were

basically undertaken with the primary goal of making
the monarchy, once
again, the dominant institution in Iran.^^

To achieve such an end, the

Shah, in the process, attained such eventualities
as land reforms and

centralization of power which do coincide with the process of
political

modernization from
polity.

a

traditional feudal is tic culture into

a

modern

""00

Bureaucracy

.

The first basis of support was to be the state

bureaucracy, but certainly not in the terms anticipated by Huntington

where an efficient bureaucracy was to be utilized to transform the
traditional society.

The many studies on the Iranian political elite^^^

clearly indicate the accumulation of power in the state, the Shah's
ability to direct such power, and the political elite's ability to reap
material and political benefit as

a

result of its support for such a
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process.

102

The Shah's attainment of power
and control resulted in

weak cabinet, legislature and
bureaucracy.

a

For example, the Plan and

Budget Organization (PBO), which
was established with much fanfare
in
1949 as the national planning arm of the
government to prepare develop-

ment plans, had lost much of its clout
in the 1970s.
the PBO against
a

critical

a

The warnings of

high growth rate went unheeded^^^^^d
when, in 1976,

report from the PBO to ministries and
other government

agencies was circulated, its publication
was suppressed.

'•O^

it was

commonly claimed within the PBO that an
ovenvhelming number of projects

were "pet" projects of the court, namely
the Reza Pahlavi Industrial

Complex in Shahreza, Shahestan-e Pahlavi,
Tehran Metro.

""OS

p^hlavi Library, ^^6

It was widely felt within the ranks of
the planners

that when orders came down favoring a
project, the role of PBO was to

provide justification as to why it deserved
priority.^^^
Furthermore, the government bureaucracy was plagued
with inse-

curity and lack of authority to deal with
matters that theoretically

were their responsibility.

Insecurity was caused by fear of reprisals

if certain projects or undertakings proved
contradictory to the wishes

of somebody higher up, resulting in situations where
nobody was wi
to take responsibility for any action.

""^^

1 1

ing

The accumulation of decision

making powers in certain quarters had made almost every action of the

bureaucracy dependent on orders from above.
this crisis of bureaucracy

in

the

process in Iran, which was caused by

George Baldwin recognized

insufficiency of the planning
a

lack of system of checks and

balances by the legitimate institutions whereby "all important numbers.

^

^
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proposals, and judgements could
be exposed to criticism
before

decisions are made."

The institutions that could
excert external

influence on the process of planning
were "extremely weak" and were
not
given much "recogni tion. " ^ 10
fact, the bureaucracy, excluding
the

m

military and the universities,
included in its ranks some 57,000
individuals!!! with above high
school education who were basically
dependent on the government for their
livelihood.
Through the bureaucracy, these individuals were given
employment in order to be coopted
into the ranks of government
supporters or at least to prevent them,

particularly those with

a

higher education level, from drifting
into

the ranks of the opposi tion.

The inability to influence the course
of events was hardly

limited to the middle ranking bureaucrats.

Many high ranking individ-

uals, namely those in the cabinet,
complained about the absurdities of
the cabinet meetings, since major decisions
had previously been made
in audiences with the Shah.

impression of

a

Robert Graham reports the "unedifying"

cabinet member after his first meeting with the

cabinet:
At my first Cabinet meeting I was very nervous, but then
I
almost laughed when I saw how frivolous the whole thing
was.
No one talked very much.
They (the ministers) just
sat there signing documents or listened to Hoveida (the
Prime Minister).
I
remember one day a Minister got up
and asked something like "Why do we bother to come here
if no one discusses anything?" This created little
reaction and changed nothing.
A further weakness of the bureaucracy was caused by the Shah's

parallel government.

The parallel government duplicated the ministries

and other national agencies.

For example, although there was

a

cabinet
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post responsible for Ministry of
Energy, the affairs of the
National
Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) fell
outside the limits of that
ministry.

Nice was headed by

a

directly to the Shah.

chairman and board of directors
who reported
Such matters as defense and
foreign policy were

the exclusive domain of the
Shah.
the Shah,

The Minister of Court, appointed
by

reported directly to the Shah and
did not attend cabinet

discussions.

The Minister of Court was a
representative of the Shah

to the cabinent and, as such,
his presence had the "royal

behind it."

He could cancel

authority

"or overrule orders from all other
bodies

or individuals in government and
{officials of the ministry had)

considerable authority over the Shah's
parallel government.
In short,

"

^ ^

the civilian bureaucracy possessed
little power, if

any, to give support to the monarch
against the aristocracy or, for

that matter, against any social or economic
class.

In fact,

the

bureaucracy, due to its inability to initiate
any action or to influence the political process of the nation, was
rather frustrated and was
among the first groups to oppose the Shah by
strikes and work slowdowns

early in the fall of 1978.^^^
The armed forces.

The armed forces, during most of the Pahlavi

rule, were primarily charged with responsibility for
internal security.

116

Their inadequacy in defending the country against foreign

invasion was displayed in August

1941

when the Soviet and British

forces invaded the country with little challenge from Iranian armed
forces.

Mohammad-Reza Shah's approach from 1953 on clearly displayed

his reliance on the armed forces to keep him in power.

Loyalty to the

51

person of the Shah became the
highest priority of the armed
forces.
"Khoda, Shah, Meehan'' (God,
King and Country) became
the motto of the

armed forces.

The Shah had felt secure
enough to elevate himself
above

the "country."

m

the mid-1950s, the armed
forces were purged of

officers who were suspected of
being sympathetic to the
ludeh (Communist)

Party.

General Zahedi

,

who had led the loyal armed
forces to

oust Dr. Mossadegh, was dropped
in 1955 as prime minister
and was

appointed as Iranian representative
to the United Nations in
Geneva.
The armed forces had been a source
of contention to Shah's rule.
The
ranks of officers, particularly
at junior levels during the
1950s and
1960s, were composed mostly of men
from middle class backgrounds.

Such

individuals, given the middle class
sympathy for the Nationalist cause,
were a source of concern for the
Shah.
The general staff, however,

posed

a

greater threat due to their influence
and, in some cases, due

to regional or tribal

affiliations which were independent from
the

court.

the armed forces were stripped of officers
who

By the 1960s,

had any basis of support independent
from the Shah.

Thus, the armed

forces were fast becoming the sole domain of
the Shah.""""^

They showed

their unwavering loyalty to the Shah during the
1963 uprising by

putting it down brutal ly.

As a result of this suppression, the

armed forces went down in popular esteem.

Due to the dwindling number

of middle class recruits, particularly during the
1970s, the armed
forces became

a

haven for lov/er-middle and lower class recruits.

the rate of migration to larger urban areas increased,

became

a

As

the armed forces

source of attraction for upwardly mobile emigrants.

By the
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virtue of their function as
protectors of the monarchy, the
armed
forces had put a distance
between themselves and the
Shah's opponents.
The army itself, however,
was plagued with problems and
insecurity.

The high echelon of the army
lined their purses with
kickbacks
from foreign purchases^^^
while the middle ranking officers
looked on.
The omnipresence of American
advisors and the total dependence
of the

Imperial Armed Forces on foreign
technicians was

ence for these proud men.

a

demoralizing experi-

During 1978, the armed forces
once again

found themselves as the protectors
of the Shah and his rule.

Although
most of the Army remained loyal,
there were signs of defection^^O
it was

thought that the armed forces might
collapse in the face of

prolonged civil strife.

Although during the 1970s the Iranian
armed forces had been
turned into

a

mighty force with over 300,000 in uniform
equipped with

the most advanced weapons system;
this force never posed any threat
to

the Shah himself.

The high ranking generals were tightly
controlled

and were devoted to the person of the
Shah.

The Shah, as commander-in-

chief, was personally involved in details
of operations and promotions

above the rank of colonel.

The Shah was also in control of the Iranian

equivalent of joint chiefs of staff which provided the
only forum where
the three services could communicate and harmonize
planning.

The

intended separation of the services was to offset the potential
for
any individual within the services to gain control and,
thus, to be in
a

position to challenge the Shah.
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In short,

the organization and the
goals of the armed forces

were made to coincide with
the goals and ambitions of
the Shah.

Thus,

the institution of the armed
forces was dependent on the
Shah and

identified with his goals.

The armed forces, by the
same token, suf-

fered from the the same
inadequacies as that of the
institution of
monarchy.
Since they, at least on the
general staff, had lost all
basis
of legitimacy besides the
Shah, they were not able to
be

influence on the opposition during
periods of crisis.

appointment of

a

a

moderating

In fact,

the

military government in November
1978, which was done

at the urging of the high
ranking generals, aggravated the
political

upheaval and hastened the Shah's
downfall.
to the appointment of General

This was in dire contrast

Razm-Ara to lead the government in
1950.

The nation then was facing
constitutional problems and civilian govern-

ments, one after another, were falling.

The general proved rather

popular and his programs won the approval
of the Majlis by
95 to 8.

a

vote of

The general was able to end the constitutional
problems and

restore some calm to the government until
he fell to an assassin's

bullet nine months later.
Although the armed forces were rewarded for their
loyalty to
the Shah, the high ranking generals were
courted only so long as they

served the purposes of the Shah.

General Zahedi

,

who had led the coup

against Dr. Mossadegh and had brought back the Shah to
power, was
relieved of his post as prime minister in 1955 to make way for
the
Shah's personal control of the government and the armed forces.

The

most recent example was General Nematollah Nassiri who had served
the

.
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Shah for 14 years as chief of
SAVAK and who was the officer
who dared
to deliver the Shah's
dismissal order to Prime Minister
Mossadegh on

August 13, 1953.

Nassiri, who had been appointed
as Ambassador to

Pakistan in 1978, was recalled by
the Shah several months later
to face
charges stenming from corruption
and excess during his years
as chief
of SAVAK.

The army found that, to appease
the opposition, the Shah

would go to any length to assure
the survival of his regime even
if it
entailed sacrificing his most loyal
generals.

SAVAK (State Security and Intelligence
Organization).

Sazeman

-e Ettela a t_VajW^^at::e, acronym
SAVAK, was established in 1957 with

aid and technical assistance from
the United States.
of development, the Israeli

During its course

intelligence service, Mosad, also assisted

SAVAK in some of its undertakings

s^vak was basically set up to

infiltrate the opposition groups and to
nullify the enemies of the
crown.

Its chief had the designation of
"deputy prime minister" and

reported directly to the Shah.

There were estimates of up to 90,000

SAVAK agents inside and outside the country,
monitoring the activities
of potential anti-Shah elements.

""^^

As such,

the security services,

including SAVAK, became pillars of the Shah's government.

SAVAK

arrested suspected individuals, interrogated, tortured
and then either

imprisoned or eliminated them.
over SAVAK'

s

investigations.

The civil courts had no jurisdiction
Its prosecutions were channeled through

military tribunals where the panel of judges and often the defense
counsel were all military personnel.
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In the early 1970s, SAVAK's
actions

by Parviz Sabeti

under new manager.ent headed

(the head of Tehran Committee
and the most powerful

individual after General Nassiri)
became more repressive.

In Robert
Graham's words, "For SAVAK there
[were] only those who approvedCd]
of

Mohammad-Reza Shah and those who disapproved. "^25

The security forces

harassed and imprisoned anybody who
was suspected of being disloyal
to
the throne.

Just before the beginning of celebrations
for the 2,500th

anniversary of the Persian Empire in
1971, tens of thousands of people

suspected of opposition to the celebration
were arrested to spare the
Shah embarrassment during the festi vities.

The excesses of SAVAK soon became
Shah.

127

severe liability for the

These agencies had been employed to destroy the
opposition to

the Shah wherever

and the bazaaris

,

they

were

as well

insulted and ridiculed.
ary 9,

a

as

to be found.

In the process,

the ulama

the students and intellectuals, were

The letter published in the Ettela'at of Janu-

1978 accusing Ayatollah Khomeini of disloyalty to the
nation,

political subversion and sexual deviancies, was reportedly
prepared
and submitted by SAVAK under the falsified signature
of

a

clergyman.

The reaction against the letter was the start of the
political

uprising

that would cost the Shah his throne.
The Iranian bureaucracy, due to its lack of power and decision-

making prerogatives, was made inefficient and, as

a

result,

a

source

of discontent to the many educated civil servants who filled the

most important ranks of the civil service.
become

a

Although the military had

firm source of support for the Shah's policies and guarantors
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of the Pahlavi monarchy, it could
not be

a

useful

tool

in a prolonged

civil strife where the soldiers
were asked constantly to shoot
the

people from amongst whom they had
been drafted.

dependence on the Shah proved

a

The military's over-

further liability since it was not

capable of intervening as an independent
institution, as in Turkey,
to put an end to the crisis.

The excesses of the security forces
put

an even further distance between
the people and the Shah.

The Shah's

direct control of SAVAK and other security
agencies displayed the

extent to which the Shah was personally
involved in the political

repression committed by the security forces
in the name of national
security.

These excesses earned him deep rooted public
animosity.

Mj/Jdie class.
a

In an

ideal

reformist situation where there is

genuine reformist monarch, it is anticipated
that the middle class

would be supportive of the king.

Huntington, concurring with such an

assumption, regards the middle class as the second
source which could
be utilized as a basis of support when reforms
are undertaken.

The Iranian middle class, with its centers of power in bazaars
and in
the universities, has long had nationalistic and reformist
aspirations.

The National Front, since the days of Dr. Mossadegh, has been the

rallying point of middle class sympathies.

Mossadegh's government by

a

The overthrow of Dr.

regime whose central figure was Shah

Mohannad-Reza could never gain their loyalty.

Thus, the relationship

of the Iranian middle class and Shah Mohammad-Reza has been one of

conflict and

di

strust.

^

The Shah offered cabinet posts to the

leaders of the National Front during the political crisis of 1961
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under pressure from the Kennedy
administration, but this was not
adequate to attract them into a
coalition government while the
Shah
still

retained almost all his power.
The economic boom of the late
1960s, reaching its zenith

following the infusion of petro-dol
lars into the economy after
1973,
did benefit the bazaar merchants.
But it also resulted in the
creation
of a class of nouveaujn^
composed of courtiers and those with
close
connections to the court, namely the
Khayyami brothers who earlier had
been minor provincial busi nessmen. ^ ^1
jhe fact that those with close

connections to the court received the
preponderant benefits of the

economic boom, while the bazaar merchants
were blamed by the court for
the economic ills of the country and
were accused of price gauging and

hording, resulted in total alienation of
the middle class.

Furthermore, as the major supporters of nationalism,
the political
in

approach of the middle class and the Shah's
political style were

contrast.

The middle class favored

a

European style democracy with

the Shah as a figurehead without much power
and with the legislature

regaining the role it had had during the 1941-1953
era.

This contra-

dicted the Shah's belief in his naked power and his
disregard for

democratic
Fallaci.

procedures, as reflected in his interview with Oriana
He had said that:

When you don't have monarchy, you have anarchy or oligarchy
or dictatorship.
Anyway, monarchy is the only way of
governing Iran ...
To get things done you need power,
and to keep power you shouldn't have to ask permission or
advice from anyone
I
can't separate the man from
the king.
Before being a man, I am a king.
A king whose
destiny is swayed by a mission to be accomplished. And
the rest don't count.
A king means first of all duty,
.

.

.

.

.
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that kind of democrLyl

Al

\ wouldn"
wh^at'tH
-.Freedom of thought!
Demo r y,
d m cr
aemocracy!
.'wir??5''
With five year old children
going on strike and
.

•

•

Thus the Shah did not appease
the middle class either by

responding to their political
demands-i

.e.

granting

democratic form
of government-or by placating
them with the economic benefits
of his
rule.

,

a

The middle class turned into an
opponent of the Shah.

The
religious feelings of the middle
class were, furthermore, with the
ulama.

It was

the bazaar merchants that provided
the mujtahids with

funds for either theological or
political purposes during the 1978

uprising.

The added insult and degradation of
the uiama had been salt

on the wounds of the middle class
which

resulted in the latter'

s

total

support for the uiama in opposition to
the Shah.""^^
Land reforms.

While attempting to win the support of the

middle class to his side in the early
1960s, the Shah also undertook
to rally the support of the lower
class, namely the landless peasants

and workers.

The Shah, on two occasions, had attempted
agrarian

reforms by selling some of the family lands to
the farmers in 1941,
soon after his accession to the throne, and by
selling lands to the

government for distribution among farmers in 1951.
Shah's failure to coopt the National Front into
in

a

Following the
coalition government

1961, the Shah appointed Dr. Ali Amini prime minister to direct

"land reforms" under the auspicies of Hassan Arsanjani, the Minister of

Agriculture, who had formulated the process and its application several
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years beforehand J 35

The Shah had tried to pass
agrarian reforms but

had confronted bitter opposition
in the Majlis which was
packed with
the aristocracy and their agentsJ^G
^he aristocracy had felt that
land reforms would result in
their displacement as political
figures
and thus had resisted it.

The Majlis was dissolved in 1962
at the

request of Dr. Amini; the Shah later
resorted to

a

national

referendum

to have the six points of his
well-publicized "White Revolution"

approved.

The major components of the reforms
were:

distribution of

land among the farmers (by the order
of the Shah, the word "peasant"

was removed from Persian dictionaries);
sale of shares of government

owned factories to the ex-landlords for
payment of their lands (the
price of land was based on the annual tax paid
to the government in

previous years); and the establishment of
the Education Corps to be
sent to rural areas to establish schools and
help in the improvement of

quality of life in the villages.
The first land reform law was enacted in 1960,
calling for

distribution of all lands above 400 irrigated and 800
non-irrigated
hectars.

The law was poorly planned and was full of loopholes
that

enabled the landlords to hold on to more land.

This law was amended in

1962 by what has since become known as the. land reform law.

permitted the landlords to keep one village.

This law

It also exempted from

distribution lands under mechanized farming, tea gardens, orchards, and
farms employing wage labor.

The land was sold to share croppers who

had to pay for the land over

a

15

year period.

During this stage, some
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16,000 villages (one-quarter of all
villages), making up 19
percent of
all arable land, was affected
by the reforms.
The second stage was an
apparent attempt to placate
the landlords and in fact was a
formalization of the existing
status quo.^37
During this phase, "five methods
of settlement were offered:
sale,
division of land on the same basis
as the old share cropping
arrangement, fixed tenancy, formation
of a rural cooperative, or
purchase of
the tenants rights due under
the law by the landlord."
Cooperatives

were under government control.
The last phase, beginning in
1967, was basically concerned with

management of farms, small and fragmented
as
It undertook to group such
farms

a

result of the reforms.

into cooperatives whereby government

assistance would be possible and managable.

In

1973, cooperatives were

consolidated into fewer numbers which took
into consideration the manpower limitations of the government.
With such reforms directed at the farming
population of Iran,

which made up over half of the population,
the Shah felt that he could
be certain of majority support for his
role as a reforming king as well
as

an all-powerful

ruler of the nation.

suffered from several shortcomings.

The Shah's approach, however,

Within

a

few months of the enact-

ment of the land reform laws, the Shah saw and feared
the increasing

power of the farmers, particularly following the National
Concress of
Farmers held in Tehran in January 1963.

farmers raised the possibility of

a

During the congress the

Peasants'

Party.

The high temper

of some farmers in realizing the newly instituted reforms was perhaps
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responsible for making the Shah think
twice before further destroying
the traditional

rural

balance of power.

As a result, the second
stage

of the land reforms were made more
palatable for the landlords

Furthermore, the rural communities were
also

a

J39

stronghold of tradition-

alism and, as such, strongly loyal
to the ulama.

In a

conflict between

the Shah and the clergy, the
government could not count on the support

of the farmers on its behalf.

from

a

In

addition, the farmers also suffered

very low level of literacy, often
below 10 percent;!^^ and, due

the physical nature of the country,
many farm communities were not

within easy access of seats of political
power-i.e., Tehran and/or pro
vincial centers.
The land reforms also suffered from major
problems.

The

removal of landlords and their representatives
from villages also

removed the backup they gave the farmers during
not uncommon in arid Iran.

a

bad harvest which is

It would take several years for the govern-

ment to establish cooperatives and banks that could
assist the farmers,

meanwhile the cash-short farmers had to acquire, on their own,
seed,

water and plows which were formerly supplied by the landlords.

The

landlords, with their knowledge of the agriculture market, also had

helped to decide on the kind and amount of crops that were to be
planted.

During famine, pestilence and other catastrophies

peasants "expected and received help from the landlords."
also expected the landlords'
agents.

,

the

The peasants

protection against the government and its

Often the landlords and their representatives "intervened to

"
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help the peasants escape
crushing tax exactions and to
rescue the
peasants' sons from military
conscription.
On several occasions following
the land reforms, the agricul-

tural market experienced shortages
of certain crops and
overabundance
of others due to poor planning.
The inefficient bureaucracy,
as

already discussed, was

a

poor protection for farmers as
was obvious in

the poor results from the
Knuzistan agrobusiness.

The farmers

suffered also from severe infrastructure
inadequacies, such as transportation and marketing facilities,
resulting in an estimated $2 billion worth of agricultural crop
losses each year.

Furthermore, farming

profits proved far from satisfactory
to the farmers who got an estimated 5.5 percent of the final

retail price for most of their crops.

""^^

Such gross negligence of agriculture greatly
contributed to the rural-

to-urban migration during the 1970s.

In

the cities, wages for

unskilled workers had increased some 500
percent within five years.
This was attractive to the farmers who were
absorbed mainly as con-

struction workers.

The high cost of living and the huge gap between

the haves and have nots subsequently became more
real as the need for

unskilled labor grew.

The farmers continued flowing to the urban

centers, creating tin and cardboard shacks on vacant lots
in the middle
of the urban sprawl.
In short,

at the onset of the revolution, the farmers, usually

the females, the very young and very old, remained on the farms,

managing barely

a

minimal

living.

They were perhaps slightly better

off than they were in the 1950s, while the urban entrepreneurs were
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reaping financial gains at an
unimaginable speed, creating
the rest of the society at

of

a

growing daily margin.

a

gap with

The immense wealth

certain few contrasted against
the stark destitude of those
young
farmers who had come to the
cities in search of a better
life.
This
a

situation did not fit with the
benevolent image that the Shah had
attempted to build for himself.
Consequently, the urban poor were
attracted by the
and the opposition who, by
1977, once again had
become outspoken about popular
grievances.

ul^

During the height of the revolution
in December 1978, nevertheless, the government brought in farmers
from rural areas around

Isfahan to the city to show their support
for the regime.

""^"^

Such

attempts failed in comparison to the huge
outpouring of people, esti-

mated in excess of

a

million, on Ashura (December 10, 1978) in
Tehran.

The hope of utilizing the farmers as
to offset the general

a

basis of support and legitimacy

appeal of the opposition had failed.

Support from outside.

It had been common during the nineteenth-

century by those claiming the throne to enlist
the support of
power.

The Qajars often used Russia to back their claims.

""^^

a

foreign
With the

advent of nationalism in the second half of the
twentieth-century, such

affiliations with
to foreign powers.

a

foreign power were scorned and regarded as tutelage
The anglophiles and Russophiles of the Qajar period

who boasted of their connections with foreign legations^'*^ would not
do
so, at least, publicly.

Thus, the Shah's return to Iran with the help

of the CIA following Dr. Mossadegh's overthrow was

national pride and ego.

a

blow to Iranian

Consequently, the Shah was viewed as the

.
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embodiment of American and Western
interests which were seen as
contradictory to Iranian national interest.
It is within such a framework
that Huntington prescribes support
from a foreign government as
the

fourth source whicn

a

reforming monarch can utilize.

He actually uses

the American support of the Shah
as an example of his contention,

neglecting the fact that the Shah's
reliance on Washington was partly
responsible for his low rating with his
people which eventually
resulted in his downfall
The reliance of

a

political

leader on

a

foreign power is con-

sidered an act of weakness in the Iranian
political culture.
ical

A polit-

leader, as discussed by Professor Norman
Jacobs, is to cause pride

and respect in the eyes of foreigners

.

^^^^^

^

subservience

and tutelage of the Iranian political hierarchy,
including the Shah,
to a foreign power, namely the United States,
has been a source of

resentment and

a

reason to oppose the Shah.

This dependency, to

a

great extent, prevented the establishment of an
independent Iranian
political posture with Iranian national interests as its primary
goal.
The present rupture of relations between Iran and the United

States, following the taking of 53 hostages at the American Embassy in

Tehran by militants with the apparent blessing of Ayatollah Khomeini,
has its roots in such historical experience.

The independent policy of

the Ayatollah and his opposition to foreign interference, particularly
the United States and the Soviet Union, in Iranian internal affairs

receives tremendous public support since it invokes pride and feelings
of "rubbing the nose of

a

superpower in dirt."

The escalation of
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political conflict with the United
States and the super-power's

inability to exert much influence
over events in Iran, despite
all the
resultant political, social and
economic ill effects on Iran,
has
become

a

caus^^elebn.

The conflict's attainment of
international

scope with some perceived support
for the Iranian cause among
some
third world countries, especially
amongst Islamic revivalists, has

become

a

further cause of pride since the
Iranian leader is being

viewed as an international leader.

Som^luritiie^^

Monarchy under the Pahlavis took

tic turn away from its traditional
mold.

a

dras-

Centralization of power in

the hands of the monarch and the
destruction of the traditional national

balance of power caused political chaos that
resulted in the downfall
of the institution of monarch.

The political approach of the Pahlavis aimed at
establishing
the institution of monarchy as the only
legitimate political

institu-

tion and the "people" as the only other viable
"institution."

This

approach manifested itself in the so called "Shah-People
Revolution"
(another name for the 1963 reforms).

The Shah, in support of his

approach, asserted that:
In making revolution, the leader of the nation plays
the
crucial role.
A strong enlightened leader, fully comprehending existing condition, nurtures and develops the
idea of revolution in his mind, transfers the idea to
the people and then moves to implement it.

The document, furthermore, likens the relationship of the Shah
to the nation as that of a father to a son.

the people.

The Shah stands above all

He is "in the first instance teacher and spiritual

leader.
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an idividual who not only
builds his nation roads,
bridges, dams and

ganat

but also guides the spirit,
thought and hearts of his people. "^^^
In short, the people play
only a passive role, while
the Shah generates
ideas and policies.
As such, all organizations
are there to serve the
Shah in the transfer of ideas
from the monarch to the people
and to

help to implement and operational
ize such ideas.
Such an image of the Shah greatly
contradicted the traditional

mold of monarchy.

Traditionally, the Iranian political
culture was

a

"web system," composed of "a network
of power relationships which

possess profound plasticity due to the
balancing nature of these
tensions."

In such a system, although
the Shah

remains the central

figure in the political structure, he
shares power, depending on the

circumstances, with members of the royal
family, the high ulama, the
tribal elite, the military elite, the
landlords, the economic aristocracy, the landless rentierelite, and/or
the foreign capitalists.

The

system, with its built-in safety valves such as
"power reciprocity,

informality, personalism, secrecy, and insecurity"
through

a

system of

conflict, was supported and maintained.
With the growing power of the monarch during the rule
of Reza

Shah and from 1953 to 1978 under Mohammad-Reza Shah, the
web system
was employed to enhance the position of the monarch rather
than to

afford stability to the political structure of the nation.

As dis-

cussed already, the groups that traditionally shared power with the

monarch were made dependent on royal grace.
elite had become the person of the Shah.

The political base of the

The Shah continued to employ

,
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the traditional

conflict syste. to prevent any
one group from gaining
excessive advantage thereby reinforcing
the royal position as the

dominant one within the political
structure.
of the nation, from

a

The political structure

symbiotic relationship between the
monarch and

the political elite, was reduced
to

a

system of dependency of the

political elite on the person of the
Shah.

The land reforms of 1963,

for example, achieved such an end
by debasing the landed aristocracy

from its traditional political power
base.
The subversion of the traditional
political structure by the

establishment of
in reality,

a

structure where the institution of monarchy,
or,

the person of the Shah as the only
legitimate and viable

institution was not well thought out nor well
executed.

In the process,

the Shah had underestimated his unpopularity,
particularly following

the overthrow of Dr. Mossadegh, and overestimated
his own capacity as
"a strong

tions.

enlightened leader" who fully comprehended existing
condi-

The Shah apparently suffered from severe insecurity
problems.

Such feelings were well revealed in his own conversations:

My father said that he wanted to improve the government
machinery to such a degree that, if he should die, the dayto-day process of administration would operate almost automatically without the need of continuous supervision from
the top.
I
was still rather young and perhaps not very
mature; and I took his remark as an insult.
"What does he
mean?" I thought.
"Does he think that if he were gone I
couldn't take over and continue his work?""150

Although he seemed an astute observer of his father's style of
rule, noting that as his father became older his circle of advisors

grew narrower and consisted of

undistinguished

subservients

Mohammad-Reza Shah, in 1963 during the June political crisis, displayed
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his limited capacity for
receiving advice fro. some of
his most loyal

devotees.

They had come to the monarch
with the best of intentions
to
aid the monarchy at its dark
hours.
The Shah was furious at the
four
for thinking of "giving" advice
to the Shah.
These four, including
Hussein Ala. Sardar Fakher-e Hekmat,
Abdollah Entezam, and General

Morteza Yazdan-Panah

,

were rebuffed, dismissed from their
positions,

and thrown into political oblivion.

The insecurity of Mohammad-

Reza Shah marked the major difference
in the style of kingship between

himself and Reza Shah.

Walter Lacqueur notes that

a

great difference

between the father and the son was that
"whereas no one dared to lie to
(Reza Shah), no one dared to tell the
truth to (Mohammad-Reza Shah).""""

Recognizing the depth of Shi 'ism in the country,
the Shah also
tried to employ religious symbolism to gain
legitimacy for his rule.
On many occasions the Shah claimed divine
support for his rule and the

institution of monarchy.

In his book.

Mission for My Country

,

he

claims to have seen apparitions of Shiah saints
giving their support to

him in his childhood.

Furthermore, the failure of several attempts on

his life was interpreted to mean divine support
for his "missions."

The Shah's person was labeled as "Shadow of God," gaining
further

divine right for the role of the Shah and for the institution of monarchy.

Some concluding remarks

.

With the socio-political tradition

of Iran, the sources of support put forth by Samuel Huntington to be

used by

a

"reforming monarch" and their seeming application in Iran has

proved their inadequacies.

Too little attention has been paid to the
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cultural milieuof nations in
formulation and application of
such
proposals.
Furthermore, there seemed to be a
great discrepancy between

Huntington's perception of
Shah's rule.

a

reformist monarch and the reality
of the

Although certain periods of the
Shah's rule may be

heralded as "reformist," the primary
purpose remained the survival of
the Pahlavi regime.

To attain such an end, the monarch
utilized the

carrot and stick approach; the carrot
heralded as "reformist" undertakings and the stick, as SAVAK.
The Shah proclaimed the institution
of monarchy as inseparable

from Iranian culture and tradition,
claiming it was the true and

inherent desire of the Iranian people to
be ruled by kings.

''^'^

However,

the organic and symbiotic relationship
that the Shah claimed has rarely

been displayed in Iranian history despite
over 2,500 years of claimed

kingship.

In

tocracy or

a

essence, the country remained feudalistic with
an arisreligious oligarchy ruling the empire.

The rigid class

structure through which the aristocracy and religious
nobility ruled

ancient Iran became so brittle that the Mazdakian
revolt, which proscribed

a

communistic society, nearly destroyed the social fabric of

the Sassanid Empire in the early sixth-century A.D.

The destruction

of the huge Sassanid Empire finally came about when faced
with the

Islamic surge that preached equality for all.

The ideals of Islam had

attracted huge numbers of peasants who composed the bulk of the
empire's armies.

The tiny Arab armies that were out numbered ten-to-

one were able to defeat the huge but demoralized Sassanid armies in the
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middle of the seventh century and,
thus, the Sassanid Empire
came to
an end.

The history of Iran is full of
invasions and tribual feuds

which, every so often, resulted in
the establishment of new dynasti
IGS
Following the Arab conquest of Iran
it took over 800 years until
a
native Iranian dynasty took control
of the nation.

Meanwhile, the

country had been overrun by various
Mongol and Turkic tribes.

It was,

therefore, the military might that gained
its possessor the throne of
Iran and not

a

popular desire by the masses to be ruled
by kings.

While the kings retained titular control
of the nation, it was the
local overlords that in effect controlled
the nation.

They had their

own administrative system, taxed the
population under their control and

supplied the king with troops in times of war.
their own dynasties and held court.
the concept of shah-in-shah

These overlords had

As such, the system gave rise to

(king of kings) that was even retained by

the last Pahlavi monarch.

During the Safavid and Qajar periods, as already noted, the
kings retained their position by

a

balanced tension between the insti-

tution of monarchy and the political elite.

The monarchs, recognizing

the inherent weakness of the institution of monarchy, utilized support

from such quarters as the aristocracy, the ulama

,

the bureaucracy and

the tribes to maintain their position.

Furthermore, the Iranian experience of kingship for the past
several

thousand years has been no exception since the world, for most

parts, was ruled by kings.

Until

recent times, the Iranian society,
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in essence, was feudal

and tribal and, as such,
feudal

retained autonomy within their
fiefdoms.

lords and chiefs

With the advancement of

statism and centralized political
authority, the local lords and
chiefs
were replaced by governors appointed
by monarchs who, as the result
of
the centralization of power, had
become the central authority.

The

most imposing objection to the
rule of kings came from the Shiah
ulama
who considered all temporal authority
illegitimate in the absence of
the Hidden Imam, as already has
been discussed.

While the ulama were

able to influence the political
process of the nation during late

Safavid (1666-1732) and early Qajar
periods (1779-1848),

a

balance

between the ulama and the political body
of the nation was achieved
during early Safavid (1500-1666) and
late Qajar period (1848-1907).
During the Pahlavi period (1925-1978),
for the most part, the governing
political body shifted the balance of power
to itself thus reducing the

influence of the ulama on the political
process.
With the infiltration of democratic ideals
during the past

century, there have been serious challenges to
the authority of the
kings.

This is exemplified in the Constitutional Revolution
and in

attempts by individuals, such as Reza Khan, to establish
Iran.

a

republic in

Therefore, it follows that the Iranian culture is no more

attracted to the institution of monarchy than most other cultures
in
the world.

In fact,

of the last six kings in the Qajar and Pahlavi

dynasties during the past century, only Mozafar al-Din Shah (1898-1906)
had died as

a

king as

a

result of natural causes.

Of the remaining

five, Naser al-Din Shah (1848-1898) was assassinated and the last four:
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Mohammad-Ali Shah (1906-1090), Ahmad
Shah (1909-1925), Reza Shah
Pahlavi (1925-1941), and
Mohammad-Reza Shah (1941-1979)
have all abidicated in the face of either
internal or external opposition
to their
rule.

Perhaps it was the recognition
of the traditional "weakness"
of
the institution of monarchy
that led Shah Mohammad-Reza
to undertake
to establish monarchy as the
dominant political institution.
In doing
so, he utilized all means of
propaganda including pomp and
ostentation.

Although earlier he had said that
there was no pride in ruling over
a
hungry nation and that he would
not crown himself a king unless
substantial improvements were made in
the citizens'

lives, he crowned

himself and his wife in 1967 at the
cost of millions of dollars.

The

Shah's thirst for lavish and extravagant
parties culminated in cele-

brations such as the 2500th anniversary
of the Persian Empire in 1971
at

a

cost of $40 million reported by the
government itself.

Two-

hundred million dollars was the cost
claimed by the Shah's opponents.T57
The Shah's silver jubilee in 1965, the
50th anniversary of the Pahlavi

dynasty in 1976 and the 100th birthday of Reza
Shah in 1978 were also

celebrated at enormous costs.

There was forced participation in the

above events in forms of parades, political
gatherings or even forced

donations towards the cost of festivi ties by well-to-do
businessmen.
There were also such annual events as the birthdays of the
Shah, Farah
and the Crown Prince; the overthrow of Dr. Mossadegh; thanksgiving
on
the occasion of the Shah's escaping from an assassination
attempt in

1964; and the anniversary of the "White Revolution," where the public,
in

particular the civil servants and industrial workers, were forced
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to participate.

Furthennore, newspaper advertisements
congratulating

these occasions pretended public
approval and support for the
Shah's
rule.

To the dismay of its benefactors,
such wholesale approaches had
Uttle, if any, impact on placating the
public or gaining support for
the Shah's rule.
There never was any doubt in the
people's minds as
to the spuriousness of the
events.

Furthermore, there was an attempt by
the regime to connect the
Pahlavi dynasty with the ancient
Persian tradition of kingship.

regarded as "the Pahlavi revival of the
sacred kingship."

It was

As such, the

hand-picked Majlis in 1967, on the occasion
of the Shah's coronation,
bestowed on him the title of Aryamehr
(the Light of Aryans), which

purportedly was to reaffirm the "primordial
spirit of Iran fostered by
a

monarchy whose aim was to combine the
continuity of the ancient

principles with modern transformations. "^58
in March

supplemented

1976 when the Majlis voted for a monarchy calendar
replacing

the Islamic calendar based on the solar
Hijra year.

The new calendar

was based on the coronation of Cyrus the Great,
2,535 years earlier.

While the title of "Aryamehr" was regarded as

a

farce by tne general

public, the change of calendar was regarded as an affront
to the Isamic

tradition of the nation.
Furthermore,

a

As such,

it aroused considerable opposition.

major problem facing the Iranian political

process had been the uncertainty of political direction, exacerbated
by the Shah's lack of political conviction and the lack of

political philosophy.

a

coherent

For example, in his first book. Mission for My

Country (1961) the Shah hails

a

two-party political system, while in
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his most recent book,

applauded

a

Ipwards_Jhe^^

(^975)^

single party system.

It has been said that during
the early 1970s the Shah
lost

sight of his intended reforms
that he had begun with much
fanfare a
decade earlierJ59
became more concerned with the
trappings of
kingship and power, since he saw
himself in the total control of

the

country with his rule and position
secured.

However, both during his

"reform" period (1961-1971) and
during his megalomania years (19711978), the policies of the government
the person of the Shah.

process of government.

became

the expressed wishes of

Thus, as the Shah's mood changed
so did the
It was felt that there was no
need for con-

tending political institutions with
which the Shah would share power
or with whom he would consult.

Absence of independent political insti-

tutions served two primary purposes:

it lessened the possibility of

challenge to the Shah's rule; it made
the survival of the nation dependent on the person of the Shah.

So it was not unusual

to hear, even

during the height of the uprising in
1978, serious questions regarding
the leadership of the country in the absence
of the shah.

The question

was serious since the 25 year authoritarian
rule of the Shah, since
1953, had left the country without leaders who had
political and

managerial expertise with political and national base
or support.

Most

of the leaders of the opposition were old and consisted
of the

colleagues of Dr. Mossadegh in the National Front.

They had all been

pushed out of the existing political arena for 25 years and had
little,
if any, base of political support from which they could
operate.
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Ayatollah Khomeini, on the other
hand, had gathered an
immense
following among the people and
was the unquestioned leader
of the
opposition.
However, the Ayatollah had no
administrative or managerial
experience and thus was unable
to guide the nation to the
shores of
political stability.
In the face of the
oppressive Pahlavi rule and
the deteriorating economic and
political situation in late
1978. such
an arguement. however,
attracted little support. All the
frustrations

that had accumulated, particularly
over the past 25 years, spewed
out,

washing away the Pahlavi monarchy.

There seemed to be little concern

for the institution of monarchy
that the Shah attempted to portray
as

second nature to Iranians.

None of the institutions that
the Shah had

manipulated or attempted to build-i.e.,
the legislature and the
Rastakhis Party -were able to aid the
faltering monarchy or even to

maintain their own survival.

The armed forces that the Shah had
so

dearly groomed, patronized, and transformed
into

a

force to assure the

survival of the Pahlavi dynasty burst
open at the seams.

Nonetheless,

opposition political parties and organizations
that had been severely

suppressed and punished surfaced overnight, but
were unable to exert
any real influence over the course of events.
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CHAPTER

II

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Although Iran boasts an
ancient political tradition,
none of
its present-day formal
political institutions predate
the Constitutional Revolution of 1906.
The parliament, the Judiciary,
and the

executive have all been created
since the inception of
tional government.

The only exception

a

constitu-

was the institution of
monarchy

which was changed from that of
feudal tradition to an
institution of
centralized authoritarianism with
increased control over the daily
affairs of the citizens.
The constitutional movement
was born out of

a

rivalry of the

clergy and the intellectuals and
the aristocracy headed by the
Shah.
While the former were supported
and encouraged by the British,
the

latter had the blessing of the
Russians.^

In other words,

the consti-

tutional movement in Iran was partly
due to the power rivalry to control

the internal affairs of Iran
which reached its zenith during the

first two decades of the twentieth
century.^
The constitution, nonetheless, provided
the nation with

foundation for modern political institutions.

a

This constitutional

process of government needs to be contrasted
against the de facto
powers of the shahs which, in Robert Grahams
words, well demonstrated
the "unconstitutional

side" of the political process in Iran.^
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Ih e Constitution
The Belgian constitution
was used as

drafting of the 1906 Iranian
constitution.

a

reference for the

The Fundamental Law pro-

vided for the election of
the Majlis (National
Consultative Assembly).
The Supplementary Fundamental
Law of 1907 was composed of
more
extensive rules pertaining to
the political process of
the nation.
It

established the religious board for
review of the legislature and
separated governmental powers into
three branches:

executive, and judiciary.
on three principles:

legislative,

The foundation of the constitution
rested

Shiah Islam, separation of powers
and monarchy.

Article 35 of the Supplementary
Fundamental Law stated that "The

sovereignty is

a

trust confided (as

person of the King."

a

Divine gift) by the people to the

This reasserted the basic inviolability
of

people's rights regarding the king as
credible ruler only as long as
he served the interests of the
community.

The power of the legislature

was also curtailed by Article 2 of
the Supplementary Fundamental Law
that stated that "At no time must any
legal enactment of the (Majlis),

established by the favor and assistance of
(the Hidden Imam), the favor
of (the Shah) of Iran, the care of
(the ulama ), and the whole people of
the Iranian nation, be at variance with
the sacred principles of Islam

or the laws established by (the Prophet--i

.

e.

,

the Sharia )."

The

council of five mujtehids was to act as the
ultimate body to review all
laws to establish that they were not in
variance with the Sharia

council of five mujtehids never materialized.

.

The
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Tne Iranian constitutional
system, at least in theory,
was
parliamentary system with the
Majlis as the

a

central focus of the pro-

cess.

Both the proponents and the
opponents of the government justi-

fied their policies by citing
the legislature's support
or constitutional perogatives.

A truly representative political
process as envisioned by the
constitution has rarely materialized
since the inception of a

constitutional government in Iran.
in session for a total

From 1906 to 1921, the Majlis
was

of less than five years (see
Table II-l).

The

Majlis then was turned into an
obedient instrument of Reza Shah,

particularly following the 1928 elections
to the Vllth Majlis.
the brief period from 1941

After

to 1953 when the parliamentary
process took

partial control of the political
process in Iran, the Majlis, following
Dr.

Mossadegh's overthrow, once again was
closely controlled by the

ruling monarch, Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi.^
The constitution was amended on four occasions.

To do this.

Parliament (Majlis alone until 1950; since
the establishment of the
Senate in 1950, both houses), with

two-thirds majority, called for

a

elections for the Constituent Assembly.

Its

to the number of members of Parliament.

They had to approve any amend-

ment to the constitution by

a

representatives were equal

two-thirds majority.

In

1925, the

Supplementary Laws were amended to change the monarchy from the Qajar
dynasty to the Pahlavi dynasty.

In

1949, some procedural

changes were

made del ineating the election of the Senate and the Shah's right
to

dissolve the Majlis and/or the Senate.

An amendment in 1957 increased

the number of deputies
fro. ,36 to 200. extended
the

te™ of the
two to four years, and
determined the quorun, as
half of
the membership of the
Majlis.
The Supplementary Laws
were further
amended to give the Shah a
suspensive veto over financial
bills passed
by the Hajlis Which had
the right to approve
the national budget.
MajUs from

The fourth and last amendment
dealt with Supplementary
Laws
regarding the regency.
The amendment made the
Queen the regent.
She
was to have formed a
council to execute the royal
duties until the
crown prince reached the
age of twenty.
Along with the above amendments, there were also
changes in the electoral laws
pertaining to the
length of the terms of the
Senate and the Majlis with an
increase in
the number of deputies in
the Najlis based on the
most recent population census.
The last three amendments
were made to enhance the royal

perogatives vis-a-vis the Majlis.

The changes were made in the
legis-

lative periods when the Shah
enjoyed overwhelming support among
Majlis
deputies.

The legal and extralegal powers
of the monarch included

appointment and dismissal of cabinet
ministers, general staff of the
armed forces and half of the senators.
The Shah was also commander-

in-chief of the armed forces and, thus,
could declare war, make peace
and negotiate treaties.

He could also dissolve the parliament,
call

for new elections, and reject the
national budget approved by the

Majlis unless overridden by

a

three-fourths majority.
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Legislature
From the inception of
constitutional government until
1921,
the Majlis sat for a total
of five years.
It convened from 1906
to
1908, but upon the bombardment of
the Majlis by Mohammad-Ali
Shah, it
was dissolved and the
constitution was abrogated.^ A new
Majlis was
convened on October 28, 1909 and
sat until a coup d'etat
against the
Second Majlis on December
24, 1911 when it refused the
request of
Samsam al-Saltaneh cabinent to
comply with the Russian ultimatum^
demanding the dismissal of Morgan
Shuster, an American financial

advisor hired by Iran, along with
an apology for interference
with

a

contigent of Russian troops guarding
the house of Shoa al-Saltaneh,
an
Iranian in exile in Russia, by
gendarmes under orders from Shuster.
The Third Majlis was convened
three years later in November 1914.

dissolving

a

year later in the face of fear that the
pressure of the

Majlis seriously perturbed the British
and Russian legations.^
short, the political turmoil that began as

In

a

result of the

Russo-British intervention in the internal affairs
of Iran retarded the
nation's consi tutional development.

Following the Russo-British agree-

ment in 1907, which divided Iran into zones of
influence, the two powers

developed

a

parallel approach to Iranian affairs that did not include

constitutional government which the British had earlier
supported.^
The Russian Revolution of 1917 and the economic hardship
in Britain

following the First World War afforded Iranians some respite
from
foreign intervention and domination.
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The emergence of Reza
Khan in 1921, his
success in quelling the
prevailing political
disturbances all across the
country, and the
establishment of a centrailized
administrative authority in
Tehran
hrought about some measure
of political tranquillity.
The elections
for the Fourth Majlis
had been in the works
for many months.
It
finally convened in February
1921.
The role of the Majlis
became
important in Reza Khan's
consolidation of power, although
he soon began
to develop a contempt
and distrust for the
Majlis.^ He employed the
Majlis to meet his aims,
but he was not sympathetic
to the ideals of
constitutional democracy or
legal procedure.
Reza Khan had hoped to
establish a republic in Iran
on the same theme as
that of the new
republic being formed by
Ataturk in Turkey.^" As noted
earlier, however, the clergy persuaded
Reza Khan to seek a change
from the Qajar
dynasty to his own family
instead," on fears that
republicanism would
spread secularism.
The Majlis by its first
amendment to the constitution, in 1925, transferred
the monarchy from the Qajar
dynasty to the
Pahlavi dynasty.

Although there was some opposition
to Reza Khan in the Majlis,
namely by Seyyed Hassan Modaress^^
and Mohammad Mossadegh

J^

Reza Khan's

control over the Majlis was
strengthened following each election.

With

the elections for the Vllth
Majlis in 1928, the parliament had
turned

into an institution of virtual
tutelage dedicated to legitimizing Reza

Shah's rule.

Opposition figures such as Modaress were
prevented from

being elected to the Majlis; Mossadegh
took refuge among the tribes in
the south.

The Majlis remained

a

political backwater for the monarch
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until

1941, When he was forced to
abdicate the throne by the
Allies on
the suspicion of his
German sympathies J'*

The rule of parliament was
strengthened in 1941, partly
due to
the Allied presence.
They tried to influence
the course of political
process through legitimate
channels by establishing
political parties
favorable to them.
Iradeh Melli (National Will)
Party, headed by
Seyyed Ziaaldin Tabatabai,
supported the British'^
the Tudeh (Mass)
Party (communist orientation)
supported the Soviet Union's
perspective.
Both the British and the
Soviets attempted to use the
parliamentary process to gain further
advantages.
The Russians were

interested in oil concessions and.
as later revealed, in
political and
territorial gains in northern and
northwestern Iran. The British were
interested in maintaining and
extending their influence in
southern
Iran, particularly in the oil

fields and territories close to
the

British colonial territories in South
Asia.

attained

a

very nationalistic posture as
displayed by the measures

undertaken by It between 1941 and
1953.
were:

(1)

The Majlis, however, had

adoption of

a

Among its major accomplishments

law in 1944 which forbade the
government to

negotiate or grant any oil concession without
the prior approval and

subsequent ratification by the Majlis;
(2)

repudiation, by an almost

unanimous vote in 1947, of an oil concession
granted by the then prime

minister, Qavvam, to the Soviet Union; and most
importantly, (3)

nationalization of the oil industry in Iran in 1951.

This last act

left a lasting impact on the Iranian political
situation, in particular,
and on the Middle Eastern political posture, in
general.'^
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During this period the
Majlis also began to exercise
the prerogative, first exercised in
1910 by Nasir al-Mulk, the
first regent
for the .1„or Aha.ad Shah,
of being consulted before
a prime minister
was appointed. 18 The
constitution had, In fact,
given the right of
selection of the prime minister
and members of the cabinet
to the
Shah. 19

Unlike the British parliamentary
system, the members of the
cabinet were not to be selected
from amongst the deputies
in the
20
Majlis.
In effect, a Majlis
deputy could not retain his
seat after
becoming a member of the cabinet.
This was intended to separate
the

legislative and executive branches
of government.

Ministers had the

primary responsibility for
introducing bills in the Majlis,^!
but the
bills still had to receive
the prior approval of the
^2
cabinet.
Deputies also could initiate
legislation.

One such piece of legisla-

tion that has gained fame was
the Oil Nationalization Act,
sponsored
by Dr. Mossadegh and his
colleagues in the XVIth Majlis
(1950).

Following the overthrow of Dr. Mossadegh's
government in 1953,
martial law was proclaimed and General
Fazl-ollah Zahedi was appointed

prime minister.

The Majlis was dissolved in December
and new elections

were called for in early 1954.

With martial

law in full

force, General

Zahedi was in total control of the
government while the anti-Shah

elements were in hiding, in jails, or in
exile.
the Majlis

The XVIIIth session of

(1954-56) contained no known anti-Shah elements
nor any

sympathizers of Dr. Mossadegh and his National Front.

All

subsequent

parliamentary elections, particularly in Tehran and
larger cities, were
controlled by the government.

Thus, deputies favorable to the
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govern„.nt were "elected."

I„ .ural

areas and smaller cities
where

the landed aristocracy and
the tribes had a controlling
Influence, the
deputies to the Hajlls were
elected fro™ amongst the
aristocracy or
those loyal to the..^* Although
the posture of the Hajlls
remained

conservative, It was not within
the total control of the
governn^nt
For example, the Majlis
refused on several occasions
to ratify the land

reform bill which had the
Shah's support or to revise it
In
was anything but land "reform. "^^
Although the constitution had
provided for

a

tions for the first Senate were
not held until 1950.

a

Senate,

way that

elec-

The 1949 Consti-

tuent Assembly provided for an
electoral procedure of electing the
Senate.
The membership of the Senate
was composed of 60 senators;

half of whom were to be elected
with the remaining to be appointed
by
the Shah.

From Tehran, 15 were elected and
15 appointed with the

remaining apportioned to the provinces.

Although the Senate lacked

the constitutional prerogatives of
the Majlis, the monarch anticipated
an increased control

over the legislature particularly through
his

appointment of half the senators.
The period of 1953 to 1963 was basically
the Shah assumed more control of the government.
trol

period during which

a

He attempted to con-

the Majlis while, at the same time, to project

democratic rule through the establishment of
system.

a

a

semblance of

two-party political

The experiment in democracy failed due to the
overzealousness

of Dr. Manuchehr Igbal

,

the then prime minister, who rigged the

elections for his own benefit,

and to the general government policy
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of not permitting the
Nationalists to seek election
to the Majlis 29
The ensuing e.barass.ent
over the election procedure
resulted i„ the
Shah's dissolution of the
XXth Hajlis (1960) three
months after its
election with a call for new
elections.
The new Majlis (1961)
was also
dissolved a few months later
by the Shah at the
request of Dr. Ali
Amini, the then prime minister,
who saw the Majlis as an
obstacle to
his reformist approach.
New elections were not
scheduled.
This was
in clear violation of
^0
the constitution.
Dr.

Amini had confronted staunch
opposition in the Hajlis

toward his reformist legislation,
particularly the land reform bill.
As already noted, the
legislation would have eventually
resulted in the
transfer to the peasants of the
land owned by the landed
aristocracy
who were immensely influential
in the Majlis, either
directly or
through their agents.

3'

Aside from the economic impact
of the land

reforms, its political consequences
were feared.
the landlords from their
traditional

The displacement of

strongholds in rural areas and

smaller towns would also cost them
their long-held political influence.
Thus, the land reforms, aside from
the reformist objectives, intended
to centralize power in the hands
of the central government in Tehran. ^2
It was this

latter objective that raised fear among
the aristocracy

and also among the ulama who saw a
further increase in the totalitarian

powers of the Shah.

Although Dr. Amini and his Minister of Agriculture,

Hassan Arsanjani, were moved by reformist
intentions, their land reforms,
in political

terms, could not but lead to an increase
in the power of

the central government.

Dr.

Amini objected to the domination of the

political process by the
Shah and hoped to

,i.u

the monarch's administrative prerogatives,
but he was relieved of
his post in July 1962
Mr. Arsanjani, however.
«as retained to pursue
the course of land
reforn,.
Opposition to the Shah's
undertakings was also vehement
among
tribes, particularly the
Qashgales who fought government
control for
two years before being
subdued In 1964.

The XXth Hajlis (1961)
saw the end of an era in
Iranian parlia"lentary history.
With the displacement of
the power of the landed
aristocracy, the authority
of tne central government
was extended to
all parts of the country.
Elections for the XXIst Majlis
(1963-67)
were held in October 1963.
Most deputies joined the
newly formed Iran
Novin (New Iran) Party,
founded by Hassa^Al 1 Mansur.
a young rising
politician, and his colleagues,
with the blessings of the
Shah.
A few
deputies retained their affiliation
with Mardom Party which took
the
role of the opposition. ^3 A
few months later. Mansur was
appointed

prime minister, and thus the Iran
Novin era that would last for
some
13 years began.
A comparison of the percentages
of the landlords in the Majlis

during the pre-1963 sessions of
Majlis and the XXIInd Majlis (1967-71)
best describes the impact of land
reforms on the legislative process
in
Iran.

While some 50 percent of the deputies
during the first 20

sessions of the Majlis came from landlord
backgrounds, the level

dropped to less than 25 percent in
the XXIst and the XXIInd Majlis
sessions. 34

The government, by manipulating the party
system and the

electoral process, was able to control access
to the Majlis and the
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senate and. thus, to reduce
the parlla^ntary
process to the legitimization of the policies of
the monarch's government.
It was only i„
such a forum that it was
possible to legislate a bill
giving ..pio^^tic
-munity to American military
personnel and their

families.
The bill
was ratified by the Majlis
within a few hours after
its submission by
the government in October
1964.
It was the outrage
against the enactment of this bill that
finally resulted in the
banishment of Ayatollah
Khomeini, who vehemently and
actively opposed it, to exile.^S
jhe
passage of the aforementioned
bill clearly represents
the extent to
which the Majlis had been
turned into a subordinate
branch of the
executive.
Such submission to executive
power was unparallelled in
other parliamentary periods,
perhaps with the exception of
the period
from 1928 to 1941 under Reza
Shah.
Reza Shah, however, was moved
by

nationalistic aspirations to end
foreign capitulatory rights 1n
Iran
granted during the Qajar period.
On the inauguration of the
single party process in 1975, the

government sponsored political parties,
Iran Novin and Mardom, along
with the government sanctioned
parties. Pan Iranist and Iranian with

a

total of four deputies in the
XXIIIrd Majlis, dissolved their
respective

political parties and joined the new
Rastakhiz (Resurgence) Party.
In

1978, with the political turmoil well underway,
there were

movements within the Majlis indicating an
emerging opposition to the
government.

In June the Pan

resigned from Rastakhiz.^''
Tabriz, along with

a

Iranists revived their old party and

Ahmad Bani-Ahmad, an independent from

few others also resigned from Rastakhiz.
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Nevertheless, most deputies
remained loyal to the Shah
to the end, as
was reflected in the
over^vhelming approval of
the military government's
program to restore order. 38
The Majlis, however, was
experiencing
emotion-packed days like those of
1941-1953 as genuinely heated
debates
became a part of parliamentary
process.
Despite these debates, the Majlis
remained in the service of
the Shah.^O The call for
the dissolution of the Majlis
and for freely

contested elections went unheeded.

Despite the vote of confidence

given to Dr. Shahpour Bakhtiar's
government, as prime minister he
had
a very shaky month-long
rule which finally toppled in
the face of
popular agitation and political
opposition from forces loyal to Ayatollan Khomeini.
With the success of the Islamic
Revolution came the
end of the Majlis as provided for
by the Constitution of 1906-07.

Although the parliament in Iran
existed on paper for threequarters of
in excess
a

a

century, in actuality parliamentary
rule existed barely

of a decade.

The legislature was prevented from
establishing

tradition of independence from which it
could seek equality with the

other branches of the government,
particularly the executive.

The

Majlis was dominated by the aristocracy,
particularly the landlords.

After the emergence of Reza Khan and his
domination of the administration of the government, the Majlis for

a

time was the only arena which

could effectively challenge his authority and
control.

With the 1928

election, Reza Shah effectively muted the Majlis and
gained total
control.

Aside from sheer force in subduing the opposition,
particu-

larly the Qajars, he cultivated their loyalties in
marrying

a

Qajar.
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The lineage of Iranian
aristocracy, better known
as the "thousand
fan,„y ... is traced
back to the fa„,i,ies of
tribal khans; Qashqaies
Bakhtiaries and. of course.
Qajars/^ Qajars. who ruled
Iran for son.
150 years, incorporated other lesser
tribes into the ruling
elite durinc
their rule.
The tribal elites had
control over the fortunes
of their
respective tribes and were
the unquestioned .asters
of their traditional
tribal territory that, in
some instances, included
all or parts of
several provinces.
The khans and their children,
particularly the sons,
had high levels of education
(the sons were often sent
to Europe or the
united States for education).
They lived in the urban
centers closest
to their tribal domain
(Qashqaie khans lived in their
mansions in
Shiraz while the Bakhtiary
khans lived in Isfahan).
The khans were
recognized as the legitimate
power by their respective tribesmen.
The
common tribesmen, in contrast
to their khans, were illiterate
and
extremely poor, even by Iranian
standards.

Aside from tribal khans,

a

major portion of the farming lands

were owned by landlords who had
moved to cities in years past but
still had kept control of villages
owned by their families.

Some such

holdings included several hundred villages
and thousands of peasants

--the Alam family holdings in South
Khorasan for example.

The landlords

rarely visited their holdings but were
represented by their agents who

collected royalties.

As noted already, this system had its
benefits as

well as its shortcomings.

had

a

''2

In sum, both the khans and the
landlords

controlling influence over their respective
peoples.

As such,

they or their representatives gained
access to the parliament.

As a
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TABliE 1

Chronology of National
Consultative Assembly
(Majlis)
Date inaugurated

First Majlis
Second Majlis
Third Majlis
Fourth Majlis
Fifth Majlis
Sixth Majlis
Seventh Majlis
Eighth Majlis
Ninth Majlis
Tenth Majlis
Eleventh Majlis
Twelfth Majlis
hirteenth Majlis
ourteenth Majlis (1)
ifteenth Majlis
Sixteenth Majlis
Seventeenth Majlis
ighteenth Majlis
"ineteenth Majlis (2)
wentieth Majlis (3)

wenty-First Majlis
wenty-Second Majlis
wenty-Third Majlis
wen ty- Fourth Majlis

August 7, 1906
November 17, 1909
December 6, 1914
June 21, 1921
January 1924
July 6, 1926
October 6, 1928
December 15, 1930
March 15, 1933
June 4, 1935
September 11, 1938
October 27, 1939
November 12, 1941
(1944)
July 15, 1947

February 1950
April 27,
1952
March 15,
1954
May 31, 1956

August 27, 1960
February 21, 1961
October 1963
October 6, 1967
September 1971
September 1975

Date dissolved
June 23, 1908
December 24, 1911
November 1915
June 1923
February 1926
May 1928
September 1930
February 1933
March 1935
June 12, 1937
September 1939
October 1941
(1943)

March 12, 1946
August 7, 1949
February 1952
December 19, 1953
April 1956
June 1960
October 1960
May 9, 1961
September 1967
August 1971
August 1975
February 1979

Fourteenth Majlis were conducted under
certain condi^nn^M
"^^'"-^ P'^^P^^ elections were held, and,
^
in far?
''o^^teenth
Majlis was a continuation of the Thirteenth
Majlis!'
(2)

The term of the Majlis was extended from

impropriety and rigging

2

to 4 years.

in the elections for the
TwpntHlh°M!-v
Twent eth Majlis,"""fr^
the elections of June-July 1960 were
nullified and

new elections were held in January-February
1961
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result, for

n.uch

of its life, the .ajlis
remained within the domain

Of the landed aristocracy
in their battle to
safeguard their privileged
position Vis-a-vis the ruling
monarchs.
In essence, the Iranian
parliament, for much of its
life, was neither a forum
to legitimize the
traditional pluralism nor to
institute democratic reforms.
Despite the
reformist claims of Mohammad-Reza
Pahlavi from 1962-1978, he
used the

legislature to broaden his
power base by eliminating any
challenge from
the Majlis in order, he
felt, to ensure stability
and durability for
Himself and his dynasty. This
was a further step in instituting
a
political system where all
political power emanated from
tne throne.
In effect,

the Shan became the only
viable institution.

fplitical Parties

Political parties in Iran are

a

product of constitutional

government, emerging for the first time
in the Second Majlis in 1910.
The idea of political parties, in
fact a political division in the

Majlis, was promoted by Nasir al-Mulk,
the first regent for the minor

Ahmad Shah, who was fond of the
British Parliamentary system.

As

a

result, the Majlis was organized into
two political groupings. Democrats
and Ettedallion (the moderates).

The Democrats were the minority with

some 20 deputies joining their ranks.

There had been some political

groupings previously in the fight against
Mohammad-Ali Shah for safe-

guarding the constitution.

The Democrats had their foundation in the

ranks of the liberals in Tabriz and the workers
in the Baku oil fields
in Russian

Azarbaijan who had become acquainted with socialist
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theories.^

The Ettedallion were
supported by ™ore moderate
elements
such as the Bakhtlary Khans,
Ephrai™ Khan, the Armenian
constitutionalist, and his comrade-in-arms,
Sephadar Azam, who assumed
premiership

following^their victory over
anti-Constitutionalists led by MohammadAli Shah.

•'either party, however, had

organization.

a

Western style party

Thus, as the fate of the
Majlis fluctuated so did that

of the parties.

With the dissolution of the
Majlis in November 1915,

the issue of political
parties subsided for six years
until

the elec-

tions of 1921.

Dowreh.^^.
influenced by

Traditionally, the political process
in Iran has been
a

system of dowreh.45

circle, is basically
10 to

a

gathering of

D^wreh^ which literally means
a

number of individuals, between

15, who share similar interests.

Dowrehs serve economic, social

and cultural, as well as political
purposes.

Although dowrehs exist

among middle class as well as upper
class individuals, the ones with
elite membership, of course, are more
powerful and wield more political
clout.

Members of dowrehs meet regularly,
usually once

every other week.

a

As such, the dowreh

channel for dissemination of political
news and rumors.

The most significant function of dowreh

member is elevated to
a

a

,

however, is that when

a

politically important position, "there exists

long established coterie of fellow elites
who can be called upon to

fill" other positions attached to the member's
new post.^^
a

week or once

The political dowrehs meet to discuss and exchange
infor-

mation regarding prevailing political
events.

system acts as

a

Sometimes

few members of a dowreh are better known or are economically
or
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politically more po«erf.l than
other members.

Such dowrehs are usually

referred to by the „a.e of
that influential person or
persons.
Dowrehs
criss-cross social and political
lines.
For example, there are
dowrehs
representing graduates of a
certain foreign university
or country.
The

membership within

a

dpwreh remains fairly constant
and meetings are

limited to the dowrel^ members.

At

ti^s

the activities of a

dow^

are shouded in secrecy.

Although the dowreh system is
informal and limited in membership it, nevertheless, wields
much influence on the Iranian
political
process.

M.

M.

Balfour explained the role of
the dowreh at the turn

of the century by noting
that "In practice the country
is run
small rings of politicians
cooperating with a powerful and
corrupt
.

.

.

by

bureaucracy, whose aim is to enrich
themselves so far as possible before
a turn of the political
wheel brings their term of office
to an end."47
Members of a dpwreh usually belong
to the same generation and have
a

similar educational background.

By having their membership in
different

positions within the political structure,
the members are assured of
being able to utilize the system for
"purposes of mutual welfare."
As noted earlier, there are social

and cultural dowrehs as

well. An individual can be a member of
several dowrehs

.

As such, the

dpwreh provides "multiple association membership,"
facilitates "contact
with diversity of individuals within and without
the elite," and

establishes

a

system of "reciprocal obligations with as many
individuals

representing as diverse sectors of Iranian life as
"^^
possible.
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The dowreh system was part
of the Qajar system; the
Qajar kings
were themselves members of
the dowrehs.^^ After the
transfer of
monarchy from the Qajar dynasty
to the Pahlavi dynasty,
the dowreh
system retained its influence
on the political structure.
Even today,
the dpwr^eh system remains
influential.

Members of dj^wrehs, through

their informal system, assist
each other in obtaining positions
of
influence in the system. A recent
example displaying the importance
of
the dowreh system was that,
upon the ascendancy of Hassan-Ali
Mansur
in

1964 to premiership, members of his
cabinet or gained influential

posts in the government.50
of Mansur'

s

Aside from controlling the cabinet,
members

d_pwreh also formed the nucleus
of Iran Novin

(New Iran)

Party which became the dominant
political party from 1964-1975.

Dowreh

system earlier had also provided the
foundation of Mardom (People)
Party, formed in 1957 by Assadollah
Alam,

Shah, out of the former's dowreh.
tial

in the Majlis

of

single party-system.

a

until

a

very close confidant of the

The Mardom Party remained influen-

1975 when all parties were dissolved in
favor

As such, the dowreh system has served
as the first stage for

the development of a political party,
whereby the membership has been

broadened and opened to the public.

However, such

a

transition served

mainly the political ambitions of the original members
who strove for

greater political role by establishing their own political
parties.
Such parties also helped to legitimize the political ambitions
of the

aspirants.

As a consequence, most Iranian political

parties remained
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devoid of grassroots support,
with the .ajor exception
of the Tudeh
Party.

Powreh system has remained strong
within the Iranian political
tradition since it directly
benefits the close-knit
membership, whereas,
in political

parties the individual political
gains have to be shared

by a greatly expanded
membership and an individual's
political actions
and gains become public
knowledge.
This is contrary to the
desires of

most Iranians who prefer secrecy
and privacy to maximize their
gains.
Nonetheless, the historical analysis
of political parties in Iran
reveals

transformation from dowreh to party
when such transformations
were deemed useful; otherwise,
the dowreh system was retained.
a

^°Iili^^L£ar^^

D^3p.^^

significance of

the dowreh in the political
process of Iran, parties have assumed

certain significance also.

The importance of the party has
been due to

the composition of its leadership
or to its political ideology.
1957 until

1978, however,

a

From

the parties were formed by the
government to

give it a sense of legitimacy and an
aura of democracy.

The Tudeh

(masses) party, with communist ideology,
nonetheless, had remained the

best organized political party with

a

coherent ideology,

relying on

"intellectuals and popular agi tiation. "^^
With the opening of the IVth Majlis in 1921, some
elements from
the Democratic Party and Ettedalion formed

however, there was

a

a

Socialist Party.

Soon,

factionalism within the new party between the

younger members who favored Marxism and

a

close relationship with the

Soviet Union and the second group, who were older and distrusted
both
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the Russians and the
British.

Thus, while the

fo^er group

found

a

new

Socialist Party, the latter
became known as the Ettedalion.
The Ettedalion was able to gain a
majority in the Vth MajUs
which opened In
1923.
The Majlis, until 1928.
witnessed intense rivalry
between the
two parties.
The Ettedalion had fallen
under the control of the
clergy
led by Seyyed Hassan Moddaress.
Reza Shah, who had a deep
suspicion of
the parliamentary system.S^
by 1928 had gained complete
control of the
electoral procedure and thus had
turned the Majlis into his
virtual
domain.
Reza Shah banned political
parties of any kind after 1928.

Nevertheless, there were underground
political movements:
led by Dr. Arani

and Facscists led by Dr. Jahansuz.

Communists

Both groups were

uncovered; their members were
arrested; and several, along with
Dr.
Arani, died in the process.

^^l^^i^^i^^lMeL^^
in

Following Reza Shah's abdication

1941, several parties appeared on the
political scene,

newspapers and seeking representation in
the Majlis.

publishing

They represented

divergent political perspectives and, as
in many other developing
countries, they were built around one or
It was

a

few well-known politicians.

the personality, philosophy and/or the
conviction of the party

leader or leaders that attracted followers.

In

other words, political

parties became vehicles for the advancement of
the politician's goals
and ambitions.

The rise or decline of the fortunes of the
political

leader directly affected the future of the
political party.
Party was an exception.

The Tudeh

It is most often cited as an example of the

.
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most effective political
party in the Middle East
due to its tight
organization and its coherent
ideology.
The Tudeh "attempted
to aggregate through its own
organization, and was truly
conspi ratorial
Its organizational

structure was used as

a

model by other parties
as

divergent as Qavvam's Democrat-e
Iran Party and Alam's
Mardom Party.
During this period political
parties were constitutional,
liberal or nationalistic in
outlook while a few were
surrogates of the
occupying forces (British
and Soviets).
The beginning of this period
is

symbolized by the activities of
the Tudeh, supported by
the Soviet
Union, and the Iradeh Melli
(National Will) Party, led by
Seyyed Zia
al-Din Tabatabai which was
established with the blessings of
the
British to counter the Tudeh.

JMJ[udehJ^

The Tudeh Party has its roots
in the Social-

ist movement in Iran which
dates back to the first decade of
the

present century.
Iraj

Iskandari),

Among its early supporters was
Iskadar Mirza (later
a

Qajar prince.

Prior to any organized Marxist

political party, there had been labor
movements in many parts of the
country, initiated mainly by Iranians
who worked in the border regions
of Russia, particularly in the
Baku oil fields.

m

the IVth Majlis,

the Socialist Party (Ejtemayoun
Amiyoun) which represented some Marxist

sentiments, developed

a

link with communist-inspired labor
organizations

and supported their strikes.

Following Reza Shah's accession to the

throne, all political parties were
suppressed.
is credited with the

Dr. Arani

,

a

physician,

establishment of the Communist Party in Iran.^^

Following his return to Iran from Berlin in
the early 1930s, he founded
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his group, composed

™inly

thies for Marxian Ideals.

-rested

of students and
professionals «1th sympaDr.

Arani and 52

of his colleagues were

In

1937 and tried under the 1931
Act forbidding co„™un1st
activities.
All were sentenced to
long prison terms and Dr.
Arani
reportedly was murdered
57
_
uruerea in nrUnn
prison.
The Communist Party reemerged
as
the Tudeh Party in January
1942 as a result of the ''new
wartime democracy" which was enjoyed
following the occupation of
the country by the

Allies in 1941.

The leadership of the Tudeh
consisted mostly of those

members of the Communist Party
who had just been freed from
prison.
The Party was also joined by
others, naaely Seyyed Jaffar
Pishevarl,
who later gained fame as a
result of his position in the
Azarbaijan
separatist movement in 1945-46.
The Tudeh had an organization
similar to other communist

parties with

a

Central Executive Committee and

a

Control Commission. ^8

The party operated several papers
and had subsidiary organizations
for
students, women, workers, and peasants.
It also collaborated with

other political groups such as the
Anti-Fascist Society in the

communist-oriented United Front.^^
tionary rhetoric.
traditional

The Tudeh, however, avoided revolu-

"Its platform included all

the essential

features of

liberalism"; there was no mention of
collectivization or

nationalization of private properties.

The party, nonetheless,

remained strongest in the Russian zone of
occupation.

The Tudeh, for

the first time, gained eight seats in the
XlVth Majlis, inaugurated in

early 1944.^0

The Tudeh faced its first challenges from
within its own

ranks, when, with Soviet support, the
Azerbaijan Democratic Party, the
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provincia,

a™s

of the T.deh 1n Azerbaijan,
and the Kurdish Democratic

Party (K..elah) in Kurdistan
announced the autonomy of
their respective
regions in 1945.
The Azerbaijan De„»cratic
Party, under the leadership
of Pishevari. in September
declared Azerbaijan an
autonon»us state
In
December, he severed relations
with the central government
in Tehran
and declared the separation
of Azerbaijan.61
The Kurdish separatist
.novement. centered in the
Mahabad Republic, was led by
Qazi Mohammad,
elected as its president.
The blow to the communist
movement, in general, and to
the

Tudeh, in particular, was severe.

The party's central committee
in

Tehran, however, tried to keep
its distance from the separatist
movements.
Nevertheless, the party had appeared
as the covert front for
Soviet ambitions in Iran which
brought back to attention the imperialist Tzarist aims of reaching
the warm waters of the Indian
Ocean

through Iran.

Such a process was seen to be
undertaken through dis-

memberment of the nation through separatist
movement under the guise
of the Tudeh.

In Cottam's words, many Tudeh
members

for the first time

understood that "the objectives of
Iranian nationalism and international

communism were inherently contradictory.""

As a result, many of the

Tudeh membership split and established
their own separate organizations
or cooperated with other leftist groups.

Khalil Maleki was one such

individual who joined Qavvam's Iran Democratic
Party, later joined by
Dr.

Muzafar Baqai who finally established his own
Third Force Party,

Titoist association.

a

Ill

The Tudeh, following the
Azarbaijan and Kurdistan
affairs
was reduced in influence
and prestige.
With the assassination
attempt
on the Shah in 1949
blamed on it. its activities
were prohibited and

™de illegal."

Tudeh activities, however,
continued underground,

resurfacing in the early
1950s with increased
anti-British agitation
centered on the issue of
nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company.

In ™id-1953. Dr.

Mossadegh used the Tudeh and
its organization

to counter the rightist
and pro-monarchist activities
against his

government.

The Tudeh was allowed a
public demonstration on July
21.

1n the Majlis square
where the

their meeting.

sa^

morning the National Front had
held

The Tudeh attracted between
50.000 to 100.000 people-

five to ten times more than
the National Front.65

Once again the Tudeh

had shown its political strength
and vitality.

Following the abortive coup led
by pro-Shah officers on August
16,

the Shah fled the country and
most organizers of the coup, including

General Zahedi
.

went into hiding.

From

a

historical perspective, the

greatest mistake took place when the
Tudeh turned out mobs who pulled
down Reza Shah's statues and
"raised red flags over the city."
In
Guilan Province, the Tudeh elements
took control of the government.

Suddenly the Tudeh had emerged as the
chief threat to Dr. Mossadegh's
government, which was ironic because he
had thought that he was

employing the Tudeh to further his own
aims.

He struck back on August

18 by ordering the dispersal of the Tudeh
mobs.

the Tudeh as in retreat.

Within

a

few hours
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I„ 1945,

Ahmad Qavvan, (Qavvam alSaltaneh) established the
Iran Democratic Party
during his premiership
The main objective of this
party «as to sustain
Qavvam's premiership.
It established a central
committee with nine members
and had a youth
and women's organization
connected with It. Almost
all the politicians
of any consequence had
joined the ranks of the Iran
Democratic Party
with the exception of Dr.
Mossadegh, who was seen as a
"bull In a
china shop."

Politicians with close connection
to the Court were also
avoided.
Ahmad Qavvam Invited the Tudeh
and the Iran Party to join
the Iran Democratic Party
in a coalition.
The coalition was seen as
an attempt on Qavvam's part
to weaken the Tudeh Party and
to help him
to pack the Majl1s,68 the
elections for which had been delayed
since

early 1946 by

a

legislative rule that forbade holding
of elections so

long as there remained foreign
troops 1n Iran.^^

This legal bind had

left the nation without a
parliament for almost a year and a
half until
the elections for the XVth Majlis
were concluded in July 1947. The

absence of

a

legislative assembly gave Qavvam

a

freer hand in the con-

ducting of affairs of state,
particularly In his negotiations with the

Soviet Union regarding the affairs of
Azarbaijan.

Three Tudeh members joined Qavvam In his
1946 cabinet to display good faith and an eagerness to work
closely with the Soviet Union
in resolving the conflict over
Azarbaijan and to give Qavvam a show of

continued support for the oil agreement with the
Soviet Union which
needed the ratification of the Majlis whose
elections were postponed
until

all

Soviet troops were removed from Iranian soil.

In the
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elections of 1947, 85 out of
136 deputies were affiliated
with Qavva^'s
Iran Democratic Party,
the rest going mostly to
the candidates of the
court who were elected following
the army's entrance to
Azarbaijan
after the Soviet withdrawal.
Qavvam's control over the
Majlis, however,
declined sharply when his
acquiescence to the Soviet demands
were made
public.
Qavvam had worked out an agreement
with the Soviets, including
a 51 percent share in
an oil concession to them
in northern Iran.^^
This was in dire contrast to
the Majlis guidelines that
forbade any
such talks prior to an approval
by the Majlis.

agreement was rejected by

a

vote of 100 to

2.

The Russo-Iranian Oil
A subsequent vote of no

confidence resulted in the resignation
of Qavvam as prime minister
and
the appointment of Ebrahim Hakimy
on December 27, 1947 as the new

premier.
Iran Party

.

The Iran Party was formed primarily as
an engin-

eers association in 1941.

In

engineer-politician and later
it became a political

1943, at the urging of Alahyar Saleh, an
a

prominent figure in the National Front,

party and adopted its name.

Due to its composi-

tion from the ranks of the educated and
intellectuals, it was

a

valu-

able ally for those advocating radical reforms
and modernization.

party joined Qavvam in

a

coalition with the Tudeh.

Although the coali-

tion was shortlived, the Iran Party attained
prominence.

7''

It joined

other parties in the National Front led by Dr. Mohammad
Mossadegh,
advocating radical reforms, nationalism, and nationalization of
the
oil

industry.

The
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With the decline of

Qavva™ and his party, .any
new political parties
ca.e into being «hose
leaders had been his
associates.
Ba.ai established the
Toilers Party
He had been elected to
the XVth Hajlis (1947-49)
under the banner of
Qavvam's Iran Democratic Party,
but he split with Qavva.
a year later
to for. the Organization
for Supervising the
Freedom of Elections in
his native Kerman in
preparation for the elections for
the XVIth Majlis
in 1950.
After his election this
organization was changed to
Organization for Supervising the
Implementation of the Law.
Following Dr.
Mossadegh's accession to premiership,
Baqai brought together all
his
political organizations under
the Tollers Party and later
joined Dr.
Mossadegh's National Front coalition.
The Toilers Party is an example
of the middle class parties

that were used as vehicles of
personal

interests.

Contrasted with the

Toilers Party is the case of
organizations such as the Iran Party
that

represented class interests.

Leonard Binder notes that the platforms

of the Toilers Party and Iran Party
"were essentially programs rather
than reasoned systems of values,"
and, as such, they were similar.

The

Tollers Party, under the leadership
of Dr. Baqai and his personal
approach, attempted "to achieve power
through cooperation and bargaining
with existing, even traditional, leaders
of groups or interests. "'^
Such an approach, however, resulted in
the distrust of Dr. Baqai and
some of his associates In the Toilers Party
by Dr. Mossadegh.

friction resulted in

a

The

split in the Toilers Party, resulting in the
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formation of
of Khali

1

new group called the Third
Force under the leadership
Maleki.
a

M^:ii^ce.^^j^^

Khalil Maleki had been
a

member of the original Communist
Party, Jailed and
suppressed under
Reza Shah.
Following the establishment
of the Tudeh by the
remnants of
the communist group, Maleki
had become a member of the
Tudeh.
However,
he broke with Tudeh and
established the Iranian Socialist
Society as
the only "true" communist
party in Iran.
The Socialist Society was

dissolved upon Soviet opposition
to Maleki

's

claim.

Maleki subsequently

joined Dr. Baqai and gained
prominence through the latter's
political
organization.
Upon the split, Maleki
expounded on the nature of his
party's anti-communism and its
promotion of "Nehru Socialism,"
"Titoism," and "West European
Socialism."

After

a

brief detention

following the Shah's return to
power, Maleki resumed his
anti-communist
activities mainly by translating
articles for his journal. ^3

PilLliarmts.
into two groups.

Historically, the Pan-Iranists have
been divided

Hezb-e Mellat-e Iran (Iranian Nation's
Party) led by

Dariush Foruhar was formed from
the followers of Dr. Jahansuz and
was

basically anti-communist.

Its rank and file was composed of
members

of bazaar guilds and small merchants.
Dr.

This group cooperated with

Mossadegh and until 1979 was part of the
National Front.
The second group, under the leadership
of Dr. Munshizadeh, grew

out of Sumka (National Socialist Workers
Party of Iran).

The party

opposed the Tudeh, but it also criticized
Dr. Mossadegh and cooperated
with the Court.

Sumka reportedly had

a

working relationship with
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General Zahedi and some
other right-wing generals.

along with all other
parties, during General
Zahedi
It was asked, however,

Su.ka was banned
^s

peremiership.

to participate in the
Shah's birthday celebra-

tions in 1954 by putting

a

wreath on Reza Shah's grave.

The Sumka split into several
factions during the 1950s.
Arya
Party was formed by the
Sepher brothers as a result of
an internal
dispute.
It later joined the Mardum
(People) Party.
Another group,
led by Abbas Amini, split
from the party, calling itself
Feday-e
Iranshah (sacrifices for Shah)
Party in 1956. Another group
led by
Dr.

Fazl-ollah Sadr left the party
in 1967 and formed the
Iranian Party.
The remnants of the party
are presently known as Pan
Iranists, led by
Mr.

Mohsen Pezeshkpour who had been

until

a

deputy in the Majlis from 1964

1978.

The Sumka ideology was patterned
after the Nazi Party in

Germany "glorifying the struggle for
power above all else, stressing
racialism, attacking capitalism and
imperialism, (and) attacking democ-

racy."^^
Fun damentalists,.
in the late

Islam. 77

Two groups that gained national
prominence

1940s and early 1950s were Fedaeyan-e
Islam and Mjuahedeen-e

jhe former, led by Navvab Safavi

,

gained fame by the assassina-

ation of Premier Haj Ali Razmara in 1951
and other political violence

including assassinations and attempted
assassinations. 7^

The group,

although underground, remained active during
the 1950s and 1960s as
seen by the attempted assassination of Premier
Hussein Ala in 1955 and
the assassination of Premier Hassan-Ali Mansur
in 1965.

The Fedaeyan
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-s

an

fundamentalist g.oup.

They were also motivated
by
nat1o„al1s. "seeMng to
p.Hf, the Persian language
and .unite

t-1an-SM.ite
under an

the

lands as well as to
establish an Isla.ic

go™

Imam.'"^^

The Mujahedeen-e Isla.
was led by Sha.s
Qanat-abadi and had
Close association with
Mulla Kashani. a .ember
of the clergy and a
Ma,l,s deputy.
Li,e the Fedaeyan, the
Mujahedeen were also nationalistic and fundamentalists.
The two groups cooperated
for a short
While, but the opposition
of the Fedaeyan to the
traditional clergy,
of which Kashani was
one, led to their
eventual split.80 The
Mujahedeen was basically a
political organization built
by Safavi and
nurtured by Kashani to further
their ai.s of pan-Islamism.
With the
break between Dr. Mossadegh
and Mulla Kashani. brought
about by the
former's heavy reliance on
the Tudeh to accomplish
his goals, the
coalition between the National
Front and the Mujahedeen was
severed
and the latter, as a viable
political group, was nullified.

^^^i^5naLFm]juyet^^

Following the decline of

Qavvam's Iran Democratic Party,
many of its members joined
Dr. Mossadegh in the National Front:
Dr. Shayegan, Hussein Makki,
and Amir

Alaee among many.

The National Front was a
coalition of several

political parties, including the
Iran Party, Toilers Party, The
Third
Force Party, and the Pan Iranists
led by Darisuh Foruhar.
The National

Front coalition was composed of
elements representing all social
classes
and all segments of the body
politic including right and left,
upperclass and lower-class, professionals
and farmers, as well as clergy and
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secular.

—

The front was
composed of political

-

'

....

*™n^

--ossaae..

,

le..»
'^3ders united behind
•

political pre.o.i.nce
of

Z

a. ,eco.e the personification Of
the iran-

for political
independence and national
di.nit,.
such
ne was accepted
and truqtori h„ ,
increasing public as
an 'absolutely trustworthy
leader who deserved
their wholehearted
and
-critical support... The
..symbolic leadership.,
of Or. Hossadegh
and
e formation of
political groupings
behind him gave the
National Pront
the Vitality for
it to become the
dominant political factor
from 1951
to 1953.
The groups represented
in the National
Pront ranged from
the

M

and, ideologically,
the center-left dominated
the political perspective.
The disparate nature
of the front, however,
made possible only
the broadest and most
general policy platforms.
In sum.

the political parties
of this period, for
the most

part, remained short-lived
and as the political
fortune of its leader/
leaders declined so did
the party.
Thus, only a few of the
parties of
this period lasted more
than a few years.
The main exceptions were
the
Tudeh and the National
Front, both of which went
underground following
the overthrow of Mossadegh.
Patterns of membership and
support differed
greatly.
While party discipline
and organized cell-structure
prevailed
in the Tudeh Party,
others, such as the fundamentalist
groups, had
loose organizations and a
changing pattern of affiliation.
The National
Front, due to its broad
scope of affiliation, had the
largest national
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-ss suppon.

w.e.eas,

suppose, o.

.0. .3c.p„.„ea a.

—

.

t.e Tu.e..

_

;
Effect,ve ^..e.shlp

hundred to
popularity.

a

-1.es

n«™us

e.e«.e.

ot.e. pa..es
.enected cuss an.

Z

aU.ou,. ,ess

Of pe.o„al

,„,e.ests, 1„

po^lca, amnions

'

.ost parties was

so^he.e between a few
few thousand.
thniiQ;inH
If even that, at
the high point of
their
-.--p

'^^-^^^^^^-^^^i^^^^Mi^

Following the fan

o.Dr Hossa
political parties, even
those friendl, to the
court, were
suppressed,
.either prl^ .master
Zahedl (1953-1955) nor
Hussein
AU (1955-195;) were friendl,
towards the Idea of
formation of political parties.
The Tudeh was severely
repressed.
Following the
uncovering of an alleged
ring of over 500 Tudeh
sympathisers within
the ranks of the armed
forces, the Tudeh's
resistance had hro.en down
and Its organization
was 1n d1sarra..83
^^^^
the country and
regrouped 1„ Eastern Europe
with East Berlin as their
center of political
activities.
Although son. Tudeh elements
remained
active among Iranian
student organizations in
the West, their signiflcance was negligible.

an

J^^^J*!^Mm^s:(stm.

Beginning in 1957, two
political parties

were forced by the Shah's
closest aides, Asadolla Alam
and Dr. Manuchehr
Eqbal, at the urging of the
United States.
The former na^d his party

Mardum (People), while the
latter called his Melliyoun
(Nationalists).
Since Dr. Eqbal had been
appointed prime minister in
1957. his party
became the government party
while Mardum remained the
opposition.

In
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the Shah's own
words

y

Of

thp establishment
pc+^^kt u

sent™
'

desire on the

"-«"1-er-t.pe

—

of these parties
was "helped

pan

of the Americans
and

of democracy (l„

.ve

an air Of

democrat

-eain..es.ste.

th'

.as con-

;
trolled
by the Shah since
he was the fln,i ,
authority who approved
,
the
I'st Of candidates
for the Majlis
«4
elections.
.

-tly

Neither party had any
grassroots support and
their memberships
consisted, i„ the one
case, of the members
of Alam's dowreh
Civil servants Who.
by

Hen.youn party, had hoped

e-nt.sa

to advance their
positions within the
,ov-

,,,,,3
^^^^^^^^

^^^^^^^

Of course" parties.

The two parties,
nevertheless, were supposed
to
have some ideological
differences.
Mardum represented itself
as a
-formist party favoring
land reforms, "labor
welfare, e.ual rights
for
women, and social
insurance." The Melliyoun.
on the other hand
represented a more
traditional mode of the
country with its ran^
and
f'le dependent on
individuals who enjoyed
much influence and
access to
sources of power within
the establishment.
Its ideology differed
little from that of Mardum,
but it stressed free
medical service, labor
benefits, purification of
the Persian language,
and "physical exercise
and scouting. "^7

Corruption and ballot box
rigging i„ the 1960 elections,
mostly
as a result of Dr.
Eqbal's excesses, led the
Shah to nullify the elections. 88 Dr. Eqbal's
prompt resignation was asked
and new elections
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--.o.eMa„U.o.Kas.a.-

e.c.ons

....

.o.

XX.

:'^^-r^^^^^'^'^^------ee,ec.o.a..,,.
e .oHa
P.SS

to

CO.. .e e,ection
p.cess.

T.e opposU.on

the occasion as
an opportunity
to increase its
activities ^0

-tlonai Pront revived
e.onstration

A-di

in

,,a,.

its activities ana
.e,a its

W.est

.e.
The

post-,S53

The Pront also „eico..
to its ran.s
«eh.at-e

Iran (Freedo. Hove„,ent

oMran)

Ayatollah Nah.oud Tale.hanl.^l

,

,ed by Hehdl Bazargan
and

The Preedo. Hove.ent
was

Of activists .ith
,s,a.ic orientation with

bazaans, clergy and
students.

a

a

coalition

polltica, 5ase a^ong
the

With the resignation
of Dr. A^ini fro™
premiership in ,962 the
new.y appointed premier,
AsadoHah Ala™, proposed a
coalition gove^nto the National
front.
The proposition fel,
through when the gap
between the Shah and
the National front
proved unbridgeable.^^

-t

On^dj^nnanljart^s^

following the January 1953
refer-

endum approving the Shah
sponsored ^asures which
becan,e known as the
White Revolution," a
government sponsored congress
of Free Hen and
Won,en

of Iran was inaugurated
in Tehran.

This congress

beca^

the

foundation of the Iran Novin
(New Iran) Party. led by
Hassan-Ali Hansur
and the members of his
dowreh.
Some 85 percent of the deputies
of the
XXIst Majlis that had been
opened in October promptly
joined the new
party with the remaining
going to Alam's Mardum Party,
functioning
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as t.e „,i„o.u.

"

pan..

'--"--Mc.

"
IT'
-.p.nica,

Pames

I.e.

also t..ee deputies
f.o. tHe

.a. r.an1an claims
to Ba..e,„ isUn.s
and

s™
"

„e.e

for seats 1n either
house of parliament.

-

-

p'-o™.

and we.e not a„o„e.
to co.ete

The dominance of Iran
Novin in the Iranian
political process
lasted for ,2 .ears
under the leadership
of A^ir Ahhas
Hoveida who heca.e the pri,„e minister
in 1965 after the
assassination of Mansur
O^^in, this period the
Shah was able to
manipulate the Iranian
political
process including the
legislature through the
party and, thus, to
legislate his own policies.
However, the public
remained indifferent
and apathetic to the
political process devised
by the Shah.
Voter
turnout at elections was
scant and those who
participated did so often
under pressure from
their supervisors at
government or factory
Jobs
During the late 1960s and
the 1970s extremist
attacks on the
government, in the for. of
guerrilla operations, began
to appear with
increased frequency.
Although the police and SAVAK
were able to
neutralize the guerrilla
operations to a great extent,
they were never
effectively neutralized.

UiM^Jm^Lllstem.

In the face of

growing opposition to

his

increasingly oppressive rule,
the Shah, in order to broaden
the
base of support for his rule,
envisioned politicizing the whole
adult
population of the country and to
involve everybody in the political
process.

This approach was based on
the assumption that the silent

majority, particularly the working
class and the farmers, supported
his
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-t.e
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Thus. ,y 1n.„„,„g
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po,U,ca, process, he cou,.
offset the cHtlcls.
of
Rasta.h1z-e MeHi

the oppos-

(National Resurgence)
Pan., 1„ Ha.ch ,975

beca.e the on,, offlca,,.
sanctioned polUIca,

An

pan.

1„ the

count./

other previous,, sanctioned
panies were dissolved and
Joined the
-ks Of the new part.. The political
phllosoph. of Rasta.hiz
was
based on three fundamentals:
"The Shah-People
Revolution" (The White
Revolution,; the Institution
of anarch, as an
Inseparable pan of the
lran,an soclo-poHtlcal
s.ste.; and adherence
to the constitution
of
1906-07.
Within this framework.
It was envisioned
that diverse political opinion could be
formed so long as the
funda^ntal principles were
adhered to.
The part, was Intended
as a pennanent
Institution and
membership 1„ the part,
was seen as an Indication
of lo.alt. to the
".onarch..94

^hus the Shah had declared
that "Ever.one must be
man
enough to clarlf. his
position In this countr..
He either approves of
the conditions or he
does not." Therefore,
an Iranian not joining
the
Rastakhiz Part, was rejecting
the principles set fonh
and was regarded
by the Shah as a
"traitor who should be In an
Iranian prison, or should
leave the countr.."^^
^he Iranian press actual,,
carried repons on
one person who opted to
leave the country.
Therefore, the assumption
was that a,l who had
remained were lo.al to the
principles of the

Rastakhiz Part..

over the country.

Neighborhood branches of the part,
were set up

B. ,976, there were
7,289 urban and ,3,578 rural

.nits of the part, with some
2.4 million ambers.
in

a„

sUce membership

the part, was rumored to be
compulsor., man. had actuall. joined

for fear of reprisals and
attendance at meetings was ver. poor.
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The organizational
apparatus of the party

mc.ed

at

Us

head

With 25 members.

Some of the Mdrty
party leader,
.
leaders h.n
had .had
experience in
party organization
as members of thp t,.h ^
"^'"^ly Mohammad Baheri
,
and
Mahmoud Jafarian.
anticipation of divergent
oolif
political1 views and
to
contro, s.ch .lews,
two ,ead1n, .ethers
o. the .ove^ent,
.a^sheed
A™.e,ar and Hushang Ansarl,
were designated
respective,, as the
leaders of the
Progressive'' and
Constructive', wings of
the part.
under the auspices of
the party, elections
were held in August
1975
wMch onl. the candidates
of the Rasta.hiz
Part, would compete
for
seats.

_

,

^

•

-

The economic problems
of 1977. with rising
unemployment, ra.Pant inflation and shortage
of raw materials and
food stuffs, on top
Of the ever increasing
gap between the poor
and the rich, was
straining
the political structure
as well.
Oa.sheed Amuzegar, previously
the
leader of the Progressi
ve^^ wing i„ the
party which believed that
'too
h^gh Of a price should
not be paid for economic
development,^^ was as.ed
to for. a cabinet.
Hoveida. after 13 years of
premiership, the longest
the constitutional history
of Iran, resigned.
Amuzegar^s appoint^nt. although he was a reform
minded technocrat, was a
disappointment
for many.
Public opinion had been
made ready for the appointment
of a
prime minister who would
not be connected with the
Shah and his political apparatus.
The rumors had persistently
namd All Amini. the one
time prime minister from
1961-62 as the probable
candidate.
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The Change in the
govern^nt 1„ 1977
coincided with the

-;;-----a.te.. _,enc.
o-.poiic.

-

-ncidin,

also a .elative

5ec«

one ot the

With

in

Ca.e.s

..edo. of p.ss

..ington With

his

p.o.se

election to the
p^sidenc.

in

.>st targets .0. c.ticis.

h. the

p.ss. The political alienation and indignation that had
heen ..wing as the
.esult 0.
the establishment
of a single political
pan,, .ased on pHnciples

-cn

gene.all, had little
s.ppo.t fro. the p.hlic,
Even the Shah himself
c.tici.ed
the

c-ncy and deviation f.o.

pan.

h.st

into the open

fo. its co.^ption,
ineffi-

his goals and ambitions.

Howeve., it was

Rastakhiz ticket, declared
their Independence from
the party
the end of the year,
the number of Majlis
deputies who challenged
the
government and Its policies
had reached two dozen.^^
,,,,
revolutionary fervor, the
Shah and the institution
of the Rastakhiz
Party that he had built
and had envisioned to
endure beyond his lifetime crumbled before
him.

"

LMel_sumMri.

This brief history of
Iranian political

parties clearly Indicates
that, while gaining control
of the institutions of government, the
Shah was not Interested in
political parties
that would have had
grassroots support. I.e., parties
that would
develop from the public need
for a vehicle of political
expression.
The parties since 1957
had been created by the
governn^nt and given a
philosophical framework based on
support for the Shah, with attempts

'
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vehicles of public
political expressions
P^-essions.
ThP„ never gained
They
popularity
or Ipnif
the public.
The parties that had
grassroots support
the national Pront
and Tudeh, were
suppressed,
it is inte
est,ng to note that
the Shah, i„ January
1979, relied on a
.e.her of
the National Pront,
Dr. Shahpour
Ba.htiar. to save the
monarchy.
By
the ti.e Of Hoha^ad-Reza
Shah's abdication in
January 1979, so.e 100
political parties and
groups had co.e into
existence vying for
polit-

oMegu^cy.th
.

«

F-t,

were Just emerging fro.
underground,

had just been founded.

*reas.

.any other parties

Media
The recent experience
of the „,edia has been
similar to that of
other institutions. Just
as there was freedom
of expression in the
niedia during the
periods of relative political
freedom, nan^ly ,941-53,
so the „,edia was controlled
by the authoritarian
rule very much like
the political parties and
other political institutions.

Mnteij^.

The press, newspapers and
magazines were introduced to
Iran early in the 19th
century.
During the Constitutional
Revolution,
the press was greatly
responsible for disseminating
democratic ideals
and principles that resulted
in the adoption of the
Constitution of
1906-07.
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The press suffered
fro. t.e autho.1tan-a„
and repressive
rule

PollticaMroups and parties.

For exa.ple, durin,
this period the

T.de. Part, and Its
affiliate organizations
puMlshed so.e ,0 separate
newspapers or magazines
with
Wuh t-i,„
the coup against Dr.
9 zines.
Mossadegh and the
Shah to power, an
0.
the newspapers and
magazines associated
Uh the political groups that
had supported Dr.
.ossadegh were .anned
only a few Independents,
namely
^nd Ettel^.^, remained
In operation.
The content of these
papers, however, was
controlled and
censored.

-rn

Ke^

The censorship and
unreliability of news,
especially domestic
rendered the press
Ineffective as a vehicle
of news reporting
,n
fact, the most popular
pages of the two leading
evening Tehran papers
'
and
were the obituary and
the classified sections.
The 1963 Press Laws
greatly reduced the number
of newspapers
and and news magazines
thus further undermining
the effectiveness of
the press.
The law forbade the
publication of newspapers with
circulation of less than 3,000
copies and magazines with
less than 5,000.
In

^

EtteW.

1970, an optimistic estimate of
press circulation In Iran
Included

200,000 copies of dally newspapers,
50,000 copies of weekly newspapers,
200,000 copies of weekly magazines.
20,000 copies of monthly magazines,
and 30,000 copies of
almanacs.
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The newspapers,
however
i.f.
information
on new policiec;

servpH

n

'
^nr^

P'^'P^^^ 0^ disseminatinq

^

.

directives

^^th the establishment
of the Rastakhiz
^niz rarty,
Party

a new
n
morning dailv
appropriately called
Rastakhiz as it was th. f.official newspaper
of thp
party, was added
to the short list
of Iranian
•

''"^

1n a very short

ti^

"

'
spokesOf the ,o.ern™ent
that its editorials
and news releases
were care
fully read by the
interpst^H „ u-,
Placed government
urncials would resort
esort tn
to the newspaper
as their primary
source of
-formation and guidelines
for new government
policies
a

«nh

increased economic
problems and desparate
urban problems.

-spapers criticizing
^IS^est Officials.

-^"cism

government officials
but never reaching
the
By .id-l.;a, when
the revolution was
well

unde.ay

Of highly placed
individuals.

Shan, began to appear
in the
e papers
papers.

cism of the Shah or
the roval
fam^i,,
royal family.

.„y

close confidants of
the

;tin .-h
Still
there was no direct
crititu
There even was some
support for

the Shah. Who.
according to the then
highly respected editor
of the

independent

Kho^,

,3ghar Amirani. had been
misled by the

corrupt Officials of
the government.

was a large drop in
sales.

Soon after this assertion
in an

However, with relative
freedom and relaxa-

tion of censorship on
the press, circulation
of daily papers such
as
and
reached a million copies
a day.
Following the

MMH

EtMl,^

demonstrations in Tehran on
November 4 and

5,

the Shah installed a

'
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military government headed by the armed
forces' chief of staff. General
Azhari.

With the imposition of censorship and
curtailment of press

rights that had been guaranteed by the
outgoing prime minister Sharief-

Emami, the press went on strike and the majority
of the newspapers,

including Keyhan and Ettela'at

,

did not publish for two months, until

January 6, 1979 when Shahpour Bakhtiar's government
was installed.
In 1967,

cation,

a

""^^

following the reorganization of the Ministry of Edu-

new ministry called Ministry of Arts and Culture,
headed by

Mehrdad Pahlbod, the Shah's brother-in-law, was established.

This

ministry, along with Ministry of Information and Tourism, was
delegated

power over publication of newspapers, magazines and books.

Many books

waited for years at the Ministry of Arts and Culture to be approved for
publication.

Those that did, obviously applauded the government's

perspective.

Often there would be so much of

to get the government's approval

publication of the book.

a

book deleted in order

that the authors would forego the

Those writers who had dared to make any direct

or even indirect criticism of the Shah were harshly dealt with, often

with torture and imprisonment.

As a result,

very few books dealing

with the socio-political situation in Iran were approved for publication.

The book publishing industry in Iran was in

books ever went beyond the first printing.

was regarded as

a

best seller.

a

bleak state.

Few

Anything over 3,000 copies

Most of the 1,500 titles published in

Iran during 1976-77 were on literary and religious subjects.
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In

short, the interested public had little opportunity to read expository

works on socio-political issues.
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The classical tradition of poetry remained
to express their political

Reza Barahani

writer and poet, notes that "Iranian poetry

to the people;

censors.

vehicle for some

frustrations and thus to communicate with

those who searched for elusive meanings.

tripled-tongued metaphors.

a

full

is

,

an Iranian

of double-and-

One meaning opens the secrets of repression

the other conceals them from the curious
eyes of the

Thus, the new school of Iranian poetry is
written on one hand

from the viewpoint of the people and on the other
from that of the
police."

Furthermore, Iranian writers go through "ingenious methods

to get permission from the government censors" to publish
their books.

Barahani, for example, concedes that he wrote

a

whole piece on "the

situation of repression in the country and simply signed it Bertolt
Brecht."

The piece was published without any problems since Brecht was

on the approved list.^^-^
In contrast,

1978 experienced

a

tremendous boom in the sale of

books, mostly the previously banned books by both Iranian and foreign

writers.

Sidewalk book stalls sprouted all over Tehran and all major

cities, offering books on social and political, as well as critical

literary works.

Although many books were being pirated, there was

a

flourishing book publishing business, with many books going into second
and third printings in

a

matter of one year.

The Iranians, who only

five years before were reading an average of less than 30 seconds of

books per year,

1

04

had turned into avid readers of all kinds of publi-

cations, including newspapers, magazines and books.
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ElectronlcjTigdia.

Although the first radio station in Iran
was estab-

lished in 1940, many Iranians still tuned
into the stations in the

neighboring countries, Turkey and the Soviet
Union.

The program of

the first radio station in Iran was most
devoted to the praise of Reza

Shah and his modernizing achievements.

The radio system in Iran, since

its establishment, has been state owned
and operated.

Thus, it always

has been the instrument of government
policies and propaganda.

radio networks broadcast the government version of
the news.

The
It also

had programs geared towards farmers and workers
along with general

entertainment.
The National

Iranian Radio and Television (NIRT), in the late

1970s, had a transmitting station in all major cities
with some pro-

grams in the local

languages and dialects.

covered by two 2,000 kilowatt stations.

The country was also

Among major Asian nations,

after Japan, Iran had the highest number of radio receivers per capita
(see TABLE 3).

Thus, the radio networks were becoming an increasingly

TABLE

3

The number of radio receivers per 1,000 inhabitants in some
Asian countries*

Bahrein (1974)
Hong Kong (1975)
India (1974)
Iran (1974)

*Source:

412
574
25
249

Iraq (1974)

Japan (1975)
Kuwait (1974)
Lebanon (1974)

United Nations Statistical Yearbook:
p.

944.

116
465
231

474

1976, Table 217,

133

effective means of communication in
the country.

Despite the revolu-

tionary fervor and relaxation of press
censorship, the radio networks,

except on

a

few occasions, never achieved the
freedom to disseminate

news which the press had during most of
1978.

A large portion of radio

listeners, during the 1978 uprising, listened
to the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) programs in Farsi
to learn of the events in Iran
and to get a firsthand report of the
political developments, particu-

larly in the absence of newspapers during
the military government of
General Azhari

in

November and December 1978.

Since the 1950s, two

radio stations, Paik-e Iran and Radio Melli-e
Iran, both Soviet

sponsored, had been broadcasting news to Iranian
listeners on
basis.

a

daily

These stations, however, ended their activities
following the

improvement of Iranian relations with the Soviet Union
and were both
off the air by 1976.
The first television station in Iran began operation in 1958.

Within

a

short time another station in Abadan, southwestern Iran, began

operations.

These two private stations, along with an American Armed

Forces Radio and Television station, were the only television stations
in the country until

the mid-1960s.

Although the two stations were

private, nevertheless, their broadcasts, especially the news programs,

were controlled by the government.

The government, under the auspices

of the Ministry of Information and Tourism, set up television stations
in Tehran and other major cities and soon brought under its

both of the privately owned stations.

control

The American stations, radio and

television, however, continued their independent course until 1977 when
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they were taken over by NIRT.

The programming of these stations,
how-

ever, remained in English and was basically
intended for the foreign

community residing in Iran.

Television broadcasting, despite having been in
private hands
for several years, remained

a

tool of government propaganda.

radio networks, it never achieved

a

respectable position as

Like the
a

source of domestic news so far as the public was
concerned.

reliable
The

entertainment programs of the television stations were
mostly of
foreign nature, mainly American.

a

The domestically produced programs,

although dealing critically with certain social problems,
nevertheless,

avoided prevailing political issues.

The television media, particularly

during the last decade, was used effectively as

a

propaganda medium.

The evening news, news shows and special shows were used to publicize
the policies of the government and its achievements and to praise the

Shah and the benefits of his reforms for the nation, and thus attempted
to gain support for his rule.

ical

Furthermore, on occasion some philosoph-

debates would be conducted on the air to display the openness of

the television media as a vehicle for dissemination of ideas.

The

debates, howe\/er, would center on issues least relevant to the on-going

problems of the country.

According to the government's plan, by the

end of the 1970s, the television medium would have covered some 70 percent of the population of the country, and thus would have been an

effective medium of communication.
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S umma ry

With the centralization of authority in Tehran
achieved by
Reza Shah and the supremacy of monarch over other
institutions,

era in the Iranian political process began.

a

new

Despite the stipulations

in the Constitution of 1906-07 dividing the government
into three

separate but equal branches, the executive, led by Reza Shah and
later
by Mohammad-Reza Shah, manipulated the legislature and
the judiciary.

The decade following the Allied occupation of Iran with Reza Shah

deposed saw rule of law brought back to the country.

However, with

the overthrow of Dr. Mossadegh's government in 1953, the political

power reverted back to the hands of the monarch, with other institutions, once again, subjugated to the policies of the court.

The

dominance of the institution of monarchy, naturally, meant the weakness
of other institutions.

Contributing to the inability of the legisla-

ture and political parties to withstand the pressures of the monarchy

was the use of such institutions by individuals for personal purposes.

Political parties were mainly vehicles of the personal ambitions of one
or more politicians.

coherent ideology.

Such parties lacked organization, discipline, and

The legislature, furthermore, functioned as an arena

for political power brokers and political opportunists, landed aristocracy who dominated the Majlis through the 1950s.

Although at times

moved by nationalist aspirations, the Majlis deputies represented

a

more traditional cross-section of the country and resisted changes that

would cause any weakening of their traditional power bases.

The con-

flict between the Shah and the legislature was resolved, with the
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former in total control, when the Shah
led land reforms that debased
the landed aristocracy, thus changing
the Shah from an authoritarian

ruler to

a

totalitarian one.

This re-established the power of the

Shah over all other political institutions.

The Shah, nonetheless,

retained "democratic-looking" institutions
to be able to laud himself
as a liberal-minded monarch who utilized
a constitutional

running the affairs of the state.

Only

a

process in

shell remained of the consti-

tutional political system of the nation after
the monarch had destroyed
or weakened other contending institutions, thus
making the monarchy the

pervasuve institution.

No thought was given to the prospect that per-

haps there lurked a danger for the monarchy in a weakened
constitutional

process where the inadequacies of the political institutions did
not
allow them to withstand political threats from within.

As such, the

Rastakhiz Party and the legislature were in no position to come to the
aid of the monarchy at its darkest hour.
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CHAPTER

III

INDIVIDUALISM AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
Like so many attributes of Iranian society,
the political ideal
of the nation and its religious sentiments
are in contrast and antip-

athy to each other.

The traditional political ideal calls for

a

strong

and benevolent leader, while Shiah doctrine holds
all temporal powers

illegitimate.

This contrast is reflected in the outlook of the
members

of the society who are torn between these two opposing
traditions.

Although one feeling may win out as the overriding reality
for

a

time,

the other twin, nonetheless, lingers on until the time for
its rise to

political supremacy comes.

Many regard Shi 'ism as

a

philosophical out-

come of the Iranian cultural tradition which is estranged from the

rational-political world as

a

result of

a

history that has been filled

with phsyical insecurities resulting from Mongol
invasions, to name but
as

a

a

These have rendered the average

very insecure person who feels that the course of his life is

generally out of his control.
as

Turkic and Afghan

few, coupled with natural catastrophies such

disease, earthquake and drought.

Iranian

,

Depending on myth, magic and fate serve

an escape from the harsh realities of the world.

person turned inside.

The result is

a

Since God is held to be just, therefore, one

has no fear of relegating oneself unto His hands.

The earthly life may

be harsh but it is believed to be only a testing ground to prove one's
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devotion to the Creator.

Piety and communion with God take precedence

over one's relationships with fellow beings.

Mysticism

is

outgrowth of this metaphysical and nonrational philosophy.

natural

a

Disregard

for temporalities, as already noted, render all things
related to them
as superfluous and unnecessary,

including the political apparatus.

The

only legitimate political authority that matters is
belief in the

Hidden Imam whose return is sought to bring justice to the
world.
Thus the individual

is on his own

without any attachments or

responsibilities to political authority or to society in general.

responsibility is to his family, both immediate and extended.

His

Disregard

for society in general influences the development/lack of development
of political institutions in the country.

For example, the formation

of political parties, the bureaucracy, the cabinet, and even the personal and dictatorial

rule of the kings with the power emanating from

the top of the pyramid are all by-products of this self-centeredness

ingrained in Iranian political culture.

This individualism, as observed

by experts on Iran, namely Sir Percy Sikes,^ Leonard Binder,^ Richard

Cottam,^ Marvin Zonis,"^ James

A.

Bill,^ and William Forbis,^ does not

include the positive connotations that are associated with development
in Western

industrial societies.

The attributes of Iranian individual-

ism are feelings of rejection, uniqueness, anxiety, self-condemnation
and mistrust, perceptions of the world as dangerous and hostile, general

pessimism, and an individualistic trend.
that Zonis has detected in general

Iranian

These eight sub-syndromes

behavior are part of Abraham

Maslow's 14 subsyndromes of personal insecurity.'^

Zonis thus concludes
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that it is personal insecurity that has helped
to shape the Iranian

mind and outlook.^

This feeling of insecurity, in turn, has had
an

immense influence on the process of political
socialization.
A theoretical

insight in to individualism

.

A differentiation is made

between individualism as the property of individual
and individualism
as

a

group quality.

Robert Lane defines an individualistic society as

one in which "individualism prevails and where the
control over behavior
and thought is vested in the individual

relatively more than in customs,

tradition and consensus (as is the case in primitive and traditional
societies) and relatively more than in authority (as in command economies and authoritarian societies)."
two types of individualism.
vidual

He then distinguishes between

Functional

individualism enables an indi-

to function adequately in an individualistic society--i .e.

,

"to

energize and coordinate the tasks which sucn societies usually set for
themselves."

The other type is developmental individualism which is

"not only separate from the evaluation of the group but which, in

accord with much humanistic thought, gives priority to the individual
over the group and its code of practices."
"a conviction that the ultimate value lies

individual to his full powers."

This last kind represents
in

the development of the

Functional individualism, on the other

hand, implies that properties are developed because "they are functional
to any society where neither tradition nor authority serves as an

adequate guide to behavior."
is perceived as

In short,

in functional

individualism man

the means, whereas, man is seen as the end in develop-

mental individualism.

g
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Individualism, in the above modes, is not

a

product of ancient

cultures but is traced back only to the
Renaissance, Reformation and
the rise of the industrial
in

revolution.

The social contracts, beginning

the 17th century, also gave a new
perspective to the individual.

They valued individuals separately and thus
the individual was viewed
as

subject rather than object.

social

Finally, Lane contends, "the idea of

contracts served to break the grip of the customary
order for

it implied that people can create their own
institutions, and it led

to the concept of popular sovereignty thrusting
responsibilities back

upon individuals."

however, was

a

The individual as seen through the social contract,

functional one and had not reached the developmental

stage as yet.

Unlike the traditional cultures where routines for coordination
and achievement of communal goals are developed and authoritarian

societies where hierarchy and command are utilized for similar purposes, in individualistic societies, according to Robert Lane, the

individual is required to take on some of the functions which tradition
and command achieve in these other two kinds of societies.

undertake such

a

However, to

task, certain cognitive, motivational, emotional, and

behavioral properties are required of the individual who must also

develop the ability to think for himself.
freedom.

It also requires

Thinking for oneself requires

"cognitive complexity."

In

other words,

since decisions in an individualistic society are placed on the individual,

a

notion of self- awareness is required.^^

Self-aware individ-

uals, according to Witkin, are aware of needs, feelings and attributes.
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recognized as their own and as distinct from
those of othersJ^
result, when

a

As a

society demands rational analysis, the wholes are

broken down into parts and these parts are combined
into new realities

where a different "field independent cognitive style"
In

is

developed.

this cognitive style, the individual has the sense of
self as

a

distinctly separate part of the environment.^^
Socio-psychological reasearch reveals that since an individ-

ualistic society would be competitive and therefore often upleasant,
it would result in agonizing comparisons betwen the self and others.

This would most likely inspire ambition, causing frutrations when
goals can't be reached.

"Deindividuation,"

identity is over-shadowed by the environment
in traditional

a

state where individual
(a

situation promulgated

and authoritarian societies), on the other hand, hinders

or prevents an individual from "facing contradictions between his

opinion or norms and his behavior; he is not required to face internal

discrepancies."^^
An end result of an individualistic society is thought to be

egoism, selfishness and narcissism.

Pride, envy and generally inflated

self-concern are said to be the natural outcome of

a

society that

encourages the individual to think for himself as free from the rest of
the community.

There are also those, among them Eric Fromm, who argue

that self-awareness will cause the growth and development of the individual resulting in a search for a higher moral code reaching for self-

respect instead of self-love."

1

s

Supporting Fromm'

s

contention,

Abraham Maslow believes that the "growth instinct, once released, will
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make for

better version of man,

a

a

version not only compatible with

but a condition for human society. "^^

Robert Lane, citing several sociological studies,
notes that

although it is true that man is in harmony with nature
when he

embedded in

a

is

community, it is also instinctive that he would want
to

control his own environment.''''

Supporting Lane's contentions, Richard

deCharms notes that "man's primary motivational propensity
is to be

effective in producing change in his environment."^^
tion, however, is dependent on three conditions.

Motive satisfac-

These are:

The motive must be aroused or released by
1.
legitimizes it

a

culture which

The individual must believe that he is, in fact, the agent
2.
of his own powers, the origin of his own acts and not the
pawn of fate
He must perceive that his acts make a difference, that
3.
outcomes are contingent on what he does.
Like most motives, it is
therefore associated with appropriate cognition. 19
It is obvious
is

that internal controls, or "pro-social behavior,"

required of an individual in an individualistic society.

As noted

above, absence of self-monitoring cognition would lead into the

supremacy of deadly sins--i.e., lust, envy, avarice, hate--in such
society.

a

An idealistic individual would be cognizant of the fact that

it is his actions

(and not that of others) which can be responsible and

influence the pain or lack of pain in another.

These internal controls

are obviously taught and learned through social conditioning and are

not naturally imbedded in human ego.

20

Having satisfied the requirements laid out above: thinking for

himself, using his freedom to control his environment, bringing his

149

environment, bringing his emotional self under
control, the individual
is

ready to take up his position in an individualistic
society.

This

view is supported by Philip Slater, who feels
that everyone should

pursue autonomously his own destiny.

Also supporting the contention

that assuming responsibility for one's own fate is the
central focus
of individualism, Codorcet had predicted that in time
people "would

approach

a

condition in which everyone will have the knowledge
neces-

sary to conduct himself in the ordinary affairs of life
according to
the light of his own reason

.

of providing for his own needs

.

(and) become able to find the means

.

.

.

.

."22

l^^^ regards this state of

mind as "self-reliance."

Having satisfied the personality requirements for determining
one's own destiny, the individual also becomes faced with problems

arising out of authority.

Most individuals accept the control of

authority as legitimate and thus give up their own sense of moral

responsibility and their self-censoring mechanisms.

Abdication of

one's sense of moral principles to authority. Lane argues, is part of

functional individualism which encourages the authority to become the
external moral force.

Since law and order is relatively uncoerced in

developmental individualism, the individual has incorporated his sense
of responsibility into his principles of moral reasoning.

Although not

directly related to our discussion, it should be noted that Lane feels
that economic rewards in

a

behavior by the individual.

free market society would reinforce such

"
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Interpersonal relations, as the last category of
individual

responsibility, have to be governed by mutual trust.

With removal of

cultural and traditional restraints as the
motivating elements, the

individual is left without
personal relationships.

a

coordinating device to control his inter-

Social contracts, in their traditional meaning,

are not the socilization mechanism required.

According to Lane, "con-

ditions of relative abundance and the reinforcement of
trusting

behavior by appropriate rewards throughout one's life"
family are the preferred mechanism.

in a nurturant

"Scarcity leads to mistrust,"

Lane argues, "because one may not survive, for example, waiting
your
turn; the goods will give out before your turn comes around. "^^

Many

studies have found mistrust to be common in traditional societies.
Eric Erikson notes that the first lesson in child socialization must
be to learn to trust.

Abraham Maslow, as noted in the earlier parts of this chapter,
contends that an individual would be in
full

a

condition to actualize his

potential only if he has satisfied his physiological and safety

needs and has gained a feeling of self-esteem and "belongi ngness

Personal insecurity weighs

.

71

heavily since it can prevent an individual

from trusting others and thus from forming interpersonal relations.
It should be pointed out that functional
as

a

individualism serves

significant transition point on the way to developmental individ-

ualism.

Individualism, in the first instance, requires people to think

for themselves although it is neither deep nor broad based.

It also

demands that the individual be self-aware and know his desires but not

.
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his needs and values which are necessary
in developing

identity.

It further demands an individual

a

reliable

to work for himself either

egotistically or deveopmental ly
In short,

Robert Lane describes an individualistic
society as

one which:

releases and legitimizes men's desires to control
their own environment, that is, to resist external
control
for better or worse; it requires them to
master and use
their emotions, but may direct them into narrower
channelsIt encourages men to take responsibility for
their own
fate, but it is deficient in encouraging a
similar sense
of responsibility for their own acts; it requires
that men
trust each other, but not that they love each other. 29
.

.

.

Individualism

in

Iranian social context

.

Iranian social behavior has

been called excessively individualistic,

honest and pessimistic with even
as

a

portraying Iranians as dis-

national schizophrenia brought about,

already noted above, by the dichotomy between the Persian heritage

and Shiah Islam.

The theoretical presentation above, put forth by

Robert Lane, refutes, if not dismisses, such contentions that Iranian

society is individualistic.
as

Thus, to consider Iranian social behavior

individualistic, at best, is misleading.

As Ralph Patai

correctly

puts it, Iranian national character, like that of the rest of the Middle
East, is based on family rather than individual as

a

unit.

Family is

the central focus of all social organizations and demands loyalty over

individual desires.
all

Familial ism is the backbone of the culture with

social organizations such as clans, tribes and villages regarded as

mere extensions of fami 1 ies.

It is believed that the larger social

aggregates in actuality are functioning families that have for countless
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generations consisted of the descendants of one
male through the male
line.

31

In

urban Iran, for example, se.yyeds (descendants
of Prophet

Mohammad through his daughter Fatima) still claim
lineage credit by
adding the title seyyed to the beginning of their
names and distin-

guishing themselves by wearing
clergy.

It is

a

black turban if they happen to be

also common that they refer to each other as
"cousins."

The impact of familial ism and its extended and
aggregated forms
is of

great significance to the political institutions of Iran
and the

Middle East.

The idea of Arab nationalism, for example, easily crossed

national borders and became the rallying point for Arabs who
believed
in a common

heritage divided by artificial borders.

The mythical con-

cept that all Arabs had a common ancestry, in Esmael

,

son of Abraham,

certainly helped to bind the Arab brotherhood together, at least in
theory.

Due to ethnic diversity in Iran, however,

has emerged slowly.

nationalism as

a

Iranian nationalism

Cottam admits some limitations on Iranian

political determinant, since for 15 years, 1963 to

1978, the Shah was able to rule by satisfying the demands of broad

sections of the political and economic elite for influence and material

goods.

32

In contrast,

the "aggregated family" in the form of tribes

and minorities have periodically challenged the authority of the central

government.

The Azarbaijan autonomous republic of 1946-47, the

Kurdish republic of the same period and Qashaqai tribal uprisings in
the early 1960s are the best illustrations of such feelings of extended

familial ism forming the foundation of political and social institutions
in Iran.

Since the Islamic Revolution, the Iranian government has
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faced the furor of "extended fami 1 ial ism" in

a

more violent form from

the Kurds, Turkomans, Baluchis, Arabs, and
tribes such as Qashqais.

Iranian history during the present century has
witnessed an upsurge
in tribalism and regionalism whenever
the power and the authority of

the central government has declined.

Cases in point are 1908-1921,

1941-1947, and post 1978, during which tribal uprisings and
calls for

autonomy reached

a

new level with the central government in disarray.

Power struggles between tribes and ethnic groups which also
have their
own tribal

and clan organizations, on the one hand, and the central

government, on the other, testify to the fact that family and its aggregated extensions still form the basis of Iranian society.
remains

a

superimposed concept for people who tnink of their family as

the most basic social

unit.

Such concepts were promoted even by the

modernizing educational system.
ago had

a

Nationhood

story where

a

Grade school textbooks of

father handed his feuding sons

a

a

decade

bunch of twigs

tied together with a rope and asked each of them to break the bunch.

None of the five strong sons could break the bunch.

The feeble old

father broke the twigs by untying the rope and breaking the twigs one
by one.

The story depicted the significance and necessity of unity

among family members, particularly among the males who traditionally
are the decision makers of the family with responsibility lying in
them.

The same concept extends to the extended family.

Middle Eastern proverb says,

"I

As an old

and my cousins against the world:

and my brothers against my cousins;

I

against my brother."

I
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Although the aforementioned social traits are
the cultural

framework of the region and perhaps the inclination
of the majority of
its inhabitants, many of the elite of the
country do not subscribe to

various of these behavioral attitudes.

The study of the Iranian elite

has revealed this segment of the society, although
very small, to be

almost Western in their social attitudes and behavior.

For example,

statistical analysis of Maslow's insecurity syndrome, referred
to

earlier in this chapter, among the Iranian elite proved to be almost
similar to that of the average American studied.
as

The Iranian elite,

revealed by the data, was highly educated and had had extensive

exposure to Western soci o-cul tural norms.

With the stress on

Westernization since the turn of the century and an educational system
that has promoted Western norms and ideals, sometimes in conjunction

with traditional Iranian cultural norms, the growing Westernized Iranian
public has been caught between two contradictory socio-cul tural forces.
The Islamic Revolution is perhaps the epitome of this conflict, particularly for those who have been under constant Western influence.
It is those people who are in a transitional

tional

stage from tradi-

Iranian values and norms to more individualistic Western norms

who are the most alienated.

While they have not been able to totally

adopt Western norms and values, they have, nevertheless, been loosened

from their traditional value system.

The dilemma of "transitional

Iranian man" was recognized and studied by the sociologists.

During the

seventies, there was an explosion of sociological studies nurtured by
school of thought that sought to appeal to the emotional side of man.

a
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In

Iran among the leading proponents of this
school of humanism was

Ehsan Naraghi, the director of Iran's Institute
for Educational and

Scientific Research and Planning.

He thought that support for Western-

ization of "body and soul" was losing ground among
Iranian intellectuals since it was too objective and rational to satisfy
the human
needs.

In a paper presented at the Persepolis symposium,
Naraghi

had

asked the question:"^^
Why should cultures like ours in which man is considered
his aspects be deprived of all their substance by
following a so-called rational course at the end of which
lies the vast expanse of the non-rational and the impossibility of receiving an answer to our questions? Why should
this wealth of feeling and emotions which has reached us
after centuries of tradition and mystical-poetic experience
and which is one of the outstanding features of the Iranian
personality in history have to be considered as something
shameful and subjective that we must rid ourselves of.
in all

Naraghi concluded by noting that:
If only for our survival, we cannot do without science
and technology in order to make the best possible use of our
resources and enable our people to accede to material wellbeing in conditions of dignity and equity.
However, this does
not mean that we regard this material well-being as the sole
objective or bestow on it the same forms as it assumes in the
West
Our principal concern might be to interrogate other
societies on their various experiences.
.

.

.

For the majority. Westernization and modernization during the

Pahlavi era was only skin deep with a desire for superfluous trappings

of the West.

Modernization had manifested itself in fondness for

luxury homes, cars and European designer clothes.

Western institu-

tional norms such as freedom of speech, press, elections, or even an

effective bureaucracy were non-existent.

As a university student

related during the height of the revolution in December 1978:

,
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(The Shah) kept telling us we were a
great people
but all he did was copy the damn Europeans
Despite the Shah's pronouncements on "the Great
Civilization," (the Iranian) culture was moribund
with few books
published, no new buildings to compare with the
great
works of Shah Abbas in the 17th century, no musical
or
theatrical life.
Instead, there were a few imported art
festivals, a few skyscrapers in the Bauhaus mode,
St.
Laurent dresses and Gucci shoes for the women of northern
Tehran, and Levis and boots for the girls in the shops
and universities. 36

....'**

Iranian frustrations over this unedited importation of Western
values and norms were also reflected in the literary works of
recent

Iranian writers.

(Westomania)

,

Jalal Al -Ahmad in his famous work, Gh arb-zadegi

bitterly attacked the Iranian submission to the "machine."

Al -Ahmad wrote:

Our whole existence has to be tailored to the height
and size of the machine.
If the person who has made the
machine is now rebelling against it and feeling its
oppressive force, we who have become the servants thereof
do not even show signs of complaint.
We even put on airs.
And this is what I mean by "Westomania." My main contention is that we have not been able to preserve our own
original cultural identity in the face of invasion by the
machine, but have in fact given away completely 37
.

By 1978, even those who had espoused the line of government for

many years were complaining of excessive Westernization.

editor of the daily Key h an

,

Amir Taheri

called the phenomenon "Westoxication,"

proposing that, whereas the Arabs, Mongols and Turks had not been able
to culturally conquer Iran,

the West was being successful

in its

attempts to undermine Iranian culture.
Naraghi saw the political turmoil of 1978 to be the result of

Increased production of consumer goods, coupled with insatiable desire
for Western way of life, and the breakdown of traditional social
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relations that were the pillars of Iranian society, resulting
in

increased intervention of government in people's lives.
Naraghi, traditional
not

a

According to

Iranian political culture prescribes

a

just king,

king who would push them on the road to Westernization
without

the consent of the people.

As a result of the "royalty ordained"

national goals which kept the population in the dark about their imple-

mentation with resort to oppression and coercion, there was
non- involvement of the people in the affairs of the nation.

With the

realities hidden from the people, political turmoil was unavoidable."^^

Underlying all these criticisms of Westernization

is

the

belief by Iranians that their culture is one of the most unique in the
world.

Such an assumption is shared by almost all.

The ex-king,

Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi, saw this uniqueness in 2,500 years of Iranian
monarchy while Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Revolution,
sees it in his revolution which has legitimacy in the Shiah doctrine

which is believed to be the only hope for the oppressed people of the
world.
and

a

The more common citizens pride themselves in
rich literary history.

a

glorious past

Cross-nationally, they compare themselves

to the Europeans and not to the geographically closer developing

countries.

The Indo-European heritage of the nation is seen as

a

link

with Europe though the nation is positioned in the heart of the Middle
East.

Cultural and social relations with the neighboring countries,

particularly the Arab countries, has been almost non-existent, while
there has been
West.

a

profusion of cultural and social exchange with the
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This feeling of uniqueness, as claimed by
Abraham Maslow,

is

perhaps the result of insecurity borne by Iranians
during the past 160

years due to defeats by European powers and an
inability to sustain
the ancient glory.

Fall-back on the past history and

a

glorious cul-

ture, portrayed even more gloriously by the
surrounding myths, has been

the mechanism by which Iranians have tried to maintain
their pride

during

a

difficult transition period in which they are trying to
estab-

lish their place, once again, among the reputable nations
of the world.

Although Iranians on the surface boast about their cultural
heritage, in reality, they are torn between opposing versions
of it.
This is the conflict between Iranian nationalism, inherent in
the

ancient history and tradition, and Shiah Islam.
as

It is no small

problem,

Forbis correctly notes, that many Iranians are torn between opposing

emotions even when naming

a

child.

Should the child have

and therefore an Arabic name, or should he have
fore, a non-Moslem name?^°

a

a

Moslem,

Persian, and there-

Thus, the conflict in Iranian society is not

so much between classes, tribes, ethnic groups, or religious groups but

within the individual.

In Forbis'

words, "One half of Iranian past is

at war with the other half, and modern Iranians, seeking identity, are

torn in two directions."

perhaps, is

a

The effect of this cultural schizophrenia,

feeling of not belonging to the society at large.

History

has taught the Iranian to look out for his own and his family's inter-

ests.

The people in positions of power and authority are distrusted

since they also are thought to be looking out for their own interests.
It is not without reason that social justice is the most stressed value
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Iranian culture.

in

Since all men are thought to be looking out
for

their own interests, it is difficult for them
to be just.
is

Authority

thus sought out to mediate justly between the
opposing interests.

It is no coincidence that Shiah Islam adds
justice as the fourth

attribute of God while Sunni Islam has not taken the
ascription as

foundation of the religion.

a

By the same logic, the tradition of

Persian kingship declares that "a lust king is the shadow
of God on
earth."

Justice, therefore, is the highest responsibility of the

authority.
been

a

Shiah mythology claims that the Prophet said that "it had

honor to have been born during the reign of

erence to Khosrow

I

a

just king"--ref-

(531-579), also known as Anooshiravan the Just.

To make certain that his subordinates performed their duties
effectively
and efficiently and that justice was done to his subjects,
Cyrus the

Great (580-529 B.C.) employed spies to report to him of the performance
of his sartraps (governors).

The myths have it that Shah Abbas the

Great (1571-1629) bedecked himself in dervish clothing and travelled
among his subjects inquiring about their problems and the inadequacies
of his administration in order to correct them.

Tales that relate justice and fairness dominate
of Iranian literature.

The Golestan of Saadi

good portion

(1213-1292), in partic-

ular, is filled with fables exemplifying this theme.
a

a

Justice is also

theme stressed in Siassat-Nameh (Book of Politics) by Khawjeh Nezam

al-Mulk and Qabus-Nameh by Kaikavous Ibn-Iskandar, both written in the

eleventh century as guidebooks for kings.

Reflecting back on the

literary tradition of Iran, it is safe to note that the theme of justice
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is

the most pronounced attribute noted in
relationships between men

The thirst for justice seemed to abound in

a

culture that has period-

ically been ravaged by disease, foreign invasion,
massacre, despotic
kings, wicked governors, untrustworthy neighbors,
and chronic banditry
on the roads.

The sense of insecurity and pessimism over time has also
merged
with religious tradition of the nation.

In Norman Jacobs'

words:

The Iranian religious heritage, not abstractly in its
own right, but in so far as can be related to social
behavior by inference, has coincided with a pessimistic
view of this world and this life, and with a feeling of
hopelessness or at least insecurity before a destiny the
individual never feels competent he can control.
For
Iranian individualism is a sign of distruct, even fear,
of one's fellow men in society, and is not a sign of
a self-discipline born of confidence in one's ability
to act successfully and rewardingly in social relationships.
Subsequently, society primarily is of negative
interest to the Iranians and its prescriptions are more
to be avoided than to be manipulated positively or
challenged to serve one's rational interests. 41

Jacobs distinguishes five basic cultural traits that are

responsible for the present social value prevalent in Iran:
rules made by men can not be trusted and relied upon;

point in trying to develop morals for the society as

(2)
a

(1)

the

there is no

whole since

honesty and integrity on such levels do not exist; (3) when faced with
temptation, it is more useful to withdraw than to overcome with self-

discipline or social change;

(4)

the insecurity of social

relationships

negates the ability to plan for the future; and (5) fate denies control
of one

'^^
'

s

1 i

fe

.

If the development of mysticism is in anyway related to cultural

and environmental conditioning, the Iranian culture had the correct

161

ingredients to nurture
through Sufism.

mind created

a

flourishing mystic tradition, conceptualized

a

Ravaged by

a

hostile physical environment, the Iranian

metaphysical paradise, seen in poems of Attar, Mulavi,

Hafez and many others, and sought harmony with the Creator
through

exaltation.

Sufism allowed the individual mind to reach

where man could see nothing but God."

a

"stage

Escape from the physical world

was the natural outcome of this abounding insecurity where man
was
seen as unable to produce a major impact on his physical surroundings.

This is even today verbalized as:

"History tells the Iranians that

you always lose in the end," as was noted by Mahmoud Ziai,
the last Pahlavi Majlis.

43

a

deputy in

As Zonis has pointed out, this sense of

pessimism abounds among Iranians.

Distrust in fellow man and the

belief that gismat (fate) is more often unfavorable than not have had
their impact on making Iranians reserved, non-committal and unenterprising.

Iranian architecture is

a

vivid reflection of the insecurity

of its people, their isolation from outside and the dominance of the

concept of family on the traditional society.

The houses are surrounded

with high walls and are usually located off narrow lanes.

usually have

a

foyer just beyond the main door where non- family male

visitors and strangers are admitted.
into two parts:

Inside they

bi rouni

,

The larger houses are divided

where visitors are received and which is also

the official quarters of the male head of the household; and andarouni

where the females and children live.
usually received here.

No male, except first of kin, is

This system dominated the Iranian residential

,
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architecture until the turn of the century.
partly responsible for giving

a

Although Reza Shah was

new look to major cities, including

spacious official buildings, city

parks,

and wide tree-lined avenues,

the acceptance of Western mode of architecture was partly
due to the

increased feeling of security brought about by the centralization of

authority and annihilation of bandits and banditry.

As the streets in

towns and the roads outside the cities were made safe to travel, the

physical

insecurity of the population was reduced.

around cities and villages were first to go.

The walls and gates

Furthermore, there was

no need for narrow and winding lanes to keep the pillaging bandits out

of a neighborhood or high walls to keep the attackers from reaching
the inner sanctuary of the house.

The relative security following the ascendancy of the first
Pahlavi, Reza Shah, to power reduced the phsyical insecurity of the
individual but new demands were soon made on the government, such as

"security from arbitrary arrest, from dismissal from their occupation

without due cause, from financial manipulation and economic confiscation
by the government or the elite."^^

The political institutions set up

and operated by the Pahlavis were able to offer little of this latter

type of security.

The physical insecurity of the pre-Pahlavi period

was transformed into a perception of cynicism and social injustice,

even by the elite, during this period.

45

Zonis relates his encounter

with the Iranian elite and their perception of national problems.

One

had noted that "To become outstanding in any field of endeavor in Iran

requires an appetite for corruption and

a

taste for personal decay."
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The perception of corruption became even more
widespread following the
four- fold increase in oil

income beginning in October 1973.

of course, was nothing new.

Corruption,

It had often thrived in the country, par-

ticularly during the Qajar period (1779-1925).

With the economic

developments during the 1960s and increased oil income during
the
1970s, the amount of money on hand was unsurpassed in the
history of
the nation.

The gross national product rose from around $7 billion in

1965 to almost $70 billion in 1975, or almost 10 times that of a
decade
46
ago.
With an increase in the money supply, the appetite for greater

capital accumulation grew at an even faster rate.

Since the wealth of

the country was controlled by one man, the Shah, those close to him

became even more influential in the disbursement of funds while lining

their own coffers with untold millions.
that, for

a

major business to succeed, it was necessary to offer shares

to the members of the royal
as

a

It was believed by the public

family or influential courtiters.

It was

result of the royal family's influence pedalling that the Shah,

in the fall

of 1978, in the face of growing political strife, barred

his family members and their respective businesses from doing any

transactions with the government.

The remedy was too late.

Although

the great bulk of the population had benefited from the oil boom, the

overwhelming proportion had gone to those well-placed families on the
top.

The gap between rich and poor had gotten wider.

The visibility

of upper class wealth as seen in their cars, luxury mansions, and

exclusive boutiques was too omnipresent for the general population to
ignore.

The most disillusioned segment of the society was the middle
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class bazaar merchants.

With the economic downturn in 1977 and

a

war

on inflation, the bazaaris became the whipping
boys of the society.

While the royal family and those connected to
the court continuea to
reap huge profits in their respective business
dealings and the corruption in high places continued, the bazaaris were
harassed and accused
of profiteering and hoarding.

As a result, their resentment of the

government and its policies began to surface.

Bazaaris have tradi-

tionally been the backbone of the Iranian economy.
played

a

As such, they have

significant social and political as well as economic role in

the history of the nation.

mobility possible.

Loose class structure has made upward

Many of the upper-class families of recent years,

like Sabet, Ladjevardi

,

Nemazi

,

and Khayami

,

have moved up from middle-

class ranks to their present status only since World War II.

Indi-

vidual effort, creativity and achievement are traditionally encouraged

and appreciated even though such dynamics usually are family-centered

with family members encouraged to participate in further enhancing the
undertaking.

Post-war years, as noted above, provided

a

rather opportune

period for many ambitious and hardworking individuals to forge ahead
and progress.

The Years 1963-1973 were

a

period, in particular, of

sustained economic and industrial growth which provided an even more
conducive arena for personal and familial advancement.

The real growth

of the economy was amongst the highest in the world, partly due to

increased oil revenue, but mainly as
agressive economic growth.

a

result of intensive and

The Third (1963-1967) and Fourth (1968-1972)
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economic plans had attained most of their stated
objectives.

These

plans depended on oil revenues for about 62
percent of their invest-

ments, whereas the Fifth Plan (1973-1977) depended
on oil revenues for
80 percent.

Between 1963 and 1973, the private sector became increas-

ingly more interested in investments in large scale
industry.
of large industrial

The number

units grew from 694 in 1956 to 1,191 in 1961.

By

1966 their numbers had risen to 3,661 units and again jumped
to 5,651
48
by 1972.
In short, the period provided a rather secure epoch for

flourishing economic growth.

The private sector was

partner in this economic growth spurt.

a

significant

Many leading private corpora-

tions, as noted above, were products of individuals from lower or

middle income background who had

a

modicum of initiative.

The partic-

ular characteristic of these businesses was the tendency with which
they had been kept within close-knit family groups.

This, as already

noted above, is mainly due to the security that family provides.

Norman Jacobs' words:

"The Iranian family is

.

.

.

the^

In

sole surviving

source of security, cooperative mutuality, succor, and selfless social
action in Iranian society."

This intra-fami

1

ial

bond is contrasted

against the general society where self-interest in interpersonal

relationships dominates.

The security that familial interaction pro-

vides is mainly due to the known behavior of family members.

Jacobs'

49

sociological study of interpersonal relationships among

Iranians has further revealed that social action in Iran suffers from
the following inadequacies:

(1)

Interpersonal relationships work most

effectively, if at all, under authoritarian conditions, for

a

very
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limited time with limited goals and with limited
number of participants;

That there is no basis for "establishing reasonable
trust

(2)

and reciprocal, calculable self-interest in social
acti ons--that is,
the confidence that self-interest and other interests
operating in the

same direction are productive."; and (3) Rigidity in
interpersonal

relationships.

These result in the "inability to understand that

intellect is more than the cultivation of rote mastery of the
concrete,
and that intellect is not nurtured only through the accumulative,

additive knowledge of age and experience."

The belief that "the

concrete only, in and of itself, is what really matters, tends to

associate whatever absolute values the Iranian has inevitably with
(existing) concrete ways of

doijig^ tJiin^s.

"^'^

To cope with the above shortcomings in interpersonal relationships, the individual

Iranian has developed "mechanisms" that, in

Jacobs' words, "make life bearable."

These mechanisms include:

(1)

Acting within two distinct worlds--"a world of absolute ethical standards (the inner-self) and
self)

.

.

.

.";

(2)

a

world of no ethical standards (the outer-

Responding negatively to the challenges of his

environment, the individual chooses the path of escapism, through

different means, instead of acting positively and improving the quality
of the society;

(3)

Most Iranians do not see themselves in

a

position

to reform the system, and hence they hope "to make the existing system

of patterns work for (themselves) by being as clever as possible."; and
(4)

ual.

Resignation and withdrawl, nonetheless, do not pacify the individIn contrast,

the frustrations arising from the prevailing
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relationships, more often than not, result in "aggression,
open hostility, and even violence."

This agression "is both

a

personalized

and irrational attack upon the obvious frustrations
of Iranian society;

subsequently, violence does not offer any constructive,
positive

solutions to the interpersonal problems which provoked the
violence in
the first place. "^^
In

summarizing the interpersonal relationship of Iranians,

Jacobs believes that long-term commitments are avoided since ever

present chances of disaster are here and now.

believed that no one "in Iran
a

is

More importantly, it is

about to reshape his environment in

way that long-range commitments ever will be feasible."

"Hence too

many Iranians are convinced that long-range commitment can realize the
Utopia of development only in heaven as far as Iran is concerned,

although it may exist on earth in other societies "^^
.

Some concluding remarks

.

Socio-economic observations made by Norman

Jacobs complement the political observations of Marvin Zonis in regards
to the concept of "underdeveloped" social man in Iran.

The average

Iranian, due to environmental conditioning of the past, suffers from
social and personal insecurity.

With social and economic developments

of this present century, such insecurities, however, seemed less tan-

gible and rather irrational.

The social conditions under the Pahlavis,

at least, provided for a period some semblance of personal-physical,
if not psychological, security.

The poverty and ignorance of the past,

in the form of scarcity of resources which were partly responsible

for the added dimensions of insecurity, were largely muted during the
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years.

Based on such an assumption, it could have been
argued that

the individual, in due time, as

a

result of relatively abundant

resources, would have developed

a

trusting behavior leading to the

emergence of

a

secure individual.

This secure individual is the basic

ingredient of all political institutions.

As

long as there is no

security, trust and belief that self-interest and other
interests can

cooperate in the same direction, all political instituions are
only
facade.
of all

a

For institutions to be self-generating and serve the interests

individuals, social contracts must be laid down and abided by.

The socio-psychological studies of Iranians do not show such inclinations as of yet on the part of the general public.

It is suggested

that the Iranian society needs to develop the interpersonal behaviors
that are seen as the apriori requirements needed for transition onto
the threshold of functional

individualism.

This, in turn, would

supply the individuals with necessary properties to develop their

potentials, including political institutions that would aid in coordinating and accomplishing their communal goals.

2
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PART II

TEXTBOOKS AS SOCIALIZING AGENTS
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CHAPTER

IV

EDUCATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN IRAN

As discussed in some detail

in the beginning of the Introduc-

tory Chapter, Lucian Pye posits three key elements for the attainment
of political development:

equality, capacity and differentiation.

These key elements can be studied in

a

culture through the analysis of

values and norms that pertain to such principles as equality, trust,

rationality and planning, collectivity and role specification.

These

principles supplied by Pye closely correspond to others offered by
David McClelland which also contributed to the perspective of and the
analytical framework of this study.

The association between political

development and other aspects of cultural change provide
of continuity and change in the political system.

a

dynamic view

In Pye's words:

The concept of political culture also provides a useful
basis for examining the links between social and economic
factors and political performance.
Through the socialization process which sustains and shapes the political culture
of each generation, we can observe the impact of not only
the explicitly political but also all the relevant nonpolitical behavior.
In so investigating the social and
economic parameters of the political culture, we can come
to grips with the historically significant issues about
the relationships between economic development and the
prospects for stable political change.!
The dynamic link between political development and economic
factors, as asserted by Lucian Pye, is also held to be important by

Robert Lane, as discussed in the last chapter, and David McClelland.
173
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It is based on such assertions that such
values as work ana compti ti ve-

ness with material

rewards encouraging impersonal cooperation are

linked to cultural change which in turn influence political
development.

Nonetheless, there are limits and constraints as to the speed

and degree at which it is possible to initiate policies of
change in

political culture.

a

Pye notes, however, that "we must be impressed with

the potency of education in creating the attitudes and
values essential

for national development.""^

Education is regarded as one of the more significant vehicles
of development.

Robert Ward, in his observation of Japanese society,

held that the educational preparation of
ulation was
ture.

4

a

a

sizable portion of

a

pop-

basic requirement for modernization of political cul-

Educational institutions, as revealed by Dunkwart Rustow in his

study of cultural change in Turkey, proved most durable and fruitful

during the transitional change in the nineteeth century whereas others,
such as the army, the centralized tax system and the Constitution, were

overcome by problems and inadequacies.^

It is with such conceptual

premises that this inquiry, as noted in the previous chapters, intends
to approach the subject of political

development in Iran.

It is difficult to overstate the impact of education and

schooling where it is supervised by government and its curricula is
loaded with systematic and explicit political indoctrination.

Robert

Ward, in observing the Japanese educational system from 1868 to 1945,

notes the great degree to which "moral" courses played a role in pri-

mry

and secondary school curricula.

The emphasis, for example, in

9
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R.

P.

Dore's words, was on the extent to which "the
Imperial Institu-

tion (became) the fount and origin of all morality."'^

Similar level

of indoctrination was evident in the school curricula
in Egypt during

President Nasser's rule.

In Leonard Binder's words:

"...

especially

in the primary and secondary schools, efforts
were made to develop a

strong loyalty to the regime, to President Nasser, and to the religion
of Islam."

g

The intent is to give

ideal state.

a

picture of the society in its

The intended result is that:

(The student) will begin to recognize the disparity between
the two sets of standards to which he is exposed and will
gradually adjust his external behavior in accordance with
the demands of his school environment rather than solely
in terms of his father's representational behavior.
He
will gradually learn to recognize the same national symbols when repeated on the radio, in the press, and in
public speeches.
He will become accustomed to participating in group demonstrations and generally become
acquainted with the duties of an educated citizen in a

modernizing oligarchy.
For some time schools have become associated with or even have

been relegated the responsibility of character development.

Thus the

purposes of schooling were thought to be "to develop the head, the heart,
and the hand."

Although the terminology in recent years has been

changed, the basic concepts have remained pretty much intact.
are, however, substantial differences between the educational

There
approach

in the developed societies as contrasted against the developing world.

The former has adopted an experimental psychological approach with such

objectives as practical experience for conduct development, encouraging

participation in circumstances where the student will learn correct
behavior.

The latter is still very much pre-occupied with character
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development through moral stories, proverbs, and the
study of lives
of great men whom the students could emulate.^

Consequently, the developmental approaches of the textbook

writers can be ascertained by the analysis of these books
to find the

prevailing tendencies.

Thus, it is no surprise that content analysis

of textbooks in recent years has provided

scientists.

a

fertile ground for social

Their assumption has been that there

is a definite link

between cultural values and the potential for development.

Those

cultures that possess certain values that are favorable towards devel-

opment ought to be more successful in becoming developed than those
cultures that do not possess such values.

Inquiries into folktales,

proverbs, and similar cultural expressions are used to measure the
values that are stressed in
In
a

a

culture.

recent years, governments and education boards have made

conscious effort to promote values and norms in school texts that

they find favorable to their orientation.

Thus, the underlying assump-

tion is that values favorable to certain policies are able to be trans-

mitted via textbooks to the students.
It is based on this assumption that this section of this

inquiry is undertaken.

Since it was the professed policy of the

Pahlavi regime to "modernize" the country, it is assumed that one can
look into the educational materials that were used in Iran and find

values and norms that stress modernization being transmitted to the

students.

This is particularly so due to the fact that the Iranian
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students were being educated in an environment
in which the government
had a high level of influence and control.
A close relationship between political system
maintenance and
the role of education has existed in modern Iran.

During the late

nineteenth century, with travel to Europe becoming more of

a

possi-

bility, some of the children of the elite and aristocracy
were sent to

Europe for higher education, while others received their higher
education in Iran at Dar al-Fonoun (House of Sciences), established
in 1851.

The graduates of Dar al-Fonoun and the returning students from Europe

filled high positions in the government, and administrations of the

Qajar kings.

Until the emergence of Reza Khan in 1921, the elite and

their children comprised almost all the Western-educated Iranians.

Following the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1907, the middle class
began to grow and thus the sheer numbers of their children who acquired
a

Western-style education grew.
After ascendency to power, Reza Khan sent many students to

Europe, particularly France, for higher education.

The students mostly

came from the middle class, a few from the lower-middle class.

These

individuals owed their allegiance to Reza Shah and were placed in

important administrative, professional and legal positions upon their
return to the country.

As such,

a

new breed of technocrats who were

not members of the traditional aristocracy were introduced into the

ranks of the political elite.

enabling one to become
to Iranians.

a

Thus, education became an instrument

member of the elite.

The point was not lost

Soon there was stiff competition for the limited number
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of admissions to Tehran University that had
opened in 1937.

Many

students also pursued their higher education in the
European and

American institutions of higher learning.

Today, there are as many

Iranian students enrolled in colleges and universities outside
the

country as there are in the country.
The indications are that the educational system functioned for
dual

purposes.

It provided a professional

education that often was

intended as an entry visa to the ranks of the elite.

Both groups,

however, by and large, depended on the government for their respective

endeavors.

The Shah personally supervised movements of all individuals

in high government positions.

Positions would be bestowed on individ-

uals for their services or to coopt them into the system.

With the

Shah's virtual control of all major industries and educational institutions, in addition to bureaucracies, there were few places for the

counter-elite to find any meaningful employment where they could remain
outside the government's sphere of influence.
to be either pro-government or apolitical

Thus, the educated had

to survive and remain immune

from harassment in the Iranian socio-political environment.
is a

This fact

major reason for the enormous "brain drain" of Iranian profession-

als to Europe and the United States during the 1950s, 1960s and the

early 1970s.
For the purpose of more indepth analysis, the role of education
in modern
(1)

Iranian history will be dealt with in the following sequence:

Education as an instrument to promote socio-cul tural norms;
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(2)

Education as an instrument of the regime for
political system main-

tenance; and (3) Education as an instrument of political
development.
E ducation

as an instrument of socio-cultura!

norms

.

The impact of

Islamic attributes, whether real or imagined, have been of
immense

importance to the Iranian educational system.
is

In Shiah

Islam, which

the dominant branch in Iran, education is considered
to be the

teachings of moral knowledge.

Norman Jacobs contends that "This asso-

ciation between moral knowledge and education persisted, even after

education formally was disassociated from religion; that is, at the
time when religious values came to affect education only in diffused

form."^^

The impact of religion on the educational system and its

values, according to Jacobs, was five fold:

(1)

All

learnings that

promoted "religious perfectibility" were desired and those that were
not considered to be so, at best, were regarded to be of "secondary

interest";

(2)

With the introduction of secular curriculum into reli-

gious schools and with the establishment of secular schools in the

twentieth century there were few, if any, qualitative modifications
in the process of learning;

(3)

Despite the apparent modernization of

the education process, "acquisition of morality" remained the basic

concern of the educational system; (4) Since religious education had
been considered as the proper preparation for statecraft, the association has been carried over to secular education also, thus it came to
be considered the proper preparation for statecraft;

education was regarded primarily as
spirit" more than as

a

a

(5)

Lastly, secular

way to gain access to the "Iranian

way of gaining empirical skills.

12
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The dynamic relationship between religion and politics
visible in Iran.
facets of life.

is

very

Furthermore, religious prescriptions govern all
However, many long held beliefs are also adopted to

reflect religious values that in fact have no Koranic basis.

Thus,

the term religion acquires wider perspective and includes norms
and

values that reflect cultural traits.
Lack of intellectual and rational attitudes within the whole

Iranian society, in general, and within the educational institutions,
in particular,

Iranians alike.

has been the subject of criticism by Iranians and nonIn this vein, the educational

the student very well to cope with the society.

system actually prepared
Abstract educational

theory would expect the system to encourage intellectual and rational
attitudes.

From this viewpoint, the Iranian educational system was

a failure.

The result of the existing system was:

the "educated man" who, primarily, although not exclusively,
is a political animal, who is a good memorizer, who speaks
well, but not concretely, who is quick to copy and serve
those in authority, who tends to talk rather than to act,
who hates to make decisions, who is not utilitarian, who is
not objective, who cannot operate effectively in a critical
environment, who does not necessarily understand what he
accepts, who cannot analyze his responsibilities, who is
not adaptable as far as work and the positive environment
are concerned (but only as far as maneuvering people is
concerned), and finally who basically is insecure and maladjusted to any of his occupational demands and consequently,
unproducti ve--i n brief, an individual who is the very
antithesis of the kind of educated or sophisticated individual required to participate in, let alone, create and
develop, a rational, self-generating economic system. 13

Richard

W.

Gable, who also has studied the impact of culture

on Iranian institutions, notes that many of these traits influence the

Iranian pattern of administrative behavior.

These, combined with the

5
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pattern of Iranian individualism discussed earlier,
create an administrative bureaucracy whose decision-making patterns
are unplanned,
illogical, fatalistic, centralized, and lacking in
delegation of authority.

In short,

it is a system which is dominated by subjectivity
and

traditionalism.

Consequently, almost all educational reforms that were initiated
at junior or senior levels at the Ministry of Education
were doomed to

failure.

Many of these reforms were attentive merely to the formal

structure of the institution in question with little regard for the
dynamics involved or to actual conditions.
in the recent educational

years of elementary,

3

This is best demonstrated

devolution" in which the 5-3-4 concept

(5

years of guidance, 4 years of high school edu-

cation in place of the traditional system of 6 years of elementary,
and 6 years of high school, divided into 3 years of first and 3 years

of second cycle) was adopted.

Many of the science and math textbooks

were rewritten with the intent of making students think rather than
memorize.

The teachers in many cases did not receive adequate prepara-

tion to deal with this basic change in approach.
still

The students were

required to memorize rather than to understand.

Moreover, few

counselors were available to assist the teachers or the students in
the planning of their programs.

Furthermore, the new concept had not

been "analyzed in terms of practicality, costs, and benefits."

1

Meaningful changes in the educational system were impossible

within the existing framework due to major bottlenecks in coordination,
implementation, cooperation, and planning.

These patterns are closely
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related to political and cultural conditions

J^

Any reforms, including

educational, have to include the total society within their
scope
Education as an inst rument of the regime to promote political
system
maintenance.

When Reza Shah came to power, the elite was composed of

individuals from families that had had close contact and relations
with the deposed Qajar dynasty.

Thus, Reza Shah created

that owed its allegiance solely to him.

a

new elite

The incoming elite was com-

posed mostly of professionals, technocrats and army officers whose

education and training was their hall mark of entry into the new status,
Education took

a

new dimension, and soon there was stiff com-

petition for entry into the newly founded Tehran University.

With the

great public demand for education just after the Second World War,

educational institutions expanded greatly.

As a result, the number of

graduates at all levels soon began to exceed the government's absorptive

capacity.

The high school graduates, in particular, had

a

difficult task since there were few jobs available and only about

11

to 16 percent of them could gain admission to Iranian universities.^^

The entrance to an Iranian university was not based only on the aca-

demic record of

a

student.

Marvin Zonis relates his meeting with an

Iranian who had been influential in formulating higher education
policies.

He said that:

Orders had come from above to restrict entrance to Iranian
universities.
He was to make higher education more expensive
while raising the minimum entrance examination grade considered
necessary for admission.
Thus access to higher education would
be limited to those students who had the most at stake in
maintaining the present system. 18
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The result was the obvious admission of those students who
were com-

mitted to maintaining the status quo.
Despite such

a

policy, the Iranian universities continued as

major centers of opposition to the government.
tion had its flaws.

The process of selec-

Many children of the elite were instrumental in

anti-government agitation.

Furthermore, the incoming students were

soon politicized and coopted into the student activist groups on
campus.

Following the infusion of petro-dol 1 ars beginning in 1973,

shortage of skilled and semi-skilled workers developed.

government adopted

a

In

a

1975, the

new educational policy by which secondary educa-

tion (grades 9 through 12)) and college education at all public educa-

tional

institutions that had carried little tuition (approximately $15

per year at high schools; $300 at universities) were to charge extremely
high fees (approximately $300 at high schools; $3,000 per year at

universities).

However, the students would have been exempt from paying

these exorbitant tuitions if they pledged government service of one

year for every year of high school free of tuition; two years for
every year at college level.

The jobs and their locations were desig-

nated by the government for which

a

government salary was paid.

Although some who had the financial means opted for tuition payment
rather than
choice.

a

pledge to work for the government, most did not have

Their only choice was between no education or

for the government at

a

a

a

pledge to work

government appointed position and location at

the low government salary.

Although the measure supposedly was desig-

nated to lure educated individuals into government service in locations
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that most would not have opted for, it also gave the
government control

over the individual's destiny for the duration of the
obligation years.
A student who had received four years of high school and four
years of

college education through the pledge system would have had to
serve 12

years to fulfill his pledge of obligations.
matured, it would have been

a

If such a system had

punishing experience for the political

activists who had opted for the pledge system during their school
years.

The government's control over education was not limited to
financial

considerations.

Since the early 1960s, the government had

established direct control over the content of textbooks from first
through twelfth grade.

Prior to this time, schools had been given the

choice of selection from amongst the available texts in the market.

However, since 1960 the Ministry of Education has taken over the

writing, editting and publishing of all school texts.
of textbooks as

a

socializing agent was not lost on the government.

will be seen in the next chapter, the Farsi
the elementary school

into

a

The significance
As

readers, particularly at

level, were turned into instruments of cooption

value system in which several entries held the Shah and his

family in high esteem and praised his undertakings.

students were not immune from such

a

process either.

The high school
By the end of the

decade, the students enrolled in high schools had to study the text of
the White Revolution as an academic subject.

The students also served as an instrument of government show-

manship.

Aside from lining the streets during parades for major
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political events or for visits by friendly heads of states;
students

performed sports shows on the birthdays of the Shah, Shahbanou
(Queen)
and Crown Prince in Tehran's main sports field.

The students were also

encouraged to join the Boy or Girl Scouts as another means of socialization.

The royal family took

a

particular interest in the Scouts'

movement and the Shah was the titular head of the Iranian Scout Organization.

The government had gone further in 1975 by promoting the

formation of

a

youth vanguard for the Rastakhiz (National Resurgence)

Party which would have been recruited from amongst the high school
students.
The Education Corps has been another institution through which
the political
rural

values promoted by the regime were to be inculcated to

inhabitants.

The promoters of the Education Corps have praised

the undertaking as a major modernizing scheme.

Its success in improve-

ment of educational, economic, and health conditions in villages has
also accompanied changes favorable to the regime in political orientation among tribes and villagers.
as

The political objectives of Corpsmen

viewed by the government were as follows:
In order to inculcate the spirit of national unity,
the people in the isolated villages and of the migrating
tribes who speak different dialects and who have different
customs and mores should be led to the feeling that they
belong to the nation. The national ties must be strengthened.
Knowledge of the past national contributions to the
development of world civilization and visions of the future
participation in national and international development are
important facets of the Education Corps training. 19

The objection here certainly is not aimed at creation of

national feeling among the citizens but at the displacement of

a
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traditional systems by

newer system that at best was inadequate.

a

From the onset of the land reforms in 1963, the village
system hierarchy based on landlords and their representatives and their
selected

kadkhoda (village administrator) was displaced.
lucky enough to receive

a

The villages that were

Corpsman got to elect their kadkhoda, under

the Corpsmen's supervision, and even got to elect members to
the

village House of Justice.

Otherwise, the village elections were

embroiled in clan and tribal feuds.
The Corpsmen, based on the formula of its establishment, were
all

recent high school graduates.

They had received four months of

training, almost 70 percent of which was devoted to military subjects.^'

These youth, many of whom were rather idealistic, were given the task
of "transforming a peasant into a farmer."

Inexperience and inadequate

training were hardly the only problems facing the Corpsmen.

They also

suffered from the traditional distrust of outsiders by the villagers.
This was coupled with the reverence the villagers had for old age--

which these corpsmen lacked.

The short period of stay--at most 20

months--was another added shortcoming.
The most vital contribution of the Education Corpsmen, however,
was their regular teaching of classes to rural children.

Although

there were classes for adults, the attendance ratio for such classes
was lower.

The textbooks that the rural children read were basically

the same as the ones that the students in urban areas read.

Little

provision was made in the books to adapt them to the rural, physcial,
or cultural environment that differs so drastically from one region of
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Iran to the next.

There were but

a

few items in the elementary text-

books that depicted life in rural areas.

Another problem facing the rural students was the fact that
very few secondary schools existed in rural areas.
50 percent of Iranians

live in rural areas

Although almost

(places with less than 5,000

inhabitants), almost all the secondary schools are located in urban
areas.

The level of literacy in some villages is less than

5

percent,

although the national average is 40 percent.
As discussed before,

aside from wealth, education has been

looked upon as the major vehicle of upward social mobility by many

Iranians.^^

The government recognized this fact by promoting the edu-

cated as individuals who would "occupy the directing position in the
country. "23

j^e educated, particularly those with

a

university educa-

tion, represented a very small segment of the Iranian population.
small

This

segment, moreover, had been gaining significance as the Iranian

economy grew and there was

a

higher demand for their skills.

The sig-

nificance of their presence in the Iranian society was not lost on
the Shah.

He had become increasingly more involved in all facets of

higher education.

Furthermore, as Zonis points out, the Shah's most

significant undertaking as far as the educated elite were concerned
was his allocation of positions to these individuals.

This in turn

made it possible for the Shah to maintain his power because the educated elite then owed their loyalty to the person of the Shah.

24
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Education as an ins trument of political development
development, as

a

component of the

general

involves the building of institutions.

.

Political

theory of development,

The presence of references to

political institutions and citizenship role in school
texts, therefore,

would indicate

a

desire by the government to bring about

change through means of education.
political

a

political

The frequency of references to

institutions would, theoreti cal ly, reveal the extent to which

the government hoped to induce norms that were favorable to the ideals

of political development and promotion of civic training among students.

Attempts by the government to use school textbooks as
of political socialization is not

a

recent phenomena.

a

means

When the modern

educational system was adopted in Iran by Reza Shah in the 1920s, one
of the main ambitions was secularization of education.

Although there

had been several secular schools, their numbers and the number of

students were extremely limited.

Reza Shah had hoped that with the

introduction of Western style education he would be able to create
"modern" Iran, emulating European countries.

a

The emphasis was typically

put on the structure with little attention paid to the dynamics of

modern education.

Furthermore, Reza Shah's hopes of "Westernization"

were over-powered by his despotism.

He was more interested in self-

aggrandizement and had little commitment to the goal of "democratization or modernization."

25

Educational institutions were used to promote secular education
to establish a scientific and Western-oriented foundation for the

future development of the nation.

The courses of instruction for the
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elementary school included Persian, arithmetic, geography,
history,
and physical education.

The secondary school curriculum included

subjects in natural sciences, geometry, algebra and
mathematics, and

foreign languages.

Soon other subjects were added to both elementary

and secondary school curriculum.

As discussed previously, this "mod-

ern" educational system was built on the existing cultural
foundation

that molded the new system after the old fashion.

Emphasis was put on

the passing of exams to enable a student to attain the desired
end-i.e., the diploma.

In short, the educational

system conceived by Reza

Shah had retained the "traditionalistic orientation."

Amin Banani

notes that with the introduction of modern education "the group

recitation-for-memorization method of the maktab was discarded.
ance upon memorization, however, continued. "^^

Reli-

This superficial method

of learning is still widely practiced, and the method is not limited

only to the students.

The teachers often read aloud from the textbooks

or their notes in the class.

This method of memorization is not limited

to Persian poetry and prose.

It also includes mathematical

tific principles.

and scien-

It is obvious why this method of lea>^ning is

to as "parrot-like."

referred

This modern education system has been criticized

for having produced "many superficially educated people, maladjusted
and filled with undistinguished facts which they were incapable of

applying in everyday life."

Higher education, when obtained abroad, was perceived to undertake any possible task, and thus to be able to work in any possible

capacity.

As an example, the managing director of the National

Iranian
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Oil

Company for several years was

more,

a

a

French-educated physician.

Further-

distinguished engineer and head of Tehran Polytechnique
Insti-

tute for over

a

decade served as Speaker of Majlis.

The distinguising

factor about such individuals was their loyalty to the
person of the
monarch and not their ability as distinguished managers or
politicians.

Although education served as

a

requirement for entry into the ranks of

the political elites, it was loyalty to the regime that assured
in the cabinet or other rewarding positions.

a

post

A similar feeling was

put forth by Ali -Mohammad Kardan who wrote:

The job of revising the school progarm was entrusted,
for the most parts, to individuals who had been trained
in France.
Their blind imitation of the French system
of education, and even more, their limited understanding
of the purpose of education, severely damaged Iranian
education.
They had knowledge per se more than its
applicability, theory more than practice, and the lecture method in preference to the laboratory approach ...
The result was a secondary curriculum extremely broad
in subject matter but unrelated to the life experience
of the students. 28
The above observation is no less true of present-day Iranian
education.

The progress in the last quarter of

a

century has been the

structural change from the 6-3-3 concept to the 5-3-4, which in theory

demands even greater emphasis on the understanding of the principles
of natural and physical sciences.

Nevertheless, the mechanics of the

system, as of present, are still based on the tradition of rote

learning and memorization.
It is obvious that a change in the educational

be achieved without basic changes in the total system.

system can not
In essence,

any change in the educational system of the country and its

prerequisites demands

a

change in the political-cultural mili

question posed, therefore, is if the willingness of the new
regime
Iran to undertake a policy of change of such magnitude
exists.
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CHAPTER

V

CONTENT ANALYSIS OF TEXTBOOKS

Children's stories have often been used to measure the motivation level within a culture for "achievement," "development," or

"modernization."
function as

a

The assumption has been that the culture would

framework for "development."

Cultural norms are trans-

ferred from one generation to another through many means of which
stories, be they oral or written, are only one.

The presence of folk-

tales in all cultures provides an empirical foundation for comparison.

Folktales are

a

vivid and apparent part of any culture.

They "reflect

the motives and values of the culture in the way they are told or in

their themes or plots" in

a

way that is both interesting and uninten-

tionally instructive.^
The interest in stories, so far as this inquiry is concerned,
is

limited to the entries that have been selected for publication in

the school

texts.

It is not unusual

to find folktales that convey two

This is particularly true in

contradictory values of the same culture.
a

culture that has had an unbroken and

thousand years.

a

written tradition for

a

few

Certainly the prevailing philosophical and moral

patterns in different periods of the history have left their imprints
on the national

cultural tradition of Iran.

Thus, norms and values

that are of contradictory nature are abundant in the cultural heritage
194
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of the nation.
dotes provide

Thus, this huge pool of folktales, proverbs, and aneca

resource with varying philosophical perspectives.

This offers the different administrations the opportunity to select

stories that are deemed appropriate and culturally relevant.

The

selection of entries that appeared in the textbooks during the Shah's
regime were certainly in accordance with such

a

premise.

A department

within the Ministry of Education, Sazeman-e Ketabhay-e Darsi-e Iran
(Textbooks Department of Iran) has been responsible for the editing and

publishing of all Iranian school texts since 1960.

The entries in the

textbooks are there with the government's approval or, at the least,
its tolerance.

Many of the entries are from classical Persian litera-

ture and have been an integral part of education in Iran for generations.

Examples are stories from Bustan and Golestan by Saadi

from Kalikh va Dimneh

,

and poetry by Firdousi.

by the design of the textbook writers.

,

fables

Some entries are there

These promote modern values

such as cooperation, hard work, and achievement.

Finally, some entries

are deliberately included as acts of political indoctrination through

which the government hoped to instill values favorable to its legitimization and preservation.

Although "political development" is often mentioned in the
course of this present inquiry, nonetheless, the idea of political

development, as is evident from the entries in the texts, was never
held by the Pahlavi

regime to be an important facet of development.

Instead, economic development was promoted by the government to be the

most important goal to be achieved.

It was envisioned by the Shah that
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in 25 years

Iran would achieve a similar economic status to that

of Japan and the Federal
9oal

Republic of Germany.

He referred to this

Tamadon-e Bozorg (the Great Civilization).

as

In the face of

indadequacies, problems, and bottlenecks confronting his ambitious
and unrealistic goals, the Shah soon retreated from

liis

earlier remarks

and professed that in 25 years Iran will reach the gates of the great

Civilization.

The point, however, is that economic development was

held in high esteem, while other facets of development, including

political development, were either totally or partially ignored.

McClelland lists 14 values that are purportedly of some influence on economic development (see Table 11).

Of these, three have been

confirmed-- traditional interaction pressure less frequent; ego's

relation to others more often contractual; impersonal cooperation

pressure more often of

a

material sort--and two have been partially

indirectly conf i rmed--peer pressure for interaction more frequent;
deceipt and magic as instrumental acts less frequent with hard work
and intelligence more frequent.

2

Pye, as discussed in the previous chapter, postulates that

there is
ment.

a

close relationship between economic and political develop-

Thus, many of the values that promote economic development also

promote political development.

Pye presents three themes which are

seen as essential to political development: equality, capacity and

differentiation and specialization.

McClelland's variables:

These coincide with certain of

equality with universalistic versus
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particularistic norms; capacity with rationality, planning and orderliness; differentiation and specialization with specificity vs. dif-

fuseness of role relations.^

Specificity vs. diffuseness or role relations, according to the
social theorists, stresses contract rather than status.

According to

McClelland, "traditional societies are often characterized

...

as

consisting of diffuse network(s) of relationships that individuals have
with each other which are not functionally specific
with

a

,

not entered into

specific objective to be accomplished on each side."^
Rationality, planning and orderliness are regarded by Max

Weber to be the prime determinants of economic development.

It is

contented that systems "which stress rationality in planning ought to
be able to adapt to

ahead more rapidly."

...

a

system of production more readily and move

Rational values are thought to include hard work,

intelligence and planning as opposed to the irrational, involving magic,
chance and belief in fate.
Universal ism vs. particularism is the dichotomy between the

concept of equality before the law for all which is believed to promote

development and the concept of status distinction which

is

believed to

be a deferent to development.

The content analysis of textbooks which follows will attempt
to ascertain if these values are present.

The presence or absence of

these values postulated affects the ability of the textbooks to aid in
the creation of a "software" which is

a

prerequisite for development.
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E ducational

system in Iran

.

Until

1971, the Iranian school

system was

based on the 6-3-3 concept of which the first six years were
devoted to

elementary education.
cycles.

The high school was divided into two three-year

The first cycle was

a

general

introductory discipline in which

students were introduced to physical and natural sciences, literature,
social sciences and fine arts.

The second cycle was more specialized

and was divided into branches such as mathematics, natural sciences,
social sciences and literature, with home economics for girls.

There

were also specialized schools for music, commerce and technical
training.

The Ministry of Education by 1971 began to phase out this

system and replaced it with the new 5-3-3 concept.

As a result of the

Ramsar Educational Conference in 1975, an additional year was added to
the high school which made the system into

a

5-3-4 concept.

It was

envisioned that the first five years would function as elementary education after which tne student would take

a

general exam to determine

whether he should continue on to guidance school or not.

The guidance

level, which is three years, aims to identify the students who have the

capacity and wish to continue their education, and also to determine

their abilities and interests so they can be guided to the professions
that they are best suited for.

A series of examinations at the end of

the three years would determine the future schooling of the students.

Those who pass the necessary examinations would be guided either to

further academic education or into technical or professional fields.
High school curriculum is divided into either a four-year aca-

demic program or

a

two-year or

a

four-year technical-vocational program,
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depending on the capabilities of the student.

The academic program,

for the first two years, consists of general subjects and the
last two

years are specialized in mathematics and physical sciences, natural
sciences or social sciences.

Every year there is

a

nationwide examin-

ation, administered by the Ministry of Education, to determine the

capabilities of the twelfth-graders, based on which

a

high school

diploma is granted to the passing students.

Elementary and guidance school textbooks

.

As noted at the beginning of

this inquiry, since the focus of the analysis for which the question-

naires were drafted were high school students, it was deemed appropriate
to content analyze the books that presumably would have transmitted the

"system" norms to the students during their earlier years of education.

Therefore, the content analysis is limited to the Farsi readers for the
first through the eighth grade.

Traditionally the Farsi reader has been the bulwark of moral
and socio-cul tural teaching to the students in forms of prose and
poetry.

The present-day Farsi readers have replaced books such as

Bustan and Golestan by Saadi and Kalileh va Demneh

,

which were the

backbones of the traditional maktab education system, and were very

concerned with teachings of moral codes of conduct in addition to the
basic reading and writing skills.

The present-day Farsi readers include

many entries from the above books, plus items from other famous Iranian
books of prose and poetry, along with translations from foreign, mainly

European, sources.

Among the famous Iranian poets, Firdousi and his

book Shahnameh (Book of Kings) receive the most attention, since
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nationalism, patriotism and bravery, in addition to moral codes of
conduct, are frequent subjects dealt with by Firdousi's emphasis
on

Iranian monarchy.

In it the national

and cultural heritage of Iran are

portrayed as unique and superior to that of others.
For the first three years of elementary school, the Farsi
readers function as both

a

literature and

a social

science book.

From

fourth grade on there are books that are specifically devoted to

sciences and social sciences.

These books, however, are devoid of

moral teachings; they discuss mechanical

information which has little

value so far as political development is concerned.
is paid to the analysis

Little attention

and criticism of the prevailing Iranian socio-

political institutions in the real sense of the word.

The Farsi

readers, on the other hand, are full of stories, proverbs and anecdotes
that relate concepts that are very much

a

part of everyday life.

Thus,

it was deemed more relevant to limit the analysis only to the Farsi

readers.

Besides functioning as the main literature book, the readers

are used for dictation, poems from them are assigned for memorization,

and they are used as guides for the writing of compositions.

As a

result, the Farsi readers are directly or indirectly involved in up to

one-quarter of the subjects, particularly in the elementary schools.
The role of the Farsi readers diminishes to some extent in the guidance
school with the introduction of many new subjects, such as algebra,

geometry, cnemistry, physics, natural sciences, and foreign languages.
Some of the Farsi readers, as will be observed in the following

analysis, do in fact include items that were categorized as "civic
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training" and "political indoctrination" along with the more customary
moral value enforcement.

The first grade Farsi reader is divided into two basic segments.

The first segment deals with the teaching of letters, word

composition, and sentence structure.

Although there are expressed words

that could conceivably be coded to represent certain values, the thrust
is

word introduction not plot or meaning.

of the first grade Farsi

Therefore, the first segment

readers was excluded from content analysis.

The second segment, which is composed of seventeen entries, is included
in the content analysis.

There are an average of 37 entries in the

readers for grades two to eight.
It should also be noted that only the written material

used in the analysis.

has been

There were many drawings, especially in the

elementary textbooks, that were very expressive in relating the stories
and in transmission of certain concepts via visual effects.

Further-

more, all the textbooks for the years prior to 1976 had, in this order,

photographs of the Shah, the queen, the crown prince, and the Shah's
twin sister, Ashraf, who was the titular head of the Imperial Organization for Social Services.

From 1976 on, however, only the Shah's

photograph appeared at the beginning of school textbooks.
Each lesson in the Farsi

supplemented by
cises.

a

readers, aside from the main entry, is

section composed of vocabulary, questions, and exer-

The elementary readers, in addition, have

a

grammar supplement.

It is assumed that the intention, aside from teaching of vocabulary and
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grammar, is to make the students analyze and understand the
concepts

implicit in each lesson.

A framework for content analysis

.

In the previous pages some values

thought to be related to economic as well as political development
were
introduced.

As noted,

this analysis will attempt to ascertain if the

textbooks convey these values to the students.

The general framework

for the content analysis is borrowed from the study by Richard

W.

Wilson.

Some changes were made in the categories suggested by Wilson

(Appendix

2,

Table

to conform the outline to the Iranian case

2)

study.

The content analysis of each entry was based on seven paramThe include:

eters.
moral
ity;

theme;
(6)

or not.

(4)

(1)

type of story;

(2)

main participant; (3) main

authority figure stressed; (5) attitude of the author-

hierarchical social order; and (7) whether contemporary setting
Of course, not all the entries could be categorized on all

these parameters.

Some entries that discussed, for example, "practical

knowledge" or "know your country" could not be categorized under

parameters 2 through

7.

Four Iranians, with at least

a

bachelors degree, with profes-

sional backgrounds in economics, education, and sociology, who were all

very well versed in the English language, were asked to analyze the

content of each entry and codify them according to the above mentioned
categories and enter their decisions on

a

prepared sheet that was

supplied to them with titles and classifications all in English.
were

a

There

certain number of entries that included two or more stories.

In
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such cases, each story was analyzed and codified separately.

The

entries varied greatly in length; some were pages long, while
others

were only several lines.

Some were prose and poetry; others discussed

science and technology; other, practical matters.

In general,

in the

lower grades, entries were shorter, while in the guidance school the

entries were much longer.
In the final

stage, all results were gathered and compared.

The responses that had

a

75 percent agreement (3 out of 4)

cation were included in the final stage.
was

a

In

a

on codifi-

few cases, where there

50 percent agreement (2 out of 4) on an entry, my own content

analysis of that particular item was used in computations.

If,

as a

result, majority was achieved, the results were entered in the final

analysis.

there was little disagreement on the codification,

In general

especially since sub-categories for each level were supplied to each
codifier, along with

a

broader definition of each sub-category.

This

was particularly important in the case of "main moral theme," since

each item had to be defined in broader terms.

The definitions for the

themes are as follows:
Respect:

obedience, deference, politeness and filiality

Self-discipline:
Achievement:

responsibleness

,

orderliness, value of time

value of learning, perseverance, competitiveness,
to work
1 1 i ngness

wi

Value of intelligence:
Affect:

using one's head to solve problems

kindness, love, gratitude, forgiveness

Patriotism:

love for country or culture
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Group and cooperation:
Bravery:

helpfulness, loyalty, cohesiveness

courage

The remaining sub-categories for other levels are self-

explanatory and there is no need for their repetition here.

Analysis

Type of entries

.

This category is divided into eight sub-categories

and one "miscellaneous."

The eight sub-categories are:

political

institutions and civic training; political indoctrination; nationalism;
sports, health and safety; practical knowledge and know your country;

education, science, and technology; moralistic, including religion; and
arts, culture and folklore.
In the analysis of the data

(see Table 4),

it was found that

the entries dealing with moralistic subjects made up 40 percent of all
the entries.

The number of such entries were fewer in the elementary

readers, while in the guidance readers the numbers had increased.

Moralistic items made up 30 percent of the total

in the

elementary

readers, while they composed 55 percent of the total in guidance
This is expected, since, as noted earlier, the Farsi readers

readers.

function as the main vehicle by which moral codes are taught to the
students.

The heavy emphasis on the classical books which promote

moralistic behavior, such as Gol^stan and Bustan of Saadi
of such

a

process.

As we shall

,

are examples

see later, many different moral values

are conveyed to the students with certain norms receiving more emphasis.
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Entries that dealt with practical matters, such as "letter

writing" and "know your country," which were descriptions of major
Iranian cities, made up 26 percent of all entries in the elementary

schools, whereas, there were only three entries dealing with such subjects in the guidance school readers.

Traveling and vacationing are

not institutionalized in Iran as they are in the West.^

government had included

a

Therefore, the

description of major Iranian cities for the

elementary students to broaden their view of their nation, and thus
provide them with

a

more cohesive feeling of belonging to the nation

of Iran.

Entries dealing with political institutions composed
tial

portion of the first- to third-grade readers.

a

substan-

None of these

entries, however, directly dealt with political institutions as such.

There was no mention of the Majlis, the cabinet, political parties, or
the Constitution.

The entries that are codified as dealing with

political symbols and institutions, for example, included such subjects
as saluting the national

flag.

There was also

a

village scene where

a

boy views the results of the benefits from the reforms undertaken by
the Literacy and Rural Development Corpsmen.

There was also an entry

that dealt with the election of class representatives.
far as any of the readers went in dealing with
a

democratic process, thus giving

a

a

This was as

subject that involved

semblance of civic training to the

students.

The sub-category of "political indoctrination" included such
subjects as promotion of the monarchy and the royal family, particularly
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TABLE 4

Analysis of Types of Entries for Grades

Types of entries

Political institutions
& civic training
18%
Political indoctrination
12
National ism
6
Sports, health &
safety
Practical knowledge &
know your country
41
Education, science &
technology
Moralistic including
rel igion
24
Arts, Culture &
folklore
Others (*)
total %
n

g r a d e
3
4

2

1

1

h

11°/

c

D

c

8

-DO/

0 0/

%

/I

"70/

/ 1

o

^

1

OO
_

8

n

00
c\\
3.2(9j
8.2
(23)

O

o
ii

7

c.

2.1
C 1
ib.l

1

(6)
c \
^4b)
/

/I

cc.

CI

lb

O

8

8

5

8

17

29

27

31

41

71

54

42

40.9 (114)

10
15

18

19
3

15

13
3

9
3

19
3

14.0
4.7

LI

3

(41)

(37)

(*) Includes entries that as
codified.

the Shah, the Shahbanou

o

D

101% 100% 100% 100%
(17)

7

o/o

o

o

c

to 8

average
6

5

Oo/
oh

D
0

1

a

(37)

5

D

6.1

(17)

(39)
(13)

99% 101% 100% 101% 100%
(39)

(38)

(35)

(36)

(279)

result of disagreement could not be

(queen) and Crown Prince Reza.

Also included

in this sub-category are discussions of the Shah-People Revolution

(also referred to as the White Revolution).

The achievements of the

Pahlavi period under Mohammad-Reza Shah are also included in this sub-

category.

There were

a total

of nine such entries in these textbooks

which made up about three percent of the total entries.

There seemed

to have been more emphasis on the Shah and his family during the first

few years of the schooling.

Fifth grade and eighth grade textbooks had

no direct references to the Shah and his family or reforms undertaken
by him; there was one entry each for grades four, six and seven.
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There were 23 entries, or over eight percent of all entries,
that dealt with nationalism.

More recent articles on the subject of

nationalism were supplemented by poetry from Shahnameh that deals with
mythical Iranian national heroes.
a

Although Shahnameh has always been

favorite book with Iranians, nevertheless, it has received more

attention than before as an object of rising nationalistic feelings.
As Firdousi himself put it, Shahnameh was a means by which Iranian

national feelings and cultural heritage were resurrected after three

centuries of Arab domination following the Arab conquest of Iran in
642 A.D.

Thus, Shahnameh was used to promote Iranian nationalism,

patriotism and bravery.

It also helped to give a cohesive feeling of

nationalism to the present-day citizens of Iran, among whom ethnic,
tribal and linguistic differences are considerable.

Nationalism, as

a

subject, received great attention during eighth grade, making up 28

percent of the total entries for that year.
Subjects discussing the importance of education or the significance of scientific and technological innovations made up six percent
of the entries.

Many of the items were in poetry, praising the impor-

tance of education.

Others dealing with scientific and technological

innovations dealt with both Western and Iranian achievements.

Abu-Ali

Sina (Avicina) and Razi were among the prominent classical Iranian

scholars mentioned.

The Wright Brothers, Bell, Edison, the history of

film making, paper and printing, and Madame Curie were among the sub-

jects that were included.
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Introduction to arts, culture and folklore has retained

a

consistently prominent position in the readers from second to eighth
grade.

Excerpts from European, Japanese, American-Indian and Austral-

ian Aborigine folktales are even included in the readers.
a

There were

total of 39 entries, or 14 percent of the total, that were codified

to have dealt with this sub-category.

The subject of health, sports and safety received the least

attention.

There were

a

total of 6 entries,

3

fifth grades, that dealt with this subject.

each for second and

The entries were about

such topics as permanent teeth replacing baby teeth, history of sports

during the Safavid period, and the story of the Olympics.

emphasis on health education, which is very important in

There was no
a

culture that

o

has its high share of taboo and superstition.

Schools have traditionally ignored sports.

Individual sports

such as wrestling and weightl ifting have been popular and have been

pursued outside the school environment.

Iranians have done well in

international competition in these sports.

Team sports which ought to

encourage cooperation and role specificity are played in Iran, not
a

cohesive group, but as

a

number of individuals.

as

Iranian soccer teams

have had a success in international soccer competition even though the

sport has been played based on individual initiative rather than team
cooperation.

An example of this is that Iranian soccer players become

proficient at dribbling the ball but not at passing.^

Main participant
a

.

As noted in the previous chapter, individualism is

cultural characteristic of Iranians.

This kind of individualism.
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however, has been criticized for having produced individuals who
are

egotistic, self-centered, and rather selfish.

Self-reliance, self-

perfection, and self-esteem are rarely displayed as Iranian individual
traits.

Although Iranian literature

is

full

of stories and historical

accounts enumerating personal achievements with such individuals held
in high moral

esteem, nevertheless, the socio-political environment,

at least in the past two centuries, has not been conducive to the

development of such attitudes.
The analysis of Farsi readers reveals that entries promoting
or having an individual as its main participant had

a

clear majority.

A total of 149 entries, or almost 54 percent of all entries, had an

individual as the main participant.

There was also an increase in

the number of entries with individual as the main participant as the

grade-level increased (see Table 5).

Although the institution of the family

is

the most respected

and the most effective means of communication in Iranian culture, it

received the lowest attention.

Stories that had family as the main

participant were present only up to grade three with one further entry
in grade five.

There was

a

total

absence of entries with family as the

main participant in guidance school readers.

Despite the lack of attention given to the family, the group
as the central

all

participant in entries was steadily about 20 percent

the way from the second to the eighth grade.

There were

of 55 entries with group as the central participant.

many social scientists believe that collectivity

is

a

total

As noted earlier,

one of the major
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TABLE

5

Analysis of Main Participant for Entries for Grades

1

to 8

g r a d e s

Main participant
Individual
Family
Group
Others (a)
total %

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

43%

49%

49%

59%

68%

78%

71%

14
14
29

22
24

22
16
14

22

23

5

4

24
18

25
4

6

8

%

n

71% 62.0 (149)
7.0
(18)
29
23.0
(55)
7.0
(18)

100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 99.0

n

Not relevant (b)

(7)

(37)

(10)

(4)

(37)

(34)

(28)

(36)

(31)

(31)

(240)

(3)

(11)

(2)

(4)

(5)

(39)

(a) Includes entries that as a result of disagreement could not be
codified.
(b) These items are made up of entries where there were no actual
participation by any individual.

norms that could aid in the development of an environment conducive to

political, as well as economic development.
of the Farsi
a

It seems that the authors

readers were aware of the impact of collectivity and thus

fair portion of the entries had topics promoting group and collective

undertakings.
Lack of collective action or group cooperation is legendary in

Iranian history.

Many attribute the Iranian lack of success in the

Irano-Afghan war of 1837 over the city of Herat to the lack of cooperation and coordination among the Iranian generals

J

^

It is said that

each general wished to capture the city on his own and claim the victory
for himself.

This episode is also supported by other similar accounts

detailing lack of group cooperation among Iranians.
the story of Nasser Khosrow, the medieval

Jacobs relates

Iranian poet-philosopher.
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Nasser Khosrow had raised the ire of the clergy for
certain anti-religious sentiments in his writings, and
the religious leaders organized a party to kill him.
When the party came to his house, Nasser Khosrow offered
to submit if the party would nominate a single individual
to kill him.
Each member of the party, eager for the
prestige to be gained by the killing of the famous
Nasser Khosrow, disputed who would be the one to carry
out the decision.
In the anticipated confusion, the
clever Nasser Khosrow escaped. 12

Many entries relate tales of betrayal.
1

Given the Iranian

o

fear of betrayal,

this emphasis is not unexpected.

Thus, the prominence of entries with an individual as the main

participant is only

a

cultural extension.

As we shall

see later, the

stories in the readers have tried to emphasize an individualism that

promotes

a

societal sense of responsibility as well as commitment to

self-preservation, which is

a

far cry from the negative individualism

that was discussed above.

Main moral theme

.

As noted earlier, not all

subjects that had an explicit moral theme.

of the entries dealt with

Especially in the first

three readers, some entries dealt with "practical knowledge," know your

country," and technical and mechanical information.
The most emphasized theme in all the readers was achievement
and hard work.

A total

of 63 entries, or 25 percent of the total

entries were devoted to these two themes.

Entries from both the Iran-

ian and foreign sources were used to promote achievement and hard work.

Except for the first two grades, where there was more emphasis on
respect and self-discipline, achievement was the most prominent theme

1
1

1

,
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TABLE

6

Analysis of the Main Moral theme of Entries for Grades
Main moral thpmp

1

ResDPrt
v«
\« v« u
0/0
Self discipline
Achievement &
1
lu U WU
1
Value of intelligence
Affect and
thoughtfulness
22
Patriotism
11
Group & cooperation
Bravery
Others (a)
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8
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3
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6
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3

3

6

0
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6

8
17
14

12
12

6

14

18
18

15
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9

11

6

3

16

9

9

11

9

11

6

19
14
8
6
11

6

Q
0
8

1

Q

/I

%

0 Of

•50/

J/o

to 8

1

12.0
15.0
7.0
8.0
11.0

3

20

3

6

11

11

6.0 (17)
11.0 (27)
25.0 (63)
4.0 (10)

3

18

n

(30)
(39)
(18)
(20)
(27)

total %

99%

99%

n

(9)

(36)

(32)

(35)

(34)

(36)

(34)

(35)

(251)

(8)

(5)

(5)

(2)

(5)

(2)

(1)

(1)

(28)

Not relevant (b)

98% 100% 101% 101% 101%

(a) Includes entries that as
codified.

a

99% 100%

result of disagreement could not be

(b) This row indicates the number of entries for each grade that
was deemed to have no moral theme present.

in the textbooks.

The Wright brothers, Hans Christian Anderson, Hellen

Keller, Madame Curie, Leonardo Da Vinci

,

Magellan, Captain Scott, Amund-

sen and Richard Byrd are some of the foreign achievers mentioned in
the readers.

The famous Iranian achievers of middle ages, such as

Avici na, Khayyam, Abu-Reyhan-e Biruni, and Khawjeh Nassir-e Tusi

well as the more recent personalities such as Hussein Behzad

Jabar Baghcheban,^^ are also mentioned.

14

,

as

and

The biographies of these

individuals are supplemented with poetry and prose from works of Saadi
Attar, and Nezamie.

Although sometimes the stories relate Sufi philos-

ophy and have spiritual conotations, nevertheless, attainment of goals

213

through hard work is prominently displayed.

Modern poetry and prose

by writers such as Jalal Al-Ahmad^^ and Parviz-e Natel-e Khanlari^^

promote achivement and hard work as an end in itself.

Kahnlari

relates

the story of the eagle and the crow, where the crow has no self-respect

and derives satisfaction from the least desirable worldly materials.

The eagle, on the other hand, has to fly high and try hard to get his
share of the hunt.

Although the crow lives longer than the eagle, the

eagle's life is filled with challenge, goals and ambitions that are
high and above those that the crow expects from himself.

Another entry which promotes achivement but is filled with
Sufi symbolism, philosophy and the approach to the spiritual
is the story S imorgh by Attar,

the medieval Persian Sufi poet.

story describes the search of birds for their leader Simorgh
dary bird, also mentioned in Shahnameh
father.

ultimate

,

where he raised Zal

,

,

The
a

legen-

Rustam's

Most of the birds either die or relinguish their pursuit,

since it involved hard work and

a

painful journey, along with separa-

tion from readily available pleasures.

Of all the birds, only thirty

reached their destiny, finding no sign of their expected leader.

How-

ever, when they looked at themselves, they saw thirty birds (Farsi's

translation of thirty birds is sie morgh

)

,

and realized that through

challenges and perseverance, they had become the ultimate in themselves.

To promote group cooperation for achievement, the authors of
the textbooks have relied on present-day stories or descriptions of

foreign cooperative actions.

Rochdale collective experience in England

is portrayed as the fruit of cooperative action among citizens.

The
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beneficial results from the cooperation between

stream and
depicted in

a

crow, a tree, a

farmer which result in the formation of

a

a

a

new town are

folktale.

Patriotism

is

the second most common theme in the readers.

Items from classical Persian literature and modern-day writings are

used to emphasize this theme.
15 percent of the total

Thirty-nine entries, which account for

items, deal with patriotism as the main theme.

The emphasis on patriotism is almost equally present in all the readers,

making up between

11

to 20 percent of the entries in each reader.

Patriotism is usually treated as an extension of love for the
nation.

Historical events highlighting patriotism are usually used to

promote the theme.

In some cases, however,

patriotism

is

mixed with

love for the institution of monarchy, support for the Shah and his

family, and reforms undertaken by the Shah--i.e., the White Revolution.

Often achievements by ancient Iranian kings and contributions made by
Iranian civilization to world civilization are used as

patriotic themes.
the maximum effect.

a

basis of

Sometimes patriotism and bravery are mixed to achieve

Self-sacrifice of Iranian soldiers and generals

against Greeks, Mongols and other invaders of the "motherland" are
used to emphsize the significance of bravery and patriotism.

There were a total of 30 entries that dealt with affect and
thoughtful ness, about 12 percent of the total items.

Aside from the

eighth grade reader, where there was only one entry dealing with the
theme, there were two in the fourth grade reader and the remaining

readers had three or more entries each dealing with "affect."

Readers

"
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for fifth and sixth grades had the highest number of items dealing
with

"affect" and "thoughtful ness

.

The objects of affect and kindness were not limited to mankind.

Animals were also objects of kindness and love.

Once again, the entries

were often borrowed from classical Persian literature.
the form of poetry, from such classical poets as Saadi

modern poets as Bahar.

Many were in
,

Nezami and such

Recent examples of human kindness, such as

Albert Schweitzer, were reflected in the readers.
Entries promoting bravery and courage made up eight percent of
the total.

There were entries discussing bravery in all grades except

the first grade.

Many of the items were drawn, once again, from

classical Persian literature or from historical events.

There were

also several examples from Western lore in the readers.

The courage

and bravery by William Tell

vented

a

and Peter, the little Dutch boy, who pre-

dike breaking by putting his finger in

saving his hometown, were noted.

a

leaking hole, thus

A recent example of Iranian courage

and bravery was exhibited in the story of the shepherd who, on seeing

fallen rocks on railroad tracks at night, made

a

torch from his clothing

and thus saved the lives of many passengers on the train.

These stories

are but a few of the entries used in the readers to promote bravery in
the students.

Besides several excerpts from Shahnameh describing the courage
and bravery of its heroes, there were stories relating the bravery of

Iranians in battles against foreign invaders.

against the Mongol invaders is

a

The Iranian resistance

favorite topic.
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Bravery

promoted in

is

a

micro and

a

macro sense.

Bravery and

courage within peer group and family, as well as heroism against
foreign invaders is applauded.

Sub-categories of respect, group and cooperation each made up
seven percent of the entries.

Over half of the entries in the first

grade reader had respect as their central moral theme.

However, there

was a decline in attention given to respect as the grade level

increased.

There were no items with respect as the central theme in

the sixth or seventh grade readers.

There was only one item in the

eighth grade reader with respect as the main moral theme.
of respect are varied.

The objects

They include God and religious figures; the

Shah and the royal family; and of course, parents and family members.

Group and cooperation themes also received varied attention.
There were no items dealing with cooperation in either the first grade
reader or the eighth grade reader.
as the central

There was one entry with cooperation

theme in the seventh grade reader.

Most of the discus-

sions in the previous categories dealing with individualism, emphasizing
the impact of individualism in Iranian culture, are also relevant here.

Kalileh va Demneh
as

,

the classical

Indian literary book that uses animals

its main actors, is one of the few sources for the classical stories

on group work and cooperation that is utilized in the readers.

The

story of the first cooperative in Rochdale, England is another of the

highlights for this theme.
The fewest number of entries, based on our classification, were

used in discussing the "value of intelligence."

There were 10 items

s
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altogether, at least one entry for each grade, except for the first
and seventh grades which had none.

There were also items dealing with "love of life," "fate,"
"universalism," and "arrogance" in the readers.

Since the number of

such items were few, they were all grouped and categorized as "others"
in the classification.

Authority figure stressed
central

About 70 percent of all the entries had

.

authority figure.

a

The most common authority figures were indi-

viduals with national and political prominence, most of whom were kings,

governors or persons with high administrative positions.

This was

rather expected since many of the entries were drawn from classical

literature as was noted earlier.
supply

a

Shahnameh

,

Golestan and Bustan also

substantial portion of the guidance school entries.

total of 109 entries in the guidance school Farsi

Of the

readers, 45 entries,

or 42 percent, were direct excerpts from classical Persian literature.

Saadi's works got the highest attention.

They included 10 items, six

of which were from Golestan (combination of prose and poetry) and four

from Bustan (exclusively poetry).

Saadi's works are almost all moral

teachings which are usually related in the form of stories, many from
his extensive travels in the Islamic world of the thirteenth century.

Firdowsi's work, Shahnameh
eight items.

,

received the second highest attention with

Although there are implicit moral teachings in Shahnameh

the work is the account of mythical

Iranian kings with Rustam,

moral and very strong contender, as the hero.

a

,

brave,

The work details Rustam'

bravery, patriotism and service to the Iranian monarchs.

Firdowsi was
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TABLE

7

The Main Authority Figure Stressed in Entries
for Grades

grades

Authority figure
stressed

Hotter
Other family members
Elders
Educational
Peer
Police
Kings, princes, rulers
men of power & wealth
The Shah & his family
Religious, incl. God
Others (a)

Not relevant (b)
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(8)

(33)

(32)

(29)

(28)

(31)

(21)

(17)

(198)

(9)

(8)

(5)

(8)

(11)

(7)

(14)

(19)

(81)

Includes entries that as a result of disagreement could not be

(a)

codified.
(b) This row indicates the number of entries for each grade that
had no central authority figure present.

a

favorite with the Pahlavi regime since his teachings of patriotism

and promotion of monarchy corresponded with the regime's ideals, and

thus his work was used (or misused) to promote the institution and

legitimacy of monarchy.
There are also four excerpts from Siasatnameh (Book of Politics)
of Khawjeh Nassir Tousi and Qabus-Nameh of Kaikavos ibn-Iskandar both of

which were written in the twelfth century.

Both books are concerned

with moral teachings written for the attention of the royalty of this

period to assist them in governing.

There are also two items each from
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MlMu^Oemneh
discussed earlier.

and Mante5_at,Iair of Attar,
details of which were

The rest of the entries were from
individual

classic writers and poets
The entries in the elementary
readers are less sophisticated
and are sometimes simplified versions
of stories from classical Persian

literature.

These simplified stories have kept
their implied moral

teachings intact.
Items with peers as the main authority
figures are thought to
be a positive educational

reinforcement among the children.

McClelland

includes "peer pressure for interaction" among
norms which are thought
to be important for achievement.

As noted previously, the hypothesis

for this theory has been partially indirectly
confirmed and is one of
the items noted under the general heading of
"collectivity."

notes that "peer collectivity
vidual

.

.

.

McClelland

more successfully forces the indi-

into line in the more rapidly developing countries. "^^

Further-

more, it is also found that even among the more
economically successful

authoritarian societies, there is greater peer orientation.

Thus, peer

collectivity has been suggested to be an orientation which is quite
helpful to development.

The development of peer collectivity is as

valuable to socio-political development of

a

nation as it is to its

economic development.
Some 15 percent of the entries, or 30 of them, had peers as

their central authority figure.

Some of these, as usual, were drawn

from the classical literature, but most were from recent writings by
Iranian and foreign writers.

The attention paid to peers as the main

.
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authority figure was rather uneven
throughout the readers.

There were
no items with peer as the
authority figure in the readers for
first and

fourth grade.

On the other hand, one-fourth
of the entries in second,

fifth and eighth grade readers
had peers as the main authority
figure.

Elders occupy an important socioK:ultural
position in Iranian
society.

They are revered and respect for them
is urged.

Also, a

great deal of emphasis is put on advice
from elders due to their longer
life experience.

Thus, elders traditionally have served
as

source of authority in Iranian literature
and folklore.

a

major

It is,

there-

fore, not surprising to find that 23
entries, or 12 percent of all the

items, have elders as the main authority
figure.

In some of the

stories even the rulers turn to elders for
advice, which
benefi ci

is

usually

al

Educational figures, such as teachers and school principals,
also received

a

the entries.

A total of 15 entries, or eight percent of the
items, had

fair share of emphasis as the main authority figure
in

educational figures as the main authority image.

However, there were

fewer entries with such authority figures in the guidance school
readers.

There were none in the first and fifth grade readers either.

The second grade reader had educational authorities as its main figures
in one-fifth of the entries.

There was

a

decreasing emphasis on educa-

tional figures in third and fourth grade readers.

Most of the materials

dealing with educational figures as the main authority are of recent
nature.

They mostly deal with classroom situations and/or with educa-

tional matters.
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Although almost all the elders and
politically prominent individuals were male, there were male
and female individuals performing
as

the educational

the classical

figure of authority.

As it has been noted often,

literature supplies most of the materials,
especially for

the guidance school readers.

Since classical Persian literature
is

extremely male oriented, females, as
figures of authority, are almost
absent.
a

Women are rarely mentioned in Shahnameh,
except when there is

love scene or the discussion involves
a wife, mother, or daughter of

the actor.

The major exception is the story of Bahram-e
Gur (Sassanid

King) and Azadeh, who, through perseverance,
is able to teach the king

that "achievement is the end result of
perseverance and hard work."

Religious figures, such as the Prophet Mohammad,
other Biblical
prophets. Imams (successors to the Prophet, beginning
with Ali) and
God, make up seven percent of the total entries.

As a norm, all

the

readers begin with praise for God in their first entry
in which God's
aid and assistance for achievement and success is sought.

The only

reader which had no direct reference to God or other religious figures
was the second grade reader.

On the other hand, more than one- third,

or 37 percent of all the items in the first grade reader had God or

religious personalities as the main figures of authority.

Biographies

of the religious personalities or Koranic descriptions of events such
as Noah's ark and the flood supply most of such religious figures of

authori ty.

Some 30 entries, or 16 percent of all items had
as

the main authority figure.

a

family member

Of that total, seven percent, or 13
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items, had the father as the main
authority figure, while five percent,
or

n

items, stressed mother.

Other family members, such as siblings

and grandparents, made up only three
percent of the total authority

figures in the readers.

Mothers, as main authority figures, are
stressed more in the

elementary school readers, particularly during
the first few grades.
Fathers, on the other hand, are stressed more
in the guidance school
readers as the main figure of authority.

There are no mentions of any

family member as an authority figure in the
eighth grade reader.
Fathers are usually dealt with as individuals
with strength, wisdom and
also as

a

source of guidance.

However, there were also items showing

the support that children could give to their
families and the inter-

dependence of family members on each other.
depicted as

a

Mothers are usually

source of love, kindness and self-sacrificing for
their

families, particularly to their children.

There were two entries each in first through fourth grade
readers that had the Shah and his family as the main figures of
authority.

There was also one item in the sixth grade reader discussing the

Shah's childhood as depicted in his book. Mission For My County

.

There

was no mention of the Shah or his family in the fifth, seventh and

eighth grade readers.

The items with the Shah and his family as the

main authority figures discussed the Shah, his wife and their children,

particularly Crown Prince Reza.

The items dealt with their achieve-

ments, contributions to the welfare of the nation, and sought respect
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and love for them.

There was also one entry that dealt
exclusively

with the accomplishments of Reza Shah.
There were two items that had the
police-as it is institu-

tionalized today-as the central authority
figure.

These items dealt

with the observance of traffic
regulations and depicted policemen as

benevolent and helpful.

Of the two items, one was in the
fifth grade

and the other in the sixth grade reader,
making up one percent of the
total entries.

Mmude_^LjuMlon^

The sub-categories dividing this classificati
on

are benevolence, non-benevolence and neutral.

In all

the readers,

except the fifth grade, the majority of items
had the main authority
figure as

a

benevolent person.

had a benevolent individual

as

Some two-thirds of all the items
the main authority figure.

The remain-

ing entries were divided between those with
either non-benevolent or

neutral

attitudes.

The entries, particularly in the first four

readers, had fewer authority figures with non-benevolent
attitudes than
in the next four years.

Even the entries with non-benevolent authority

figures are themselves reinforcing

negative consequences.

a

positive moral theme by depicting

The story of the shepherd who cried wolf is

a

good example of this mode of teaching (see Table 8).

Hierarchical social order

.

Very few of the entries in the elementary

school readers had a hierarchical social order implicit in them.

Over

85 percent of the readers from second to fifth grade had no hierarchical

social order present.

There were five entries in the first grade reader
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TABLE 8
The Attit ude of Authority Streesed in
Entries for Grades
Attitudes of authority
stressed
1
2
3
4
5
'

—Spades

^

t

No^b:i:v"o^ant
Neutral (a)

17

total %

3^

\f

2^

100% 100% 101% 100%

^

to 8

^

if if

f;'

^

1

"

'I

'I

^

ta

|36)

\\

99% 100% 100%

99% 99 0%

(6)

(33)

(35)

(29)

(28)

(31)

(20)

(17)

(197)

(11)

(8)

(2)

(8)

(11)

(7)

(15)

(20)

(82)

No authority

present (b)

entries that as

a

codified^"^^^^^^

result of disagreement could not be

(b) This row indicates the number of
entries for each grade that was
deemed to have no authoritative attitude stressed.

that were relevant to this classification, three of which
dealt with

religious hierarchy and the monarchy.
The presence of classical
by hierarchical

literature, which is often influenced

social order, in the guidance school

readers gave rise

to the number of items with hierarchical social order
explicit in them.

At the most, one- third of all the entries had an explicit social
order.

The table below (Table 9) displays the increasing number of items

where hierarchical social order

is

present and rather explicit as the

grade level increases.
Social stratification is still very much
social structure.
is

a

a

part of Iranian

The often talked about hezar famil

(thousand family)

socio-economic class that has dominated the affairs of tne nation

at least since the late eighteenth century.

Their significance and

1
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TABLE

Hierarchical social
order

1

Present
Not present

60%
40

total %

Not relevant (a)

them

A

A

6%
94

3

7%
93

G r a d e s
4
5
6

14%
86

14%
86

8

7

23%

33%

77

67

%

n
1

34% 19.0
(43)
66 81.0 (182)

100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
100%

n

nr.A-^'

2

9

it

(5)

(32)

(30)

(32)

(35)

(36)

(27)

(30)

(225)

(12)

(9)

(7)

(5)

(4)

(3)

(8)

(7)

(54)

^"^^ ^s a rcsu 1 of disagreement could not be
that had no hierarchical social order
present in

^".^'^'^^

1

influence on the economic and political affairs of
revolutionary Iran,
however, cannot be determined as of yet.
The social class system, which was so much

a

part of Iranian

life in pre- Islamic Iran, had its influence on the Iranian
Constitution
of 1906, when the class system was recognized as a basis for
parliamen-

tary representation with all classes electing their deputies to the

Majlis.

Although class basis for parliamentary election was soon

abolished, it is no coincidence that hierarchical social order is an
integral part of classical Persian literature and is often depicted in
school

texts, particularly in the guidance school readers.

Contemporary setting

.

Students are able to relate more easily to

entries with contemporary settings.

Items depicted in setting of the

distant past or of more fairy-tale than real life experience are
thought to be of little help, if any, to students in the development
of the senses and the concepts that would be helpful in real life
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TABLE 10

Setting

[

Con tempora

ry

i

oo% 100%

Non-contemporary

.

total %

]
^

.

7^~V~^~t~^.
5
6

^

64%
36

71%

49%

29

tV IV

377

7

8

%

n

?v/

iqo/

n

n.r.^

77

II'

Ito

^(sgj

100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
100% 100% 100%

n

(6)

(28)

j;o^^anlMa)_Jl^

situations.

^

'

(33)

(28)

(35)

(28)

(22)

(22)

(199)

(4)

(9)

(4)

(n)

(13)

(15)

(go)

As Table 10 shows, the setting of most entries
in the first

four years are contemporary, while the majority
of the entries in the
last four years are not.

Of course, the nature of classical literature,
particularly

present in the guidance school, aids the high proportion of
items set
in non-contemporary situations.

Also, biographies of famous men,

poets, inventors, explorers, artists and scientists all add to
the

number of items that have taken place in the past.

All

settings taking

place in the nineteenth century and before have been regarded as not

contemporary for the sake of analysis here.
However, most of the items, as shown in Table 10 above, have

contemporary setting.
readers are set in

a

All

the items in the first and second grade

contemporary situation, while less than one-fifth

of all the items in the eighth grade reader are set in contemporary
ci

rcumstances.

a
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s™ar^.

As the data analysis shows,
the average Iranian student
in

his eight years of elementary and
guidance school education has been

exposed to varying themes in his Farsi
readers.

Certain moral values

are stressed while some others are
less apparent.

work, for example, receive

a

Achievement and hard

proportionately high representation in

the readers, while group work and
cooperation leading to achievement

are very much neglected.

also receives

a

Love of country, as reflected in
patriotism,

very high representation in the Farsi
textbooks.

of the entries promoting bravery also
have

a

Some

fair amount of patriotism

implicit in them.

Most of the items delineated by McClelland to
have an influence
on economic development are present in the
readers.

The five norms

that were outlined to have a proven or indirectly
proven impact on

economic development are all included in the readers.

The institu-

tional norms, such as respect and friendship, are also
well represented,

making up almost one-fifth of the total entries.

As noted above, group

activity and cooperation do not receive the prominence that they
require.

There are many entries, however, that stress the significance

of rationality, planning and orderliness.

There are few items that

deal either with specificity, role relation or impersonal

cooperation.

Almost totally absent are civic training in its present-day
context.

There are no discussions of the role of government, its

responsibility to
government.

a

modern polity, or the public's obligations to the

There are no discussions of the Iranian constitution, the

parliament, the cabinet, or any other civil or military institution.
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In short,

there is

the Farsi
a

readers attempt no citizenship
training.

Although

social science text in the three
years of guidance school,

it also attempts to present
factual

information without much elabora-

tion on the concepts, such as what
gave rise to the promulgation of
the Constitution of 1906-07.

So far as the authority figures
present in the entries, the

traditional sources of authority, such as
kings, governors, vaziers
(ministers), elders, and parents are very
much the norm.

They contrib-

ute most of the authority figures present
in some classical

works, are but

a

literary

recent concept in modern Persian literature.

Tradi-

tionally, the emphasis has been on hierarchical
social order which has
very much been part of Iranian life and,
as was apparent above, is very

much present in modern-day Persian textbooks.
The Farsi readers perform

a

many faceted educational task.

Although their primary purpose is to teach the Persian
alphabet,
writing, vocabulary and grammar in the elementary school, and
to provide
a

basic introduction to classical Persian literature in the guidance

school, their mission, nevertheless, is influenced by other objectives.

Historically, Persian literature has served as
cal

vehicle.

a

moral

and philosophi-

Moral and philosophical teachings still compose the most

significant portion of the readers that were analyzed here.

Excerpts

from classical Persian literature, along with modern Persian literature,

compose the majority of the items present in the readers.

This is not

surprising, since the readers are primarily intended to introduce the
students to Persian literature.
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Another task of books that deal with
teachings of mores and
values is their relevance to the
present-day needs of men.

A major

shortcoming of the readers stems from
the fact that certain norms and
values which, as suggested earlier, are
crucial to development of sociopolitical and economic institutions have
received little attention.
For example, too little attention is
paid to collective activity for

purposes of communal good.

In

light of the discussions detailing
the

negative form of "individualism" and its
impact on the perceptions of
each individual, the subject of collectivity
demands more rigorous

attention.

The socio-cultural notion of individualism,
as represented

in the textbooks, has

to be moderated.

Too often, the individual as

the champion and prodigy remains the central
attention of the entries.

Too frequently survival of an individual is portrayed
as dependent on
his wit and intelligence since those around him,
often striving and

competing for realization of their own personal interests,
are indifferent, if not hostile, to his interests.

Furthermore, the notion of individualism is supported by the
phiolosophical tradition implicit in Sufism and displayed in classical
Persian literature.

The emphasis on the individual attempt for ulti-

mate perfection has been in

a

large part responsible for the omni-

presence of "individualism" in the Iranian mind.
in general,

and the Farsi

Thus, the literature,

readers, in particular, are an extension of

the Iranian socio-cultural tradition.

The shortcoming of the Iranian cultural tradition, on the other
hand, has not been compensated to an effective degree by the inclusion
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of new innovative entries or
stories from foreign literary
sources.
Although there is a wide representation
of foreign literary works
in
the readers with items from Tolstoy,
Victor Hugo, Schiller, H.

C.

Anderson, Moliere and Nehru, and
biographies of famous men and women
such as Magellan, DaVinci, Albert
Schweitzer, Alexander Graham Bell,

Thomas Edison, Helen Keller and the
Wright brothers, the spirit of group

work and collective action is lacking.
Family activity, which is the only group
activity that serves
as

a

source of support for most Iranians,
receives very little atten-

tion.

Family bonds, especially at

time of industrialization and

a

very active urbanization which undermines such
bonds, need to be

further affirmed and supported.
The readers also perform as

a

major vehicle for politicaliza-

tion in the forms of nationalism, patriotism and
political indoctrination.

Many of the items classified under "know you country"
also

serve to create

a

national identify in the students, thus making about

one-fourth of all entries in the readers related to political
socialization.

Individualism and de-emphasis of group action means that

values needed for development of political institutions are missing,

since all such activities require cooperative action.
the subject of political

ignored.

Furthermore,

institutions and citizenship roles are totally

No discussions of political

institutions, such as the Majlis,

political parties, the system of justice, labor organizations, or the

army is available in any of the readers, although these institutions
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were created or promoted by the Pahlavi
regime to serve its purposes
and to help to legitimize its
rule.
The values and norms present in
the readers greatly emphasiize
themes that are either of little
relevance to political development
or
are in contrast to the ideals of
political modernization and development.

The case in point is the emphasis
on individual action and de-

emphasis on collective action.

Furthermore, institutional norms seem

to predominate in the textbooks,
while such norms as universalism or

"salience of nature" are rather absent.
The attention paid to the development of
achievement oriented
norms, while ignoring development of institutions
to perform as the

infra-structure of

a

developed society, is

a

classic example of the

"modernization" that was envisioned by the Shah.

Modernization to the

Shah had been pieces of highly sophisticated technology,
imported from

abroad and maintained by foreign experts, while having no
real relevance
to the needs and lives of Iranians.

Shah's vision of modernization.

These show pieces served as the

The school readers are another manifes-

tation of such modernizating visions.

While attention is paid to

achievement oriented themes, the contradictory traditional foundation
which perpetuates the cultural framework

is

also retained.

Thus, in a

sense, attempts are made to impose modern and developed values on

a

foundation which is basically alien to such themes.
In short,

it could be noted that the second Pahlavi

monarch,

like the first, had little interest in the development of the nation,
be it economic or political.

Like his father, Mahammad Reza Pahlavi
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was more interested in self-aggrandizement
than in modernizing the
state.
A student's relationship to his or
her environment, however,
is not bound just to the textbooks
that he or she reads and has to
pass

exams on.

Peer groups, mass communication,
teacher-student relation-

ship, and most important of all, the
parent-student relationship serve
as

further vehicles of socialization and
politicization.

The next

section. Part III, deals with comparison of
student-parent values and
perhaps will offer an added dimension by which
some suggestions could
be made as to the impact of the textbooks
on the students, on one hand,

and the influence of parent's values on
the students, on the other hand,
in determining the direction of socialization
and political

among students.

learning
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for it.
the majority of Iranians have no cash
savings,

Since
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Iraditionally, the well-to-do,
during the summer seasons, moved to more
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For example, the rich Tehranis took up
summer residence
in Shemiran, on the foothills of
Alburz, 10 miles to the north
It
was this same class, and the expanding
middle class, that now could
afford either travelling to the beaches on
the Caspian or to foreign
^'ciyn
resort areas for vacations.
g

It is not unusual to find many Iranian
youth in their 20s that
know very little about biological matters involving
the opposite sex
astounded to find out from a 21 year old Iranian
youth
LT/^u^!;^^^
that he had never heard or known about a woman's
monthly period.
9

^'^most all

Iranian schools lack sport facilities at the barest
Most scnools only have a few hundred square yards of
playground
that are used as playing ground, recreation area, and,
when needed, as
either volleyball or basketball courts. The ground is either
asphalt
or of cement tiles, which make falling a hazardous
eventuality. There
are a few sports fields that are used by some of the schools
in the more
prosperous neighborhoods. The government, in the past two summer
Olympics and the Asian Olympics, spent a fortune to promote sports at
home and abroad, but the results, particularly at the Mexico City Olympics, were disastrous.
The sports had only been attended to at the
post-high school amateur level. The schools, on the other hand, were
on their own.
Neighborhood alleyways and streets performed as sports
arenas for the youth.
Such elements as danger of being run over by
cars and unsupervised training certainly were not conducive to the kind
level.
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^^Ibid.
^^A modern painter who revived the art of miniature painting.
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The founder of

a

school for deaf and mute in Iran.

^^A modern novelist and author whose progressive writings are
highly respected.
^^A modern poet-educationalist and one-time Minister of Education.
1

o

Items from classical poets such as Anvari
Farokhi
Ibn-e Yamin,
Nasser Khosrow, Nesami and modern poets such as Bahar, Dehkhoda,
Foroughi, Naderpour, Parvin Etesami Shahriyar, Soratgar are included
,

Jami
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in the readers.
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p.

187.

20

Among extravagant items are nuclear reactors, Pahlavi Library
with the most sophisticated equipment to get any material in any library
in the world in a few hours (see Iran Almanac and Book of Facts: 1976
p. 127), while there is chronic shortage of readers and absence of regular libraries in most major cities.
Also, Kish Resort Island in the
Persian Gulf, paid for by revenues from National Iranian Oil Company,
constructed for foreign tourists during the winter months for vacation,
gambling and duty free shopping.
Iranians were not allowed to the
island and needed a special permit and clearance to visit it.
,
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PARENTS AS SOCIALIZING AGENTS
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CHAPTER

VI

INTERGENERATIONAL SOCIALIZATION PROCESS
The family, as the first socializing
institution,

is

perhaps

the most crucial source of values
and norms taught to children.

The

family's role in socialization is
important for the deliberate teaching
of values and, paradoxically, for
the lack of transmission of values
and norms.

Dawson and Prewitt note that two main
factors are responsi-

ble for the importance of the family
role in socialization process.

First, in the child's early years when
his political self is forming,
the family is

a

major influence and in many cases the only
influence.

Second, the child develops relationships with
his family which are among
the most important and emotionally intense he
will ever have.^

The family's impact on the process of political
socialization
of its members is achieved through several means.

The family may

transmit values and norms to its children through direct
teaching or

indoctrination methods.

The family also influences the development of

the children's personalities and of their non-political social

tations and values.

Moreover, the family is

child's basic self-identification.
those in the family is affected by

relationships.

a

orien-

major influence on the

Finally, the political outlook of
a

network of social and economic

p
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The family, as

a

primary socializing agent, cannot be
con-

trolled or manipulated by centralized
agencies and is able to transmit
political values or to abstain from
transmitting them at its will.3 The

significance of family impact on political
socialization was noted by
the Greenstein and the Easton-Hess
studies, showing the feeling of

national identification and loyalty developed
by children prior to

their enrollment in schools.^
In

ical

traditional societies, in the absence of formalized
polit-

institutions, the impact of family on the process of
political

socialization is amplified.

While one would expect to find

a

greater

similarity in societal norms and values adhered to by
parents and children in the traditional societies, in the transitional
societies where
there is a rapid change in the process of socialization,
the difference

between the parental values and norms and that of their
children could
be expected to be greater.^
As noted earlier, the partental

interest or, as Dawson and

Prewitt have noted, the parental lack of interest has significant impact
on the development of political

children.^

Political

participation and political interest in

interest or the lack of it

is of crucial

tance in the process of socialization in any society.

impor-

The political

socialization militated by the family is usually not executed in
conscious manner.

The parents do not usually plan or intend in any

systematic way to transfer these values.
of the children occurs as
family.

a

a

The political socialization

by-product of the interactions of the

Furthermore, the family seldom thinks of political training
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as

one of its

tasks7

It is on rare occasions that
there is a delib-

erate intention by the family to instill
political values in children.
Such

a

situation exists to the dismay of political
leadership, partic-

ularly in the authoritarian political
systems where the centralized
political authorities seek to have total
control over the "process
and contents of political

learning.

They wish to ensure that the

family would transmit only the "right"
political and social norms and

would refrain from injecting the "wrong" norms to
the children.

Of

course, with the severe limitations on the power
of any authoritarian

government to control the transmission of values from
parents to
children, the role of family as

a

very important socializing agent

remains formidable.

Socio-cultural norms

While the primary focus in this study of the

.

intergenerational socialization process is the similarities and differences between the parents and students, an analysis of norms and value

associated with the orientations of both groups is also undertaken.
These norms, termed "socio-cultural variables," measure
of social behavior.

a

wide spectrum

They are selected because of their presumed asso-

ciation with the general concept of development.

These items are

borrowed from the "Four Country Study," reported in David McClelland's
The Achieving Society

.

The utilization of the following socio-cultural

variables in this section of the inquiry will create

a

comparable basis

for the comparative analysis of the value coding schemes used for the

textbook analysis with an eye to the fundamental socio-cultural traits
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which are present in the Iranian culture
and which may influence the
political orientation of the respondents,
(see Table 11).^

Jraditional interaction pressure

Traditional values are

.

defined in Parsonian terms as "force(s)
for conformity which (are)
highly generalized, super individual,
persistent over time, and

supplying to the actor

a

set of rules for his behavior.

"''0

There are

four items in the questionnaire dealing
with traditionalism, divided
into two segments:

respect and friendship.

ables deal with respect.

The following two vari-

While variable 19 measures the level of

respect for parents, variable 25 is an indicator of
the level of respect
for elders.

Variable 19:

There is hardly anybody lower than a person who
does not feel a great love, gratitude and respect for
his parents.

Variable 25:

Respect is due an older man, no matter what kind
of a person he is.

The level of friendship, as

a

tradi ti onal mode of behavior, is

measured by the following two items:
Variable 27:

Real friendship is permanent friendship; friends
don't change with circumstances.

Variable 39:

Ho sane and decent person would ever think of
hurting a close friend.

Universal ism vs. particularism
that having the attitude that "all

political development.

.

The Parsonian contention is

(are) equal before the law," aids

Values promoting "status distinction among the

the protagonists" tend to supress the ideal of universalism which aims
in

development of

viduals."^^

a

"code of law which applies equally to all indi-

Particularism

is

thought to be

a

detriment to development.

240

Two items in the questionnaire
measured this mode of behavior.

They

are:

Variable 24:

There are some people like great
artists and
musicians who can be forgiven for not
being
siderate of others, kind to poor, etc

Variable 34:

A man with money cannot really
learn how to
behave among dignified people if he has
not had
the proper upbringing.

Conectivi ty

vs.

self-orientation

value systems where collectivi ty-i .e.

,

.

Parsons argues that the

the group, society, nation,

etc. --is put above the goals promoting
personal

mental in political development.

eating collectivity.

interests are instru-

Two measures are proposed for delin-

Interaction under pressure from peers and modes

of cooperation are suggested as "the extent
to which pressure for

conformity came from peers or the generalized
others.

"^"^

The two

statements measuring peer pressure are:

Variable 20:

The negative opinion of others often keeps me
from seeing a movie or a play that I had planned
to attend.

Variable 28:

My political opinion is not easily swayed by
what I read in the newspapers.

The second measurement of collectivity is described as "the

extent to which motives for cooperation were selfish. "^^

The items

measuring levels of collectivity among the respondents were:
Variable 22:

There is no satisfaction in any good without
companion.

Variable 45:

It is better to go without something than to ask
for a favor.

a
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McClelland contends that modern
industrialized societies
require

a

"greater degree of public coordination"
than was previously

required by lower levels of technology.""^

Rationality and planning

vs.

determinism

.

Rationality and

planning are regarded by Weber to be
prime determinants of development.
It is contended that systems
"which stress rationality and planning

ought to be able to adapt to

...

and move ahead more rapidly.-^^

a

system of production more readily

^^^.^^^^ ^^^^^^

^^^^^^^

.^^^^^^

hard work, intelligence and planning
as opposed to irrational, involving

magic, chance and belief in fate.

Items measuring hard work in the

questionnaire are:
Variable 32:

I
set difficult goals for myself which
to reach.

Variable 36:

I
work hard at everything I undertake until
satisfied with the results.

Variable 46:

I
I

I

attempt

I

am

often do something just to prove to myself that
can do it.

Items measuring planning in the questionnaire are:

Variable 17:

When a man is born, the success he is going to
have is already in the cards, so he might as well
accept it and not fight against it.

Variable 43:

Planning only makes a person unhappy since plans
hardly ever work out anyway.

Variable 44:

Nowadays, with the world condition the way it is,
the wise person lives for today and lets tomorrow
take care of itself.

Although the next item was originally intended for measurement
of risk taking behavior, due to the composition of the question
and the cultural framework of the country, it actually measured the

.

.

242

TABLE
Relations of

11

to Socio-Cultural
Variables Thought to be
ot Importance for Economic
Development
^^^^^J^s

Social variables thought
to be"
important for economic develop^
ment
1.

'Modern' vs. 'traditional'
social structure.
(a) Universal is tic vs.
particularistic norms,
(b) Specifity vs.
diffuseness
of role relations.
(c)

Achieved vs. ascribed status

(d)

Collectivity vs. selforientation.

Corresponding items which
should
characterize more rapidly growing
economies.
1.

2.

*
3.

'

Institutional (traditional) interaction pressure less frequent
Peer status of 'ego" more frequent (a society of equals).
Ego's relation to others more
often 'contractual' (e.g. motivated with an outcome).
Achieved status more frequent
ascribed status less frequent !
Peer pressure for interaction
more frequent
Self-interest, self-esteem and
nurturance less frequent as
motive for interaction.
Impulse control and/or punishment for impulse expression
more frequent
Deceit and magic as instrumental
acts less frequent hard work
and 'intelligence' more frequent
Fate and magic as influence on
ego less frequent
Man over nature more frequent
:

5t

.

6.

2.

Affective neutrality (asceti-

7.

cism, thrift).
3.

Rationality, planning, orderli
ness.

+
8.

.

;

9.

4.

Man over nature, optimism,
belief in progress.

.

10.

.

11. Ego's action more often

successful
5.

Material needs over other
concerns.

12. Biological

needs more frequent

as a motive for 'ego'
13. Material reward more frequent
as means of exerting interac-

^ tion pressure.
Impersonal cooperation pressure
more often of a material sort.

4.

* Hypothesis confirmed.
+ Hypothesis indirectly or partly confirmed

This table in its entirety has been borrowed from David
McClelland,
The Achieving Society, (Princeton: Van Nostrand,
1961), p. 173, Table
5.4
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respondents'

attitude on "chance."

Therefore, it is included in this

category indicating deterministic
behavior.

Variable 37:

I

enjoy

Iin£ortance of time.

a

race or

R.H.

a

It state that:

game when

bet on it.

I

Knapp and many others have stressed
the

significance of time in assessing the level
of achievement.

Those

with high level of achievement tend
to stress the significance of time.

Although in the "Four Country Study"
no significant relationship
between importance of time and level of
achievement was found, nevertheless, the question was included in this
inquiry.

The item measuring

importance of time states:

Variable 29:

It would irritate me very much to have
a watch or
a

Impulse control.
a

clock which was off by several minutes everyday.

Weber contends that this mode of behavior,

key characteristic of Protestantism, displayed
in the forms of "hard

work, savings, asceticism, and renunciation of
worldly pleasures," is

instrumental in business expansion.

Thus, it is argued that the

"nations which were developing rapidly would stress the
importance of

controlling one's impulses."^''

Impulse control

is

measured by the

following item:

Variable 16:

If you get bad news, it is better to hide what
you feel and behave as if you don't care.

Respect for children

.

This category is actually intended to

denote child-rearing attitudes, emphasizing parental attitudes with
stress on the importance of self-reliance and "of an individual's

finding out things on his own, and that they are often better when they
1

R

are on their own."'°

Self-reliance

is

assumed to be

a

value that would
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promote high achievement.

As in "importance of time,"
little evidence

has been found to support the
assumption that self-reliance in
children

actually promotes achievement.

Nevertheless, the item is included in

the questionnaire for purposes of
analysis.

Variable 33:

Political attitud

e.

It states

that:

A child should never be asked to do
anything
unless he is first told why he is
asked to do it.

The examination of political orientation
of

parents and students is undertaken with
respect to several basic postures.

The questions in this inquiry are the
general items which are

often used in the study of political character
of individuals.

They

include political participation, public policy
orientation, political

efficacy and political trust and distrust in the
government.
P olitical

participation

.

This segment of the study is divided

into passive and active political participation.

measured by two items.

Each category is

Those indicating passive political participa-

tion are:

Variable 12:

Some people often listen to the news on radio or
television, how about you?

Variable 13:

Some people often read newspaper and magazine
articles about socio-political events in our
country, how about you?

Items measuring active political participation are:

Variable 14:

Some people often think about the political and
economic condition of our country, how about you?

Variable 15:

Some people often talk about the political and
economic issues of our country with their friends,
how about you?
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^^^^-li^JoIle^L^I^^
two sections.

tolerance.

This segment is also divided
into

They include role of the government
and socio-political

Variables measuring the extent to
which an individual

believes the government should have

a

role include:

Variable 18:

The government should have plenty
of power and
influence over people's lives.

Variable 21:

The government should give money
and food to the
unemployed.

Items measuring socio-political
toleration are:

Variable 26:

Our socio-political system should be
for all other nations in the world.

Variable 41:

If a person wanted to make a speech
against
religion in this community, he should be al lowed.

Political efficacy.

is

blue-print

Political efficacy is defined as an indi-

vidual's responsiveness to political system functions.
a

a

In other words,

politically efficacious individual will indicate that the
government
responsive to his demands, whereas, an inefficacious individual
will

be cynical of the government.

of political efficacy.

Two items are used to measure the extent

They are:

Variable 23:

Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me cannot really understand what is going on.

Variable 31:

Over the years, the government has paid no
attention to what people like me think when it
decides what to do.

Political trust/distrust

.

Items indicating both political

trust and distrust in the government are used.

The items indicating

political trust are:

Variable 40:

The government usually knows what is best for
people.
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Variable 42:

People running the government
are smart people
who usually know what they are
doing.

Items measuring the level of
political distrust in the govern-

ment are:

Variable 30:

The government is pretty much
influenced by
big interests looking out for
themselves.

Variable 35:

I
think the government wastes
needlessly
of the money we pay in taxes.

Variable 38:

Focus of the analysis

I

.

a

few

lot

think some people in the government
are crooked.

The study of parent-student similarities
and

differences will be pursued on several
different levels.
will be

a

a

While there

primary attention paid to the impact of
socio-economic

variables on parent-student orientation, the
impact of political convictions on the shaping of further political
orientation of the

respondents also will be analyzed.

Finally, an analysis of relation-

ships between soci o-cul tural norms and parent
student political orien-

tations will be undertaken.

In all

these three levels, particular

attention will be paid to the similarities and differences
between the
two samples.
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CHAPTER

VII

PUBLIC POLICY ORIENTATION
A major portion of this study
was undertaken during the year

preceding the establishment of the
Islamic Republic.

That year saw

a

chaotic socio-political situation
with four cabinet changes, martial
law in most major cities and a
breakdown of the socio-economic status
quo.

Although there was limited toleration
of political expression,

there was also increased fear of the
government security agency, SAVAK.
To establish the necessary trust
in this research by the respondents

during the fast moving events of the
revolutionary upsurge proved to
be

a

cumbersome task.

Consequently, general questions regarding socio-

political outlook were used rather than
questions relating to specific

situations.

These general questions were designed to
measure sets of

norms that are long lived, not relating only
to the present situation
but to the general expectations of the
respondents as to how the system

ought to be.

One set of questions, relating to the socio-political

tolerance of the individual and to his preference for what
role the

government should have in his life, relates to public policy
issues
that cut across the recent revolution.

The study of public policy orientation among the students is

significant since it provides "an indication of the likelihood and the
direction of change along major policy dimensions."^
248

Furthermore, the

.
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orientations of the incoming generation
could provide
longevity of socio-political
controversies.

a

clue as to the

One should also note the

impact of issues on the forming of
broader political attitudes.
None of the questions used concerning
public policy attitudes

could be regarded as very controversial.

It was thought that controver-

sial questions, particularly ones
seeking responses related to the Shah

or the performance of the government,
might result either in

a

high

percentage of no responses or perhaps some
falsified answers to save
the respondent from

a

possible fear of harassment by the securi
ty forces

As noted in Appendix II,

only about 15 percent of all

Iranians

of high school age, or 24 percent of
the urban population of high school
age, ever go to high school.

This segment of the population, as evi-

denced during the revolution, is highly politicized,
and has become in-

creasingly vocal about the socio-political situation
in Iran.

^

Our sample

of parents was selected from among student parents
who are almost all

urban dwellers.

Their level of education and income

is

above the

national average, and it is assumed they also have reasonably
well

informed attitudes and knowledge of public policy issues.

Role of the Government

In

this chapter, the variables related to socio-political

tolerance/intolerance, and to the role and scope of government in every
day life will be examined.

Variable 18, "The government should have

plenty of power and influence over people's lives," and variable 21,
"The government should give money and food to the unemployed," measure
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what students and parents feel should
be the role of government.

Variable 26, "Our socio-political system
should be

other nations in the world," and
variable 41, "If
make

a

a

a

blueprint for all
person wanted to

speech against religion in this community,
he should be allowed."

measure how politically tolerant parents
and students are.
Along with analyzing the political
orientations, these items
also extract the prevailing modes of
behavior that may contribute to
or impede the process of political
development.
a

For example, there is

prevailing feeling, supported by the data,
that the government should

provide goods and services to the general
public.

Such was not expected

a

century or even

a

society where slowly government control over and
involvement in the

a

few decades ago.

life of the individual

increases.

These demands aid in creation of

Needless to say, as the transitional

society inches its way onto the threshold of
modernization, popular
demands are aggregated through institutions and these
political institutions become the essence of the process of political
development.

Parent-student comparison

.

On the set of issues dealing with govern-

ment's role, students follow the pattern of parent preference, seemingly,
to a great extent.

Both students and parents overwhelmingly agree with

greater influence by government over the affairs of people.

This

finding was puzzling when compared to previous studies that have
reported

a

great deal of political cynicism amonst Iranians.^

On the

other hand, other studies have shown support for political authority
when such authorities have lead the people and acted according to the

public will.^

If the data in Table

12 is taken into consideration in

"

1
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TABLE 12
Parents and Students Attitudes on
Public Policy Issues

Agree

Issue

Disagree

%

%

total
"L
10

n
1

Variable 18: "The government should
have plenty of power and influence
over people's lives."
(Jul

C

1 1

Co

Students

83
81

17
19

100 (167)
100 (601)

58
62

42
38

100 (168)
100 (611)

77
79

23
21

100 (162)
100 (606)

28

72
47

100 (151)
100 (589)

Variable 21: "The government should
give money and food to the
unemployed.
pu

1

ClI

Students

Variable 26: "Our socio-political
system should be a blue-print for
all other nations in the world."
parents
students

Variable 41: "If a person wanted
to make a speech against religion
in this community he should be
allowed."
parents
students
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light of recent events and the overwhelming support for
the inception

of the Islamic Republic,

it can be argued that the cynicism found, for

example, by Zonis was against the unpopular Pahlavi regime and not

against the institution of government itself.
In all,

students and parents displayed similar tendencies to

favor government power and influence over their lives.

However, as is

evident in the following diagram (Fig. 1), while 28 percent of students

strongly agreed (+3) with variable 18, thirty-eight percent of the
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Figure

1

Comparison of Parent-Student Responses
to Variable 18
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similar attitude, thus displaying

view on the issue.

a

more assertive paren-

Such a tendency, as will be seen throughout

this chapter, is displayed by parents on all

issues--i .e.

,

the parents

tend to strongly agree (+3) or disagree (-3) more often
than the

students.

The degree of difference on the other points of this con-

tinuum diminish, resulting in proportions in which the student and
parent tabulations are almost identical when viewed in an agree-disagree
dichotomy.
As Table 13 and Fig.

1

indicate,

a

vast majority of parents and

students agreed with variable 18, stating that "government should have

power and influence over people's lives."

In

cross-tabulation of the

socio-economic status of the students with variable 18, it was found
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that the male students favored

female students (gamma

=

a

greater government role than
the
The trend points to an
attitudinal

.263).

difference between the male and female
students that will often be
observed.
The data suggests that the
orientation of female students

is

towards somewhat less government control
than that of the male students.
The difference between the male and
female high school students is

inherent in the social posture of the
female students in Iran.
noted in Appendix

II

(Table 42)

,

high schools in Iran are female.

As

only one-thi rd of students attending

Most Iranian parents allow their

daughters to acquire grade school education;
fewer allow them to
progress as far as the middle school or
guidance level.

Since learning

to perform the duties of being wife and
mother are considered to be

the primary goal of a young female, schooling
is not felt to be

especially important.
It is mostly among the educated and more modern
families that

high school education is accepted to be equally important
for both male
and female.
high school

Consequently, the female students, particularly in the
level, usually come from

male students.

Thus, it is

a

a

more educated background than

statement of fact that the female students

are more often open and broad-minded than their male counterparts.

The

impact of familial education on the student's orientation will be ob-

served in the next two chapters.
The parent's level of education had

a

significant association

with the student's preference for government control

Although even those with

a

(gamma

=

.337).

high level of parental education still
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overwhelmingly approved of

a

greater role for the government,
neverthe-

less, there was an evident trend
indicating that those students
whose
fathers had had a high level of
education favored less government

control

(74 percent)

than those students whose
fathers had had no

education (91 percent).
Mothers' education was also significantly
associated with

students'

attitude to variable 18 (gamma

expected since, generally,

a

=

.332).

This trend was

higher level of education results in

a

broader socio-political outlook whereby
an individual seeks to participate in the political process that
determines policies of the state.
The oven^helming support for

a

government with power and influence over

people's lives, as indicated earlier, is

a

manifestation of traditional

political desire whereby the people are supportive
of

a

"supervised

guidance and outlining (of) popular duties."^
The student's family income was also

associating with variable 18 (gamma

=

a

significant factor,

.296); those students from high

income families favored less government control than those
from low
income families.

Since family income itself tends to depend on parent's

level of education,

i.e., those with high education had high income and

those with low education had low income (gamma

gamma

=

=

.548 for parent sample;

.472 for student sample), the same general premise influencing

education would also apply here.

An additional explanation could be

that these poor, who are also less educated, want to have more access
to the material well-being which they think the government can and

should provide.

The better educated, who have higher incomes, are less
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inclined to support government
intervention in their affairs, since,
in providing services to the
needy, the government will
have to tax
them.

Those parents with

a

high level of education and
income don't

need the government's help to find
jobs and would be less likely
to

support government programs that
supply employment to the poor.
For the parents, the data analysis
revealed that only the

family income had

a

significant association with the parents'
response

to variable 18 (gamma =
a

.239).

The cross-tabulation also suggested

slight trend where, as in the case of the
student sample, those with

higher income level favored less government
control than those with
lower income.

Sti

1

1,

three-quarters of both students and parents with

high income agreed with government power and
influence over people's
lives.

As noted above,

the cultural tradition orients both parents and

students from varying education and economic backgrounds
towards this
political orientation.
The level of cosmopolitanism, which measures the respondent's

degree of urbanization, associated at

a

significant level with student's

attitude toward government control (gamma

highest degree of urbanization--i
with government control

.e.

(77 percent)

,

=

-.261).

Those with the

residents of Tehran--agreed less
than those from low cosmopolitan

areas--i.e., towns between 10,000 to 25,000 population— (97 percent).
The same did not hold true for the parent sample, which actually showed
no distinctive pattern.

The lack of influence of cosmopolitanism on

parents, in this case and other cases to be followed, is the result of

many factors such as length of residency in present place of residence.

s
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TABLE 13

Cross-Tabulation uof "Government
government power and influence
over DeoolP"
Variable 18 with Socio-Economic
Status

"Government should have plenty
of power and
influence over people's lives."

Socio-Economic
Status

Sex

Agree

male
female
=

1; p

Education
(Ij

Education

85%

22; phi
.01; phi

77
^

11; gamma =
.10; gamma

=

.427
.263

74%

82
90

low
.

no education

71

82
86

91
=

p

.33; V =

.14; gamma = .260
.0006; V = .17; gamma = .337

high

medium

70
79

low
no education
2

(students) x^

amily
ncome
Level

81%

high

medium

(parents) x^^= 3.42; df = 3; p
(students) x = 17.5; df = 3;
Mother'
Level of

students

91

(parents) x^p= 1.45; df = 1; p
(students)
= 6.14; df =
ather' s
.evel of

parents

=

88

16.1; df - 3; p = .001; V = .16; gamma = .332

high

76%
84
87

medium
low

{parents) x^,= 6.62; df = 2; p
(students) x"^ = 12.5; df = 2; p
1- highest

Level of 2
Cosmopol- 3
itanism
4
5- lowest

=

,036; V = ,20; gamma
.019; V = .15; gamma

79%
90
88

79

87
=

239
.296

77%
81

85

84
97

75

81

(parents) x^ = 2.92; df = 4; p = .57; V = .13; gamma = -.041
(students) x = 13.8; df = 4; p = .008; V = .15; gamma = -.260
(1) For parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education" is the
mother's level of education when she was the respondent.
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place of birth, and migratory history.

For example, 34 percent of
the

responding parents were residents of
Tehran, yet only 15 percent
had
actually been born there. Moreover,
9 percent of responding
parents
lived in places that were termed
"least cosmopol itan"-i

.e.

,

places

with less than 10,000 population-while
some 22 percent had been born
there.

Therefore,

a

high level of rural to urban
migration amongst

the parent sample made the category
of cosmopolitanism of little
value
in analyzing its impact on the
variables.

The student sample, however, was much
less transitory than the

parent sample.

As evidenced by the data, 81

percent of those who

lived in Tehran at the time of this inquiry
were born there.

migration in other parts of the country was also
minimal.

Student

Thus, as we

can observe in this case and many other cases
to be followed, the level
of cosmopolitanism proves to be an influential
variable in the analysis

of student orientation.
one or

a

In many developing countries, where
usually

few cities become the focus of all major
socio-political and

economic activities, the rest of the nation usually suffers
neglect.
In

Iran, where the capital

city, Tehran, has taken the appearance of

a

Western-style cosmopolitan hub with 15 percent of the nation's population, the rest of the country, including small and medium size
towns,

remains eons away.
Iran,

To empasize the disparity of cosmopolitanism in

let it suffice to note that in 1970-71, three out of eight univer-

sities in Iran were located in Tehran with 78 percent of the total

university enrollment.^

Furthermore, of the 20 daily newspapers pub-

lished in Iran in 1971, 13 were put out in Tehran with over 95 percent
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Figure

2

Comparison of Parent-Student
Responses to Variable 21
Six-Level Continuum

\x\

7\

.30

parents

-.

.20

.^-''y

.10
^

xT^^TT'-^^^^

^

+2

disagree

+3

agree

of the total national circulation.^

It is with such a background that

the impact of cosmopolitanism in attitude
orientation of the responding

students is stressed.
In variable 21,

dealing with government's role, although

a

few

more of the students favored government aid to the
unemployed tnan the
parents, the difference was not significant.

As the graph

(Fig.

2)

shows, the parent-student attitudes were rather similar
except in the

somewhat agree (+1) category, where 13 percent of the students
agreed
with government aid to the unemployed, whereas only 9 percent of the
parents did the same, resulting in an overall difference of four percent
for parent-student response to variable 21, which is not considered
signi ficant.
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The student's sex associated at

variable

21

(gamma

=

.210).

a

significant level with

While 70 percent of the female
students

approved of government aid, only 56
percent of the male students
responded similarly (Table 14).

As

indicated above, the attitudinal

difference between male and female
students is most likely the result
of higher level of parental
education among the female students.

Thus,

finding the female students, on the
average, more sympathetic to

government aid for the unemployed than the
male students

is

a

function

of a broader perspective brought
about by the higher level of familial

education.

Father's level of education was significant, as
expected, in

shaping student's attitude (gamma
level

=

-.195).

It is assumed that high

of education is often credited with higher
level of socio-

political interest and broader perspective, whereas
low level of education, particularly impoverished parental education,
results in

and parochial perspective in the students.

a

narrow

Supporting such an assump-

tion, we find that of those students whose fathers
had had high level

of education, 83 percent approved of government aid
to unemployed,

whereas of those students whose fathers had had no education,
only 58
percent did the same (Table 14).
Mother's education was also significant (gamma
those students whose mother had had

a

=

-.206).

Of

high level of education, 78 per-

cent approved of aid for unemployed, whereas of those students whose

mother had had no education, only 44 percent did the same.

ss
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TABLE 14

Cross-Tabulation of "Government aid to the
unemployed'
Variable 21 with Socio-Economic Status
"Government should give money and food
to
the unemployed."

Socio-Economic
Status

Agree

^^^^
female

Sex

parents

students

56%
55

56%
70

(parents) x^p= .776; df - 1 p = .378; phi =
.083; gamma = -.209
(students) x^ = 10.87; df = 1;
p = .001; phi = .137; gamma = .210
,

Father'
Level of
Education
(1)

medium
low
no education

(parents) x p= .873; df = 3; p =
(students) x = 11.56; df = 3; p

Mother

47%

83%

56
55
66

60

Level of

Education

=

.072; gamma = .035
.009; V = .140; gamma = -.195

78%

medium

73

low

64
56

no education

(students) x^= 8.68; df

58

.832; V =

high
'

66

=

3;

p

=

.034; V = .120; gamma = -.206

Fami ly

high

54%

64%

Income
Level

medium

56
63

63
59

low

(parents) x^P= 1.04; df = 2; p = .594; V = .080; gamma = .126
(students) x"^ = 1.44; df = 2; p = .485; V = .049; gamma = .304
1- high

Level of

Cosmopolitanism

65%
48
67
60
25

2
3

4
5- low
p =

(parents) x p= 10.2; df = 4;
(students) x = 22.04; df = 4; p

=

70%
54
55
51

44

037; V = .246; gamma = .204
.0002; V = .190; gamma = .304

For parents' columr\ the "Father's Level of Education" is the
mother's level of education when she was the respondent.
(1)
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Cosmopolitanism proved to have significant
association with
variable 21 for both parents (gamma

=

.204)

and students (gannna

-

.304),

Students in the most cosmopolitan
aroa-i.e., Tehran-agreed 70 percent
with govern.,^nt aid to the unemployed,
while only 44 percent of those
in the least cosmopolitan areas

the unemployed.

(Table 14).

thought that the government should
aid

A similar trend was also evident
among the parents

Such

a

tendency is perhaps the result of acute
unemploy-

ment or job insecurity which is
present in major urban areas, while
the problem facing rural areas is
under-employment.

Farmers and their

families lack any major source of income in
seasons when they are not

preoccupied by farming (weaving rugs and geljms
is an exception

in some

areas and basically is the preoccupation of
the females and children).

Socio-Poli tical Tolerance

The second set of variables dealing with public policy
issues,
by virtue of their composition, also measured the
level of socio-

political tolerance of both students and parents, including
political

fanaticism and religious zeal.
wanted to make

a

It is

in variable 41,

"If a person

speech against religion in this community he should be

allowed," that the greatest diversity between student and parent

responses is discovered, while in variable 26, "Our socio-political

system should be

a

blueprint for all other nations in the world,"

both samples concur.

Parent-student comparison

.

As

the next diagram (Fig.

3)

shows, the

varying degrees of disagreement on the issue of political chauvinism
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Figure

3

Comparison of Parent-Student
Responses to Variable 26 in
Six-Level Continuum

a

40

parents
students30

20

10

-3

-1

+1

+2

+3
agree

di s agree

seem to be nearnly identical for both parents and
students.
a^ree side, however, some differences begin to emerge.

On the

Fewer students

agree strongly (+3) with variable 26 than do parents;
while more

students agree somewhat (+1) with the issue than do parents.

This

signifies the fact that students are somewhat less forceful in their
level of political

intolerance than are parents, despite the fact that

both groups are vastly intolerant.

The cross-tabulation and association analysis reveals that the

female students are somewhat politically tolerant than the male
students (gamma

=

.215).

As will

be seen below, since high level of
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education results in higher level
of political tolerance
(also deduced
by Jennings and Niemi),^
the impact of parent's education
on the
students becomes

a

significant factor.

The analysis of cross-tabulation
data suggests that the father's
education is an important factor
influencing student orientation
(gamma

=

.227).

Of those students whose fathers
had had

a

high level

of education, 66 percent agreed
with the issue regarding political

intolerance.

On the other hand, of those
students whose fathers had

had no education, 85 percent agreed
that "our socio-political system

should be

a

blueprint for all other nations,"
displaying

of political

more

chauvinism.

In short,

a

high level

those with high education are

politically tolerant than those with low
level of education.
The cross-tabulation of mother's level of
education with vari-

able 26 also suggested a similar trend
to that of the father's education (gamma

=

.220).

Of students whose mothers had had no
education,

83 percent agreed with variable 26, compared to 66
percent of the

students whose mothers had had some high school
education.
As concurred by Jennings and Niemi

in their study of American

students and parents, "individuals with narrow, parochial
outlook

strongly (agree) that everyone else should adopt (their) system,
while
those with

a

broader perspective apparently recognize some of the diffi-

culties inherent in so sweeping

a

judgement."^

Although in the Jennings

and Niemi study only 54 percent of the students agreed with the state-

ment identical to the one in variable 26, seventy-nine percent of the
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students in our study agreed
with the statement, displaying

a

much

greater political intolerance.
Parent's education level proved
of no significance in
deter-

mining their own posture in regard
to variable 26, as it had
failed
to do so in the previous two

seems that

a

variables-i

.e.

,

variables 18 and 21.

It

parent's education is of more
consequence in determining

his child's orientation than
his own.

This pattern is very likely the

result of greater socio-cul tural
conditioning on parents which lessens
the impact of education except
where a very high level of education
has

been obtained.

The level of cosmopolitanism that
proved significant in deter-

mining the student's attitude on the
two issues dealing with the role
of the government displayed no tangible
bearing in relation to this
issue.

Variable 41, dealing with attitudes towards
tolerance, was
seen as rather controversial by respondents.

More than

11

percent of

parents and six percent of students, the largest
number for both groups,
refused to answer the question.

wanted to make
be allowed."

question.
is
a

a

The question stated that "If

a

person

speech in this community against religion, he should

Some may have been incensed or even outraged by the

Since Iran is

a

country where 97 percent of the population

Muslim with 90 percent of them belonging to the Shiah sect, there
general consensus on religion.

is

Even those who do not consider them-

selves practicing Muslims seldom criticize the religion.

Therefore,

criticising the religion, let alone speaking against it, seems to be

s
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TABLE 15

Cross-Tabulation "f^O-^ocio-poinical
syste. is the best in the
«orld"
variable 26 with Socio-Economic
Status
"Our socio-political system
should be a
blue-print for all other nations
in the
world."

Socio-Economic
Status

Agree

^^^^
female

Sex

(parents) x^p= .050; df = 1 ; p
(students)
= 4.37; df = 1; p

Father

=

high
'

Level of

Education
(1)

students

76%
80

82%
75

,822; phi = .035; gamma = -.106
.036; phi = .089; gamma = .215

medium

65%
82

66%

low

79

no education

80

80
85

2

(parents) x ^= 4.28; df = 3; p
(students) x = 8.92; df = 3;

Mother's
Level of
Education

parents

=

p

75

232; V = .166; gamma = .184
.03; V = .123; gamma = .227

high

71%
66
80
83

medium
low
no education

(students) x^ = 9.41; df = 3; p = .024; V = .127; gamma = .220
-ami ly

high

Income
Level

medium

75%
69
85

low

75%
82
80

(parents) x^P= 4.25; df = 2; p = .119; V = .164; gamma = .207
(students) x^ = 3.1; df = 2; p = .212; V = .073; gamma = .099
1- high

75%

78%

Level of

2

67

75

Cosmopolitanism

3

84

4
5- low

76

82
81
78

(parents) x p= 3.19; df = 4; p
(students) x = 1.32; df = 4; p

87
=

522; V = .140; gamma = -.121
.858; V = .047; gamma = -.044

(1) For parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education" is the
mother's level of education when she was the respondent.

.

266

rather an extreme undertaking.

Thus, this question seems to
measure

more than simply an attitude
towards

a

policy issue.

It measures,

perhaps, an extreme level of
tolerance/intolerance of freedom of
expression.

It also could measure the
level

of acquisition of secular
norms

in one's attitudes and orientation.

The results of the analysis of the
data were most interesting.

While there were some anticipated
findings, there were some that were
unexpected.

As the next diagram (Fig.

4)

shows, the differences

between student and parent orientations
were phenomenal.

While 44

percent of parents disagreed stron^lx
(-3) with the issue regarding
religious intolerance, only 22 percent of the
students, or half as many,
did the same.

In short, while only 28 percent of
parents agreed in

varying degrees with the issue, 53 percent of the
students, or almost
twice as many, did the same.

This item has shown the greatest dispar-

ity in parent-student orientation so far.

The level of parent-student

difference in response to the previous items was four percent
on variable 21 and two percent each on variables 18 and 26, while
the differ-

ence on this issue is

Table 12).

a

rather impressive 25 percentage points (see

What could be the source of such

a

great difference in

atti tudes

Father's education level, in contrast to the earlier items,

offered no significant association, although the chi-square probability
was significant at .008 level.

whose fathers had had

a

The data suggested that those students

middle school level of education--i

.e.

,

some

high school education--were the most tolerant, whereas, those with
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Figure 4

Comparison of Parent-Student Responses
to Variable 41 in
Six-Level Continuum
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fathers who had had no education were more tolerant than
those with

either fathers with low level or high level education.
posed certain difficulties.

This finding

It is apparent that, despite the generally

accepted rule that as the level of education increases so does
the
level of tolerance, the data here posed some exceptions
to the rule.
In their research, Jennings and Niemi

found the question of religious

tolerance causing significant differences in their samples of American
parents and students.

They, however, observed a pattern of positive

correlation between higher level of education and religious tolerance.

They also noticed that the parent-student differences were greatest

s
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TABLE 16

Cross-Tabulation of "Socio-rel igious
toleration"
Variable 41 with Socio-Economic Status
"If a person wanted to make a
speech
against religion in this community
he
should be allowed."

Socio-Economic
Status

Agree

parents
Sex

female
(parents) x p= .014; df = 1; p =
(students) x"" = 2.41; df = 1 ; p

Father's
Level of
Education

=

^'^^

f

students

29%

440^

26

51

904; phi = .028; gamma = .078
.120; phi = .067; gamma = -.135

25%
28
27
37

^^"^^
^

no education

370^

59

43
48

(parents) x^2= -853; df = 3; p = .836; V = .075; gamma =
.082
(students) X = 11.6; df = 3; p = .008; V = .143; gamma = -.070

Mother'
Level of
Education

high

29%
54

medium
low

48
44

no education

(students) x^ = 1.66; df = 3;

p =

.647; V = .05; gamma = -.089

Family
Income

high

33%

49%

medium

Level

low

22
26

49
45

(parents) x^P= 1.20; df == 2; p == .547; V = .090; gamma = -.089
(students) x^ = 1.36; df = 2; p = .505; V = .049; gamma = -.073
=

1-high

30%

Level of

2

Cosmopolitanism

3
4

26
27
26
37

5-low

51%
45
47
35
36

(parents) /r,= 1.0; df = 4; p = .908; V = .081 ; gamma = - .008
(students) x = 7.05; df = 4; p = .133; V = .109; gamma = .162
(1) For parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education" is the
mother's level of education when she was the respondent.
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between those with lowest parental
education level and smallest
between those with a high education
level
the analysis of this
present data, however, no such
findings were revealed.
In fact, it

m

was found that the greatest
differences between the parent and
student
data on the question of religious
tolerance was between those with
middle level education-i e.
some high school education-and
,
the
.

smallest differences were between
those with either no education or
high level of education,

However, there is

a

11

a

and 12 percent respectively (see
Table 17).

marked increase in level of religious
tolerance

from parents to students in all levels.
To explain the source of religious
tolerance/intolerance,

perhaps, the data should be viewed in several
segments with attempts
made to explain the factors influencing each
strata of the sample

rather than attempting to make sweeping
generalizations.

It is surmised

here that the higher level of religious intolerance
among the students
and parents with high level of education is
perhaps the result of the

association made between the institution of religion and
political

activisim in Iran in past few years, particularly during the
period
leading to the Iranian revolution.

Religion had become the only insti-

tution through which the people could voice their opposition to the
policies of the government.

More and more, with the suppression of

polticial opposition, the educated took advantage of this situation
and the institution of religion became

government.

a

symbol of opposition to the

To speak out against religion, therefore, to many was to

speak against the people and the popular sentiments and for the
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government.

Many of the educated, who were
amongst the most vocal of
the opposition, as witnessed
throughout the political turmoil
of
1978-79, displayed

a

less tolerant attitude about
permitting speech

against religion, as is reflected
in the case of the question
in our
questionnaire.
This, perhaps, is the major factor
contributing to the

confusion around the fact that many
of those with
cation indicated

a

a

lesser tolerance than those with

high level of edua

low level

of

education or no education at all.
In factor analysis of the data,
which will

detail

in

Chapter IX,

a

be discussed in

major factor contributing to religious
intol-

erance among parents was traditionalism
and adherence to traditional
values.

This segment of the population manifested
itself in respect

for family and friends (variables
19, 27 and 39, indexed respectively
at .454,

.263 and .597), social class (variable
34, indexed at .401),

and individualism (variable 45, indexed
at .280), while religious

intolerance, variable 41, was indexed at .289
(see Fig.

14).

The factor

analysis of the student data, in addition to the
association between
religious intolerance

,

variable

41

(indexed at .234) and traditionalism

(variables 17, 19, 24 and 25), suggested
cal

factors and intolerance.

a

relationship between politi-

The same factor matrix indexed religious

tolerance with political tolerance (variable 26) at .398, with
political

inefficacy (variable 31) at .553, and with political distrust (variables
35,

38,

40 and 42)

respectively at .699, .487, .627 and 662.

Also

related were high parental education and high family income (see Fig.
15).

Thus, it could be surmised that in certain segments of the student
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population sinnlar indications
to that of the Jennings
and Nie.i study
where high level of parental
education increases level of
religious
tolerance, are to be found.

However, traditional values
and orienta-

tions seem to be the dominant
factor, particularly among
parents,
causing a higher level of
intolerance.

Although the question in variable

41

was constructed purely to

measure religious toleration
and the impact of variables
such as education, income and cosmopolitanism
on the orientation of and
the
similarities and differences between
parents and students, the events
that led to the Iranian revolution
were already in the works and,
as
we see, influenced, at least,
the responses of those with
level of education to this
question.

a

higher

It is presumed that if the above

question were put to test in November/
December 1978, shortly before
the return of Ayatollah Khomeini

to Iran from France,

rather than the

spring of 1978 when most of the
questionnaires were actually completed,
there would have been a much greater
association between religious

intolerance, as

a

political statement against the Shah and his
rule,

and political distrust.
It was apparent that many with a high level

of education, as

early as the spring of 1978, were displaying
anti-government sentiments
by supporting the religious establishment and the
clergy.
a

To find such

pattern developing was interesting and exciting, yet our
original

question and expectations remained somewhat unanswered.

With the avail-

able responses, however, one cannot measure the long-term
question of

religious tolerance, although it seems that traditionalism and
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paroch1al1s. encourage religious
intolerance.

A widespread .argin
between parent-student
orientations, nevertheless,
is evident fro. the
data,
such a wide disparity,
one could surmise, despite
the political
underpinnings, is a reflection
of differing orientations
between the
parents and the students.

Summary.

In three out of four
issues discussed in this
chapter, we

find basic similarities
between student and parent
orientations on
public policy issues.
The similarities at first
sight looked rather
impressive.
A more indepth analysis of
the data, however, showed
that
the students differed
substantially on at least one
issue and to a

significant degree on two others.
less forceful

in their attitudes and to
follow a less resolute pattern

of behavior than the parents.
all

The students tended basically
to be

For example, as the graphs
indicate on

issues in this chapter, there
was

smaller percentage of students

a

than parents at either end of
the graphs responding either
agreed

Itron^l^ (+3) or

djsaareed^tr^^

(-3)

to the questions.

Level of education of parents seems
to be the most significant

variable influencing the student's behavior,
while it is of little
consequences for the parents themelves.

In many cases there seems to

be a similar level of agreement between
parents who have

of education and the students whose
fathers have had
education.

a

a

high level

high level of

However, as the father's level of education
decreases,

gap between parent's and student's responses
begins to emerge.

a

Further-

more, we also discover that students whose fathers
have no education

tend to respond more efficaciously--i .e.

,

to give support to the
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govern.ent-tha„ those parents
who had had no education.

On the other
hand, «e find that often
the students whose fathers
have a high level
Of education tend to
be as open-minded or
.ore so, on the issues,
than
the parents.
This finding is similar
to Jennings' and Niemi's
findings
Where, as noted earlier,
the education level
tends to enhance one's
interest and involvement in
socio-political endeavors.
In short, it
is expected that education
would provide a fairly
reliable prediction

of attitudes and
orientations.

Generally, as the father's
education level decreases, the
student's response becomes more
close-minded and a gap that exists
between the student and the
parent responses begins to merge
until,
seemingly, the students whose
fathers had had no education
display
responses more close-minded than
parents who had had no education.
The
largest gap between parent and
student responses was between
students
whose fathers had had a moderate
level of education and the
parents who
had had a moderate level of
education.
An exception was on the issue
of government aid to unemployed
where the largest difference was
between
the students whose fathers had had
a high level of education
and the

parents who had had

a

high level

of education.

This attests to the

fact that as the level of education
of the parent sample rose, they

displayed

a

reduced desire for government to aid the
unemployed.

Never-

theless, the children of highly educated
parents remained strong pro-

ponents of government aid to the unemployed.

parent-student attitude on this issue

is

presense of idealism among the students.

The disparity in the

perhaps partly due to the

Furthermore, the need for
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social security a™,ng the
least educated of the
parents who usually
labor in unskilled
professions is higher than
a™,ng those with higher
level of education whose
skills are direly needed
in the country.
The
parents' attitudes could also
be motivated by the fact
of their obligations to self and fa.ily.
This would be in contrast
to issues such
as aid to the unemployed,
which concerns itself with
altruistic
societal issues.
Individualism, as discussed in
earlier chapters,
has its bias in the cultural
tradition of the country.
In a society
where n.ost are motivated by
self-serving interests, attempts
are made
to secure a rewarding
position within the society, and
little attention
is given to group needs.
The above assumptions are
thus held to be

responsible for the difference in
parent-student orientation.

With

support from Marshall Meyer's study
of the Harvard students in
the
midst of the Vietnam crisis, it
could be surmised that situations
and
events could and do radicalize
students to an extent that results
in
students dissociating their views from
that of their parents."
Such

disparities in the parent-student
orientation is referred to as "generation gap."
the

The data here suggests such gaps on
two of the items-aid to

unemployed and the issue of religious
toleration.
Although on these two issues (variables 23
and 41). students

have been shown to be more open-minded
than their parents, on the

question dealing with whether the "Iranian
socio-political system
should become

a

blueprint for all other nations." the students
were,

generally, less open-minded than the parents.

As the level of father's

and mother's education rose, the students gave more
liberal responses.
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TABLE 17
Changes in 'Liberal' Responses
from Parents to Students
change
%

Variable 18: "The government
should (not) have plenty of
power
and influence over people's
lives.''
high
medium

25%
18
10
14

low
no education

(9)

26% (12)

(11)
(5)

29
18

(3)

9

+1

(40)
(50)
(10)

+11
+8
-5

(parents) x2= 3.4; df = 3;
p = .33; gamma = .260
(students)
^
= 17.5; df
3; p = .0006; gamm^ = .337

c
o

Variable 21: "The government should
give money'and'food'to'the"
unemployed."
(T3

U
^

^
^

high

47% (17)

medium

83% (40)

56
55
66

66
(93)
60 (173)
58
(66)

I

low
I

no education
=vju^,auiu[i
'

parents)

!:!!^?!"!!^

=

^

(35)
(27)
(14)

+36
+10
+5
-8

.873; df = 3; p = .832; gamma = .035
= 11-56; df = 3; p = .009; gamma = -.195

Variable 26: "Our socio-political system
should (not) be'a'blJe
print for all other nations in the world."
O)

>

high

35% (13)

medium

34% (16)

-1

18
21
20

25
20
15

+7

low
no education

(10)
(10)
(4)

(parents) x^p= 4.28; df = 3; p =
(students) x^ = 9.92; df = 3; p
cu

=

(35)
(56)
(17)

232; gamma
.03; gamma

-1

-5

184
227

Variable 41: "If a person wanted to make a speech
against religion in this community he should be allowed."

-M

Ll_

high

25%

medium

28
27
37

low
no education

(7)

37% (17)

(17)
(13)

59
(82)
43 (120)
48
(51)

(6)

+12
+31
+16
+11

2

(parents) x^^= .853;' df = 3; p = .836; gamma = .082
(students) x = 11.66; df = 3; p = .008; gamma = -.070

(l)For parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education" is the
mother's level of education when she was the respondent.
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disagreeing with their
systen, becoming

a

blueprint for

a„

other

nations.

Nevertheless, the level of
change fro. parents to
students
renamed negative (see Table
17). except for those
students «hose
parents had had high school
education,
students co.ing fro.
fa.lHes
"here the fathers have
had high school education
see. to be a rather
unique segment.
The rate of change In
open-.lnded responses fro.
parents to students was
the greatest a.ong the.,
except In the case of
variable 21.
It see.s that, generally,
the students coming fro.
this
group, for reason or another,
have the environment
conducive to the
widest change and difference
fro. that of the parents
with si.ilar
education level. Reasons for
such a contrariety cannot
be discerned
fro. this data; only
speculation could
be .ade.

A somewhat more indepth
evaluation of the data reveals
that the
size of the city of residence
(cosmopolitanism), generally, is
quite
Significant and often is associated
with the respondent's attitude.
Although, due to technical
difficulties explained earlier, the
parents'
data for cosmopolitanism could
not be relied on, the data for
the

students, however, was significantly
related with variables 18 and 21.
In variables 26 and
41.

ism, however,

a

the items dealing with intolerance
and chauvin-

different kind of relationship is
revealed.

The data

suggests that the parents and students
who reside in cities labeled
"second level cosmopol itan"-1 .e.

.

cities with population of 100,000

to 1.000,000-were less in favor of
the item suggesting that "our socio-

political system become a blueprint for
all other nations," than the

remaining groups in the sample.

Some 76 percent of the parent sample
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and 57 percent of the
student sample for this
category were residents
of the city of Tabriz in
northwest Iran. The population
of this city
and the whole northwest region
of Iran, ethnically and
linguistically,
is different than the rest
of the

Iranians.

There have been demands

for autonomy in this region
in the past, most recently
during 1945-46.
Therefore, it could be assumed
that the underlying feeling of
beinfl

different could be responsible
for

a

somewhat lower level of political,

intolerance for both parents and
students in this category, which
subsequently affects the outcome of
the data for level of
cosmopolitanism.
In short, similarities or
near similarities suggested by
the

data represented in Table 12 in
the subsequent analysis appears
to be
of little relevance.
There are great diversities in the
parent-student

orientations enhanced by many factors,
namely the parental education
and level of cosmopolitanism.

The parents'

orientations seem to be

affected little by the variables that
affect the student's attitudes.
It

is

suggested that parental orientations are
the result of

a

more

complex set of variables and circumstances
reinforced by longer exposure
to socio-cultural

traits of the environment which they are part of.
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CHAPTER

VIII

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
It is purposed here that
the deceptive facade put up by
the

government to display popular support
for the regime, as described
earlier, resulted in further cynicism
and alienation of the public
rather than in gaining support for
the regime.
The implications of
this proposal will be demonstrated
in this chapter.

The citizenship role in Iran, unlike
in Western democracies,
did not appear in the forms of
membership in or affiliation with political

groups, voting regularity, or even
participation in civic respon-

sibilities.

There were

a

few who were members of political
groups or

organizations like the National Front, the
Tudeh Party, or the

Confederation of Iranian Students which were
all "illegal."
in such

organizations was punished by imprisonment.

was often not

a

result of one's affinity for

or individual but
civil

a

a

Membership

Voting in elections

certain political party

duty imposed on citizens, mainly those who were

servants or factory workers since they were led to
believe that

they had to show their voter registration cards
to receive their
salaries.

Civic responsibilities seldom took forms of political
partic-

ipation, instead they were often conducted within one's
neighborhood,

motivated by religious and moral duties.

Thus, it is improper to use

the mold developed to study political participation in the West for
the
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purpose of this inquiry.

For analysis purpose,
political alienation,

general political interest, and
level of political efficacy
will be
used as measures of the
citizenship role. The measures
will be used
in three levels:

passive, active and political
efficacy.

Passive

measures will basically deal with
the individual's interest

in listening
to news on the radio, watching
it on television or reading
it in news-

papers and magazines.

Active measures will be attitudes
such as

thinking about politics or talking
about it with others.

Lastly,

political efficacy will measure one's
responsiveness to political

system functions.

Passive Measures

This category is measured by two variables:

variable 11, "Some

people often listen to news on radio or
television, how about you?" and

variable 12, "Some people often read newspaper
and magazine articles
about political, economic and social matters,
how about you?".

Although

listening to, watching or reading about news in
newspapers and magazines
does not constitute an act of political
participation, nevertheless, it

displays

a

level

of interest in the affairs of the country or of
the

world.
An analysis of the association between these two measures with

indicators of active measures---"talking about politics" and "thinking
about politics"--confirmed
two types of measures.

a

significant relationship between these

Therefore, it can be assumed that these
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TABLE 18

frequency

Passive participation
variables

often sometimes seldom
%

%

Variable 12: "Some people often
listen to news on radio or television, how about you?"
parents
81%
students
71

Variable 13: "Some people often
read newspapers and magazine
articles about political, economic and social matters, how
about you?"
parents
students

67%
65

total

%

2%

17%

4

25

9%
14

24%
21

100% (168)
100% (622^

100% (145)
100% (621)

indicators will be useful, even under the
circumstances, in measuring
political interest among both parents and students.

The media, as discussed in Chapter II, was
greatly handicapped
by governmental

controls.

Perhaps it was an indication of such controls

and a perception of the unreliability of the news
that resulted in no

association between

a

student's education and his parent's education

in regard to the habit of listening to news

Table 19 suggests
ents'

and students'

a

(see Table 19).

rather significant difference between par-

habits of listening to the news.

news more often than students.

Parents listen to

On the other hand, there seems to be

little difference between parents' and students' habits of reading news-

paper and magazine articles about political matters.

Further breakdown

of the data reveals some important differences between the two samples.
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TABLE 19
to news",

^'aH;M.'']r'°".^'c"^^^^^"^'"9
___J^_nable
12, with Socio-Economic
Status
vision^'hS,^'
k'"'!""
VTSTon,
how about
you?

Socio-Economic
Status

often

"^^^ °" the radio or tele.
I
listen to it:

sometimes

seldom

parents students parents
students parents students

male
female

Sex
f

83%

77%

2%

71

3%

15%

63

20%

3

6

26

31

2

.

parents) x ^= 2.66; df = 2ion
d =
?fi- v (students) x2 = 13.65; df = 2
=
p
6oi.~V*
91%
Father's '^^'5'?
^^^^^f"
87
Level of
76
Education
,
no education
52
(2)
f'^^'—-^-^ -^.=
17.?- Hf
QT =
= ^.
b;
f^l
7 Z\ x^2" =
(students)
3.63; df =

65%
77
69
71

p =
6; p =

Mother's "^^^
Level of
Education
,
r
no education
(students) x

Family
Income

= 4.7;

1-hiqh
2

Cosmopol- 3
itanism
4
5-low
..2

(1)

mother

s

31%
13

4

6

5

3

20
43

76
71

20
26
26

20%
25
25

70

df - 6; p = .57; V = .063; qamma =
-.099

87
69

70%
90
76

88
94

_

4%

nnn. w
.008; V = .226- qamma = -.483
.73^ V = .067; qamma = -.035

3%
8

70
72

(parents) x^^= 9.23; df = 4; p = .05; V
(students) x = 3.5; df = 4; p = .45;
V

Level of

'^^^

3

72%

low

^

100%

hiqh

medium

Level

r.

3%

I'J™

65%
80
76
78
89

3

.168; qamma
.072; qamma

4%

2
6

10%

25%

15
27

23
25

-.418
-.003

6%

26%

29%

1

10
24
10

19
21

3
2
3

20
8

= 8; p = .12; V = .195; qamma = .353
= 8; p = .025; V = .106;
qamma = -.268

For parents' column, the "Father's Level of
Education" is the
level of education when she was the respondent.
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^^^i^^^JMmi^news.

The data in Table 19 reveals
that male

students listened to news more
often than female students.
square probability was significant
at .001 level.
ciation between

a

The chi-

A significant asso-

student's habit of listening
to news and gender was

also revealed (gamma

=

.319).

Among parents

there was an association

between level of education and
frequency of listening to news
(gamma
-483).

-

Gender was also significantly
associated with "listening to

news" in the parents"

sample with male parents having
this habit more

often than female parents (gamma

=

.336).

Among the student respondents, the
chi-square probability for
fathers' education level and frequency
of listening to news was not

significant.
The analysis of the parent data
suggested that parents with

higher levels of education more frequently
had the habit of listening
to news.

The data suggested that almost all the
parents with high

education level listened to news while only
half of the parents with
no education indicated a similar habit
(gamma

=

.483).

The family income of the parents was of significance
in deter-

mining whether they listened to news often.

The chi-square probability

was significant at .05 level, but as indicated by
gamma, there was no

significant relationship between income level and habit of
listening
to news among parents.

The cross-tabulation revealed that there was

the tendency among the low income parents to listen to
news less often

than other income groups.

284

The level of cosmopolitanism
was significant for students
with
ch1-square probability at .025
level.
The students in all areas,
as

suggested by the data, relied
heavily on radio and television
as their
major source of news. However,
the students from smaller
towns and
rural

areas used electronic media
more often than those from
Tehran.

While 65 percent of the students
from Tehran Indicated that they
often
listened to news on radio and
television, some 89 percent did
so in
rural areas.

The fact of printed news and
Information sources being

less available in smaller towns
and rural areas was an obvious
reason

for the popularity of electronic
media as a source of information
in

smaller towns and rural areas.
In summary,

the data suggested that the male
students tended

to listen to news on radio and
television more often than female

students.

Furthermore, while the higher the parent's
education level,

the higher their frequency of listening
to news, education level of

parents had little impact on the student's
likelihood of listening to
the news.

The data also indicated that as the level
of cosmopolitanism

decreased there was an apparent increase in frequency
of listening to
the news among students.

H abit

of reading newspapers

.

The variable dealing with the habit of

reading newspaper and magazine articles about political,
economic and
social matters, according to the data (Table 20), revealed
that more

male parents showed an interest in reading newspapers than did female
parents.

The probability of chi-square was significant at .009 level.

The relationship of these items also proved to be significant
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TABLE 20
"'"^'^"9

newspapersv7Ha^lP^n'''°;.°c
variable 13, with Socio-Economic
Status

Socio-Economic
Status

cles about political,
social and economic
matters, how about you?"
I
read them"

often

sometimes

seldom

parents students parents
students parents students

male
female

Sex

61%
48

^8%

9%

62

3

.2
parents x^.=
4.82; df = 2: d = nnq- v (students) x2 = 3.12;
xc, ui
2-^p -= .^1,
2?' \l
df = ^,
V -

ather's
Level of
Education

f

^i'^'"

^

83%

79%

71

76
61
53

47

no education

(2)

13%
14

30%
48

19%
24

i7i

^ '^^^
'
nl gamma =
.07;
.131

11%
10
6

12%

6%

12
14
15

8%

19

12

47

25
32

(parents) x
53.8; df = 6- d = nnnn- \i - /in/i
''^'^^
(students) x2 = 24.7;
-^-z. UI
df = 0,
0 =
6
- .UUU4,
QOol V
i-- .143;
A\ gamma ^ = -.302
p

^™

high
Mother's
medium
.evel of
low
iducation
no education

-

100%
84
67
55

13
18

21

(_students) X^ =
= 26.8; df = 6;
p = .0002; V = .149; gamma =

amily

tncome
evel

high

medium
low
2

11%
64
39

66
57

8
7

12%
17
13

27
-,

320

12%
28
54

17
29

df = 4; p = .0002; V = .260; gamma =
-.510
Is?uden1s/x2=_22.0;
(students)
X
- 18.7; df = 4; p = .0009; V =
,124; gamma = -.245

1-high
-evel of 2
[^osmopol- 3

itanism

4
5- low

64%

70%

55
54
60
56

57
61

4%
10
12

55
64

19

5

11%
16
19
16
14

33%
35
33
35
25

19%
27
21
30
22

(parents) x2= 5.87; df = 8; p = .66; V =
.133; gamma = ,039
(students) X = 11.7; df = 8; p = .16; V =
.097; gamma = .156
(1) For parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education"
mother's level of education when she was the respondent.

is the
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(gamma

=

.295).

The cross-tabulation showed

a

rather substantial gap

(13 percent) between the male and female
parents'

newspapers.
of

a

Such a difference, understandably,
was the direct result

lower rate of literacy among
female parents.

The level of education had

a

significant impact on the parent's

and the student's habit of
reading newspapers.
level was significant and
instrumental
in

habits of reading

Father's education

in influencing student's
interest

reading newspapers and magazines
(gamma

=

.302).

Mother's education

level was also a significant factor
influencing the student's interest
in

reading newspapers (ganma

=

.320).

The association between parent's
education level and the habit
of reading newspapers and magazines
was very significant (gamma

=

.670).

The chi-square probability was significant
at .0000 level, revealing
that 83 percent of parents with high
level of education often read

newspapers, while 47 percent of those with
lower level of education
did the same.

The finding, however, was only

a

demonstration of the

fact that the educated read more often than
those with less education.
The family income level was also significant for
both parents
and students in relation to their habit of
reading newspapers and

magazines for political news.

While the chi-square probability for the

students was significant at .0009 level, for the parents
it was significant at .0002 level.

Of those parents from high income level, 76

percent indicated that they often read newspapers, while 39 percent
of
those from low income level responded in a similar manner.

Of the

students from high income families, 74 percent indicated that they
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often read newspapers and magazines,
while 57 percent from low
inco„«
families did the sa«.
Certainly, since level of
education and Income
are interdependent, and analysis
of the two items showed an
association

significant at gamma

=

.548, among parents, therefore,
such

a

relation-

ship was expected.
Level of cosmopolitanism proved
of no significance when
analyzed

against either the student's or
the parent's habit of reading
about
political matters in the printed
news media.

farent::^^

The items denoting

"passive" political interest seemingly
measured similar attitudes.

Listening to news and reading newspapers
were associated at very significant levels:
gamma was .479.

for the parents, gamma was .808;
and for the students,

This indicated that those interested in
the news

utilized both electronic and printed media
as their sources.

This was

particularly evident, as reflected in the data,
among the parents.
The analysis showed that gender was

a

significant variable

among parents in regard to reading newspapers,
while the student data

indicated that the male students listened to news more
often than the
female students.

Parent's level of education seemed to influence both

parents themselves and students in regard to reading newspapers,
and
parents themselves in regard to listening to electronic media.

All

students relied more often on printed news media than parents,
with the

exception of parents with high education level.
and when these students would attain

a

It

is

similar level of

assumed that if
higfi

education

themselves, ther^' would bo an increase in their habit of reading
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printed material for their source
of information regarding
political,
social and economic matters.
The family income level was
significant for both parents
and

students in determining their attitudes
about reading newspapers.
the other hand, income level
proved of no significance for
either

sample in determining their interest
in listening to news.

On

Further-

more, while cosmopolitanism was
significant in determining level of
interest in listening to news for
the students, it failed to attain

significance in regard to reading newspapers.
In short,

one could note that while education
and family income

were all influential in bringing about
an interest in both parents and
students in regard to reading newspapers,
they did not aid in frequency
of listening to news, due to the basic
differences in the nature of
these two media.

From the analysis of the data, it seemed
that these

two measures were perhaps suggestive of
general political

interest

among both parents and students regardless of
their political perspective.
as well

It seemed that the

educated parents relied on reading material

as electronic media as

their sources of political information.

On the other hand, while higher parental education
caused more use of

printed media among the students, the same was not true in
regard to

electronic media.

Active Measures

Active measures of political interest were measured, for the
purpose of this study, by the following two items:

"thinking about
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politics" and "talking about
politics."

There may have been some

procedural and built-in flaws in
the questionnaire.

For example, when

the word politics entered the
questionnaire, it may have given
rise to
some degree of suspiciousness and
uncertainty in some respondents.

They probably were not certain
how confidentially their answers
would
be treated.
There may even have been suspicions
in their minds that
the questionnaire had been
devised by the government to find
out about

their political beliefs, thoughts
and habits.

The significant associ-

ation between these two measures
and with passive measures,^ however,

suggested that there was
and student data.

a

great deal of consistency in both the
parent

As noted earlier, the respondents
were given assur-

ances that the data was for research
purposes and that there was no

interest in knowing the identity of the
individual respondents.

Names

and addresses of the respondents were not
asked for nor collected.

Also, it may be significant to keep in mind
that the time of this ques-

tionnaire coincided with some relative relaxation
of the press and

freedom of expression.
Over half of both parents and students noted that they
never
think or talk about politics!

Only one out of three students, and one

out of four parents indicated that they often thought or talked
about

politics (see Table 21).

The data suggested an extremely high associa-

tion between those who thought and those who talked about politics;

gamma was .885 for parents and .774 for students, both highly significant.
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TABLE 21

Parent-Student Comparison on 'Active'
Political Measures
frequency

Active political
participation measures

total

often

sometimes

seldom

%

°l
10

%

%

n

Variable 14: "Some people often
think about political and economic condition of our country,
how about you?"
parents
students

26%
35

17%
15

57%
50

100% (166)
100% (617)

Variable 15: "Some people talk
about political and economic
issues facing our contry, how
about you?"
parents
students

26%
34

11%

63%

14

52

100% (167)
100% (621)

The cross-tabulation of the data revealed
some attitude differ-

ences resulting from the sex of the responding
parents.

Male parents

thought and talked more often about politics
than female parents,

a

likely result of higher level of education among
the male parents.

The

chi-square probability was .002 for thinking
about politics and .06 for
talking about politics with parent's sex,
gamma at .622 and .447 respectively, indicating

a

very significant association.

The chi-square prob-

ability did not emerge as significant for student's
sex with either
measure.

The higher frequency of talking and thinking about politics
among male parents is in part due to

a

higher level of education among

them, as the cross-tabulations in Tables 22 and 23 suggested.

Further-

more, the patriarchial nature of Iranian culture also contributed to
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their increased level of
contact with and Interest In
socio-political
1 ssues
The parent's education level
did associate significantly
with
their habit of talking about
politics (gamma - .419) and
thinking about
politics (gan^a - .334).
The cross-tabulation suggested
that those
parents who had a higher level of
education talked and thought more
often about politics than those
who had a lower level of education.
Of those parents who had a high
level of education, 44 percent
talked
often and 40 percent thought often
about politics, while of those

parents who had

a

low level of education, 23
percent often talked and

29 percent often thought about politics.

Parent's education level was

also of some significance in determining
student's orientation.

There

was an association, with gamma at
.275 and .286, respectively, for
both

thinking about politics and talking about
politics with father's level
of education.

Of those students whose father had

a

high level of edu-

cation, 58 percent talked and 56 percent
thought often about politics,

whereas of those students whose fathers had no
education 23 percent
talked and 21 percent thought often about politics.

Mother's education level, as suggested by the data, was
also
significant.

The chi-square probability was .003, and gamma reflected

the association between mother's level of education
with thinking and

talking about politics at .216 and .229 respectively.
The data also suggested that the rate of change in orientation

from parents to students coming from similar educational backgrounds
was lowest among students whose fathers had

a

low level of education

s
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TABLE 22

Cross-Tabulation of "Thinking about
politics"
Variable 14, with Socio-Economic
Status

'

"Some people often think about
political and
economic condition of our country,
how about
you?" I think about it:

Socio-Economic
Status

often

sometimes

seldom

parents students parents students
parents students,

male
female

Sex

31%

32%

9

39

18%
8

16%
13

50%
83

•JC/o

48

(parents) x^p= 12.1; df = 2;
P
, = .002; V = .270; qamma = .622
(students)
= 3.88; df = 2; p = .14; V =
.08; qamma = - .101
=

Father's
Level of
Education

40%

^''f.

f

'^^'^"^

^

no education

26
29

56%
43
33

--

21

(parents) x^^= 18.5; df = 6; p
(students)
= 25.9; df = 6;

Mother

'

Level of

Education

p =

86%
47
35
28

low
.2

=

-

34%

31%

15
14
16

61
54
90

41
53

62

.005;
.236; qamma = -.334
.001; V = .147; gamma = -.275

high

no education

12%

13
17
10
V =

=

medium

(students)

Family
Income
Level

=

26%

14%
33
49
57

20%
16
13

19.5; df = 6; p = .003; V = .128; qamma = -.216

high

medium

37%
34

45%
35

low

13

28

16%

14%

47%

17
15

17
14

49
72

16%
48
59

(parents) x ^= 10.5; df = 4; p
.03; V = .181; gamma = -.330
(students) x = 16.0; df = 6; p = .003; V = .115; gamma = -.221
=

1-high
Level of

2

Cosmopol- 3
itanism
4
5- low

14%
40
30
30
40

38%

10%

12%

41
31
35
14

15

15
14
21
31

9

20
47

75%
45

50%
43
55
44^

61
50
13

54

2

(parents) x ^=

2i

= 8; p =
= 8; p =

.001; V = .281; gamma = -.336
.02; V = .121; gamma = .050

(1) For parents' column, th e "Father's Level of Education"
mother's level of education when she was the respondent.

is

the
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(Table 24).

The students coming from
families wi,ere the fathers
had
no education had the highest
rate of change compared to
their fathers.
The difference was partly due
to the fact that none of
the parents
with "no education" had indicated
a high interest in
thinking or
talking about politics.
Despite the lowest level of active
political

interest among the students coming
from those of "no education"
background, with 21 percent thinking
and 23 percent talking about
politics,
the gap was considerable enough
,
resulting in the greatest change in

orientation from parents to students
coming from similar educational
backgrounds.
It is

apparent that

in a broader socio-political

a

higher level of education often resulted
perspective, giving an impetus to both

parents and students for "active"
political participation.
was

a

level

The result

higher level of political discourse among
parents with higher
of education and among students coming
from similar educational

backgrounds, who by the virtue of their own
education and by the

exposure to

a

higher level of activism in families where
parents have

high level of education, became more
conditioned to political action.

The data in Tables 21 and 22 also suggested that as
the income
level

among families rose so did the level of political
thinking and

discourse.

Of parents with high income level, 37 percent
thought

often about politics and 36 percent talked often about
politics,

whereas, of parents who had low income, 13 percent thought and
talked
about politics.

The students from all three income levels were more

active than the parents.

Of students from high income groups, 45

e

TABLE 23

Cross-Tabulation of "Talking about
politics."
Variable 15, with Socio-Economic
Status

Socio-Economic
Status

Some people often liin[bout
political aTiTiTonomic issues of our country
with their friends
how about you?"
I
talk about thoiir
ol Lcfi

'iOmetime'

'->C'

I

doiii

pa rcnL'o ^^tudents parents
students parents student:;

male
f ema 1

Sex

30%

33%
34

14

12%

14%

6

(parents) x^^= 5.56; df = 2; p =
.06; V =
(students) x2=.42;df =

182-

2;p^.8i;v--:526;

Father's ^^^h
^^^"^
Level of
Education
,
no education

f

44%

58%

27
23
--

41

13

30
23

10

(parents) X ^= 16.9; df = 6; p = .01; V
(students) x^ = 28.3; df = 6; p = .0001

Mother's '^^^
Level of ^^^^""^
low
Education
no education
Students) X

=

19.5; df = 6; p = .003; V

high

36%

36%

ncome
Level

medium

32

low

13

33
32

I

(parents)

;

:::::

.225; gamma
V

=

.i53';

i

tan ism

.447
-.033

29%
44
55
65

95
=

-.419
"= -.286

22%
14

22%
36
53
58

15
14
=

.127; gamma = -.229

14%
8
12

18%
17
11

46%
49

60
75

59

2
X

1-high

Cosmopol-

53%
50

44%
60
67

gamma

^= 10.1; df = 4; p = .04; V = .175; gamma
(i>Ludents) x
= 7.5; df = 4; p = .11; V = .079; gamma

Level of

-

12%
15
15
12

56%
50
33
28

Fami ly

qamma

5
=

58%
80

15

2
3

4

5- low

(parents) x^p= 12.0;
(students) x - 8.3;

19%
43
24
27
33

34%

9%

29
38
33

5

31

= 8;

p =

= 8;

p =

14%
22

6

9

15
27

11

22

335
109

72%

51%
48

52
70
57
40

53
56
47

.15; V = .189; gamma = -.179
.40; V = .081; gamma = .015

(i) lor parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education"
mother's level of education when she was the respondent.

is

the
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percent thought often about
politics, while 28 percent
fro. low inco^
level did Similarly.
There was an increase of 15
percent from parents
to students of the low
income families in their
attitude of thinki,ing

about politics, as

a

measure of their "active"
political interest.

Chi-square probability for the
student data with respect to
talking
about politics failed to reach
a significant level
(see Table 22).
The analysis of variables
"thinking about politics" and
"talking about
politics" with family income
supported a significant relationship
with
gamma at .330 and .335, respectively,
for thinking and talking about

politics among the parents, while
failing to display any significant

association with regard to the student
data.

Cosmopolitanism failed to suggest any pattern
of association
with the respondent's frequency of
"talking about politics."

The

probability of chi-square, however, was
significant for both parents
and students in regard to thinking
about politics and level of cosmo-

politanism.

The parent data suggested an association
significant with

gamma at -.336 level.

While 14 percent of parents from Tehran
noted

that they often thought about politics,
some 40 percent rural areas
and small

towns indicated

a

similar habit.

In general,

respondents from all areas, excluding Tehran, indicated

however, the
a

high level of

"active" political interest.

Political thinking, it was hoped, would be
of political interest.

a

better measurement

Since it was assumed that while one did not

necessarily report indulging himself in political discussions which
supposedly could have had undesireable consequences, he would,
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TABLE 24
Ra te of Change from par

ents_^^^^

parents
%

students

n

%

44% (16)

medium

58% (28)

27
23

41

low

O)

(17)
(11)

30

no education
ta

o

o

a

23

%

+14
+14
+7
+23

(59)
(86)
(27)

"I often think about
political and economic'
issues facing our country."

high

40% (14)

medium

26
29

S-

low
(T3

(16)
(14)

no education

Q.

change

n

high
O)

4-

'Active' Measures

political and economic
iLuIJ^n/n^"
issues
of our country with my
friends."

Independent
variable

>

on

nonetheless, reveal

a

56% (27)
43
(60)

+16
+17

33
21

+4
+21

(92)
(25)

degree of politicalization or lack of it by

responding to this question.

Though the pattern of political thinking

was supposedly of little cause for concern
with the authorities, the

responses we received for this question closely
resembled the responses
to the item denoting political

discussion.

measure of association for parents (gamma
(gamma
In

=

As noted,
=

.885)

there was

a

high

and for the students

.774) with the two measures of "active" political

interest.

short, those who thought often about politics also often
talked about

it.

The level of parent's education, as well as income, influenced

significantly the student's frequency of political thinking.

One

finding, however, stressed the importance of high family income on

student's level of political thinking, while not attaining

a

significant
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level

as

to their frequency of talking
about politics.

revealed that

The data

greater rate of students from
high or low income families showed interest in thinking
about politics than parents
with
those income levels (see Table
23).
a

The data analysis also suggests
some similarities and, in fact,
some dissimilarities between
parents and students from similar
backgrounds.
Students, in both cases, seemed
to be more interested in

politics and, therefore, more
politicized than parents.

gender did not seem to have

a

Although

significant influence on student orien-

tation, male parents, were interested
in politics at twice the rate
of
female parents.
Parent's education exerted a great
influence on

student's orientation, and was also
associated, at

a

significant level,

with their habit of talking and thinking
about politics.

Tables 22 and

23 suggested a high frequency of talking and
thinking about politics

among those parents who had

a

high level of education.

Those with mod-

erate or low level of education, as
suggested by the data, seemed to
have

a

similar orientation regarding "active"
political participation.

The most probable cause of such

a

differentiation, perhaps, was implicit

in the nature of higher educational

institutions of Iran.

Historically,

Iranian colleges and universities have been
centers of political activisim.

The graduates of such institutions, by the same token,
after

graduation would very likely continue to express at least some
of their
socio-political concerns.

The result, as the data suggests, is

a

higher level of "active" political interest among those with high
education--i

.e.

,

at least some college education.
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Figure 5.
Scatter plot indicating the impact of education
on parents "passive" and "active" orientations.
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To further illustrate the relationship
of passive and active

habits with socio-economic status and
political indicators, the results

from the factor analysis of the parent
and the student data was

utilized here.
ical

The factor analysis indicated two factors
with polit-

interest as the main factor for both parents
and students,

significant at above 1.0 Eigenvalue.
The first factor was characterized by the
impact of education
on levels of political

parents who had

a

interest.

This factor indicated that the

very low education level,

low income level, and

a

many children in their families seldom
listened to news or read newspapers and magazines concerning the socio-political
and economic affairs
of the country.
matters.

They also seldom spoke or thought about political

These parents, furthermore, favored government influence
and

power over their lives.

They also indicated

a

low level

of efficacy,

agreeing that they did not understand what was going on in the
government since it was so complicated (see Fig. 5).
The students from this background also factored along the same

basic line with little differentiation from parents.

whose parents had

a

low education level,

a

The students

low income level, and had

many children in their families seldom read newspapers and magazines
and seldom talked or thought about political matters.

moreover, favored
lives.

a

These students,

political system that greatly influenced citizens'

They indicated that all other countries in the world should

adopt their socio-political system as

a

blueprint.

These same students
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Figure 6.
Scatter plot indicating the impact of education
on students "passive" and "active" orientations.
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had

high level of trust in the
government and did not think
that the
government should aid the
unemployed (see Fig. 6).
a

The factor analysis, in
short, supported the previous
assumption that While level of
education was highly associated
with active
and passive political
interest in both parents and
students, there was
little association between
education and active or passive
political
interests with political attitude
and orientation.
The relationship
of the political variables
with the other factors in the
tables were
too weak to be regarded as a
basis for any fundamental
discussion.
The second fact dealt with
the habit of political interest
and
the impact of age.
This factor was shared by both
samples.
It simply
suggested that the male parents who
were younger and had fewer children
often thought and talked about
politics.
This factor for parents,

however, was devoid of any political
implications.
that active political

interest was higher among parents who
had small

families, with youth as the overriding
factor.
the youthful political

It just suggested

Perhaps it was

interest, without any support by other
factors

such as education, that made this
important.

The student index suggested that the students
in upper grades

more often had "passive" and "active" political
interests than those
in lower grades.

As they got to higher classes they listened
to news

and read newspapers more.

They also thought and talked about politics.

The student factor index, however, was loaded by
one political indicator.

The analysis suggested that these students were rather
effica-

cious, in that they indicated that the government paid attention
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to people's needs.

It could only be surmised
that these efficacious

students were upwardly mobile
individuals who hoped to gain
advantage
by positive response to
government demands. They hoped
to be recruited
into the political system, therefore,
they were somewhat receptive
to

system demands.

Political Efficacy

As
is

the third measure of political

interest, political efficacy

thought to function as an indicator of
individual's responsiveness

to political

vidual will

system functions.
report

a

Thus, a politically efficacious indi-

government to be responsive to his or her
efforts

and demands, whereas, a politically
inefficacious individual is cynical
of the political system.

A politically efficacious individual
would

most likely subscribe to the system
norms, and, as Easton and Dennis
have argued, they would in effect support
the system.^

The two questions (see Table 25) used for this
part of the

inquiry have often been used by researchers for
measurement of political
efficacy.

The level of political efficacy found in this
study does not

resemble other studies, namely the Easton and Dennis^
and Niemi studies.^

Both of these studies reported

political efficacy among students than parents.

a

or the Jennings

higher level of

However, in this

inquiry, as indicated in Table 25, the students resemble their parents

closely in their level of political efficacy.
not closely compare studies done in

a

Of course, one should

society with

a

high level of

perceived role of citizen participation in political functions of the
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TABLE 25

Parent-Student Comparison on Levels of Political
Efficacy
frequency
Ef f i cacy/ i nef f i cacy

indicators
( i

agree
nef fi cacy)

disagree
(efficacy)

80%

20%

82

18

58%
54

42%

Variable 23: "Sometimes politics
and government seem so complicated that a person like me can
not really understand what is
going on."
parents
students
Variable 31: "Over the years, the
government has paid no attention
to what people like me think
when it decides what to do."
parents
students

society to Iran under the Pahlavis.

As

is

total

100% (i6o;
100% (599;

100% (162'
100% (584;

46

suggested by the high numbers

of inefficacious respondents in both samples, political efficacy
in
Iran functioned as the level of support/lack of support for the
govern-

ment.

Politics are complicated

.

As Table 25 suggests,

the level

of agreement

between parents and students on both issues is rather similar, which
may indicate
Fig.

7

a

parent-student similarity on the issue.

However, as

reveals, there are some differences on the parent-student

responses when measured on

a

six-level

continuum.

While

a

substantially

higher percentage of parents strongly agree (+3) that "politics are
complicated" than students, more students somewhat agree (+1) with the
issue than parents.

This indicates a more determined level of political

306

Figure

7

Comparison of Parent-Student Responses
to Variable 23 in
Six Level Continuum

a
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efficacy among parents than students, although our first data
(Table 25)
did not reveal such

a

trend.

The cross-tabulation of variable 23, "Sometimes politics and

government seem so complicated that

a

person like me cannot really

understand what is going on," with socio-economic status of parents and
student's parents revealing some similarities between the two samples.
There is no strong association between father's education and student's
level

of political efficacy (g amma

-

-.195), although the chi-square

probability was significant at .009 level.
ated at

a

significant level

The level of income associ-

(gamma = .456) with political efficacy/

inefficacy among the parents.

Furthermore, the level of cosmopolitanism

failed to indicate any significant relationship with the parent sample.
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while there was

a

significant association between the
size of student's

place of residence and attitude
towards this item (gamma
the size of their city of residence
grew, there was

a

=

.309).

As

decline in level

of political efficacy (see Table
26).
The relationship of high level of
cosmopolitanism with low
level of political efficacy was
expected, though, at first glance, it

contradicted our primary assumptions.

It was earlier surmised that

higher family income would result in
higher level of political efficacy.
Thus, assuming that since those in
the more cosmopolitan areas have
higher level of income and those in
smaller towns and rural areas have
lower income, the students in least
cosmopolitan areas, by the same
token, were expected to be less efficacious.

The cross-tabulation of

family income with variable 23, however,
did not produce

a

significant

chi-square probability and, as such, could not
aid in any generalization.

The following explanation, while not negating
the previous

assumption, will aid in understanding the relationship
between cosmo-

politanism and political efficacy.

The attitude could be related to

the respondent's interaction with or their assumptions
about the func-

tions of the political system they know best; that is, the
local government.

Although the Iranian political system under the Pahlavis was

highly centralized and almost all orders were generated in Tehran, most

students, who were not in everyday contact with government bureaucracy
and the havoc of big city life, were familiar with

a

smaller administra-

tion, where channels of authority were more distinct and visible, and,

thus, easier to digest and relate to.

It would,

therefore, allow one
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TABLE 26

Cross-Tabulation of "Government and
politics are complicated
_______J)^nable 23), with Socio-Economic Status

'

i>ometimes pontics and government
sliHTl^
complicated that a person like me
cannot
really understand what is going
on "

Socio- Economic
Status

Agree (political inefficacy)
parents
Sex

79% (100)
80
(28)

f
female

''''

~-

P^^'

{sL'de^?l/x2^1n'Rf
(students)
X
- 10.87; df = ?
1; p = .001;
Father's
Level of

^^9*?

f^^""^

Education
(1)

students

^

"0 education

66%
82
80
95

(23)
(47)
(39)
(19)

790^

94
=

(254)
(235)

9amma = -.206
.137; gamma = -.280

-'''-^

piii

=

74%
(35)
85
(119
83
(235
81

(90)

(parents) x2= 73; df = 3; p = .06; V =
.213; gamma = .323
(students) X = 11.6; df = 3; p = .009; V =
.140; gamma = -.195

Mother's

^'^^^

Level of

f^^"'"

Education

^

no education

(students) X

Family
Income
Level

= 8.7;

"
"
"
-

df = 3; p = .03; V = .120; gamma = -.206

high

67%

medium

78
90

low

71%
(5)
85
(73)
85
(214)
78
(185)

(32)
(40)
(54)

78% (146)
84
(141
82
(187

(parents) x^= 8.8; df = 2; p = .01; V = .236; gamma =
.456
(students) x = 1.44; df = 2; p = .48; V = .049; gamma = -.079

J-high

75%

2

81
81

^
Level, of
Cosmopol-

3

itanism

4

,

5-low

87
69

(39)
(17)
(26)
(34)
(11)

85% (285)
83
(55
79
75
67

(77)
(48)
(24)

(parents) x^ = 3.4; df = 4; p = .48; V = .146; gamma = -.089
(students) x = 22.0; df = 4; p = .0002; V = .190; gamma = .304
(l)For the parent's column, the "Father's Level of Education" is
the mother's level of education when she was the respondent.
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to gain a semblance of efficacy,
particularly since the question
in

variable 23 was centered around
the complexity of visible
political
and administrative posture.

By the same token,

Tehran with all the everyday concerns
of

a

life in a city like

hectic captial city, with

most channels of authority rather
blurred, plus the higher level of

politicalizationcoupledwith lesser level of
political visibility caused
by the sheer number of high school
students, would only serve as

fertile ground for political inefficacy.
The students whose fathers had
a

high level of political efficacy.

a

high education level displayed

Another significant find was that

the students whose fathers and mothers
had no education displayed

a

higher level of political efficacy than those
students whose parents
had

a

low or moderate level of education.

Furthermore, the increase in

level of political efficacy from parents to
students among the no edu-

cation group was enormous, while there was

a

decline in level of

political efficacy from parents to students among the
other segments.
The orientation pattern, in some ways, resembled the
associa-

tion found earlier in the measures of active political
interest.

With

little knowledge about the workings of the political system
among

parents with no education, and some semblance of system recognition

among students who have some high school education, the wide gap

between the parents with no education and the students whose parents
had no education is understandable.
The family income level was related at

variable 23 among the parents.

a

significant level with

The cross -tabulation suggested that

^
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those with

a

higher level of income were

with lower Income levels.

nK,re

efficacious than those

Of the parents with high incor^,
33 percent

agreed with variable 23, whereas
10 percent of those with
low income
did the same.
In short,

analysis.

some anticipated patterns were
suggested by the

Among parents,

a

income were associated with

high level of education and
a

a

high level of

decreased level of political inefficacy.

The same pattern, however, was not
displayed by the students.

A

basically similar trend was indicated
by Jennings and Niemi when they

administered the same question to their sample
of parents and students.
The higher level of efficacy among the
more educated parents, as sug-

gested by variable 23, was the result of their
education, which gave
them

a

better understanding of what

is

going on in the government.

reverse is true for those with less education.

The students, who all

had basically similar levels of education, indicated
level

The

a

generally similar

of efficacy, except when overwhelmed by high
parental education.
It also seems

that certain students who resided in less cosmo-

politan areas, motivated by upward mobility, became more responsive
to
the political

system demands and thus were less inefficacious than those

from more cosmopolitan areas.
Cross -tabulation of variable 23 with the measures of passive
and active political

interest along with items denoting levels of

political trust or distrust were thought to give

a

better understanding

of the impact or relationship of political ef f icacy/i neff i cacy to the
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TABLE 27

Cross-Tabulation of 'Political
Inefficacy,' Variable 2^

with

and Di^trusTpob-ticar

Agree
(inefficacy)

often
sometimes
sel dom
total

students
71%

18

:
,HH, QT : I: p
.80; V =
I - ifr,'

A

Disagree
(efficacy)

24

parents

students

91%

72%

3

23

100% (127) 100% (488) 100% (32) 100%
(110)

l^)'^^'^:
J

Ue^f

^565

parents

news

•

'^'^

"Sometimes pol i tTHi~^^d~^^^^iF?ir
ent seem so
comp icated that a person
like me cannot
really understand what is
going on."

Passive, active,
trust and distrust
variables

Variable 12:
Listening to

d

Variable 13:
Reading newspapers

often
sometimes
seldom

Variable 14:
Thinking about
politics

often
sometimes
seldom

^amma - -.123

=

'H^'^ gamma = .074
.086;

66%"""

58%

66%

8
34

14
20

30%

34%

21%

15
55

16
50

21
58

66%
9

10
25
24
total
100% (125) 100% (486) 100% (32)
100% (110
2- 1:49; df = 2; p = .48; V = .124; gamma = -.061
[s?MdPnt^'
(students) X = 2.82; df = 2;
p = .23; V = .093; gamma = .038

total
2

(parents)
(students) X

9

50
100% (124) 100% (488) 100% (33) 100%
(109)

83; df = 2; p = .40; V = .194; gamma = .019
= 6.18; df = 2; p = .04; V = .164; gamma =
.065
1

Variable 15:
Talking about
pel itics

41%

often
sometimes
seldom

28%

34%

11

16
50

61

44%
9

11

66
45
100% (127) 100% (488) 100% (32) 100% (109)

total

;parents)^x ^= .39;^df = 2; p = .85; V = .043;
gamma = .010
students) x = 3.23; df = 2; p = .20; V = .125; gamma =
.059

Variable 30:
agree
Big business
disagree
influences gov't
total

66%
71%
45%
34
29
55
46
100% (125) 100% (478) 100% (33) 100% (108)

parents) x^ = 3.66; df = 1; p = .055; phi = .168; r = .168;
p
students) x = 11.2; df = 1 p = .0008; phi = .143; r = .143;
;

=

.017
.0003

p =

continued in next page
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TABLE 27 (Continued)
Gov't wastes our disagree
tax money
total

48
45
50
100% (120) 100% (470) 100%
(33) 100% (102)

parents) X = .7; df = 1;
p
(students)_x^_= 6.5; df = 1;

=

Variable 38:
agree
Some people in
disagree
gov't are crooked
total
(students) X

- 12.8;

df =

86%

82%

67%

14

18

33

1

;

p =

153

p ^

004

66%"""
^4

.0003; phi = .155; r = .155; p =

0001

80%

97%"
^00^
71%
20
29
3
31
100% (119) 100% (479) 100% (30) 100%
(105)

= 3.7; df = 1; p = .053;
= .22; df = 1; p = .64;

Variable 42:
People in the
gov't are smart

083- p =

l^'^h;

100% (125) 100% (471) 100% (33) 100%
(102)

Variable 40:
agree
Gov't knows what disagree
is best for people
total
(parents) X
(students)

.41; phi = .083; r =
.01; phi = .ui; ,

p =

agree
disagree

phi = .181; r = -.181; p =
014
phi = .024,' r = .024; p = .28

72%
65%
83%
71%
28
35
17
29
100% (118) 100% (474) 100% (29) 100% (106)

total

(parents) X = .89; df = 1; p = .34; phi =
.097; r = -.097; p
(students) X = 1.04; df = 1; p = .31; phi = .047; r =
-.047;

=

.12
.13

p =

political orientations of our samples, and to distinguish
differences,
if

any,

between parent and student populations.
Levels of political efficacy, as measured by variable 23, did

not relate at significant levels with either passive or active political

participation measures, as indicated by "listening to news," "reading
newspapers," "talking and thinking about politics."

Chi-square analysis

resulted in below significant probability for all the cross-tabulations
of parent data, except for frequency of listening to news (p

The data failed to display

a

=

.035).

significant association between frequency

of listening to news and variable 23.

There was

a

somewhat similar
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outcome from the analysis of the
student data.

Chi-square probability

was only significant for
cross-tabulation of "thinking about
politics"
and variable 23
(p = .04), once again with no significant
association
as

indicated by gamma.

In

short, there were no significant
relation-

ships between political inefficacy,
as indicated by variable
23, and

passive or active political participation
measures.
The levels of political trust/distrust,
which will be dealt

with in detail in Chapter IX, were
the next control items in the

analysis of efficacy.

Variables 30, 35 and 38 indicated distrust
in

the government while variables 40 and
42 indicated levels of trust in
the government.

(Throughout this discussion refer to Table
27.)

The inefficacious respondents, both
parents and students, as

suggested by the data, had less trust in the
government than the
efficacious respondents.

The analysis of the parent data did not

reveal any major association between political
trust/distrust and

political efficacy at levels considered significant.

analyses based on Pearson'

s

Of the five

correlation, none attatined

a

level

of .005

which was regarded in this discussion as significant.
In variable 30,

"The government was influenced by

interests," the data indicated

a

a

few big

chi-square probability significant at

.0008 level, with Pearson's correlation also significant at .0003
level
23.

for the student sample with political efficacy— i

.e.

,

variable

Of the efficacious students, 54 percent agreed with variable 30,

while of the inefficacious students,

71

percent did the same.

There
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was an Increase of 17 percent
in level of distrust from
efficacious
to inefficacious students.
In variable 35,

"The government is wasting the
taxpayers-

money," the student data revealed
at .01

a

chi-square probability significant

level, with Pearson's correlation
also significant at .004 level

(see Table 27).

The cross-tabulation of the student
data suggested

that there was an increase in level
of distrust in government from

efficacious to inefficacious students.

Of the efficacious students,

40 percent agreed with the statement, whereas, of
the inefficacious,
55 percent did the same.
In variable 38,

"Some people in the government are crooked,"

the analysis revealed that the chi-square
probability was significant
at .025 level

for parents and at .0003 level for
students, with

Pearson's correlations also significant at .0001 level
for the latter.

Although the Pearsons correlation for the parent
data failed to attain
the .005 level, nonetheless, based on measurement
of association indi-

cated by gamma, the relationship was significant (gamma

=

.496).

Based

on the cross-tabulation of the efficacious students,
66 percent agreed

with the statement in variable 38, while 82 percent of the inefficacious
agreed.

There was an increase of 16 percent in distrust of government

from efficacious to inefficacious students.

Of the efficacious parents,

67 percent agreed with variable 38, while 86 percent of the ineffica-

cious did the same.

There was an increase of 19 percent in level of

government distrust from efficacious to inefficacious parents.
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Of the two items dealing with
political trust, the only one
with significant chi-square
probability in the parent data was
between
variable 40, "The government knows
what is best for people," and
variable 23, at .053 level.

The correlation analysis for
this table also

failed to reach the anticipated
level of significance.

Based on the

analysis of cross-tabulation, however,
it was indicated that of the

efficacious parents, 97 percent agreed
with the statement, whereas, of
the inefficacious, 80 percent did
the same;

a

decline of 17 percent in

level of government support from
efficacious to inefficacious parents.
In the last item

dealing with political trust, variable
42,

"The people running the government are
smart," the data ceased to

indicate any significant chi-square probability
for either sample.
In summary,

neither set of data revealed any strong

political efficacy and "passive" political
interest.

1 i

nks between

There were also

no major associations between political
efficacy and "active" political

interest.

The data, however, suggested significant
relationships

between political distrust and political inefficacy,
particularly among
the students.

In short,

the data supported the earlier assumptions

that politically efficacious individuals more often will
subscribe to

system norms and have

a

higher level of trust in government, while the

politically inefficacious individuals will behave in an opposite manner.

Government pays no attention

.

The second item in this section dealing

with political efficacy/inefficacy was variable 31, "Over the years, the

government has paid no attention to what people like me think when it
decides what to do."

This item, like the previous one, has often been
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used in research to measure the
level of political efficacy.
as seen in Table 25,

23 since it made

indicated
tions.

a

a

received

a

This item,

more efficacious response than
variable

more forceful and less ambiguous
suggestion that

more indepth feeling between the
individual and system func-

Without any pretense, the statement
attempted to engage the

respondent in

a

situation whereby his or her ascription
to system norms

could be measured.

Perhaps it was for this reason that the
two varia-

bles, variable 23 and 31, did not even
correlate (p- .119) in the

parent data.

Thus, it could be assumed that the two
variables were not

measuring exactly the same attitudes.
31,

as

suggested above, measured

a

The assumption was that variable

higher level of political efficacy/

inefficacy, perhaps coupled with some measure of
political trust/

distrust in the government.
The level of political efficacy, and, therefore, support
for

system norms, as suggested by this item (see Fig.
5),
in

variable 23.

was higher than

Some 42 percent of parents and 46 percent of students

responded efficaciously as measured by variable 31, in contrast to 20
and 18 percent respectively, as measured by variable 23.

responded to this question in

a

The students

slightly more efficacious manner than

did the parents, whereas, the parents responded somewhat more effica-

ciously to variable 23.
two groups were minimal
cant.

In either case,

the differences between the

and did not seem to be statistically signifi-

Furthermore, as Fig. 8 shows, when the two groups were compared

in a six-level

continuum, the similarities between the two samples were

rather striking.
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Figure 8

Comparison of Parent-Student Responses
to Variable 31
Six Level Continuum
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The data analysis, however, indicated some basic dissimilarities.

While the chi-square probability for the cross-tabulation of

student's gender with variable

was significant at .05 level, it

31

failed to display any significant association between the two (gamma
= -.170).

The cross-tabulation, however, suggested that male students

were slightly more efficacious than female students.
students, 59 percent gave efficacious responses, while
the male students did the same.
as

Of the female
51

percent of

The explanation put forth previously

to the higher percentage of female students from families with a

higher level of education was credited with
among female students resulting in

a

a

pronounced orientation

higher level of inefficacy among

the male students, since higher level of parental education, as will
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TABLE 28

Cross-Tabulation of "Government pays no
attention to people '
(Variable 31), with Socio-Economic
Status

'

"Oyer the years, the government
has paid no
attention to what people like me think
when
It decides what to do."

Socio-Economic
Status

Agree (political inefficacy)
parents

Sex

1^
f
female

61%
48

students

(79)
(16)

51% (159)
59

(159)

(parents) X = 1 16; df = 1 ; p = .28; phi =
.10; gamma = .244
(students) X = 3.86; df = 1; p = .055; phi =
.085; gamma = -.170

Father's
Level of
Education
(1)

^""^

71%

f^^""^

54
52
63

^

"0 education

(25)
(33)
(25)
(12)

74%
58
50
55

(34)
(79)
(135)
(60)

(parents) x^2= ^-^^i df = 3; p = .27; V = .154; gamma =
-.130
(students) X = 10.1; df = 3; p = .02; V = .134; gamma =
-.137

Mother's
Level of
Education

high

57%
(4)
64
(54)
57
(141)
48
(111)

medium
low
no education

(students) x^ = 7.4; df = 3; p = .06; V

Family
Income
Level

high

medium

57%
62

low

57

(27)
(32)
(34)

=

.114; gamma = .192

60% (110)
57
47

(92)
(106)

(parents) x^P= .30; df = 2; p = .86; V = .043; gamma = -.018
(students) X = 7.0; df = 2; p = .03; V = .111; gamma = -.177
=

1- high

Level of

2

Cosmopolitanism

3

4
5- low

53%
67
59
63
50

(29)
(14)
(19)
(24)
(8)

61% (209)
55
49

39
24

(37)
(41)
(24)
(8)

(parents) x^ = 2.31; df = 4; p = .68; V = .119; gamma = -.059
(students) x = 27.4; df = 4; p = .0000; V = .216; gamma = .321
(1) For the parent's column, the "Father's Level of Education" is
the mother's level of education when she was the respondent.
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be discussed shortly, seemingly
was associated with increased
political

inefficacy among students.
The analysis also revealed that
while there were relationships

between some of the socio-economic
variables and the student's efficacy
level, no significant association
existed in the parent data. Among
the students the chi-square
probability for father's level of
education

and variable

fathers had

31
a

was significant at .02 level.

Of those students whose

high level of education, 74 percent
gave inefficacious

responses, whereas, 50 percent of the
students whose fathers had low

education and 55 percent whose fathers had
no education gave inefficacious responses.

The chi-square probability for mother's education
and level of

efficacy/inefficacy was just below significance at .06
level.
square probability for family income and variable
.03 level

for the students.

31

The chi-

was significant at

The cross-tabulation analysis showed that,

of the students from high income families, 60
percent gave inefficacious

responses, whereas, 47 percent of the students from income families
did
the same.

Finally, the chi-square probability for level of cosmopolitanism and variable

31

among the students was significant at .0000 level.

Also, as indicated by the data, there was

(gamma

=

.321) between the two variables.

a

significant association
Of the students from small

towns and rural areas, 24 percent responded inefficaciously , while 61

percent of the students from Tehran did the same.

Higher level of

education and income, plus the living conditions in the more

320

cosmopolitan areas, as discussed
above, are perhaps responsible
for
the negative association between
cosmopolitanism and political efficacy.
As

indicated in Table 28, in contrast
to variable 23, where

students with higher parental education
had

efficacy, in variable

31

a

higher level of political

those with highest parental education
and

income had the lowest level of political
efficacy.

Such

a

finding is

not all that unexpected since one
would assume that individuals with

lower education level would have less
understanding of politics and

government.

On the other hand, those with a
higher level of education

would anticipate

a

higher level of interplay with and
response from

the system and would have more explicit
demands on the system.

They,

thus, would be less efficacious when
measured by the statement "The

government pays no attention to what people
think when it decides what
to do."

Furthermore, there were several other reasons for
such an

otherwise unexpected difference in orientation of
students, most of
which have been discussed previously when resulting
in similar circumstances.

They include heightened idealism among students, particularly

among those from more educated backgrounds.

The disparity in parent-

student orientation, particularly among the well-to-do, has already
been noted with references to Marshall Meyer's study of Harvard students
in the midst of the

Vietnam war.^

In short,

the more efficacious the

parents, that is the more highly educated with higher income, who interact positively with the prevailing system, the more inefficacious the

students, who, at least during their youth, tended to become more
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socially and politically conscious
and active.

As a result, some

students emerged as inefficacious and
dejected by the system functions.
This interplay, augmented by
political repression in the country,
may
have been greatly responsible for
the drop in the efficacy rate
from

parents to students among the high
income groups.

The opposite is

also true; some students from lower
income families tended to favor
the system more than parents from
similar groups since, having already

attained

a

level of education higher than
their parents, they can

expect to reap better economic benefits
than their parents.

An obvious

example was the great number of lower and
lower-middle class joining
the ranks of the armed forces, the
national police, and the secret

police, SAVAK, as system support elements.

Of course, such was not

the general orientation of either group,
as suggested also by the data.

Those few who were coopted into the system,
however, resulted in some
change in orientation pattern from parents to
students as indicated by
the foregoing analysis.

Furthermore, the assumption that the children

of the less educated and lower income groups with
upward mobility drive

become more efficacious and support the system norms also seemed
to be

relevant in this case.

This aided the assumption that, either for

financial gains or lack of political convictions, there was

a

tendency

among those students with low parental education levels and lower
income to support the system functions in the hope of securing
tion within the system.

a

posi-

For example, in recent years the ranks of the

armed forces and the national police have been filled with junior

officers who were mostly from very humble backgrounds.

It was alleged
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TABLE 29
Inefficacy,' Variable 31, with
Passive
^'°"."nH^A;it^''°V^'^°^^^^:''^
and Active P articipation, Trust
and Distrust Political items
"Over the years, the government
has paid no
attention to what people like me
think when
It decides what to do."

Passive, active,
trust, and distrust
variables

Agree
(inefficacy)
parents

Variable 12:
Listening to
news

often
sometimes
seldom

students

parents

students

80%

68%

82%

74%

3

7

2

3

17

total

Disagree
(efficacy)

25
16
23
100% (318) 100% (67) 100% (259)

100% (94)

(parents) x ^= .52; df = 2; p = .78; V =
.060; gamma = -.008
(students) x = .16; df = 2; p = .90; V =
.059; gamma = -.078
^/ariable 13:

Reading newspapers

often
sometimes
seldom

59%

67%

11

14
19

30
100% (93)

total

100% (317)

(parents) x^p= 2.24; df = 2; p = .30; V
(students) x^ = 2.8; df = 2; p = .23; V

/ariable 14:
Talking about
politics

often
sometimes
seldom

=

=

34%

64%

5

12
38
24
100% (66) 100% (265)

.199; gamma = .054
.134; gamma = .068

40%

12
54

total

58%

15
9
14
45
75
58
100% (315) 100% (65) 100% (262)

100% (92)

(parents) yCr,= 7.8; df = 2; p = .022; V
.261; gamma = .347
(students) x = 11.16; df = 2 p = .002; V = .254; gamma = .316
=

=

;

Variable 15:
Thinking about
politics

often
sometimes
seldom
total

32%

40%

20%

30%

17
51

14
47

13
67

16
54

100% (93)

(parents) y^^= 4.4; df = 2; p
(students) x = 5.27; df = 2;

=

Variable 30: Big
business influences gov't

73%
27
100% (92)

agree
disagree
total

(parents) x^p= 13.6; df =
(students) x = 3.2; df =

1;
1

;

100% (316) 100% (66) 100% (263)

.11; V = .196; gamma = .252
.062; V = .179; gamma = .232

p =

p =
p =

71%

43%

29

57

63%
37
100% (313) 100% (68) 100% (261)

.0002; phi = .304; r = .304; p = .0000
.07; phi = .078; r = .078; p = .03

continued in next page
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TABLE 29 (continued)
Variable 35: Gov't
wastes our t.^y
tax

agree
Hic:>r,v,^^
disagree
total

i/ariable 38: Some
people in gov't

are crooked

pari able 40: Gov't
knows what is
best for people

72%
oo
28

93%
100% (94)

agree
disagree

80%
20
100% (84)

total

V

(sLlen'ts)V^'3i'^ df = \'1; ' p
Utudents)^x^^-^34.5;
Variable 42: People
in the gov't
^•"^

^"^^'^^

agree
disagree

p =
;

p =

32
i\
100% (313) 100% (67) 100%
(262)

"35%

fi7o/"""
64%
^^^^
3^
100% (317) 100% (67) 100% 9258)

71%

97%

29

3

69%""
3?

100% (310) 100% (67) 100% (255)

P^^" = -2^2;
-r^'
.OOOO; phi =.251;

63%
37
100% (84)

total

(parents) x^2= 11-2; df = l;
(students) x^ +46.6; df = 1

=

'oZ
29%

n

7

total

m

51

100% (92)

agree
disagree

m

r = -.352; p =
r = -.251; p =

.0000
.0000

""8"8%
53%
81%
47
12
19
100% (311) 100% (68) 100% (254)

.0008; phi = .286; r=- 286' p = 0002
.0001; phi = .291; r= -.291 ! p = ioOOO

that some had even been recruited out of orphanages.

This changed the

traditional complexion of the armed forces and the police which had

previously been filled from the middle class.

With the increased unpop-

ularity of the army after the fall of Mossadegh, particularly with the
army's participation in suppression of the June 1963 uprising, an army

career had become less enticing to the middle class.

The economic boom

of the 1970s that benefited the middle class saw the children of the

middle class vying for professional careers outside the armed forces.
Thus, the ranks of the armed forces and the police began to be filled

with recruits from among the high school graduates of the low income

.
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families.

Thus, it is not surprising to find

higher level of political efficacy among those students
who came from families with
lower
a

incomes and from less cosmopolitan
areas.

Cross-tabulations and Pearson's correlation
analysis of variable
31

with "passive" and "active" political
interests and the levels of

political

interests and the levels of political
trust/distrust in the

government also proved very useful in
the understanding of political
eff i cacy/i nef f i cacy
Although no significant association between
"passive" political
interests and variable

31

was found, the analysis indicated

a

signifi-

cant chi-square probability in both samples
between "talking about

politics," with variable

31

indicating

a

chi-square probability signif-

icant at .02 level for parents and at .022 level
for students.

There

were also significant associations between the
two variables among the
parents (gamma

=

.374)

and among the students

(gamma = .316).

Of the

efficacious parents, 16 percent often talked about politics and
of the
inefficacious, 34 percent did the same.

There was an increase of 18

percent in the number of inefficacious parents who often talked about
politics.

Of

the

efficacious students, 16 percent often talked about

politics, whereas, of the inefficacious, 40 percent did similarly.

This

was an increase of 24 percent in frequency of talking about politics

from efficacious to inefficacious students.

Increased political "acti-

visim" among inefficacious, whether parents or students, was universal.

Despite the severe controls on public protest against the government
and its policies, political

activism and anti-government agitation

325

continued among the inefficacious adults
and students.

It happened

mainly by discussion of political
issues with peers in school and
by
participation in marches and demonstrations
in the streets during the
1978-79 uprising.
The inefficacious adults, despite
the controls and limitations,

also expressed their opinions to
trusted friends, relatives, or cohorts.

These expressions took varying forms,
including participation in
religious ceremonies or even associations
with literary circles.

Poetry

and anecdotes were often used to
express opinions, especially since the

wealth of Persian literature provides an
almost endless resource which
can be utilized for naked or veiled
socio-political expressions (see

Chapter II).
The cross-tabulation of variable
tics," did not attain

a

with "thinking about poli-

significant chi-square probability for either

the parent or the student sample.
31

31

However, the analysis of variable

with political trust/distrust variables suggested significant
associ-

ations between them.

Cross-tabulation analysis and Pearson's correla-

tion anaylsis were used to analyze the relationships.
23,

As in variable

the inefficacious respondents, both parents and students, indicated

distrust in government, while the efficacious respondents displayed

a

greater level of trust in it.
In the analysis of variable 31

with variable 30, "The government

was influenced by a few big interests," there was
tion (r = .304) at .0000 level for parents.

a

significant correla-

Of the efficacious parents,

43 percent agreed with the item, while 73 percent of the inefficacious
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parents did the same.

This was an increase of 30
percent in government

distrust from efficacious to inefficacious
parents.
the student data, however, did
not indicate

a

The analysis of

significant chi-square

probabi lity.
In regard to variable
35,

there was

a

"The government wasted our tax money,"

correlation with variable

31

for parents (r

nificant at .0000 level and for students
(r
at .0000 level.

=

.425)

=

.531), sig-

also significant

Of the efficacious parents, 18 percent
agreed with

the statement, while 72 percent of
those labeled inefficacious agreed.

This was an increase of 52 percent in level
of distrust in government

from efficacious to inefficacious parents.

Of the efficacious students,

29 percent agreed with variable 31, whereas, 49
percent of the ineffi-

cacious responded in

a

similar manner.

This was an increase of 20

percent in government distrust from efficacious to
inefficacious
students.
In

regard to variable 38, "Some people in the government are

crooked," there was
(r = .355),

a

correlation with variable

significant at .0000 level.

31

for parents

Of the efficacious parents,

64 percent agreed with the suggestion in variable 31, while 93 percent
of the inefficacious agreed.

This was an increase of 29 percent in

government distrust from efficacious to inefficacious parents.

Of the

efficacious students, 67 percent agreed with the suggestion, whereas,
89 percent of the inefficacious did the same.

This was an increase of

22 percent in government distrust from efficacious to inefficacious

students.
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Levels of trust in the government,
indicated by response to
the following two questions, further
revealed the relationship between

trust in government and political
efficacy.

Stressing the assumption

that the inefficacious disapproved of
system functions present in the

Shah's government, the efficacious
approved of and interacted positively

with the system functions.

Both variables 40 and 42 correlated
signif-

icantly with variable 31, denoting
political efficacy, at above .001
level

for both parents and students.
In

regard to variable 40, "The government
knows what is best

for people," there was

parents (r

=

a

significant correlation with variable

-.352), at ,0000 level of significance.

31

for

Of the efficacious

parents, 98 percent agreed with the statement in
variable 40, while 73

percent of the inefficacious did the same.

Despite the indication that

the vast majority of the respondents displayed
trust in government,

nonetheless, there was

a

decline of 25 percent in level of trust in

government from efficacious to inefficacious parents.
the student data indicated

nificant at .0000 level.

a

significant correlation (r

There was

=

-.251), sig-

Of the efficacious students, 84 percent agreed

with the statement in variable 40, while
did the same.

The analysis of

a

61

percent of the inefficacious

decline of 23 percent in government trust

from efficacious to inefficacious students.
The second item dealing with trust in government was variable
42,

"People in the government are smart."

correlation (r
31.

=

There was

a

significant

-.286), at .0002 level of significance with variable

Of the efficacious parents, 88 percent agreed with the statement
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while 63 percent of the inefficacious
did the same.

There was

a

dec! ine

of 25 percent in level of government
trust from efficacious to ineffi
ca-

cious parents.
(r = -.291)

The student data indicated

at .0000 level.

a

significant correlation

Of the efficacious students,

percent

81

agreed with variable 42, while 53 percent
of the inefficacious responded
similarly.

Once again, there was

a

decline of 28 percent in government

trust from efficacious to inefficacious
students.
As the above data indicates, there
was a suggested association

between distrust of government and respondent's
inefficacy.

On the

average, there was an increase of 32 percent in
government distrust

from efficacious to inefficacious parents and
an increase of 18 percent
in government distrust from efficacious

general, the students displayed

a

to inefficacious students.

In

higher level of political efficacy

than the parents.

The data also indicated an increase in level of political

efficacy from parents to students in both variables 23 and
Table 30).

31

(see

The table suggests that in all cases, except in the case

of variable 23 with variable 38, there was an increase in
level of

efficacy, as high as 20 percent, from parents to students.
is

This find

similar to the Jenning and Niemi study of the American parents and

students, where there was

a

reported increase of 13 to 17 percent in

rate of efficacy from parents to students.'^

Similar findings were also

reported by Jack Dennis, in his study of the eleventh-graders and their
parents in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.^
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TABLE 30
Ch ange in Level of Politic al

Efficacy from Parents to
WW Students*
V.UUV.|i J
Variable 23; "Politics and" Variable
31; "Government
government are complicated pays no
attention to what
for a person like me."
people like me think."
V/

Trust/distrust
variables

—

I,

.

1

efficacious responses

parents students change
i/ariable 30:

Big

business influence gov't.
parents
students
i/ariable 35:

Gov't
wastes our tax
money.
parents
students

1/ariables 38: Some
people in gov't

are crooked.
parents
students
i/ariable 40:

Gov't
knows what is
best for people.
parents
students

/ariable 42: People
in the gov't
are smart.
parents
students

66%

r =
r =

52%

r =
r =

85%

r =
r =

20%

71%

parents students change

+5

43%

.168; p = .017
.143; p = .0003

r =
r =

55%

+3

.083; p = .153
.111; p = .004

82%

18%

r =
r =

-4

64%

.199; p = .006
.155; p = .0001

r =
r =

29%

+9

27%

63%

+20

.304; p = .0000
.078; p = .03

29%

+11

.531; p = .0000
.425; p = .0000

67%

+3

.355; p = .0000
.204; p = .0000

39%

+12

r = -.181; p = .014
r = -.024; p = .28

r = -.352; p = .0000
r = -.251; p = .0000

28%

37%

35%

r = -.097; p =
r = -.047; p =

+7

.12
.13

47%

+10

r = -.286; p = .0002
r = -.291; p = .0000

(*) Cross-tabulation analysis for the parents data between variables 23 and 35, 23 and 42, and in the students data between variables
23 and 40, 23 and 42, 31 and 30 did not achieve significant chi-square
probabilities.
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It is proposed here that
the higher level

of political efficacy

among students indicated that
the influence of the
educational system,
whereby political efficacy was
taught by the educational
institutions
and through textbooks, resulted
in some positive response
to the government.

The fact that these students
have not had

a

chance to test their

interactions with the government as
of yet also contributed to
their
higher level of political efficacy.
In contract,

distrust of government and alienation
among parents

resulted in lower efficacy.

education was
In this

a

As noted previously,

in some cases even

factor in increasing the level of political
inefficacy.

case, based on the nature of the question
and the socio-

political situation under the Shah's rule,
the demands of the educated

were more articulated and were perceived
by the regime to be contrary
to its own best interests, since many
such demands included basic political

reforms.

These were thus less likely to materialize than
demands

from the less educated and poorer citizens
who desired such things as

higher wages and job security.

Parent-Student Similarities and Differences

In this chapter, more differences between parents and students

were encountered than similarities.

While socio-economic status was of

some value in determining the attitudes of parents, it proved of more
value in determining the attitudes of the students.

Parent's education,

family income, cosmopolitanism were all of major significance in the

shaping of student orientations.

The data has shown that the majority

331

of parents of students did
listen to news on radio and
watched news on
television.
In contrast, the majority
of the same respondents
indicated
that they seldom thought or talked
about political matters,
displaying
a high degree of political
inefficacy.
An obvious consequence would
be a citizenry who at least
appeared to be politically aloof,
seldom

taking part in the political
processes of the nation.

This high rate

of political inefficacy impeded
the aggregation of political
demands
on the government.

As

a

result, few grassroots political
parties or

other such political institutions developed.
In short,
as

"passive" political interest measures did
not emerge

significant in typifying either the student
or the parent sample.

Both parents and students, regardless of
their political mode, engaged
in "passive"

political behavior equally.

Parental education emerged as one of the most
significant

indicators of the likelihood that

a

student would engage in "active"

political behavior, and their own education was equally
important in

determining the parent's behavior.
As noted earlier, parental education was of significance in

determining if the students would be politically efficacious, which in
turn influenced individual trust/distrust of the government.

The

efficacy/inefficacy level of students, moreover, seemed to be influenced
by different variables for different groups.

The efficacy level of

the students whose fathers had a higher level of education was lower

than the parents in the case of variable

31

and higher in the case of
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variable 23.

Such an inverse relationship was
due to the nature of
the

question, it is proposed, and not

a

contradictory finding.

Parental education emerges as the
most persistent determinant
of political efficacy/inefficacy,
as seen in the case of
those students

coming from families with high
parental education.

On the other hand,

those students who come from more
humble backgrounds were more influenced by their own education than by
that of their parents.
The data

also suggested that, at these levels,
cosmopolitanism became

factor influencing the student's
orientation.

a

major

It is proposed here that

many students from smaller towns and
rural areas, who also come from

families with low or no education background,
found recruitment into the

system as

a

major avenue open to them for upward mobility,
and were also

less politicized due to the more simple
nature of their communities.

For this reason

a

perceptible increase in the level of political

efficacy among the students from the least cosmopolitan
areas and with
lower than average parental education was observed.

It should also

not be ignored that since the land reforms which
increased the influence
of the central

government in rural areas due to the removal of land-

lords, the regime had done its utmost to create
for itself among the farmers.

a

support foundation

Although it has been suggested that this

policy failed in many cases, the government, as late as December 1978,
was able to muster support for the faltering Pahlavi regime from the
rural population.

q

Finally, it is presumed that in the absence of

a

strong familial

politicalization effect on students from families with low or no
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education, the apparent void was filled
by other agents, namely
peers,
or by the socialization and pol
iticalization attempts undertaken by
the system, particularly through
the educational system and
mass commun-

ication.

The result, as the data suggests,
was

a

higher level of

political efficacy among the students,
particularly among those whose

parents had lower education levels.

FOOTNOTES

y.^^]^^'^^^ are the strength of associations between "Dac;c;ivp"
. A u
and
"active" variables as measured by
gamma
For parents
''ull
'
to news" and "thinking about
politics." gamma
6
h "t
about politics," gamma = .592.
For students:
"listening to new "and
q'' Politics," gamma = .389; with "tal k?ng IK ut po i ics "
qamm^-'
gamma - .369.
For parents:
"reading newspapers" with "thinkinn ^hnni-

"

oLa
gamma

C"'

^^"'^ 't\ur^V.in<^
wi^r^rr'^'^r''
talking about politics," gamma

about politics,"
=
774
All thp
probability significant at

.435, with

-

'

'0000 Zfe^
2,

David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's
Acquisition of

.

3
^""^ ^^^"^ Dennis, Children in the
Political oybtem
System
P^^'^M
(New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1969).
^rj

V

'

Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, The Political
Character
ot Adolescence (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 197
4), p.

5

Jennings and Niemi

,

p.

126

126.

Marshal W. Meyer, "Harvard Students in the Midst of CrisisNote on the Sources of Leftism," Sociology of Educa tion
(Spring
no.

~

204.

2), p.

'.

A

1973

^Jennings and Niemi, table on page 125.
g

Jack Dennis, "Political Learning in Childhood and Adolescence:
A Study of Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Graders in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin,"
Madison, University of Wisconsin Research and Development Center for
Cognitive Learning, 1969, p. 27, cited in Jennings and Niemi.
9

"Hard Choices in Tehran," Time, December 25, 1978, see also "A
Case of Warrying Perception," p. 38, an interview with Mashhadi Mohammad
Nik-Dehghan, a farmer.
Farmers' support for the regime was also
reported by UPI on December 13, 1978, cited in New Castle News New
Castle, Pennsylvania, reporting attacks on anti-Shah groups, in one of
which, in Isfahan, some 40 people were reportedly killed.
See also New
York Times
December 14, 1978.
,

,

334

CHAPTER

IX

POLITICAL TRUST AND DISTRUST

In

Chapter VIII it was discussed in detail that
political

efficacy was positively associated with
political trust; those who had
a

higher level of political efficacy also had

in the government.

a

higher level of trust

However, the data had suggested that not
all the

efficacious respondents trusted the government.

There were many

efficacious respondents who did not trust the
government and there were
many inefficacious respondents who had indicated
trust in the govern-

ment (see Tables 27 and 28).

In this chapter,

the aim is to discuss

the attributes of those individuals, both parents
and students, who

trust or distrust the government.

Furthermore, attempts will be made

to explore the similarities and dissimilarities
between the parent and

the student populations.

The five items in this chapter, as displayed in Table 31, are

ordered in

a

Guttman scale so that the top of the table

is

the highest

level of trust in government while the bottom of the table represents
the lowest level

of trust in government among the respondents.

The

responses of both parents and students have met our scaling requirements
in both cases.

Due to the unique situation and differing circumstances

in each case study,

different scaling methods have been utilized than

those used in other research studies of
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a

similar kind.^

In Guttman
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TABLE 31
Level of Trust in Government and
Change from Parents to Students
(*)

Trust/distrust
variables

parents

students

%

%

change
%

The government usually knows
what is best for people
(variable 40)
agree

83

71

People running the government
are smart and usually know
what they are doing
(variable 42)
agree

74

66

The government wastes needlessly alot of the money we pay
in taxes
(variable 35)
disagree

51

48

-3

Some people believe that the
government is influenced by
a few big interests
(variables 30)
disagree

40

33

-7

think some people in the
government are crooked
(variable 38)
disagree

19

21

+2

I

-12

(*) For variables 40 and 42, levels of agreement are regarded
as
trust in the government, whereas, for variables 30, 35 and
38, levels
of disagreement are regarded as such.
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scaling, it is stipulated that
those who respond favorably,
for example,
to item 3 also will respond
favorably
to items

necessarily favorably to items 4 and
responses for items

5.

In

positive responses for items

3

through

5

and

2^,

but not

Table 31, whilo negative

and 2 were regarded as

1

1

level of distrust,

a

were regarded as such.

Adjustments were made in the computations
so all items were scaled in
one slope.

item

1

Thus, item

5

measured the lowest level of trust,
while

measured the highest level.

For parents'

The coefficient of reproducibility

data was .91 and for students' data
it was .93.

The simplo data analysis in the Table

31

indicates

a

decline in

government trust from parents to students
in all cases, except in one.
The increase of two percent was in the
case
the

variable 38, measuring

of

lowest level of trust and the highest level
of distrust.

higher level of trust among parents, apparent
from Table 31,

dictory

to

and Niemi

the studies of American parent-student
attitudes.

The
is

contra-

Jruinings

found that students trusted the government
twice as often as

parents, giving the students, rather than parents,
trust in government.^
to establish

a

Thus, further analysis of

a

higher level of

the data is needed

pattern and also identify causes of

a

somewhat higher

level of distrust among the students.

Govemnent^

For analysis purpose, we shall, however, start

from variable 38 wfiich received the highest level of answers indicating
distrust in government.

while there was

a

As

tii(>

following graph (fig. 9) suggests,

rather similar disagreement level among parents and

students when viewed

in

a

six- level

continuum

(I

ig.

9),

there was

a

338

Figure

9

Comparison of Parent-Student Responses
to Variable 38
Level Continuum

i
in
a Six

.30

.20

.10

-3

-2

-1

+1

+2

+3

disagree

agree

substantial difference in frequencies of agreement.

While the students

were rather evenly divided between the three frequencies
of agreement,
the parents showed a rather assertive orientation,
mostly agreeing
(^2)

or strongly agreeing (+3) with the statement that
"some people in

the government are crooked."

The cross- tabulation analysis of socio-economic status with

variable 38 revealed no significant relationship for either the parents
or the students.

attained

a

None of the nine cross-tabulations (see Table 32)

significant chi-square probability.

The question itself, suggesting that only

government were crooked," instead of many
responsible for bringing out such

a

,

most or

"

some people in the
aV\_,

is

greatly

vehement response agreeing with the

statement, since even in the more idealistic societies there certainly
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TABLE 32

Cross-Tabulation of So.e people in
the government are crooked"
^vanaDie 38} With Socio- Economic
Status
"Some people in the government
are crooked."

Socio-economic
status

Agree (distrust in government)
parents

Sex

f
female

81% (106)
gO
(28)
-^^^

-^!-!"^!^.'..:.:°°^:_^!.:_!:.p

^

Father's
Level of
Education

84%
80

(1)

^^^J}
^i"'"

f

^

"0 education

students

81

80

(31)
(48)
(39)
(16)

790^

=

-^^^^

9«

=

(249)
(2I3)

-o^^

87"(42r
79
73
79

({07

212
(88)

(parents) x22= -23; df = 3;
p = .97; V = .038; gamma = -.045
(students)
- 2.4; df = 3; p = .49; V =
.065; gamma = :.059

Mother's
Level of
Education

"^^^h
"1^'^''''^

^

no education

(students) X

"
—
-

= 2.5; df = 3; p =

86%
86
79
75

(6)

(67)
(201)
(175^

.46; V = .066; gamma = -.129

Family
Income

high

74%

medium

Level

low

73
72

(37)
(44)
(49)

81% (153)'
77
77

(^24)
(175)

(parents) x22= 2.5; df = 2; p = .28; V = .124; gamma =
.149
(students) X = 1.3; df = 2; p = .53; V = .045; gamma = -.086

Level of

1-high

79%

2

71

Cosmopol- 3
itanism
4
5-low

88
82
87

(44)
(15)
(29)
(32)
(14)

81% (268)
79
78
70

68

(53
(74

(44
(23)

(parents) X ^= 2.97; df = 4; p = .56; V = .134; gamma = -.144
(students) X = 7.2; df = 4; p = .12; V = .111; gamma = .192
(1) For the parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education"
is the mother's level of education when she was the respondent.
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are some individuals in the
government who are crooked.

The question

was intended to approach the feeling
of distrust in respondents
rather

cautiously and thus sense the most
widespread feeling of some distrust
in the government.

cuts across all

As a result, a feeling is revealed
that seemingly

levels of education, income and
cosmopolitanism.

Certainly those respondents who disagreed
with variable 38 are the most
trustful of the government.
With variable 30, the second item in
our
scale of distrust, suggesting that "Some
people believe that the govern-

ment is pretty much influenced by

a

few big interests looking out for

themselves," once again we find an overwhelming
rate of approval.

Some

three out of five parents and two out of three
students agreed with the

statement.

More parents had disagreed with the statement
than students,

thus showing a higher level

of trust in government.

six-level continuum (see Fig.

followed

a

When viewed in

a

10), the parent-student responses

rather similar pattern.

The graph, once again, suggests a

slightly more assertive attitude among the parents than
among the
students.

As in the past graphs and, as we shall see in the future

graphs, the parents display assertive attitudes, indicating

a

strong

favor or disfavor for statements more often than the students.

This

pattern, perhaps, is indicative of their general attitude towards the
issues which by this time and age is more crystallized that it is among

students who still have most of their socio-political experiences

before them.
The cross-tabulation analysis of variable 30 with the socio-

economic status of parents and students did not reveal any major

s

,
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TABLE 33
influenced by big business"

^'^''"^'^'Mii^?

"Some People believe that the
government is
very much influenced by a few big
interests
looking out for themselves."

Socio-Economic
Status

Agree (distrust in government)
parents
Sex

^^'^^

59%
65

female
0

students

(75)
(22)

66°/

(?^?\

68

(191)

parents) x p= .202; df = 1
p = .65; phi = .051; gamma = -.129
(students) x^ = .179; df = 1; p = .67; phi =
.020; gamma = -.044
;

Father's
Level of
Education

62%

^'^J}
^^^^^""^

62
55
63

.

no education

(21)
(37)
(27)
(12)

72%
75
62
IK)

(35)
(104)
(175)
\/o)

(parents) x^o= 68- df = o J pn —
=
9,9.'
oo , \lV —- 068; gamma = -.045
(students) x = 9.3; df = 3; p = .025; V = .126; gamma = -.105
"5

•

.

Mother's
Level of
Education

.

^^^h

f

71%

^i^'"

77
69
63

'^'^
.

no education

(students) x^ = 5.9; df = 3;

Family
Income

high
medium

Level

low

p =

(5)
(59)

(175)
(149)

.117; V = .100; gamma = -.146

62%
56
63

(29)
(28)
(39)

67% (129)
71

64

(117)
(148)

(parents) x p= .60; df = 2; p = .74; V = 061; gamma = .029
(students) x = 2.23; df = 2; p = .32; V = .062; gamma = -.064
.

Level of

1- high

54%

2

60
55
60
87

Cosmopol- 3
itanism
4
5- low

(30)
(12)
(17)
(24)
(14)

69% (231)
71

72
56
53

(46)
(73)
(35)
(19)

(parents) x^= 6.4; df = 4; p = .17; V = . 198; gamma = -.217
(students) x"^ = 8.3; df = 4; p = .078; V = .118; gamma = .110
(1) For the parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education'
is the mother's level of education when she was the respondent.
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Figure 11

Comparison of Parent-Student Responses to
Variable 35 in
Level Continuum
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agree

more assertive level of distrust in the govern-

Of those parents who agreed with the statement, 20 percent

agreed stongl.y (+3), whereas only 13 percent of the students did.
The cross-tabulation analysis revealed significant chi-square

probability between the students socio-economic status and their
responses to variable 35, except in the case of family income level.
In the parents'
a

data, on the other hand, only education level attained

significant chi-square probability in cross- tabulation with variable

35.
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The data revealed that the chi-square
probability between
the students'

sex and distrust in government
(variable 35) was signif-

icant at .0018 level.

It indicated that there was a
higher level

of

trust among the male respondents than
among the female students
(gamma

=

.261).

The difference in male/female student
orientation,

as noted in the previous

chapter, was due to

a

direct relationship

between higher parental education among the
female student respondents
and the fact that parental education,
most often, had been an influence
on the student orientations.

The chi-square probability for father's
education and variable
35 was significant at

icant level

(gamma

=

.001

level

.251).

and was also associated at

a

signif-

Of those students whose parents had

a

high education level, some 70 percent of them
indicated distrust in
the government, as measured by variable 35, whereas, of
those students

whose parents had no education, some 45 percent of them concurred.

As

indicated by the data, there was an increase of 25 percent in
the
level of trust in the government from those students whose parents

had a high level of education to those whose parents had no education
at all.

The chi-square probability of mother's education level was
also significant at .002 level and was associated with variable 35
at a significant level

gested

a

(gamma

=

.269).

The cross-tabulation sug-

decline in the level of support for the government as the

level of education increased.

While

71

percent of the students with

345

TABLE 34

Cross-Tabulation of ''Government
Needlessly Wastes Out Tax
Money'
(Variable 35) with Socio-Economic
Status

Socio-Economic
Status

"I think the government
wastes needlessly alot
of the money we pay in
taxes."

Agree (distrust in government)
parents

m

male
female

Sex

56

(68)
(18)

students
46% (143)
59

.2

'\
^students)
sL'denlLV^-f
X
- 9.77; df = 1

Father's ^^^h
Level of 'I'^^^'^'"
Education
^
^.
no education
J
(1

'
;

(i5oj

- ''"'-^ 9amma - -.193
p = ''Ik.'.''
.0018; phi = .132; gamma = -.261

67%
50

34
45

(24)
(29)
(16)
(9)

70%
(32)
62
(84)
48
(131)
45
(50)

(parents) X = 8 8; df = 3; p = .03; V =
.234; gamma = -.304
(students) X = 15.7; df = 3; p = .001; V =
.166; gamma = -.251

Mother's
Level of
Education

f ^^^"^
„

71%
64

"

55
43

.

no education

(5)

(49)
(139)
[gg)

(students) x^ = 14.97; df = 3; p = .0018; V =
.164; gamma = -.269

Family
Income
Level

high

medium

52%
52

low

44

(25)
(26)
(26)

56% (103)
55
45

(88
(104

(parents) x22= -94; df = 2; p = .62; V = .077; gamma = -.113
(students) X = 5.4; df = 2; p = .065; V = .097; gamma = -.148
^

Level, of
,

1- high
2

Cosmopol- 3
itanism
4
5-

low

59%
57
42

35
44

(33)
(12)
(13)
(13)
(7)

63% (210)
44
(29
37
(36)
21

44

(13)
(15)

(parents) x^^= 6.4; df = 4; p = .17; V = .199; gamma = .256
(students) x = 49.8; df = 4; p = .0000; V = .291; gamma = .432
(1) For the parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education"
is the mother's level of education when she was the respondent.
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a

high level of mothers' education
distrusted the government,

of 43 percent of those with

a

total

lower level of education also
mistrusted

a

the government.

The level of distrust (variable
35) among parents also had

a

significant chi-square probability at the
.03 level with their education level.
level

The two items were also associated at

(gamma = .304).

Of those parents who had

a

a

significant

high education level

67 percent of them distrusted the government, while
34 percent of

those with a low education level also mistrusted
the government.

The cross-tabulation of cosmopolitanism with
variable 35

revealed the impact of city of residence on the students'
The two items had
level

a

attitudes.

chi-square probability significant at the .0000

and were associated at

a

significant level

(gamma

=

.432).

Of the students who lived in Tehran, 63 percent of them
indicated

a

distrust in the government, whereas, 65 percent from the least cos-

mopolitan areas also had

a

distrust for the government.

the urban-rural dichotomy, discussed several

reasons for

a

Aside from

times previously as

higher level of support for the government in rural

areas, and a lower level of support in the major urban areas due to
a

combination of factors, the responses in this case were perhaps

influenced by the nature of the question--i
the taxpayers'

money.

.e.

,

payment and waste of

The fact that the burden of direct taxes

is

mostly on the shoulders of those living in the major cities, particularly Tehran due to

a

much higher level of income, makes the question
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of taxes become rather academic for
those people who live in the
less urban and rural

income levels.

areas of the country and who have
the lowest

If the phrase oiijionex could have
been used instead

of the phrase tax money,, perhaps it
would have created

impression and would have solicited

different

a

far different response.

a

to the implications present in the
expression of oil money

,

Due

and

the possible problems in securing permission
for the administration

of the questionnaires in the schools, the
less explosive connotation
of tax money was used.

Trusting the government
as

The next two items, variables 40 and 42,

.

noted previously, were stated in

tionnaires.

Therefore,

questions indicated

a

a

positive manner in the ques-

a

favorable response to either of these

level

of trust in the government.

items, as displayed in Table 31, were fashioned in

a

These two

manner which

would attract the highest level of distrust in the government from
the respondents.

These two items are in contrast to variable 38 and

are intended to measure the broadest level of trust in the govern-

ment.

Almost three out of four parents agreed with variable 42, "The
people running the government are smart and usually know what they are
doing."

Only two- thirds of the students agreed with the statement,

indicating

a

higher level of distrust among students than among parents.

The parent-student responses, viewed in

differed substantially (Fig.

12).

As

i

a

n

six-level frequency continuum,
the earl ier

i

terns

,

the parents
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Figure 12

Comparison of Parent-Student Responses to
Variable 42 in
Level Continuum
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more assertive attitude in their responses than the
students

While 23 percent of the parents agreed stongly (+3) or
disagreed

strongly (-3) with the statement in variable 42, only 18
percent of the
students responded in

a

similar assertive fashion.

The cross-tabulation analysis of the parents' socio-economic

status with variable 42 suggested no significant relationship, while
the cross-tabulation analysis of the student data suggested significant

chi-square probability for students' sex and cosmopolitanism (Table 35).
The chi-square probability for students' sex and trust in

government (variable 42) was significant at .012 level; the two items
had
71

a

relationship signficant at gamma

=

.223.

Of the male students,

percent indicated trust in the government while

female students had similar feelings.

61

percent of the
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TABLE 35

Of

Cross-Tabulation
People 1„ the Government are
Smart"
^variable 42) with Socio-Economic
Status
"People running the government
are smart and
usually know what they are
doing."

Socio-Economic
Status

Agree

(

trust in government)

parents

Sex

76%

"J^^^,

students

(93)

(oa)

7^^
=

:°^?55^«
^?Stl)V%-^^i;V=^V=-'oi2^^i,i
.Ui^, pt\i P
.106; gamma
'

'

Father's ^'^^
Level of
Education
^
no education
(1)

'

71%
68
85
70

(14)
(41)
(40)
(20)

= .223

51%
70
67
66

(12)
(

34
(98
(24)

(parents) X = 4.7; df = 3; p = .19;
V = .174; gamma = .150
(students) x^ = 5.5; df = 3; p = .142; V =
.097; gamma =044

Mother's
Level of
Education

'^^5-

f

""

^^""^
.

no education

(students) X

=

57%

"
-

57
65
71

6.8; df = 3; p = .078; V = .109; gamma

Family
Income

medium

Level

low

high

70%
75
75

(44)
(37)
(31)

=

(4)

(47)
(164)
f^gij

.186

63%"(116)
70
112
71

(158)

(parents) X ^= .34; df = 2; p = .84; V = .04; gamma =
.066
(students) X = 2.01; df = 2; p = .36; V = .059; gamma =
.067
Level of

1- high

68%

2
3

65
77
81
87

Cosmopolitanism
4

5- low

(34)
(13)
(24)
(30)
(14)

59% (196)
73
74
79
73

(50
73
(49

(25)

(parents) x^ = 3.98; df = 4; p = .41; V = .160; gamma = -.242
(students) x = 18.8; df = 4; p = .002; V = .168; gamma = -.291
(1) For the parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education"
is the mother's level of Education when she was the respondent.
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The chi-square probability for
level of cosmolitanism was
significant at .002 level.
Once again the data suggested
that the

students from Tehran had the least
trust in the government, whereas,
those students from the least
cosmopolitan areas had the most trust
in
the government (gamma - .291).

Of those students from Tehran,
59 per-

cent indicated trust in the government,
while those from small towns
and rural areas had

a

77 percent trust in the government,

indicated

as

by the statement in variable 42.

The last item in this section, variable
40, states that "The

government usually knows what

is

best for people."

response indicated support for the government,

a

While

a

positive

negative response was

the manifestation of the least trust in the
government.

As displayed

in Table 31, while 17 percent of the
parents indicated that they did

not trust the government as measured by this item,
29 percent of the

students had similar feelings.
level

There was an increase of 12 percent in

of distrust from parents to students.

continuum (Fig.

13)

When viewed in

a

six-level

over 32 percent of the parents had agreed strongly

(+3) with the statement,

indicating an assertive response favoring the

government, while only 18 percent of the student sample had done similarly.

This further supported the previous assertion that the parents

had been resolute in their political opinion whether pro or anti-

government.

Such

a

response pattern indicates that the parents had

already arrived at certain conclusions in regard to the government in
Tehran.
parents.

The students, on the other hand, were less resolute than the
Many students held to the middle ground--i

.

e.

,

somewhat agreed
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Figure 13

Comparison of Parent--Student
Responses to Variable 40 in
Level Continuum
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The

students, as measured by the trust/distrust variables in
this chapter,
in general

trusted the government somewhat less than the parents.

As in the last item, cross-tabulation of socio-economic vari-

ables with variable 40 revealed no significant chi-square probability
for the parents

(see Table 36).

Parental education, family income and

cosmopolitanism displayed significant chi-square probabilities with
variable 40 for the students.
The chi-square probability of father's education level with

variable 40 was significant at .0002 level.

associated at

a

significant level

(gamma

-

The two items also were
.234).

Of those students

s
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TABLE 36

Cross-Tabulation of "Government knows what
is best for peopT
(Variable 40) With Socio-Economic
Status

"The government usually knows
what is best
people."

Socio-Economic
Status

Agree (trust in government)
parents

^^^^
female

Sex

(parents)
(students)

Father's
Education

81% (100)
91
(30)

73% (235)
69
(189)

l.l; df = 1; p = .29; phi
105; gamma = -,394
df = 1; p = .26; ph 1 = .049; gamma =
.108

= 1.2;

^^3^

f^^^"^

Level
no education

parents)
(students) x
Mother'
Education
Level

students

=

68%
88
87
80

(16)
(42)
(53)
(19)

42%
71
72
79

6,67; df = 3; p = ,083; V = .206; gamma = .190
19.6; df = 3; p = .0002; V = .184; gamma = .234

high

43%

medium

61
73
74

low
no education
J

(students) x

Family
Income
Level

(88)
(200)
(100)
(21)

= 12.1;

df = 3; p = .0075; V = .144; gamma = .175

high

83%

medium

82
84

low

(3)

(49)
(185)
(169)

(48)
(40)
(39)

63% (117)
79
74

(127)
(172)

(parents) x^^= .12; df = 2; p = .94; V = .029; gamma = .034
(students) x = 11.34; df = 2; p = .0035 V = .140; gamma = .168
;

1- high

85%

Level of

2

Cosmopolitanism

3

70
81

4
5- low

87
87

(parents) x^p= 3.51; df = 4; p = .47; V
(students) x = 18; df = 4; p = .001; V
(1)

66% (221)

(41)
(14)
(26)
(35)
(14)

70
78
90
70
=

=

(47)
(76)
(57)
(24)

15; gamma = -.050
174; gamma = =.270

For the parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education"
level of education when she was the respondent.

is the mother's

fo»
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whose fathers had had

a

high level of education, 42
percent indicated

trust in the government, whereas,
of those students whose
fathers had
no education, only 79 percent
responded in a similar manner.
The chi-square probability of
mothers' education with variable
40 was significant at .0075 level.

The data also indicated trends
simi-

lar to the impact of father's
education level.

mothers had

a

Of those students whose

high level of education, 43 percent
trusted the govern-

ment, while of those students
whose mothers had no education, 74

percent did the same.
The chi-square probability of family income
with variable 40
was significant at .0035 level.

from high income families had

a

According to the data, the students
lower level of trust in government than

those from lower income groups.

The relationship, however, was not

statistically significant (gamma

=

.168).

Of those students from high

income families, 63 percent indicated trust in
government, whereas, of
those from low income families, 74 percent responded
similarly.
Level

the students'

of cosmopolitanism also proved significant in delineating

response pattern.

The indication was that the students

from the larger cosmopolitan areas had

a

higher level of distrust in

the government, while those from the lesser cosmopolitan areas had

higher level of trust in the government.

The probability of chi-square

for variable 40 and cosmopolitanism was significant at .001

level

the two items were associated at

=

a

a

significant level

(gamma

and

.270).

Of those students who lived in Tehran, 66 percent trust the government.
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While 90 percent of those students
who lived in smaller towns
(level
trusted the government to a similar
degree.

SMimar^.

4)

The cross-tabulation analysis so
far in this chapter has

indicated some relationship between
certain socio-economic variables
and frequencies of trust/distrust in
the government.

Some socio-

economic variables have proved significant
in certain levels and not
so indicative of the attitudes of
the respondents in other levels.

While the female students trusted the
government less than the

male students (Tables 34 and 35), the
chi-square probability for
parents'

sex was not significant.

orientation were situational.

The causes for the female student

As discussed several times already, the

unique position of female students contributed to
the great difference
in their orientation.

They usually came from families where parents

had a higher level of education.

In a traditional

male oriented society

such as Iran, where women in many cases have been
relegated

class role, and, as attested by the data in Appendix

II

a

second

(Table 42),

only half as many female students as male students are enrolled in
high
schools, these female students are certainly
of their parents'

special breed.

a

The fact

higher education level resulting, perhaps, in

a

more

broad-minded perspective on socio-political affairs than that of the
male students should result, as witnessed, in

male/female student orientation.

a

tangible difference in

The association of female students'

responses with that of individuals with higher education

throughout the preceding chapters.

is

witnessed

The higher level of familial

education in the female students' families makes them rather unique
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individuals, compared to the male
students, and their attitudes are
decidedly more open-minded.
The two most important variables
found to associate signifi-

cantly, on several occasions, with
levels of trust/distrust in govern-

ment among the students are parental
education and cosmopolitanism.
The level of education had little
impact on the parents' attitudes, but
it did have an influence on the
students'

the analysis often revealed

a

orientations.

The data and

relationship between high level of educa-

tion and distrust of the government
(see Tables 33, 34 and 36).

High

level of education associated positively
with high level of distrust in

the government in regard to variables
35 and 40, while low level of

education at the same time associated with high
level of trust in the
government.

The level of distrust among the students from
highly

educated families, as indicated by the data, usually
exceeded that of
the parents.

Even the students whose fathers had low educational

often superseded their parents in level of government
distrust.
low level

level
Fathers'

of education was seemingly responsible for the students'

level of distrust in the government (see Tables 34, 35 and
36).

lower

The

data provides no clue for the disparity of influence of education,

particularly so far as the high level of parental education helping to
increase the level of distrust in the government.

Marshall Meyer's

study of Harvard students in the midst of Vietnam War, as already noted,

attempts to explain the emergence of inefficacy among such students.^
The educated parents, in general, provide their children with better
social and educational circumstances resulting in their higher level of
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awareness and broader socio-political
perspective.

Consequently, many

of these students, aware of
the socio-economic conditions
and the state
of deprivation that many of
their countrymen live in, coupled
with the

prevalent idealism of youth, have an
increased level of inefficacy.
The reverse, as suggested by the
same indicators, is true among
some

students who display

a

higher level of efficacy, perhaps
as an indica-

tor of upward socio-economic
mobility, and who come from low
education,
low income background and live
in the lesser cosmopolitan
areas of the

country.

Cosmopolitanism also seems to influence the
behavior of the
responding students.

Detailed analysis of cosmopolitanism, however,

at first resulted in some confusion.

The question was raised as to

whether cosmopol i tanism was causing attitudinal
changes in the respondents or was there some intrinsic problem with
the data?

It was found

that the students from larger urban areas came
from families where the

parents, in general, had higher levels of education.

itself conforms with the national statistics of Iran.

This finding in

There is

a

higher

percentage of educated in larger urban areas, particularly in
Tehran,
whereas, there are fewer educated individuals in less urban and in rural
areas.

The parents'

data was also in conformity with this norm.

Thus,

it could be stated that cosmopolitanism, as an independent variable,

denotes that those living in larger urban areas also have

a

higher

education level, and, due to the cause and effect relationship between
education and income, the residents of the more cosmopolitan areas also
have

a

higher level of income.
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As

indicated in the previous chapters,
there was

a

substantial

lifetime migration among the parents
rendering their present city of
residence of little value in determining
any attitudinal changes.
data in this chapter has not indicated
parents'

a

The

strong association between

level of cosmopolitanism and their
orientations.

The students

data, on the other hand, in most
cases, has associated cosmopolitanism

with change in their attitudes towards
trust/distrust in government.
The data has indicated that the students
from larger urban areas have
less trust in government than the
students from small towns and rural

areas.

Politi cal Participation and Trust/Distrust in
Government

The data, also has indicated

a

strong relationship between

political participation and frequencies of trust/distrust
in the government.

The data analysis was accomplished through Pearson's
correlation

analysis.

For the analysis, the four items measuring political
partici-

pation were recorded into two values:

high and low participation,

while the trust/distrust variables along with the other political
and
social

variables (variables 16 through 46) had already been collapsed

into agree/disagree categories.^

Parents.

The analysis of "passive" political participation variables,

indicated by "listening to news" and "reading newspapers," revealed no

significant association with trust/distrust variables among parents.
On the other hand, "active" political participation, measured by items

"thinking about politics" and "talking about politics," showed some
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significant associations with
trust/distrust variables.
about politics" correlated at

r -

"Thinking

.290, significant at .001

level,

with variable 35, stating that
"The government needlessly
wasted

a

lot

of the taxpayer's money."

"Talking about politics," on the other
hand, correlated at
r =

.266, significant at .001

level with variable 30, stating
that

"The government was influenced by

correlated negatively

wUh

government are smart" at
short, there was

a

a

few big interests."

It was also

variable 42 that stated "People running
the

r =

-.333, significant at .001

level.

In

rather apparent association between high
level of

"active" political participation and distrust
in the government, while
the oppositie was also correct.

had

a

higher level of political trust in the government.

^^"^^"^ts
r =

Those who talked little about politics

The data revealed that there was

.

.151,

a

significant correlation,

significant at .001 level, between "reading newspapers and

variable 35, suggesting that "The government wasted
money needlessly."

a

lot of the tax

The correlation, however, may be an indirect result

of association between "reading newspapers" and parental education
(gamma

=

.302), on the one hand, and the association between the latter

and the habit of "reading newspapers"

rather than

a

(gamma = .251), on the other,

direct causal link between reading newspapers and distrust

in the government.

In

other words, those who are more educated are more

likely to read newspapers and are also more likely to have

a

distrust

in government because of the disparity between the educated man's
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perception of what government should
be and the Shah's handling
of the
affairs of state.
The "active" political participation
items, "thinking about
politics" and "talking about politics,"
associated at significant levels
with items measuring distrust in
government, variables 35 and 38, and
negatively with items measuring trust
in the government, variables
40
and 42 (see Table 38).

The analysis indicated that those
who thought

and talked more often about
politics had

a

high distrust of the govern-

ment, whereas, those who indicated
that they seldom thought or talked

about politics had

a

high level of trust in the government.

"Thinking about politics" correlated at
35,

suggesting that "government wasted

a

r =

.176 with variable

lot of the tax money need-

lessly," and with variable 38, suggesting
that "some people in the

government are crooked" at

r =

.276, both significant at .001

level.

It also correlated negatively with
variable 40, stating that "government

knew what was best for people" at r

=

-.152 and with variable 42,

stating that "people running the government are smart
and know what
they doing" at r = -.252, both significant also at
.001

"Talking about politics" correlated at
35,

negatively with variable 40 at

.001

.211 with variable

and at r = .231 with variable 38, both measuring distrust in
the

government and both significant at .001 level.

r =

r =

level.

r =

It also correlated

-.187 and with variable 42 at

-.254, indicating trust in government, both also significant at
level.
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Thus far the impact of
socio-economic status and political

participation on both parents and
students has been analyzed and
discussed.

At this juncture, it would be
helpful to group the political

variables together to determine their
impact on trust/distrust orientation of the respondents.

This would help in observing the
association

of such issues as efficacy,
public policy orientation vis-a-vis
political

trust/distrust.

Pearson's correlation and factor analysis
will be

used to assist in typifying the
respondents as to their political
posture.

denoting

This will aid in analysis of variables,
whereby the items

political factor would be grouped together
indicating the

a

strength in the relationships.

Parents.

An assumption, verified by the data, is that the
parents'

behavior

is more

and experience.

from

a

complex than the students due to facts such as
age
Thus, the change in parents' behavior pattern
stems

more differentiated set of circumstances.

For example, the

factor analysis of the parents' data produced six- factors
above 1.0 of
Eigenvalue, while for the students there were only four
factors for the
same range.

The parents'

data (Table 37) indicated that no significant

associations existed between variable 18, denoting government control
and authoritarianism, and other political variables.
26, which measured the level

However, variable

of political intolerance, indicated pos-

itive correlation with variable 40 (r

=

.309)

and with variable 42

Jb

I

Sex

Age

Education
Family
i ncome
Place of
residence

Variable
12

Variable
13

Variable
14

Variable
15
CO

Va»"iable
18

Variable
21

Variable
23

Variable
26

Variable
30

Variable
31

Variable
35

Variable
38

Variable
40

Variable
41

Variable
42
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(r =
.001

.294), specifying trust in the government,
both significant at
level.
The same item correlated negatively
with variables "talking

about politics"

(r = -.302)

and "thinking about politics"

(r = -.262),

measuring "active" political interest,
and with variable 35 (r

=

-.262),

indicating political trust, all
significant at .001 level.
Furthermore, variable 21, stating

a

public policy issue

encouraging government aid to the unemployed,
correlated only with
political inefficacy, variable 23 at
level.

r =

.256, significant at .001

Variable 41, measuring religious tolerance,
also did not corre-

late positively or negatively with any
of the political indicators.

While the variables measuring political
distrust, variables 30, 35 and
38,

correlated positively together, variables
40 and 42, measuring trust

in the government,

correlated together also.

Moreover, the variables

measuring political distrust correlated negatively
at .001 level of
significance with variables measuring political trust,
indicating that
those distrusting the government consistently
responded in that manner,

while those trusting the government also persisted
in their responses.
The factor analysis of the political variables was another

method of indicating

a

consistency in method of responses and it also

proved of aid in the grouping of the significant variables.

As the

diagram in Fig. 14 indicates, while the variables indicating political
distrust, inefficacy, rel-gious tolerance and government aid to the

unemployed were grouped together at one end of the diagram, at the
opposing end the variables indicating political trust in the government
and authoritarianism also were grouped together.

The data, as the
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diciyram di-.pl.iys,
of

Lrusl.

wherohy
<n-d

in

l.f,.

indicates that thoso parents who
havo

.jovrnmonl aro also

(joverninent has control

t,t„.

that sud,

individuals

am

i„

a

Lv.!

hicjh

favor o( an authoritarian
sys

ovor Lho cILizons' ov.-ryday

also inl.olorant.

lif(>,

other soci o-po

of

Lorn

1

i

Li

cal

systems and lu-liovo Lhat their system
is superior Lo Lho oLher
existing
systems.

As

in doLail

earlier, had noqated any association
hoLwoen oducaLion and

the correlation analysis and
cross-Labu laLion, discussed

distrust, the factor analysis also failed Lo
note education as

a

con-

LribuLinq factor to distrust of government
amony parents.
As

it

was assumed earlier, the factor analysis
indicated that

those parents who seldom think or talk about
politics are also the

individuals who

hav(>

a

hiyti

level

of trust in the cjoverrmienL, are

politically iriLoleratiL, and favor an authoritarian
political system.
As

noted in the last chapter, poliLical

hy variables 23 and 31,

itu^fficacy, as measured

correlated positively and was factored

variables denoting political distrust in the government.

In

words, the inefficacious parents also were distrustful

Lh(>

of

wiLli

oLher
govern-

ment, wfiile the efficacious trusted the government.

Students

.

In

the correlation analysis of the political

the student sample,

sample.

indicators in

thoro wf^re more correlations than in Lhe parent

This perhaps supports the prior assumption that there are more

complex variables responsible for the change

in

the parents'

attitudes,

whereas, many of the indicators present in this study explain the
reasons for Lhe change in the students' attitudes.

For example, educa-

tion of parents has been of considerable inf luence in

Lh(}

development
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of

a

general pattern of orientation among
the students.

Other vari-

ables, such as cosmopolitanism, have
also been of aid in understanding

some of the determinants of student
attitudes.

Other orientations,

such as traditionalism are also good
indicators of student orientations.

Such relationships, however, seldom
occur in the parents' data leading

one to presume that more complex
indicators influence the parents'

attitudes.

Variable 18, indicating government control
and authoritarianism,

correlated at
40 and 42,

r =

.220 at .001

level of significance with variables

indicating political trust in the government,
at

r =

.344

and r = .294, respectively, both significant
at .001 level of significance.

Variable 18 correlated negatively with variable

measuring political inefficacy, and with variables 35
(r

31
=

(r = -.186),

-.303) and

38 (r = -.159), indicating political distrust in the government,
both

significant at .001 level.

In short,

those students who favored strong

government control were also politically intolerant and felt
that their
socio-political system should be
follow.

a

blueprint for all other nations to

These same students also had

a

high level of trust in the gov-

ernment control over the citizens were politically tolerant and did
not subscribe to the system norms--i.e., they were politically ineffi-

cacious.

They had

a

high distrust of the government.

These correla-

tions demonstrate the sources of support and opposition to the Pahlavi
regime.
cal

On one hand,

the students displayed their trust in the politi-

approach of the Shah, where opposition is not tolerated and it is

affirmed that the monarchical regime

is

the ideal

and divine form of
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Scatter plot of political factors influencing
orientations.

Fig.

parents'

14.

366

90

367

government.

display

a

On the other hand, the students opposing the
government

high level of distrust in the political process
and demon-

strate an openness to other ideals by discounting the
Iranian system
as

the best in the world.

These same students also agree with an open

and democratic government where polity would have

a

control over govern-

mental policy formulations.
As in the parents'

data, variable 26, which measured political

intolerance, correlated positively at
at r =

.261 with variable 42,

cacy.

31

.273 with variable 40 and

denoting political trust in the govern-

ment, both significant at .001

negatively with variable

r =

level.

Variable 26 also correlated

(r = -.194),

indicating political ineffi-

These associations pointed out that those students who have

a

high level of political intolerance are those who have a high level
of trust in the government.

cally tolerant have

a

On the other hand, those who are politi-

high level of distrust in the government and are

not responsive to political system functions.

Variable 21, suggesting government aid to the unemployed,

correlated positively with variable 35, denoting political distrust in
the government (r

=

.230), significant at .001

level.

This suggested

that those who favored government aid to the unemployed were also dis-

trustful of the government.
The item dealing with religious intolerance, variable 41,

correlated positively with variable 31, measuring political inefficacy,
at r =

.183, and with variable 38, indicating distrust in the govern-

ment, at

r =

.339, both significant at .001

level.

In short,

those
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students who indicated that they would not
oppose speeches in their

communities against religion did not subscribe
to the system norms and
were also somewhat distrustful of the political
system.
As previously discussed in the section
dealing with political

efficacy, variables 23 and

31

have significant positive associations

with political distrust and negative associations
with political trust.
Those students who were efficacious were trusting of
the government,

while those students who were inefficacious were
distrustful of the
government.
Finally, as expected, the variables denoting political distrust

correlated positively together against the two variables indicating
political trust in the government.

This once again confirmed the con-

sistency of the student responses to these political questions.

Parent-student similarities

.

political indicators revealed
parents'.

The factor analysis of the students'
a

pattern very much like that of the

The variables indicating political trust in the government,

variables 40 and 42, and the items denoting political intolerance,

variable 26, and political authoritarianism, variable 18, were grouped

together in one extreme of the factor matrix.

The variables indicating

political distrust in the government, variables 30, 35 and 38, and

variables denoting political inefficacy, variables 23 and 31, plus items

measuring aid to the needy, variable 21, and religious tolerance, variable 41, were grouped together at the other extreme of the factor

matrix (see Fig.

14 and 15).

In

addition, the students who had indi-

cated that they often read newspaper and magazine articles for their
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Fig.

students'

15.
Scatter plot of political factors influencing
orientations
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political reports and those who had noted
that they often thought and

talked about political matters were
placed with the "anti-government"
group.

The implications of the above data
analysis are that the
political posture of the respondents, both
parents and students, are

divided into two very distinct orientations.

One orientation is char-

acterized by traditional political modus
operandi, where the authority
of the ruler is supreme and the
government controls all aspects of
life.
ical

This mode is also held to by the Islamic
tradition where politand religious life are considered one in
all, and the khaliph or

the imam, as the divine representative, is the
unquestioned authority.

The opposing orientation is

a

more Western-oriented political attitude,

where the authoritarian approach and idea is negated
and distrusted
with

a

broad-minded approach to political and social approach indicated.
It was

in the first category--i .e.

mode--that there could have existed

a

,

the traditional-conservative

basis of support for

government as conceived and idealized by the Shah.

a

style of

It is the same

sentiments that give rise to the popular support for Ayatollah Khomeini's rule, where traditional political approach and Islamic puritanism are merged to give rise to
bring about the Iranian Utopia.

a

philosopher king who
By the same token,

is

expected to

those who opposed

the Shah's authoritarian rule and his disdain for a democratic form of

government also would oppose Ayatollah Khomeini's charismatic grip on
the process of government.
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TABLE 39

Factor Analysis of Indicators of
Political Trust/Distrust
parent ^"^^^
political indicators
student
.669

.555

.381

.240

.674

vvar iduie tu; ine government
usually knows
what is best for people.

.607

(variable 26) Our socio-political system
should
oe a Diueprint for all other nations
in the world

.320

(variable 18) The government should have
plenty
fjuwer ana intiuence over people s
lives.

.383

(variable 2) Age of student (16 or less)

.141

ui

(*)
(*)

-.276

index

(variable 42) People running the
government
are smart
i/noiw iiu-^-i- +.u~
oMiai 0 AnH
aiiu iis;iip11\/
ubudiiy Know
What they are doing

^variable 13) I often read newspapers and
magazine articles about political and social
matters of our country.

.203

vvariaoie dL)
he government should give money
and food to the unemployed.

.157

I

-.278

vvdriaoie
it a person wanted to make a
speech against religion in this community, he
should be allowed.

-.307

vvariaoie c6) sometimes politics and government
seem so complicated that a person like me can't
really understand what is going on.

.197

-.356

(variable 14) I often think about the political
and economic condition of our country.

.450

-.439

(variable 30) I think that the government is
pretty much influenced by a few big interests
looking out for themselves.

.211

-.444

(variable 15) I often talk about political and
economic matters of our country with my friends.

.451

-.655

.200

(variable 38) I think some people in the government are crooked.

-

.569

(variable 31) Over the years, the government has
paid no attention to what people like me think
when it decides what to do.
continued

-

.567

.

.

.

.
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TABLE 39 (continued)

IpLlf
?
"gedlessly
(*)

^^'"^ t*'^ government wastes
alotI of the money we pay in
taxes.

-

709

These indexes were not significant
for the parents.

wMiiih:°Cr*^:rrs3s^fiy^-?hTL.*s^5r:^7ofX-???x--^There were

a

total of 34 political correlations in
the two

samples that were significant at above
.005 level.
lations were shared by both samples.

There were 17 correlations that

were significant in the students' data

significant level in the parents' data.

that

were not present at

a

There was only one correlation

(variable 21 with variable 23) that attained
parents'

Of these, 16 corre-

data and not in the students' data.

a

significant level in the
One item that emerged

twice in the student correlation analysis and attained

a

level

nificance was the seemingly high level of religious
tolerance.

of sig-

This

item did not correlate with socio-economic status, namely
parental

education, family income or cosmopolitanism.

variable
as

41

As indicated above,

correlated positively with distrust in government and,

such, is perhaps

a

by-product of open-mi ndedness

,

brought about by

secular education, among the students.
In

the past few pages, correlations of political

both samples were discussed.

indicators for

The above discussions enabled us to

observe the positive and negative relationships between the different
political indicators.

It also made it possible for us to observe the
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similarities and dissimilarities between
the parents' and the students'
samples.
The factor analysis, furthermore,
assisted in grouping the
political indicators.

It displayed the clusters of
emerging political

indicators and the strength of the relationships.

The combined factor

analysis of the socio-economic variables
along with the political indicators, in

a

chapters.

The factor analysis indicated that those
respondents dis-

sense, summarized all the discussions in
the last three

trustful of the government are likely to
be politically tolerant, have

religious tolerance, have

a

high level of political

inefficacy, favor

government assistance to the unemployed, and have
active political
interests (see Table 39).

These matched with totally contradictory

inclinations on the opposite end of the spectrum.
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FOOTNOTES
T

2
''"^^'^

141-44.

^"^

discussion in Jennings and Niemi

,

^"^'"^?all Meyers, "Harvard Students
in the Midst of CrisisN„to
Note^on the Source of Leftist,
Soaol03t^O<i,cMM;2

pp.

A

(^^

4,

correlation analysis and
1°™'
factor ana
ractor
anal^f^^^n^Jhl^H
ysis, all the data used for statistical
observations were
^^"^ation, age. income
o^L
DO
an? m^" n^Jf"" to news,"
reading newspapers," "thinking about
DO
t?c ^'and J^u?^
°' agree/disagree (variables
*
^e'th'rough
45)

dTclolZ

CHAPTER

X

SOCIAL-CULTURAL ATTITUDES AND POLITICAL
PERSPECTIVES
As the first segment of analysis,
an examination of the impact

of socio-economic status of the
respondents and their political orien-

tations was undertaken (Chapters VII, VIII
and IX).

It was assumed

that there would be associations between
the two and that certain

political attitudes were the result of
differing socio-economic status.
In this chapter,

and political

however, an examination of socio-cultural
attitudes

orientations will be undertaken to see whether
there are

significant associations between the two.

Impact of Soc io-Cultural Attitudes on Parents and
Students

The analysis of socio-cultural data revealed few significant

associations to political orientations among parents, while
tial
a

number of such associations were found among students.

a

substan-

There were

total of 13 correlations signficant at above .005 level among the

parents'
data.

data, while there were 51 such correlations among the students'

Only three of these correlations were shared by both samples

(see Tables 40 and 41).

This finding suggested that while there was

a

considerable association between socio-cultural attitudes and political

perspective among students, there were less such associations among
parents.
377
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Parents.

The data revealed that determinism,
variables 17, 43 and 44,

and collectivity, variables
20 and 22, were the more
significant indicators of political orientation.
Other significant indicators
included
traditional norms-variables 19 and
25, impulse-variable 16, and
hard

work--variable 46.
Variable 17, suggesting that "When

man is born, the success

a

he is going to have is already
in the cards so he might as
well
it and not fight against it,'"

correlated at

a

significant level with

variable 18 which measured authoritarianism
(r
level.

.001

=

.271), significant at

Variable 17 correlated negatively at

frequency of listening to news.

accept

r =

-.219 with

The relationship suggested that those

individuals favoring determinism seldom listen
to news on the radio.

Another indicator of determinism, variable
43, stating that "Planning
makes

a

person unhappy since plans hardly ever work out
anyway," corre-

lated negatively with "thinking about politics"
level of significance.

(r = -.292)

23,

at r =

a

.227,

.001

The relationship suggested that those parents

who are deterministic seldom think about politics.
correlated at

at

Variable 43 also

significant level with political inefficacy, variable
indicating that the parents who believe in determinism

are also politically inefficacious.

The last indicator of determinism,

variable 44, suggesting that "Nowadays with world conditions the way
they are, the wise person lives for today and lets tommorow take care
of itself," correlated with the parents'
r = -.244,

habit of listening to news at

indicating that parents believing in determinism seldom

listen to news on radio.
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The importance of friendship,
as measured by variable
22,

"There is no satisfaction in any
good deed without

a

related with political inefficacy,
variable 23, at

r =

significant level.

companion," cor.337 at a very

The correlation suggested that
those inclined to

join in cooperative undertakings
with friends were politically
inefficacious.
The data also indicated a significant
correlation between

variable 22 and education level.

The parents who had

a

low level of

education agreed more with the statement
in variable 22 than did those
with high education.
Another variable which actually more
represents
peer pressure, with bearing on
collectivity,

is

variable 20, "The nega-

tive opinion of others often keeps
me from seeing a movie or

that

I

had planned to attend," correlated
negatively

(

r =

a

play

-.272) with

frequency of listening to news at .001
level of significance.

The

association suggested that parents who are
influenced by peer pressure

seldom listen to news on the radio.

Variable 20 also correlated with

variable 21, suggesting government aid to the unemployed
(r
.003 level of significance.

=

.224)

at

The relationship implied that parents

influenced by peer pressure are also supportive of government
support
for the needy.

Traditional norms as indicated by variable 19, "There

anybody lower than

a

person who does not feel

a

is

hardly

great love, gratitude

and respect for his parents," correlated with variable 21, measuring

political authoritarianism, (r

=

.266) at .001

level of significance.

The relationship indicated that those parents believing in unequivocal

respect for parents supported

a

system of government which held power

381

and influence over people.
25,

Traditional norms, as indicated by
variable

"Respect is due an older man no matter
what kind of

a person he
is," also correlated with variable
21, political authoritarianism,
at

r =

.217,

significant at .005 level.

The association reflected the
tie

between political authoritarianism and
traditional cultural values in
Iranian society.

Hard work for the sake of hard work,
as measured by variable
46,

"I

often do something just to prove to
myself that

I

can do it,"

correlated with variable 21, suggesting
government aia to the unemployed,
at r =
ical

.217, significant at .005 level.

inefficacy, variable 23 (r

=

It also correlated with polit-

.267), at .001

level of significance.

The relationships indicated that those
parents who believe in hard

work approve of government assistance to those
who are out of work,

yet indicated that these same parents are politically
inefficacious.
The only other significant correlation in the parents'
data
was between impulse control, variable 16, "If you get
bad news, it is

better to hide your emotions and behave as if you do not care,"
and
parental age (r

=

-.278), significant at .001

level.

The relationship

indicated that parents who are older approve of hiding their emotions
when confronted with bad news.
In short,

the analysis of parental socio-cul tural attitudes

revealed few associations with their political perspectives.
ular importance was that determinism had
political authoritarianism.

a

Of partic-

significant association with

Other attitudes such as collectivity and

peer pressure had significant relationships with political inefficacy
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and

a

feeling that government should
aid the unemployed.

Traditional
cultural norms, upholding elders
and parents in unquestioned
high
esteem, also was associated with
political authoritarianism, which
in
itself has been a manifestation of
Iranian culture.^

Students.

As noted above,

there were

a

substantial number of signifi-

cant associations between various
soci o-cul tural attributes and the

political orientation of the students.

The most significant attributes

were determinism (variables 17, 43 and
44), traditional values
(variables 19, 25 and 39), collectivity
(variables 22 and 45), hard

work (variables 32 and 46), particularism
(variables 24 and 34), impulse
control

(variable 16), peer pressure (variable
28), importance of time

(variable 29), respect for children (variable
33), and risk taking
(variable 37).
Impact of So cio-Cultural Attitudes on Political Orientation

.

The only orientation that had any significant impact on
political par-

ticipation was determinism as manifested in Variable
17,

"When

a

correlated negatively with "reading news-

(r = -.154), with "thinking about politics

with "talking about politics"
level.

Variable

man is born, the success he is going to have in life is

already in the cards,"
papers"

17.

(r = -.131),

all

(r = -.220),

and

significant at .001

The association suggested that students believing in deter-

minism were the least interested in reading newspapers, think about
politics, or talking about politics.

.
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^^^^^^^^-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Determinism in

this analysis is measured by
variables 17, 43 and 44, which
all corre-

lated significantly with the
political attitudes of students.
17,

"When

a

3

Variable

man is born, the succes he is going
to have in his life is

already in the cards," correlated at
(r = .317) with variable
18,

itarianism.

very significant level

a

denoting acceptance of political author-

Variable 17 also correlated with variable
40 (r

and variable 42 (r

=

=

.221)

.259), both indicating political trust in
govern-

ment, both significant at .001

level.

Variable 17 also correlated with

variable 21, suggesting that government should
aid the unemployed
(r =

.130), significant at .001

level.

Variable 43, "Planning only makes

a

person unhappy since plans

hardly ever work out anyway," correlated with
variable 30 at

with variable

31

at r = .148,

and with variable 38 at r

=

r =

.146,

.124,

indicating political inefficacy and distrust in government.
Variable 44, "Nowadays with world conditions the way they
are,
the wise person lives for today and lets tomorrow take
care of itself,"

correlated with variable 18, indicating acceptance of political author-

itarinaism at

r =

.125, significant at .003 level, with variable 21,

supporting aid to the unemployed at

measuring political inefficacy at

r =

r =

.186,

and with variable 31,

.148, both significant at .001

level
In short,

determinism was significantly associated, in particu-

lar, with political

ment, and

a

inefficacy, support for an authoritarian govern-

belief that government should aid the unemployed.

Such
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associations presumably agree with
the general assumptions of
determinism where government is accepted
just because it is there, although
its interworkings may not
be clear to the public.

It is also along

the same line of thought that
the determinists urge
government support
for the unemployed, since their
misfortune is beyond their control.

^^^^^^^^-^^-^^^^^i^^

Tradi-

tional norms were measured by
variables 19, 25 and 39. ^

Traditional

norms are such values as respect
for parents, elders and friends
which
have

a

national/cultural consistency, while other
values such as deter-

minism and particularism are more
philosophical preferences.
Variable 19, "There is hardly anybody
lower than
does not feel

a

a

person who

great love, gratitude and respect for his
parents,"

correlated with variable 26, suggesting political
intolerance,
(r =

.140) significant at .001

level.

Variable 19 also correlated

negatively with variable 41, suggesting religious
toleration,
(r = -.153)

at .001

level

with political trust (r

=

of significance.
.119)

Furthermore, it correlated

at .004 level of significance.

Those

who believed in respect for parents, as indicated by
the data, also
believed tnat their socio-political system was the best in
the world
(variable 26) and had little tolerance for anyone making

against religion in their community.

a

speech

These same students also had

trust in the government.

Variable 25, "Respect is due an older man no matter what kind
of

a

person he is," correlated with variable 18, indicating acceptance

of political authoritarianism at

r

=

.191, significant at .001

level.
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Variable 25 also correlated with
variable 26, measuring political
intolerance at r = .162, significant
at .001 level.
Furthermore,
variable 25 correlated with variables
40 and 42, indicating
political
trust in government at
r =

.131,

r =

.203, significant at .001

significant at .002 level, respectively.

level, and at

Once again,

a

measure of traditionalism displayed
significant correlations with acceptance of political authoritarianism,
political intolerance, and trust
in the government.

i.e., the Pahlavi

There is

a

trend that trust in the government-

regime-and acceptance of political
authoritarianism

correlate with the acceptance of traditional
values.

Variable 39, although ranked along with
other items in this
section as
ical

a

traditional norm, is, nonetheless, tinted
with philosoph-

interpretation.

ever think of hurting
is

It states that "No sane,
a

close friend."

decent person would

The idea of respect for friends

ideally applauded in the Iranian tradition, but
it does not reach

the magnitude of respect for parents and elderly.

Perhaps it is for

this reason that variable 39 correlated significantly
with another

humanitarian gesture, variable 23, which suggested aid to the
unemployed.
Variables 39 and 23 correlated at r

=

.142, significant at .001

level.

Variable 39 also correlated with variables 30 and 38, measuring distrust
in the government at r =
r =

.139, significant at .002 level, and at

.122, significant at .003 level,

respectively.

Perhaps it is the

humanitarian nature of variable 39 that emerges as the more significant

indicator rather than its status as

a

measure of traditionalism.

explains its association with distrust in government as indicated

This
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through such statements as "The
government is controlled by

a

few

interests looking after their own,"
and that "Some people in
the
government are crooked."
In short,

traditionalism seems to associate closely
with the

feeling that the Iranian socio-political
system is far superior to
other systems in the world and with
a significant degree of
trust in
the political system of Mohammad-Reza
Shah.

ImRa^Lol^lectivity

on political nripnt.tinn

jwo of the

items, variables 22 and 45, as measures
of collectivity had significant

associations with students' political
orientations.

5

While variable 45

was associated with political orientation
of students only on one

occasion, variable 22 was related to political
attitudes on six different levels.
a

Variable 22, "There is no satisfaction in any
good without

companion," correlated with variable 21, measuring
aid to the unem-

ployed at

r =

.218, significant at .001

level.

Those students believing

in collective action also believed that the
government should aid the

unemployed.

Variable 22 also correlated with variables 23 and 31,

measuring political inefficacy at

r =

and r = .151, significant at .001

level,

.129, significant at .002 level,

respectively.

The students

subscribing to collective action, according to the data, also were
politically inefficacious.
distrust in the government.
and 38 at r = .142 and r
level,

=

Furthermore, the same students displayed

Variable 22 correlated with variables 30
.142,

respectively, both significant at .001

indicating that belief in collectivity also was associated with

distrust in the government.

Variable 45, "It is better to go without
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something than to ask for

a

favor from somebody, "a negative
measure of

collectivity, or an indicator of
individualism, correlated at r =
.128
with variable 38, indicating
distrust in the government, at
.003 level
of significance.
a

in

This association was rather
unexpected, or at least

negative correlation would have
been more in line with the
findings
variable 22.

It is presumed that variable
45 was measuring an atti-

tude somewhat different than
variable 22, and, for this reason,
no

significant association between the
two variables existed.
As suggested by variable
22,

collectivity was associated with

political inefficacy and distrust in
government.

It also had a signif-

icant relationship with the feeling
that government should aid the

unemployed.
Impact of belief in hard work on political
orientation

Two

.

items denoting "hard work," variables 32 and
46, emerged with signifi-

cant bearing on the political orientation of the
students
"I

set difficult goals for myself which

at r =

.147,

I

.

Variable 32,

attempt to reach," correlated

significant at .001 level, with variable 38, indicating

political distrust in the government.

There were five significant

correlations between variable 46 and political orientation items.

Variable 46,

"I

often do something just to prove to myself that

I

can

do it," correlated with variable 21, suggesting government aid to the

unemployed at

r =

.131, significant at .002 level.

The association

clearly reflected the attitude that public welfare was supported by
individuals who had

a

belief in hard work.

Variable 46 also correlated

with variable 31, denoting political inefficacy at

r =

.137, significant
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at .001

level, thus, those students
believing in hard work also
were

politically inefficacious.

Furthermore, variable

31

correlated at

a

significant level with variables
30, 35 and 38, all indicating
political
distrust in government at r =
.165, r - .146
=
and r

all

significant at the .001 level.

The association indicated
that

those who believed in hard work
had

government.

a

high level of distrust in
the

The correlation between variable
32 and political distrust,

on the one hand,
on the other,

.146, respectively,

and variable 46 and items denoting
political distrust,

clearly signifies the association
between those who

believe in hard work and feelings of
distrust towards the government.
Such feelings are perhaps enforced
by the notion that the government
was corrupt and that hard work and
perserverance were not rewarded properly.

of

a

Only those with connections and

willingness to become

a

a

part

system that thrived on bribery and corruption
were able to advance

within its ranks.

The association between hard work and
political

inefficacy, further, supports such

a

surmise.

Impact o f "particularism" on political orientation

.

Particular-

ism here is defined as the opposite of "uni versal
i sm"
which aims to

develop norms that are equal ly appl ied to
press the ideal of universalism.

al

1

;

particularism tends to sup-

Variable24, "There are some people like

great artists and musicians who can be forgiven for not being
considerate of others, kind to poor, etc.," correlated with variable
18,

measuring political authoritarianism at

r =

.177, significant at .001

level.

r =

.145,

Variable 24 also correlated at

significant at .001

level, with variable 40, indicating political trust in the government.
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The associations reveal the impact
of particularism which in
fact i:IS
form of social determinism that
supports authoritarianism and,
thus,
the Shah's government.

a

The association between particularism
and

support for the government

is

enforced by the close association
between

determinism and particularism.
The second item dealing with particularism
was variable 34, "A
man with money cannot really learn
how to behave among dignified people
if he has not had a proper up-bringing."

and 34 seem to suggest

a

Although both variables 24

notion of particularism, the responses
from

the students did not bear this out.

While variable 24 indicated

feelings of trust and support for the Shah's
government, those students

agreeing with variable 34 displayed exactly the
opposite.

The differ-

ence apparently was the result of an association
between variable 34
and those variables indicating traditionalism,
such as variables 19
and 27.

The responding students thus saw

a

clear relationship between

variable 34 and socio-cul tural traditional values, whereas, variable
24 was perceived as approving exemption from certain rules for the

benefit of the more famous citizens.

Although the questions stated

"artists and musicians" as the example, the intention was actually

intended to refer to politicians.

Although this was not expressly

stated, the response of the students seems to bear out that they, in
fact, did make the association.

From the analysis,

between variable 34 and political distrust emerges.
related at r

=

.152, significant at .001

level.

a

correlation
The two items cor-

Variable 34 also
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correlated with variable 23, denoting
political inefflcacy at
significant at .001 level.
In short,

r =

.144,

particularism, as an expression of the
socio-cultural

tradition of the country, seems to
be supported by those students
who
have an efficacious orientation.
These students did not agree with

granting exemptions from the rules for
certain individuals.

Qtheiijocialjjorms influen_cing political orientat/ion

The data

.

analysis also indicated there were
significant associations between variable 29, "It would irritate me to have

a

watch or clock which was off

by several minutes everyday," and
the political attitudes of students.

Those students bel ieving in the importance of
time displ ayed

a high

of distrust in the government, as indicated
by variable 30.

variables correlated at

r =

.199, significant at .001.

degree

The two

Variable 29

also correlated with variables 23 and 31, both
indicating political

inefficacy, at

r =

.128,

significant at .002 level, and

r =

.116,

significant at .005 level, respectively.
The associations seem to indicate that those students believing
in the significance of time were politically inefficacious
and distrust-

ful

of the government.

Variable 29 was associated with variables

indicating belief in hard work,^ indicating that those who believed in
importance of time also believed in hard work and perseverance.

As

noted earlier, there were strong associations between belief in hard
work, distrust in government, and political inefficacy.

Therefore, the

association between those who believe in importance of time and distrust
in government should have been expected.
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Variable 37 attempted to measure
the relationship between

belief in chance and political
attitude.
race or a game better when

I

bet on it."

It stated that "I enjoy
a

Variable 37 was closely

associated with determinism and belief
in traditional values. ^

Variable 37 correlated with belief in
authoritarianism, itself also an

extension of determinism, at

r =

.186, significant at .001

with variable 40, denoting trust in
the government at

nificant at .002 level.

In short,

r =

level, and
.132, sig-

the associations seem to further

indicate the relationship between determinism
and trust in the Pahlavi

government with approval of its style of
government.
Summar^^.

The items dealing with policy issues,
favoring authoritarian

political process and political intolerance displayed
significant
levels of association with traditional system
values-determinism,

particularism, and fate.

Although the students' data displayed

a

much

higher frequency of association, nonetheless, both sets
of data had
basic similarities.
Political inefficacy, according to the data of both samples,

displayed associations with collective orientation, hard work, and
determinism.

Political inefficacy was also associated with belief in

importance of time among students.
Levels of political trust in the Pahlavi government were posi-

tively associated with traditional system values--determinism, fate and

particularism, while political distrust was positively related with
hard work, collective orientation, importance of time and self-esteem.

Although distrust in government was also associated with determinism
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and respect for friends, it
is inevitable that

noms would

be encountered which were shared by
people fro. two opposing
political perspective, since traditional
socio-cultural norms seem to be
present in most
individuals to differing degrees.

factor_Anal;^s^^

ons

Aside from the political factors
displayed in the analysis of
the parents' and the students'
data as discussed in Chapters VIII
and
IX,

two major factors with
"determinism" and "traditionalism" as
the

main factors with above 1.0 Eigenvalue
have emerged as
data analysis.

a

result of the

The factor labelled here as traditionalism
includes

religious intolerance, familialism and
institutional norms as its main
components.

Mgliminism.

The impact of determinism on political
attitudes of

parents is displayed in Fig.
as

16.

The table displays that determinism,

measured by variables 17 and 44,

is

associated with traditional

values as signified by variable 19, promoting respect
for parents, and

with variable 25, stating that elders, irrespective of
their accomplishments, should be respected.

Determinism

is

closely associated with low

family income, as well as with political inefficacy and distrust in

government as measured by variables 23 and 38, respectively.
The impact of determinism on the political orientation of the

students (Fig.

17) was more varied.

The variables measuring determin-

ism were closely associated with several items also displayed in the
parents'

data, namely respect for elders, particularism (variable 24)
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^^^^^^^ plot of items associated with determinism that/-^iJ^'
influence parents' orientations.
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Scatter plot of items associated with
determinutteninn
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collective orientation
(variable
ariaoie 2?1
di)
1

-

,

the factor analysis
of the parents'

anH i„,
and
low f
family income.

Although

data determinis™ was
associated

With political inefficacy
and distrust in the
govern^nt, the student
data revealed the
opposite.
Determinism in the student
data was
Closely associated with
trust in the government,
as ^asured by
vari-

ables 40 and 42.

Furthermore, variable 18,
measuring authoritarianism
was closely associated
with determinism among the
students.

Determinism among the students
was also negatively
associated
with political participation.
Those students who scored
high on deterniinism seldom read
newspapers,

listened to radio or watched
news on

television.

Furthermore, they seldom
thought or talked about
political
issues and matters.
Another factor associated with
determinism among
the students was a low
level of parental education.
Another interesting
find was the low level of
determinism among the female
students.
Actually the female gender, as
displayed in the graph, was
associated with
a non-deterministic
orientation.

a

Determinism among the students was
also closely associated with
favorable attitude towards
government

21).

aid to the unemployed (variable

As anticipated, the students'

attitude towards fate, as measured

by variable 37, was significantly
associated with determinism.
In short,

determinism

is

responsible for some traditional orien-

tations such as respect for age and
particularism among
and students.

both parents

However, determinism, while associated
with inefficacy

and distrust of the government among
parents, is associated with trust
in the government among the students.
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iraditlonam..

Another set of variables
e^rging

f™™

the factor
analysis was the traditional
factor, indicated by such
ite^s as respect
for parents (variable
19), for elderly (variable
25) and for friends
(variable 39), and particularism
(variable
34).

Traditionalism was positively
associated with pride in the
socio-political system of the
country, as measured by
variable 26, and
was also negatively
associated with

govern^nt aid

(variable 21) among parents.

to the unemployed

Traditionalism was also negatively

associated with chance, betting,
or gambling, as the case
may be, as
measured by variable 37. and
also with religious tolerance,
as measured
by variable 41.

The traditional Indicators
were also closely associ-

ated with such attitudes as
respect for children (variable
33). hard
work (variable 36), and importance
to time, as measured by
variable 29
(see Fig.

18).

Among the students, the same
traditional indicators as mentioned
above were associated with pride in
the socio-political system of the

country (variable 26) yet also with
political distrust, as measured by
variables 30 and 38, and political
inefficacy, as measured by variable
23.

It was clear that those traditional
elements among the students

who had pride In their socio-political
system were rather dissatisfied
with the prevailing political administration
and had

a

high degree of

distrust in the political process.

Among the parents, the norms labeled here as
traditional were
also closely associated with such attitudes
as hard work, as measured

400

with traditional
Scatter plot of items associated
Fig 18
parent's orientations
system values that influence
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Fig. 19.
Scatter plot of items associated with
traditional
^""'^^^^O"^^
system values that influence students'
orientations
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by variables 32, 36 and
46; respect for
Tor rhnn.children, as measured
by variable 33; collectivity
and group action, as
measured by variable 22and importance of time,
as measured by variable
29.
This factor aiso
revealed a close association
between traditionalism, as
indicated by
the designated variables,
and sex of the responding
students, namely
the male students.
While female students were
closely associated with
non-determinism, the male students
were closely associated
with traditional ism.

While there is no conclusive
data here to reveal the
differences

between the male-female student
samples perhaps the apparent
"modernity
among the female students, as
indicated in the previous chapters,
is
the result of their being a
select group of students.
As indicated in
Appendix II, since only a third
of the high school population
of the

country is female, they represent
than male students.

a

group that is more cosmopol i
tan^

Their parents are more educated^^
and family income

tends to be somewhat higher than
that of male students.

Summary.

""^

Although there is an association between
"traditionalism" and

pride in the socio-political system
among both parents and students,
the student sample displayed a
noticeable distrust in the political

process of the government under the Shah's
regime.

traditionalism and anti-government orientation

The combination of

is perhaps

indicative

of the political posture of many who
took part in the uprising against
the Shah's government during 1978 and early
1979 and their support for
the traditionalist elements, namely the clergy.

405

The association
between dete™inis..
traditionalism and
PolUica, trust see.s to
contradict the association
between traditionalls, and pCitica,
distrust, as stated
earlier.
These see.in,„
contradictor, relationships
reveal the socio-political
complexities of
Iranian society.
As also displayed
in the factor
analysis of both
samples, the sa„.
variables are shared by
different or even opposing
groups.

The data analysis also
reveals that the parents'
orientations
are .ore complex and
have been influenced by
a wider variety of
variables, many of which
were not included in the
questionnaire. This is
evident particularly from
the looser association
between the variables
in the correlation
analyses.
This was expected since
the age and
therefore, longer life
experience of parents exposed
them to a greater
variety of socio-cultural
and political influences.
This results, in
turn,

in more sophisticated
individuals with greater nurt,er
of values

influencing perception and
orientation.
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CHAPTER

XI

CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing inquiry has
passed through three stages
of
analyses with varying emphasis
but a unified focus:
political institutions and their place in
the Iranian political system.
If one

believes that the future

is

a

fairly valid reflection of
the past,

given the socio-cultural
continuity of

a

nation, the study of Iranian

political institutions of the
past 70-years and the socio-cultural
milieu of the nation should
shed some light on our path
witn which one
may theorize about future
developments.
Although the Iranian sociopolitical posture at present is
in an extremely fluid state,
our access
to the past history and some
of the prevailing socio-cultural
norms

ought to enable us to predict
some likely future trends and
problems on
the road to political development.
This present analysis began by
eliciting theoretical help from

Lucian Pye who proposes three themes
as necessary for the actualization
of political development in any
society:

entiation.

equality, capacity and differ-

As was noted in presenting Pye's
view, equality connotes

popular participation in the political process.

It also infers that

performance and achievement standards should be used
as qualification
for recruitment into the political system
rather than ascriptive con-

siderations.

Lastly, the ideal of equality assumes that laws will be
407

408

applied equan. to

an

and have

a

universalistic nature.

,.an1an culture has always had so.e
semblance of class structure,
nevertheless
this inclination was
seldo. a barrier to upward
social mobility.
Iranian history is replete
with examples of those who
have cli.bed the
ladder of financial success
fro. humble beginnings.
The Pahlavis are
a case in point.
Reza Shah was a simple
soldier; his father, a
farmer

Transition fro. financial
equality to political equality,
the borders
of which at times become
very blurred, however, was
not as easily
accessible.
Political institutions of
the nation were recreated
or
subverted to serve the purpose
and objectives of the ruling
monarchs.
Loyalty to the throne and
aggrandizement of the tradition of Iranian

mnarchy were the hallmarks of

a

successful politician.

There was
no application of performance
and achievement standards nor
of equal

protection under the law.

Those who favored the regime were
favored

by it; those who opposed it
suffered from it.
a

Although traditionally

high level of education and
professionalism were considered to

facilitate one's entry to the ranks
of the political elite, many
politicians had few such merits but were,
more Importantly, loyal to
the person of the Shah.

Upward political mobility was granted
only

because one supported the regime.

Certainly those with

a high

education and. at the same time, loyalty
to the regime got
share of the political power.

a

level

of

large

At medium levels of bureaucracy, favor-

itism and nepotism traditionally have
determined recruitment rather
than acievement and performance.
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In short,

the Iranian political

institutions were generally

and the institution of
monarchy and at the lower
levels by those placed
through nepotism and
favoritism.

The concept of equality
basically arises from the
belief in
individual rights and the
idea of social contract.

were dealt with in the
Constitution of 1906-07.

Both of these ideas

In fact,

this constitution was the the first
such contract agreed to
between the people
and their soverign.
Many of the proponents of
the constitution, how-

ever, had been moved by
goals which were in opposition
to the merits
of the constitution. The
liberals had hoped for a
democratic system

emulating European democracies
where individual rights, equal
protection of the law, and many
freedoms were guaranteed.

The clergy had

hoped, by reliance on popular
support and blessing, to stop
the growing
tide of Westernization and.
along with It. the secularization
that was

submeriging their traditional
hold and influence on the political
process of the nation.
The ulama, under the leadership
of Sheikh
Nuri, vied to install

Shana (relgious

laws) as the law of the land in

the face of the propositions by
the Western-oriented constitutionalists

who favored

a

secular civil code.

In short,

to the ulama.

democracy became

a

vehicle by which they

could prevent the infiltration of
Western-secular ideals to the Shiah
state, the majority of whose citizens
were illiterate, poor, living in
rural areas and very religious.

Thus, the modern ideals such as social

contracts, individual rights and equal protection of
the law were
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generations, if not centuries,
away fro. the thoughts
of the overwhelming majority.
Due to do^stic
circumstances and foreign
pressure
the constitution was
guaranteed.
The inevitable conflict
between the
Western-oriented intellectuals
and the ujama led to the
civil war
(1908-1909), from which the
moderates emerged victorious.
Their
victory Signalled the beginning
of a new era. Modernization
and secularization became the dominant
then^.
These ideals had to be
forced
on a largely traditional
society.
Values, norms and mores had
to be
altered and changed.
The
>ic btruins
strains OT
nf tms
thic cfnii
3
still t
linger on after 70
years since the inception of
the constitution.

Although education greatly
enhanced the introduction and
acceptance of modernization, the
socio-cul tural environment still
retained
a great deal of influence
over the socialization process
which in turn

made the application and
infusion of these ideals
task.

a

very difficult

Familialism still dominated the
cultural perspective of most

Iranians.

As such,

and consensus.

individuals were not freed from customs,
traditions

As noted by Robert Lane,

individual freedom and cogni-

tive complexity are required
to enable one to think for himself.

Indi-

vidualism and, thus, the concept of
equality were stages above the
prevailing socio-political sentiments.

A constitution and forced

modernization could not result in changes
overnight, particularly
during

a

century where political stability was shortlived.

Although the data analysis suggested that the
students were
more secular-minded (variable 41) than the
parents, the students, none-

theless, displayed

a

strong institutional and traditional preference
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(variables ,7. ,9.24.
25 and 34) si.1,ar to that
of the parents
So^e traditional values
which were contrary to
the e^ualit. then.,
such
as the unquestionable
Hght of authority, were present
in the textbooks
Most often the entries in
the ele^ntary and
particularly
the
guidance school texts were
borrowed fro. traditional
Persian literature
'
™any of which stressed
the wisdo™ and compassion
of Mngs, .ulers and
governors for their suDjects.
subiect^;
in all,
;.n
^
In
over one-quarter of the
entries
in these texts stressed
some noble authority as
the main figure
seldom did any of the entries
portray the attitudes of
the authority
figure as anything less
than benevolent.
In the few cases where
the
authority acted in error or
wickedness, a higher authority
emerged as
benevolent and corrected the
wrongdoing.
Few stories showed overt
challenges of established
authority.

m

Historically, when the system
faltered, the desire for adjudication was replaced with fatalism.

As discussed previously, the
history

of the nation with its experiences
of invasions, the physical
harshness
of the land, and natural disasters
all contributed to the birth
of a
man who feels insecure and
fatalistic.

Most writers on Iran have

discussed the high level of distrust
present among the people.

Famil-

ialism encourages the individual's
isolation from other members of the

society and thus does not encourage
mutual cooperation between the
citizenry.

As a result, attributes such as hard
work, achievement,

affect and thoughtful ness

,

and self-discipline blossom and benefit

family and kin, with their outcome only
on occassion spilling over to
the society in general

to the benefit of others.
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Distrust of the government
was very much in evidence
from the
parent-student questionnaires.
At the same time, however,
there were
high demands on the
government.
It was expected that
the government
Should aid the poor and needy.
The most interesting point,
however was
the amount of power that
was delegated to the
government (variable 18).
The trend confirmed
persistence of the traditional
perception of the
role of government-that it
ought to do ^ood and deliver
^ood things
to the public.
The distrust of
a

particular leader-i.e., the Shah-

however, did not seem to have
caused much change in the
people's perception of the authority of the
government.
The Western contractual form of
government has evolved through

certain historical molds that had
no similar counterparts in the
Iranian
experience.
Reformation, for example, settled the
tension between the

secular and ecclesiastical forces in
Europe.

Following the industrial

revolution, the conflict between the ruling
class and the middle class
was resolved by social contracts.

remained absolute and autocratic.
role of the sovereign.

In Iran,

on the other hand, the king

Such was demanced and such was the

The king, since the rise of Shi 'ism during
the

Safavid period, personified the aggregation
of political
religious sentiments.

as well

as

It was only with the threat of Western
influence

and the increasing humiliation of the
Shiah State at the hands of the

imperial powers of Russia and Britain that there was

a

challenge to the

authority of the monarch by checking the absolute powers
of the monarchy.
For

a

political system to operational ize the theme of equality,

first and foremost the individual and his rights must be recognized.
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In a society where
individual

recognition is largely
dependent on

familial, clan.and tribal
association, universalis,
as a basis of its
operation would be difficult,
if not impossible, to
undertake.
The editors of the Farsi
readers, besides the
customary and
required lip service to the
Shah and his family,
attempted to put out
texts Which intended to
instill orientations and
attitudes in students
which would be conducive to
the goals of development.

The shortcomings of the
entries were basically

a projection of
the complexity of the
cultural environn^nt which has
surrounded the
life of Persian literature.
Although equality is often
enumerated as
virtue and praised as a merit,
in practice, it has been
often neglected.
The strong influence of
spiritualism and mysticism which is
sustained
by the Platonic vision of
man, manifested in Sufi
philosophy, comprises
a part of Iranian literary
tradition which confutes the other
part of
this tradition which is nourished
by Western realist tradition,
embodied
1n the teachings of Islam.
Such realism is most visible in
the excerpts

from Saadi in the textbooks.

They emphasize supremacy of education,

actualization of skill and knowledge,
equality, impulse control, contentment, moderation, philanthropy and
love for human kind, social

responsibility and self-reliance.
Despite the overwhelming influence of culture
and tradition,
there seemed to be factors that were
influencing the student's orientation which were conducive to the idea of
equality.

Such

a

tendency was

evident in the students' responses to the idea
of speech against
religion (variable 41).

Almost twice as many students as parents seemed

to

s.ppon

the i.ea of speech
against .e,1,1o„,

be construed as belief
1„

Through

u.UUu., Hghts

,„ ,

and f.eedo. of
speech

a

cuestion as controversial
as the one 1„
variable 41, it was
evident that a traditional
and fundamentalist
society such as Iran
over t1.e, could conform
to values and norms
conducive to the them^

of

equal ity.
In pre-Const1tut1onal

Iran, the

number of departments
staffed with

a

govern^nt consisted of

a

small

scant number of employees

With
the advent of
constitutional government and
Western-style governmental
-stuutlons. the number of
bureaucrats multiplied rapidly.
Despite
the extensive growth In
the number of offices
and people working for

the government, the
effectiveness and efficiency of
government perfor-

mance remained minimal.

A strong ruler, such as
Reza Shah, who reigned

from 1925-1941 was the main
guarantor of performance.

He personally

-ade the decisions that
were carried through by the
bureaucracy and he
personally checked every aspect
of the performance.
As a result, the

bureaucracy was left with little
power.
services to the public.

It was

Reza Shah who delivered

The government and all other
Institutions were

there to perform their duties
as Instructed by the monarch.
was feared.

Reza Shah

Any public servant who was
unable to deliver results on

an assignment would certainly
feel

the wrath of the king.

Thus, the

governmental Institutions were primarily
motivated by the dictate to

perform to satisfy the king's objectives
In order to avert the harsh
results of failure-a relationship
similar to that of

teacher In the traditional maktab
(school).

a

student and

The bureaucracy remained
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totally dependent on the
person of the Shah.

As s.ch,

1t only super-

ficially resembled its
Western counterparts in Europe.

Thus, the
institutional modernization
claimed by the Pahlavis was
superimposed
and artificial.

The effectiveness of the
bureaucracy remained unquestionabl
e as
long as the king remained
in power.
The authority of the central
government reached the remotest
corners of the nation.
A conscript
army was organized and put
into operation for the first
time in Iranian
history.
Furthermore, new civil codes were
drawn and put into effect
which were secular in nature
and influenced by similar
European codes.

Following the forced abdication
of Reza Shah in 1941, however,
the institutions of government
and bureaucracy experienced
chaos and
total disarray.

The army almost disintegrated and,
as

a

result, chal-

lenges to the government's authority
from many regions of the country

were raised.

The ineffectiveness of government
control and influence

was very much evident.
a

political administration that had depended
on one man as the control-

ling influence.
as

This was the obvious and natural
consequence of

The system was effective and able to
deliver as long

the captain remained on the keel.

ical

The overdependence of the polit-

administration on the directives of the Shah was
catastrophic for

the system.

At the same time, many of the reforms imposed
on the system

were undone either due to neglect or lack of
faith.
Perhaps the overriding factor keeping the nation
together was
the presence in Iran of the contending allied
forces (1941-1946) which

took charge of security in their respective zones
and deemed it in their
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own best interest to
resurrect the Majlis as an
arena for their respective political aspirations.
As a result, the
traditional forces of
the web system soon
emerged and the traditional
tensions of the political system gave rise to
a period of relative
political freedom with
the Constitution as the
compelling force of the system.
Despite the

many prevailing weaknesses,
the Majlis was able to
deliver several
important legislative bills
which were to affect Iran's
political and
economic posture for many years
to come.

The lessons of Reza Shah,
however, were lost to his son,
Moharmiad-Reza Shah who took power
in 1941.

He committed the same mis-

takes by making the system, once
again, dependent on royal
directives,

mainly to secure the hold of
the monarchy.
parties were created in the royal
image.
and national bureaucracies
eign.

were

Parliament and political
All

dependent

political institutions

on orders from the sover-

The bureaucracies, by now, were many
times bigger than under

Reza Shah and employed hundreds of
thousands of people.

ineffectiveness and corruption were rampant.
balances had broken down.

Civil

The system of checks and

servants took no restponsibi

any action lest they suffer the consequences
in
paranoia.

Inefficiency,

a

1 i

ty for

growing government

Thus, paperwork and red tape increasingly
gave rise to

frustrated and

a

dejected public.

a

Unlike the Reza Shah period, however,

there were no serious investigations or threats
against civil servants
for job failure, wrongdoings, or inefficiency.

Civil

service positions,

in fact, were sought after since one
could do almost nothing while

earning

a

living at

a

very secure job.
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The distrust of government
displayed by both parents
and
students, coupled with a
relatively high level of
political inefficacy
as

reflected in the questionnaires,
supported the above argu„«nts
that
few people felt satisfaction
with government's performance.
A vast
n.ajority of parents and
students thought that the
governnent was influenced by a few big interests
and that many people in
the government

were crooked.

Moreover. so„^ half of the
respondents in both samples

indicated that the government
needlessly wasted

a

lot of money.

Apparently, the respondents had
great doubts concerning the
governtrent's
effectiveness and efficiency.
The ethical tradition of kingship
perpetuated the concept of an
ideal ruler who ought to deliver
things and lead the nation on
the

^

right course.

The expectations that

a

king be pious, just and compas-

sionate, among other things, was
reflected in the books of statecraft

already referred to in the main
text.
in many of the entries

These expectations, reflected

in the textbooks,

certainly promoted this concept

of the ruler's responsibility
and his capacity to deliver.

Kings are

traditionally perceived as the highest
authority and as responsible for
the performance, effectiveness and
efficiency of their administrations.

Subordinates are responsible to the kings.

Kings have an ethical

responsibility to the people and moral responsibility
to God for the
performance of their duties;

a

just king is seen as the shadow of God

on earth.

The political administration of the nation in recent
decades

seemed to have had as its highest priority the preservation of
the
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Pahlavi system not by tending
to the inadequacies of
the system with
its inefficiency and
ineffectiveness, but by silencing
any criticism of
the systems inadequacies.
This should be viewed against
the traditional
expectations of the ruler.
The system suffered from
severe

ca^

problems, where its institutions
were not capable of performing
their
duties, thus resulting in
failures and impotence in the
execution of

public policies.

The system suffered from criticism
on the one side,

by those who had high
traditional expectations from their
ruler, and,
on the other side,

from those who saw the failure of
the political

system as the result of the Shah's
meddling in the integrity of the
political institutions conceived by the
Constitution

Furthermore, the system faced

a

variety of challenges.

With

the highest priority of the government
being the preservation of the

Pahlavi

rule,

to enable the rule to continue and,

economic development was perceived

as

a

support for the system would be gained.

perhaps, to prosper,

tangible course whereby some
Due to the nature of inequality

present in the system, those who benefited most
from the system were
those who were connected with the system already.

The widening gap

between the rich and the poor, so evident in recent
years, became
severe handicap and

a

cause of bitter complaints.

expectations following the flow of petro-dol 1 ars
equacies became more pronounced.

,

a

With the rising
the system's inad-

The government was unable to deliver

some of the most basic demands such as piped water and
electricity to
city dwellers, many of whom were recent migrants from farms.

Reforms

to correct the system's ineffectiveness and inefficiency were either
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late or totally absent.

The systen, had beco»
dependent on approval

and even initiative for
all projects of
consequence on the person
of
the Shah and. with the
increase in spending, the
Shah was hardly ahle
to keep up With the
pace.
The syste. structure,
at the sa^ ti™e. had

made it rather impossible
for anybody else to
take responsibility or
initiative.
Furthermore, with huge
government revenues, the Shah
had
become more interested in
extravagant projects than in
those which
in^proved the public lot.
,n short, the political
system was handicapped by its lack of capacity
to perform in either
the traditional
orientation or the modern mode.
Closely related to system
capacity

specialization of system structure"
which

is
is

"differentiation and
perceived by Lucian Pye

to be the third theme of
political development.

The constitution had

perceived three separate but equal
branches in the organization of
the
government.
They included executive,
legislative and judiciary.

Although the concept was basically
aimed at reducing the power of the
rulers, creating checks and balances
on the process of political
admin-

istration and safeguarding the
individual's rights, it also gave rise
to differentiation and
specialization in the structure of government
in

the macro sense.

Furthermore, the division of government
responsibil-

ities into as many as 24 ministries
and seven ministers without portfolio,

in

recent years, reflected the modern and
Western concept of

role specificity and job differentiation.

However, the ministries

performed little independent planning on their
own.

The ministries

were relegated the job of actualization of the
plans and projects
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envisioned and dictated at
tne highest policy .akin,
level.
It would
be, however, far fro.
the truth to say that
the Shah hi.self
conceived
an Plans and projects. He
relied heavily on his
advisors

for policy
direction and at times
supported, for implementation,
certain plans
conceived by his ministers.
Such plans could not reach
a policy state
unless they were supported
by the Shah or made into
one of his "pet"

projects.

Again the Shah's role
symbolized that of

a

medieval king

who initiated all plans and
projects and the public servants
were there
to carry them out and to
make sure that they were
actualized.

Another shortcoming of Shah
Mohammad-Reza'
approach was his reliance on

a

administrative

s

few loyal diehard politicians
who per-

formed many different and even
opposing roles.

Such job rotation did

not imply that these men had
administrative capability, outstanding

performance, or brilliance but only
that they had the loyalty and

submission to serve the Shah at any
position.

Such job rotation also

served to prevent any politician from
developing
from wnich he might conceivably pose
there were

a

a

a

strong power base

threat to the Shah.

Of course,

few who exibited a course independent
from that of the

throne's approach to political and economic
affairs.

Such individuals,

on suspicion of wavering loyalty, would
be cast into either political

oblivion or into exile where many would join
the ranks of the opposition.

The concept of renaissance man who
all

is

capable of undertaking

roles is still very strong, both among those who have

education and among those who claim experience.

a

college

There is little
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understanding or appreciation
for the concept of
role differentiation
and job specialization
In .ost Iranian ™inds.
Differentiation and
specialization 1.pl, that
a group of individuals
«ould, for a co^on
purpose. con,e together to
strive to reach a proposed
co™,on goal each
by taking part In the
section of the project that
falls within his
specialty.
Insecurity, self-preservation
and distrust render
Inoperable
the concept of Interdependence
which would initiate a free
flow of
Ideas fro. one sector of
the government or economy
to another.
Extreme
jealousy, envy and lack of
cooperation governed the
relationships
between the different segments
of the administration.
It was rather
usual to learn about similar
projects going on in several
ministries

without one department knowing
about the project of the other
department.
Most reports on projects, without

any rational reason, would
be

stamped "secret" and thus out of
circulation.

So, specialization and

differentiation in Iranian political
structure meant fragmentation and
isolation of different components
of the government from each
other.
These pieces came together only
at the highest levels of decision
making.

Although there is role specificity and
job differentiation

explicit in the Iranian tradition,
reflected in the establishment of
guilds, there is no functional
differentiation reflected in the structure of political administration.

This could be attributed to the

tradition of divine right of kings in which
the king was seen as the

ultimate source of decisions.

Though sometimes advice was sought from

confidants, there was no obligation on the part of
the king to demand
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or use such help.

Traditional political systems
operated on such a
premise:
some tribal primitive
cultures still do.
In the latter cases,
the autocratic ruler has the
capacity to deliver due mainly
to the

simple nature of such societies.

As societies modernize
and public

expectations grow, need for
differentiation and job delegation
becomes
a necessity.
In short, a modernizing
society cannot function within
a
traditional framework; such a
system, sooner or later, is
doomed to
fai

1

ure.
In summary,

the tradition of political

institutions in Iran, as

discussed here, does not meet any of
the criteria put forth by Lucian
Pye as essential

to political development.

The political tradition

remains one dominated by particularism
based on

nepotism and loyalty.

a

system of rewards,

The political system, due to the
nature of divine

rule and one man's domination of the
total political process, had been

rendered incapable of delivering to

a

large and complex society its

needs and wants and, thus, remained ineffective
and inefficient.

Initi-

ation of all major policies by the monarch
at the highest level of the

government prevented the institutions of government
from functional

specificity and specialization of structure that was
foreseen as
necessary by the constitution.

The control and influence by the throne

rendered the three but equal branches of the government
into the ineffectual domain of the monarch.
The analysis of parent-student orientations also revealed a

strong preference among the vast majority for

a

traditional political

system with high popular expectations from the government.

There was
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acceptance of so.e social
inequality by
proportions among parents and
students.

„,ost

respondents, in similar

Furthermore, there was

a

basic trust of the professional
capabilities of government
employees
However, there existed a high
level of political inefficacy
and distrust of the government
suggesting widespread dissatisfaction
regarding
its capabilities to deliver
^ood things. The data suggested
that
distrust of the government
a«Bng parents was not only by
those who had
a high level of
education, who very likely favored
a democratic and

Western style government, but
also by those who preferred the
traditional

Iranian concept of administration,
as discussed earlier, whereby
the ruler is bestowed by a
divine right to rule and is bound
by ethical
and moral obligations to his
subjects.
In other words, the Shah
had
failed to gain the support of
the democraticly oriented segment
of the

population because of his autocratic
and undemocratic rule and, at the
same time, had failed to attract
the support of the traditional
elements
who would have supported his traditional
approach to political administration.

The textbooks reflected the ideal
circumstances of

system where justice and compassion prevailed.
depicted

a

a

political

Most of the entries

traditional framework of administration where
kings were

responsible, ethical and moral in fulfilling their
duties.

The rulers

took responsibility for the actions of the
bureaucracy and corrected
its wrongs.

With such expectations from the system transferred
to the

minds of the youth and with increasing demands put on
the system for

delivery of goods due to rapid modernization, the traditional
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orientation put all responsibility
on the monarchy-1 .e.
the Shah
,
The individuals responsibility.
1„ retrospect, «as only
to be obedient
to a just ruler.
The insufficiency of the
political system to deliver
on its
presumed duties, its lack of
cohesi veness
rampant corruption and
,

subservience to international
superpowers were all in dire
contrast
to notions developed and
nurtured by the presentations in
the textbooks.
Perhaps,

a

kind of political confusion
and schizophrenia was
developed

among the polity by the heralded
glory of the past in contrast
with the
realities of the present. The
textbooks were filled with the
details
of innovations and achievements
in ancient Iran and the
accomplishments
in the West during the
past few centuries while recent
Iranian history
was devoid of similar major
achievements.
The constant stress on the

glorious accomplishments of the past,
particularly with the attempted

connections to the ancient Persian
Empire by the Pahlavi monarchs,

emulated in the concept of "Great
Civilization," contrasted with the
inability of the system to deliver on
such promises, resulting in public

frustration and alienation.

The raised expectations remained high,

reaching even higher levels with the surge
in oil income after 1973.
In the face of unrealized goals and
unkept promises,

distrust in government and political inefficacy,

as

the level of

displayed in the

data analysis, was certainly understandable.

Education seemed to cause little difference in parent orientation.
in

Parent's education, on the other hand, was of some significance

increasing the level of political awareness among students.

Although
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the student's traditional
orientation was perhaps son^what
altered by
his own education or that
of his parent, nevertheless,
it remained

strong among all respondents
(see Table 41).

The persistence of many

traditional perspectives such
as determinism (variables
19, 43 and 44),
respect for age despite the
qualitative aspects of an individual
(variable 25), respect for friends
(variables 27 and 39), and
respect
for social standing (variable
24) was posited as discouraging
to the
Idea of political development.

It was partly these attitudes
that gave

rise to inequality and
particularism in the application of
political
laws and rules.
These orientations, furthermore,
reduced the capactity
of the political system to perform
effectively and efficiently despite
the high level of training and
skill at the disposal of the
political

bureaucracy.
The authoritative rule of kings,
particularly during the Pahlavi
era, had in fact prevented the
development of political

institutions if

one is to uphold Huntington's view
of the process of political develop-

ment.

In his

view, political

institutions develop as

a

result of

competing social conflicts, and institutions
take the form of arenas
for resolving such disagreements.

Since the Pahlavis resolved all

problems, made all the decisions and allocated
all the resources from
the top,

there was little or no conflict to be passed down
to the

institutions devised by the constitution for decision
making purposes.
The duty of political

institutions remained two-fold--to given an aura

of constitutionality and thus legitimacy to the
process of decision
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making and to act as channels
for dissemination of news
and information
from the top of the pyramid
to the public at the bottom.
The web system, inherent in
the traditional political
structure
of the nation could have
been of great service in the
development of
political institutions.
The web system traditionally
transcended the
tension between the competing
centers of political influence.
It

proved its viability during the
parliamentary periods when the institutions of the government remained
populist and the national interest
was the overriding goal in
decision making.

Despite the ovemhelming

presence of the aristocracy and
the landowners, or their
representatives, in institutions such as
the Majlis, the parliamentary
system
did not spur on any feeling
that the parliamentary system was
a stumping
ground for the oligarchy.
With the addition of new segments
to the web system, such as
the military,

a

strong bureaucracy, and

tension became even more balanced.

a

new economic elite, the

The web system seemed more ready

than ever before to assume its role in
the political
In contract,

life of the nation.

there was an added hesitation by the monarch
to share

power and the decision making process.

With the suppression of all

opposition organizations, including the moderates
and traditional elements, and denial of

a

safety valve for the accumulating political

demands, frustrations and dissent finally resulted in
political
violence.

The government sponsored political institutions— i

.e.

,

the

political parties and the Majlis--as means of political modernization
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were too anificial and.
thus, were unsuccessful
1n gaining legitimacy
or grassroots support.
Cultural environment is
constantly evolving and, in
a sense
is organic.
Although it is rooted in the
past and inspired by longheld beliefs and customs,
it cannot exist in
isolation due to new and

modern developments in
communication techniques.
is

impressed by

a

Thus, it would be

have

a

A nation consequently

great many factors from outside
its own environment.
a

great mistake to assume that
cultures-or nations-

uniform vision of

a

political system throughout their
history.

The people-culture cycle
evolves and so do their demands
on the political system.
Nowadays the people have definite
demands from their
government.
These demands include moral and
ethical responsibility
(variables 30,
and 35).

31

and 38) and explicit economic
demands (variables 21

With the complexities of the
socio-economic situation,

economic demands may-or have-become
more crucial than before.

The

public awareness, as shown by the
data, is increasing from generation
to generation, and as such it will
continue to expand.

Education may

be greatly responsible for increased
public conscience and responsibil-

ity (variable 41), but pride in nation
and tradition remain high.

Culture and tradition certainly are not isolated
phenomena.

influenced by

a

They are

great variety of agents, including education.

education and culture act in

a

sort of symbiotic relationship.

textbooks certainly reflect this relationship.

As such,

The

However, emphasis of

certain norms, while de-emphasizing certain others deemed not
helpful
for the development process, should show some results in
the long term
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supporting Of the emphasized
no™s.

Institutions such as
education
however, are challenged in
their socialization
influence by formidable
counterparts such as family.
The hope regains that
education will
influence parents which In
turn will influence the
children, which in
turn.over time, will be
absorbed and become part of
the cultural tradition.
Such a procedure was
somewhat evident among the
students whose
fathers had a high level
of education.
It will be a while,
however,
before any appreciable change
conducive to political
development can
be detected and examined
among the general public.

Nevertheless, since the educated
people tend to compose most
of the political elite
and the politicized public,
the impact of education on the behavior of the
polity should be evident in short
to
mid-term.
Rationality, equality and efficiency
are among the traits
of such a political elite.

The present modicum of government
in Iran,

however, may suggest an opposite
view leaning in the direction of
irrationality, fanaticism and
isolationism.
Lessons of the past history,
however, are

a

prescription for tomorrow.

Excesses of the Pahlavi

regime, particularly in the undermining
of traditional political tensions, resulted in total demise of
that system.

Ignoring history and

the contending social and political
forces and subjegation of web

members to the will of one force, in
any administration,
and major step in the direction of
instability.

is

the first

Not only will the

system operate ineffectively, but it will not
gain legitimacy.

To con-

tinue to Impose its will on the public,
especially the politicized
public, the government will have to resort to
repression which Is the
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second, and p.oba.,, the
,ast step .efo.e its
doo.-i„
to the Pahlavi
experience.

a

™„„e. si.ila.
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QUESTIONNAIRES
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The following 1s the
translation of the original
questionnaire
which was in Farsi. The format
and the design follow
exactly the
original questionnaire.

Part One

Sex

1)

1.

4)

1.

[

]

2.

[

]

3.

[

]

4.

[

]

2.

[

]

25 years or less
26 to 30 years old
31 to 35 years old
36 to 40 years old

5.

[

]

5.

[

]

7.

[

]

8.

[

]

3.

[

]

4.

[

]

Number of Children
1. [ ]
No children

3.

[

]

4

[

]

Female

[

]

One or two children

41 to 45 years old
46 to 50 years old
51 to 60 years old
More than 60 years old

Divorced
Widowed

Three or four children
Five or more children

Religion
.

[

]

Shi a Moslem

5.

[

]

2.

[

]

Sunni Moslem

6.

[

]

3.

[

]

Zoroastrian

7.

C

]

4.

[

]

Orthodox Christi an

[

]

1

6)

Male

Marital Status
1. [ ]
Single
2. [ ]
Married

2.

5)

]

Age

2)

3)

[

Education (specify highest achievement)
1.
No educational training
7. r
]
[
2,
Traditional
education
]
[
[
3,
Few years grade school
]
9. [
[
4.
Sixth grade
]
[
9- [
5.
7th to 9th grade
11
]
[
[
6.
10th to 12 grade
12
[ ]
[

i
]
]
]

]
]

Catholic or Protestant
Jewish
Other religions (please
specify)

High school diploma
Few years college or AA
Bachelors or equivalent
M.A. or equivalent
M.D, or equivalent
Ph.D. or equivalent
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Your Job

7)

"I-

C

]

Professional or techni-

6.

L

J

Farmer or farm related

[

]

[

]

Production worker or
dri ver
Military or police
Housewife
Other (Please specify)

cal
2.

[

]

3.

[

]

4.

[

]

5.

[

]

Administration or manage 7.
ment
Clerical or related
8.
Sales or related
9.
Service sector
10.

Average monthly family income
1. [ ]
Less than 30,000 rials
2. [ ]
30,000 to 49,999 rials
3. [ ]
50,000 to 74,999 rials
4. [ ]
75,000 to 99,999 rials
5. [ ]
100,000 to 124,999 rial

8)

L

J

[

]

6.

[

]

7.

L

J

8.

[

]

9.

[

]

10.

[

]

125,000 to 149,999 rials
150,000 to 199,999 rials
200,000 to 249,999 rials
250,000 to 299,999 rials
More than 300,000 rials

9)

10)

a.

Your place of birth

b.

Your city of residence

c.
1.

How many years have you been
Less than one year
[
]

I
J.

L

r

1

J

11"" ^n^^^''^
to 10 years

b

ding in this place'?
[ ]
10 to 15 years
5- ^ ^
15 to 20 years
6. [ ]
More than 20 years

ri si

4.

From what country did you receive your last
degree?
Iran (name of the city or university?)
]
[
U.S.A.
6. [ ]
Great Britain
^- ^ ]
Canada
3. [ ]
7. [ ]
other European countries
France
4. [ ]
8. [ ]
Other Asian countries
5. [ ]
Germany
9. [ ]
other countries
1.

Part Two

12)

Some people often listen to the news on the radio or TV, how about
you?
1. [ ]
I
1 is ten
to the news everyday
2. [ ]
I
1 is ten
to the news a few times a week
3. [ ]
I
1 is ten
to the news a few times a month
4. C ]
I
1 isten
to the news once every few months
5. [ ]
I
seldom 1 isten to the news
6. [ ]
I
never listen to the news
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Some people often read newspaper
and magazine articles about
polit^
ical and social matters, how about
you?

13)

I
I
I
I
I
I

them everyday
them a few times a week
them a few times a month
them once every few months
seldom read them
never read them

Some people often converse about the
political and economic issues
of our country with their friends, how about
you?

14)

I
I

I
I
I
I

15)

read
read
read
read

talk
talk
talk
talk

about such issues everyday
about such issues a few times a week
about such issues a few times a month
about such issues once every few months
seldom talk about such issues
never talk about such issues

Some people often think about the political and
economic condition
of our country, how about you?
I

I
I

I
I
I

think about it everyday
think about it a few times a week
think about it a few times a month
think about in once every few months
seldom think about such conditions
never think about such conditions

Part Three

16)

If you get bad news, it is better to hide what you feel
as if you don t care.

and behave

'

17)

1.

[

]

I

2.

[

]

I

3.

[

]

I

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

disagree somewhat
disagree
agree stongly

When

a man is born, the success he is going to have is already in
the cards, so he might as well accept it and not fight against it.

1.

[

]

I

2.

[

]

I

3.

[

]

I

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly
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The government should have plenty
of power and influence
over
people's lives.

18)

1.

C

]

I

2.

[

]

I

3.

]

[

I

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

There is hardly anything lower than
a person who does not
feel
great love, gratitude, and respect for
his parents.

19)

1.

[

]

I

2.

[

]

I

3.

[

]

I

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

a

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

20) The negative opinion of others often keeps me
from seeing a movie
or play I had planned to attend.

^

^

1.

C

]

I

2.

[

]

I

3-

C

]

I

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

[

]

I

[

]

I

[

]

I

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

21) The government should give money and food to
the unemployed.
1.

[

]

I

2.

[

]

I

3.

[

]

I

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

22) There is no satisfaction in any good without a companion.
.

[

]

I

2.

[

]

I

3.

[

]

I

1

23)

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that
like me can't really understand what is going on.
1.

2.
3.

]

I

[

]

I

[

]

I

[

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

a

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

person
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24) There are some people like arp^t ;»rtic+c

forgiven ^0.
1.

[

]

I

2.

[

]

I

3.

I

]

[

.r.A

„^tVl„,t„\7^eVa\T:^^?Se'.r^r 1*^3^1

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

25) Respect is due an older man no matter
what kind of a person he is
1-

[

]

I

2.

[

]

I

3-

[

^-

[

]

I

[

]

I

2.
3-

I

]

I

]

[

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

''^iVL'mrtances.''
1.

3.

]

I

]

I

[

2.

[
[

I

]

]

I

]

I

[

]

I

[

]

I

[

]

I

[

]

I

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

[
[

[

]

I

[

]

I

[

]

I

1.

[

]

I

[

]

I

[

]

I

3.

29)

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

opinion is not easily swayed by what

papers.

2.

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

^^endship; friends don't change with

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

28) My political

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

I

read in the

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

It would irritate me very much to have a watch
or clock which was

off by several minutes everyday.

1.

2.
3.

]

I

[

]

I

[

]

I

[

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly
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Some people believe that
the government is overly
influenced hv
'""'^"'^^
a few big interests
looking out for themselves

30)

1.

[

2,

L

3,

[

]

I

J

I

I

]

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4.

[

J

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

31) Over the years,

the government has paid no
attention to
^'^^^ th«
the
^° wh.t
people think when it decides what
to do.

1-

[

2-

[

3.

32)

L

]

I

J

I
I

]

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

set difficult goals for myself
which

I

I
I

I

[

]

I

[

]

I

L

J

I

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

I

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

attempt to reach,

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

34) A man with money cannot really learn how to behave
in a polite
society if has not had the proper upbringing.
1.

[

J

2-

L

]

[

]

3.

35)

I

1.

I

I

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

j

I

think the government wastes needlessly
pay in taxes.
[

]

2.

[

J

3.

[

]

I
I

I

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4.

a

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

lot of the money that

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly
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''^
'

theVesuUs!

1.

[

]

I

2.

[

]

I

3.

37)

[

I

I

]

enjoy

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

[

]

I

[

]

I

[

]

I

^^^^^^^^ -til

race or game better when

1.

38)

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

'

a

23-

'''''''''''

I

I

a. satisfied with

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

bet on it.

I

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

think some people in the government
are crooked.

1.

[

]

I

2.

[

]

I

[

]

I

3.

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

No sane, decent person would ever
think of hurting

39)
•

[

]

I

2.

[

]

I

[

]

I

1

3-

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

a

close friend,

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

The government usually knows what is best for
people.

40)
1-

[

]

I

2.

[

]

I

3.

[

]

I

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4.
5.

6.

]

I

[

]

I

[

]

I

[

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

If a person wanted to make a speech in this
community against
religion, he should be allowed.

41)

1.

[

]

I

2.

[

]

I

3.

[

]

I

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4.
5.

6.

]

I

[

]

I

[

]

I

[

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

People running the government are smart people who usually know
what they are doing.

42)

1

.

2.
3.

]

I

[

]

I

[

]

I

[

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly
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''Z%::l'.
1-

C

]

I

2.

[

]

I

3.

[

I

]

''"'^ -^1-^

'

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4-

[

]

I

3-

L

J

I

6-

t

]

I

^-^'y ever work

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

Nowadays with world conditions
the wav thev arp
th.
lives for today and lets
tomorrow take care of I'tseTf!'

44)

•

1.

[

]

I

2.

[

]

I

3.

[

]

I

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

"soraebod^''
1.

[

]

I

2.

[

]

I

3.

46)

[

I

.

[

]

I

2.

[

]

I

3.

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

[

]

I

L

]

I

6.

[

]

I

""^'"'"^

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

to

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

^

[

]

I

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

f^vor from

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

often do somethi ng just to prove
to myself that

I

1

]

'° '°

4.
5-

I

can do it.

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

'
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itudent_^uestionna^
The following 1s the
translation of the original
questionnaire
Which was in Farsl.
The format and the design
follow exactly the
original questionnaire.

1)

Sex
1.

2)

3)

4)

[

2.

[

]

Female

Age
1,

[

]

2.

L

]

3.

[

]

4.

L

J

Less than 14 years
Fourteen years old
Fifteen years old
Sixteen years old

5.

[

]

6.

[

]

7.

[

]

8.

[

]

[

J

[

]

Seventeen years old
Eighteen years old
Nineteen years old
Twenty or more years old

Education
1.

[

]

2.

[

]

9th grade
10th grade

11th grade
12th grade

Father's education
[

]

[

]

[

]

[

]

[

]

[

5)

Male

]

]

No educational training
Traditional education
Few years grade school
Sixth grade
7th to 9th grade
10th to 12th grade

7.

[

]

8.

[

]

[

]

9.

lo

[

]

[

]

[

]

11

12

High School diploma
Few years of college or AA
Bachelors or equivalent
M.A. or equivalent
M.D. or equivalent
Ph.D. or equivalent

Number of children in your family
1.

[

]

2.

[

]

One or two
Three of four

[

]

[

]

Five or six
Seven or more
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6)

Where do you stand in age
among the children in your
family?
1.

[

]

2.

[

]

3.

C

]

4.

[

]

Oldest child
Second child
Third child
Fourth child

7)

Your place of birth

8)

Your place of residence

9)

Mother's education
No educational training
Traditional education
Few years grade school
Sixth grade
7th to 9th grade
10th to 12th grade

10)

[

]

C

]

7.

[

]

Fifth child
Youngest
Other (please specify)

High school diploma
Few years college or AA
Bachelors or equivalent
M.A. or equivalent
M.D. or equivalent
Ph.D. or equivalent

7.

8.

9.

lo.

n*
12

Your father's job
1.

2.

11)

5.

6.

[

]

[

]

3.

[

]

4.

[

]

5.

[

]

Professional or
technical
Administration or
Management
Clerical or related
Sales or related
Service sector

6.

[

]

7.

[

]

8.

[

]

9.

[

]

Farmer or farm- related
Production laborer or
driver
Armed forces or police
Other (please specify)

Your family's average monthly in
1.

[

]

2.

[

]

3.

[

]

4.

[

]

5.

[

]

Less than 30,000 rials
6.
30,000 to 49,999 rials
7.
50,000 to 74,999 rials
8.
75,000 to 99,999 rials
9.
100,000 to 124,999 rials 10.

[

]

[

]

[

]

[

]

[

]

125,000 to 149,999 rials
150,000 to 199,999 rials
200,000 to 249,999 rials
More than 250,000 rials
Mot available

470

Part Two

Some jople often listen to the news
on the radio or TV, how about

12)

listen to the
listen to the
listen to the
listen to the
seldom listen
never list to

1.

2.
3.

4.
5.

6.

Some people often read newspaper and magazine
articles about
political and social matters, how about you?

13)

read
read
read
read

1.

them everyday
them a few times a week
them a few times a month
them once every few months
seldom read them
never read them

2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

14)

Some people often converse about the political and economic
of our country with their friends, how about you?
I

15)

news everyday
news a few times a week
news a few times a month
news every few months
to news
news

2.

I

3.

I

4.

I

5.

I

6.

I

i

talk
talk
talk
talk

about such issues everyday
about such issues a few times a week
about such issues a few times a month
about such issues once every few months
seldom talk about such issues
never talk about such issues

Some people often think about the political and economic condition
of our country, how about you?
1.

[

2.

[

3.

L

r

]

I

]

I

]

I

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

J

I

6.

[

]

I

think about it everyday
think about it a few times a week
think about it a few times a month
think about it once every few months
seldom think about such conditions
never think about such conditions.

471

Part Three

If you get bad news, it is
as if you don't care.

16)

1.

[

]

I

2.

[

]

I

3.

[

]

I

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

r

to hide what you feel

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

and behave

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

When

a man is born, the success
he is going to have is alread in
the cards, so he might as well accept
it and not fight agains? it.

17)

1.

[

]

I

2.

[

]

I

3.

[

I

]

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

18) The government should have plenty of power and
influence over

people's lives.

1.

[

]

I

2.

[

]

I

[

]

I

3.

19)

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4-

t

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

There is hardly anything lower than a person who
does not feel
great love, gratitude, and respect for his parents.
1.

[

]

I

2.

L

]

I

3.

L

]

I

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

20) The negative opinion of others often keeps me from seeing
or play I had planned to attend.
1.

2.
3.

]

I

[

]

I

[

]

I

[

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

a

a

movie

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly
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21) The government should give money
and food to the unemployed.
1-

C

3

I

2.

L

]

I

3.

[

]

I

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

[

]

I

[

]

I

[

]

I

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

22) There is no satisfaction in any good
without a companion,
[

]

I

[

]

I

[

]

I

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4.

t

5.

L

6.

C

]

I

-I

I

]

I

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

23) Sometimes politics and government seem so
complicated that a person
like me can't really understand what
is going on.
1.

[

]

I

2.

[

]

I

3-

[

I

]

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

24) There are some people like great artists and
musicians who can be
forgiven for not being considerate of others,
kind to poor, etc.
"1.

2.
3.

[

]

I

[

]

I

[

]

I

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

Respect is due an older man no matter what kind of

25)

1.

[

]

I

2.

[

]

I

3.

[

]

I

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

.

[

]

I

[

]

I

3.

[

]

I

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

[

]

I

5,

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

a

blueprint for all other

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

system should be
nations in the world.

2.

person he

4,

26) Our socio-political

1

a

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

is,
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"'c'lrcuisJances.''
1.

[

]

I

2.

[

]

I

3.

I

]

[

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

28) My political

papers,
1.

[

]

I

2.

[

]

I

[

]

3.

I

''™'"'"' ^endship; friends don't change
with
[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

opinion is not easily swayed by what

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

It would irritate me very much

29)

4.

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

I

read in the

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

to have a watch or clock which was

off by several minutes everyday
1.

[

]

I

2.

[

]

I

[

]

I

3.

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

C

]

I

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

Some people believe that the government is overly
influenced
few big interests looking out for themselves.

30)

1.

[

]

I

2.

[

]

I

3.

[

]

I

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4.
5.

6.

]

I

[

]

I

[

]

I

[

b

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

31) Over the years,

the government has paid no attention to what the
people think when it decides what to do.

.

[

]

I

2.

[

]

I

3.

[

]

I

1

32)

I

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

set difficult goals for myself which

I

1.

[

]

I

2.

[

]

I

3.

[

]

I

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

attempt to reach.

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly
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'

^It iTeATZ^l'^.

3.

I

''''' *°

-^-^

^"'^^^^"^

agree so„,ewhat

t

[

]

\

1^ to,d

Why

',]lZlUtron,^y

34) A man with money cannot really learn
how to behave in a oolite
society If he has not had the
proper

upbringing

1.

[

o

3.

''^

I

]

r

-i

[

]

T

I

agree strongly
agree somewhat

4.

[

]

I

0.

L

J

I

6.

[

]

i

'''''' needlessly

'

payln^'taxes!"'""'"'

2
i'

[

3.

[

36)

I

3.

37)

I

1

38)

\

i

[

I

]

[
[

]

I

]

I

]

I

enjoy

a

.

[

]

I

2.

[

]

I

3.

[

]

I

I

ZTe
^9*^^^

,

agree somewhat

work very hard at everything
the results.

1-

2.

]

I

lot of the money that we

^
5.

n
[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

'

'^'^^^ree somewhat

disagree
disagree strongly

undertake until

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

race or game better when

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

a

disagree so„.what
disagree
disagree strongly

4-

L

J

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

I

I

am satisfied with

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

bet on it.

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

think some people in the government are crooked.

1-

[

]

I

2.

[

]

I

3.

[

]

I

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly
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No sane, decent person would
ever think of hurting

39)

•

[

]

I

2-

[

]

I

1

3-

[

I

]

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4.

[

]

I

5-

[

]

I

6-

[

]

I

a

close friend.

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

40) The government usually knows what is
best for people.
[

]

I

[

]

I

[

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6-

[

]

I

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

If a person wanted to make a speech
in this community against
religion, he should be allowed.

41)

1.

[

]

I

2.

[

]

I

[

]

I

3.

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4,

[

]

I

5,

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

People running the government are smart people
who usually know
what they are doing.

42)

1

.

2.
3.

43)

I

]

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

[

]

I

[

]

I

[

]

I

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

Planning only makes
out anyway.
[

]

I

2.

[

]

I

3.

[

]

I

1 .

a

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

person unhappy since plans hardly ever work

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

Nowadays with world conditions the way they are, the wise person
lives for today and lets tomorrow take care of itself.

44)

1.

[

]

I

2.

[

]

I

3.

[

]

I

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4.
5.

6.

]

I

[

]

I

[

]

I

[

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly
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45)

It is

better to go without something
than to ask for
somebody.

1.

[

]

I

2.

[

]

I

3.

46)

I

[

]

I

4.

C

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6-

[

]

I

1.

[

]

I

[

]

I

[

]

I

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

4.

[

]

I

5.

[

]

I

6.

[

]

I

favor from

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly

often do something just to prove to
myself that

2.
3.

agree strongly
agree
agree somewhat

a

I

can do it.

disagree somewhat
disagree
disagree strongly
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX
ON THE ANALYSIS OF PARENT-STUDENT DATA
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX
ON THE ANALYSIS OF PARENT-STUDENT
DATA

Part Three, which consists of
Chapters VI through X, consists
of primary and secondary material.

from the works of David

C.

The theoretical literature is
drawn

McClelland,

ILe_Achje^nn^^

Easton and Jack Dennis, Ch jj.dren in
the Politic^

Jennings and Richard
Fred

I.

Greenstein,

G.

al^v^^

David
M.

Kent

Niemi, The Political Characte^r j^l^Hnlp^^

MJdrerLjM_Pom^

Richard Dawson and Kenneth

Political Sociajjzation; and Robert
'^^^^^^y^ The Developme nt of Political

D.

Hess and Judith

Attitudes in Children

V.

.

The theoretical data has been supplemented
by statistical data,

generated by questionnaires administered to
wide sample of students and parents.
a

a

randomly selected nation-

During fall 1977 and winter 1978,

questionnaire composed of three parts-socio-economic status,
commun-

ication habits and socio-political attributes--was drafted.

Almost all

the items in the questionnaire were borrowed from
socio-political

studies intended for purposes similar to this inquiry.
the major part of the questi onnai re--i

.

e.

,

The items in

socio-political attributes-

were drawn from the "four country study" reported by McClelland, and
from studies by Jennings and Niemi, and David Easton and Jack Dennis.
Some difficulty was encountered in the translation of the items
into Farsi.

Several tests were made to insure the accuracy and cultural

adaptability of the items.

For example, in the part dealing with

479

pub policy issues, an item
stating, "If

a

communist were legally

elected to some public office
around here, the people should
allow him
to take office," was put aside
since the Communist Party (Tudeh)
in
Iran was illegal and underground
at that time.

tions" were

a

Moreover, "legal elec-

non-existent entity during most of
the Pahlavi period.

Some other standard items had
to be modified to fit the Iranian
sociocultural milieu.

In general,

however, the items were so basic that

their cross-cultural transplantation
posed few problems.

Some problems

were detected after the questionnaire
had been admininstered.
example, item 37,

"I

enjoy

a

race or

game better when

a

I

For

bet on it,"

was too closely associated with gambling
to give an indication of

"risk taking," as originally was hoped.

Since gambling is

a

cardinal

sin among Moslems, it was on this basis that
our respondents probably

viewed this item.
The questionnaires for parents and students were alike
except
for some changes in the first part dealing with
socio-economic status.

Unlike the McClelland and Jenni ngs-Niemi studies, the
parents and the
students did not come from the same families.

Both samples were

selected independently of each other, althougn the ostans (provinces)
used in both samples were the same.

Ten ostans

,

out of

a

twenty- two, were selected randomly for the sampling out of

taining the names of all the ostans

.

total of
a

bag con-

It was decided in advance that in

case the Central Ostan, which includes Tehran, was not selected by the

ninth draw, due to its significance in population and number of students
(see Table 42), at the tenth round it would be automatically selected.
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The Central Ostan, however,
was the fiftn selection and
no special
attempt was necessary.

Ihe_student_^^

There were approximately 350,000
high

school students who attended
classes in the ten selected ostans.
70 percent of these attended schools

in the Central

Ostan.

ity of them were enrolled in
schools in the city of Tehran.

among the cities in each osta_n,

a

Some

The major-

From

random selection of cities was made.

Based on the population of the city,
questionnaires were apportioned.

Seven-hundred- twenty-fourstudents, or l/500th
of the 350,000 students
in

the ten ostans, were to receive
the questionnaires which were dis-

tributed to randomly selected school(s).

Although the sample ostans

showed balanced representation of the nation,
the urban population was

disproportionately represented.
all

This resulted from the fact that almost

the high schools were located in urban areas.

Since the question-

naires were intended for high school students and
were to be administered, for the most part, by the schools
themselves, invevitably, the

urban population was overly represented.

Nevertheless, as the sample

reveals, some of the high school students were from rural areas,

attending schools in urban areas and living, presumably, with relatives
or friends.

undertake

a

Moreover, it was not the intention of this inquiry to
survey analysis of teenagers and their parents.

A compar-

ative analysis of intergenerational transfer of socio-political norms

from parents to high school students is the main focus of this study.
Since, inevitably, these are the ones, by the nature of their education, who will be the main force behind the future socio-political
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scene in Iran, it is, therefore, intended
to study their orientations,

attributes and attitudes toward socio-political
norms with an eye to
political development.
The questionnaires for areas outside of Tehran,
which consit-

tuted about 50 percent of the total sample of
students, were mailed
to the principals of the randomly selected
schools who were asked to

distribute them to one student from each class with the
first letter
of his/her last name that wnich had previously been
randomly selected.

The principals were also requested to supervise personally
or through
a

representative, the administration of the questionnaire, watching

that all students be gathered in the same room and be given about
15

minutes for its completion.
For the schools in Tehran and vicinity, the questionnaires were

personally administered by
supervision.

a

group of three people under my personal

The same method of student selection as above was used

and the students were gathered in a classroom or an office where they

were given approximately fifteen minutes to complete the questionnaires.
The rate of return for the student questionnaires was very
impressive.

A total of 624 questionnaires, or about 86 percent, were

completed and returned.

The response and acceptance by schools was

partly due to letters of introduction from the Ministry of Science and

Higher Education, the Ministry of Education, the Tehran Education Office
and the district education offices.
At first it was planned that the parents of the students who

responded to the student questionnaire would also be selected as the
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parent saniple.

Later, however, this plan
was dropped since 1t was

thought that there may be son^
concurrence between students and
their
parents in the responses to the
questions, particularly due to
the
fact that the parent's
questionnaire could not be personally
administered and had to be taken ho^
by students for their
parents to

complete.

Moreover, it was thought that
further involve,«nt with the
same students might create, or
further, any sense of suspicion
about
our intentions. They already
had been assured that no records
of their
names had been kept.
Given the political situation in
Iran at that
time,

it was

important that this be true if we
were to get real

responses.

Jh^jarent questionnaire.

Although it was deemed useful to test
the

values and norms of the parents of the
students being sampled, due to

problems noted above,

a

new sample had to be created for the
analysis

of parental norms and values.

ostans was conducted.

A new city sample survey in the same
10

From these cities, elementary, guidance and high

schools were randomly selected.

While 63 percent of the new sample

were high schools,

9

tary schools.

the selected high schools were, in fact, present in

All

the student sample.

percent were guidance and 28 percent were elemen-

The change from high schools only, in the student

sample, to include all levels of schools in the parent sample was

undertaken to broaden the parent representation and to include

a

wider

age range and, hopefully, more varying perspectives among parents,

since the parents of high school students would at least be 35 years
old, and more likely 40 and over.

Sample
provinces
responding

Sample
provinces
not responding
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The sa.e pattern as 1n
the student selection
was applied for
selection of students whose
parents would be asked
to complete the

questionnaires.

School principals were
again requested to assist
in
distribution and return of
the questionnaires.
Son. 700 questionnaires
were mailed or hand-carried
to 84 schools in the
sample ostans
The
return was not to .atch
the success we had had
with the student questionnaires due to several
reasons.
The questionnaires were
.ailed in
late April, shortly before
the period for final
exams.
The school

preoccupation with exams considerably
affected their success in locating
the preselected students
whose parents were to respond
to the questions.
Furthermore, the accelerating
political turmoil, which was
becoming
also commonplace in high schools,
resulted in a further slowdown of
school responses.

Another attempt was made in October
1978 with additional questionnaires sent to the schools that had
not yet responded.
By December
1978, some 170 questionnaires, or 25 percent
of the total, had been

completed and returned.

It was

deemed that the heightened political

turmoil and the onset of the revolutionary
atmosphere was preventing
a

high return rate of parent questionnaires.

Consequently, the 170

completed parent questionnaires were used in
the survey analysis.

Alto-

gether, responses had been received from 26
schools, 16 of which, or
62 percent, were from high schools.

Since many of the schools were

the same in the parent and student samples and
since the process of

picking students in both samples remained the same, it
was likely that
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Of the parents of the
students who had completed
the questionnaires
were among the parent
sample.

-^»2^ite_toIookj^^
Students.

The sample was somewhat
evenly divided between the
sexes
About 54 percent were male
and 46 percent were
female in a national
high school population
that is two-thirds male.
This was basically
due to the presence of
high school students from
the Central Ostan,
where female students composed
42 percent of the total
high school

enrollment in 1977.

The female representation
was further amplified

by the fact that 56
percent of the students in the
sample were from

Tehran, where male and female
students are rather evenly
represented.
The sample was made up of
22 percent ninth graders, 27
percent tenth
graders, 30 percent eleventh graders
and 21 percent twelfth graders.
The mean age of respondents for
both sexes was 17 years.
came mostly (59 percent) from
families that had

5

The students

or more children,

higher than the average of 3.9
children per family.
Level of literacy among fathers
typified that of the urban male

population: some 20 percent had had no
education; less than 12 percent
had had traditional education-i .e.

,

non-formal maktab education; 37

percent had had some grade school education;
24 percent had some high
school education; and less than 8 percent
had had at least some exposure
to college education.

The sample also represented varying backgrounds in
parental
job outlook.

Professional and managerial represented the smallest

486

group, each

percent; clerical and
sales represented the
largest group
each 19 percent; production
laborers followed closely
at 15 percentfarmers and military were
represented at 8 and 7 percent
respectively.
Income followed closely
the job description:
about 40 percent
of respondents had noted
that they had a family
income of less than
$425 per month; 43 percent bringing
in between $425 to
$1,235 per
month; and the remaining
17 percent had income of
over $1,235 per
month.
The high income level is
rather surprising, since average
national income per capi ta per
year for 1977 was $1 ,950.
It may be
asserted that the students did
not have a clear notion of their
family
income and put down an amount
that they thought was correct.
However,
it must be noted that the
sample does not represent the
average national
family.
It is obvious that the high
school students were not average
5

Iranian youths of between 15 to 19
years of age.

minority of youth in their age bracket.

They are rather

a

They necessarily came from

families with above average education and
income, since at least

a

moderate income was necessary to abate
pressure on youth so they could
continue their education instead of taking

a

job to help with family

finances.

Although the students in the sample lived in 30
different cities
and towns in eight ostans
in 20 different ostans

.

,

they had been born in 97 different localities

As such, they represented almost all

the

ostans.

Parents

.

Unlike the student sample, almost 80 percent of the responding

parents were male and the remaining 20 percent were female.

It was the
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intention of this inquiry that
the head of household
respond to the
questionnaire.
Since fathers usually are
household heads, therefore.
ove™heln,ing numbers of fathers
responding was to be expected.
The
mean age of responding father
was in his 40s. with female
respondents
somewhat younger.
Large families with five or more
children made up 45 percent of
the parent sample.
This was in contrast to 59
percent of students
coming from large families.
This resulted from several factors.
The
parents in the parent sample were
younger, since it included parents
of students in all grades.
This is presuming that younger
parents are
still

in an early stage of reproductive
capability and will

have more children.

probably

On the other hand, the student
sample included

only students above age of 14.

This would put their parents in

a

higher age bracket than that of the parents
in the parent sample, and,
therefore, in
there was

a

a

later stage of reproductive capability.

Furthermore,

definite and significant association between
number of

children and level of education with parents with
high education having

fewer children (students: chi-square
gamma

=

-.379).

=

55.6; df

=

12;

p

=

.0000;

Also, the higher level of education among parents in

the parent sample than among the parents of the student
sample could

also explain the difference.
The sample was composed of 11 percent who had some exposure to

college education, 35 percent who had had some high school education,
24 percent with some grade school education, less than 6 percent with

traditional ma k tab education and 12 percent who had had no education
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TABLE 43
A Summary Table

Sample
ostan s

n

Bushehr
Central

(Tehran)

East Azarbaijan

%

10

1.4

485

67.0

95

13.1

Hormozgan

10

1.4

Kerman

48

6.6

Kohkiloyeh and
Boyer Ahmadi
Semnan
Sistan and
Baluchistan
Yazd

Zanjan
total

at

an.

level

n

%

17

2.4

n

455

73.5

335

47

82

13.1

160

22.8

23

3.2

4.8

55

7.8

30

ft

%

1

4.1

73

42.9

51

30.0

8

4.7

6

.8

6

1.0

12

1.7

18

2.5

18

2.9

15

2.1

5

2.9

12

1.7

1

.2

33

4.7

13

7.6

28

3.9

17

2.7

20

2.8

5

2.9

12

1.7

12

1.9

30

4.3

8

4.7

724

100.0%

624

100.0%

700

100.0%

The responding parents, on the average,
had

a

170

100.0%

much higher

of education than the fathers of the
responding students.

Since

the parents in this sample are younger than
the parents in the student

sample, and since it is assumed that there

is

an association between

high level of education and younger age, therefore,
there

is

a

progres-

sive increase in the number of educated as the age of the
adults

declines.

Some of the discrepency could be explained by the presence

of parents of elementary and guidance school students, who
in general

would be younger than the parents of the high school students.
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Parents' job descriptions closely
follows that of the students'
responses, except in the professional
category comprising 14 percent,

which may reflect the increased
number of of younger parents.

other hand,

On the

8 percent of parents had stated their employment
as pro-

duction worker or drivers, whereas,
15 percent of the students had

stated that their parents had similar
employment.

This, furthermore,

amplifies the impact of education on parent's
employment.

Clerical

and sales represented the largest groups,
21 and 15 percent respectively.

Service sector employees were the smallest
group with 3.5 per-

cent, followed by military and police,
farmers and managerial, each

apprximately
the sample,

6 percent.

Production workers made up about 8 percent of

10 percent indicated that they were housewives.

Despite

a

higher level of education reported by the responding

parents coupled with increased percentage of professionals
among them,
the parents reported

dents.

a

lower level of income than the responding stu-

On the other hand,

there were fewer parents who had low income

compared to the student sample.

Some 36 percent had family income of

$425 per month; 50 percent reported $425 to

$1 ,235;

14 percent nad averaged about $1,235 a month.

and the remaining

Assuming an association

between high level of income and high level of education, the income
level

reported by the responding parents should have been above that of

the income reported by the responding students for their families.

Since the parents in general have reported

a

lower income level, it

could be assumed that there may have been some exaggeration or simple
lack of knowledge about family income by responding students, or that

491

due to taxation fear, the
parents may have understated
their actual
income.
However, it is noteworthy to
indicate that 56 percent of
the

responding students lived in Tehran,
compared to 34 percent of the
responding parents.
Since Tehran has the highest
income and the highest
cost of living, the income level
reported by the parent sample
and the

student sample may indeed be an
accurate estimation.

Taking into consideration the fewer
number of responding
parents, this sample well represented
the national character.

Respon-

ding parents had been born in 80
different localities in 15 different

ostans, with some 12 percent having been
born in rural areas.

Only 15

percent of the responding parents were born
in Tehran, compared to 34

percent residing there at the time of this
survey.
received some of their education in Tehran.
(54 percent)

or longer.
in

Some 22 percent had

Most of the respondents

had lived in their present city of residence
for 20 years

Almost all the respondents who had education were
educated

Iran except for two individuals who had been educated in
Germany.

The great majority of respondents were Moslem: 93 percent were
Shiah and 6.5 percent were Sunni.

Only one responded with "other"

religion.

Although neither sample typified the population of the country,
or even that of the urban population, nevertheless, given the facts and

surmises above, they perhaps can fulfill our intentions for the analysis
of intergenerational transmission of values and provide indications of
each group.
country.

As noted above,

this universe is not typical of the

Illiteracy and absence of adequate educational facilities are
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a

major problem in Iran.

is

illiterate.

as

a

Presently, over 60 percent of
the population

High school education and
parents who deem education

significant vehicle for achievement
are

a

rarity in

a

system that

has made high school education
as inaccessible as college
education in

European countries.

Only 15 percent of the high
school age population

of our sample pstans were enrolled
in high schools.

Of course, the

high ration in the Central Ostan,
21 percent, overloaded the
average.
As is evident in Table 42, normally
around 7 percent of the high school

age students in the sample ostans attended
high school in 1977.
it could be safely assumed that the
sample of our high school
is

certainly

a

Thus,

students

sample of the next generation of Iranian elite
who will

have above average participation and influence
in the socio-political

affairs of the nation.

APPENDIX III

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF PARENT-STUDENT
DATA
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APPENDIX III

Frequency Distribution of
Parent-Student Data
Psi^ents
n

Sex (respondents' sex)
male
female
total

students
%

135
35

79 4
20 6

170

100 at

Age (respondents' age)
Less than 14 years old
14 years old
15 years old
16 years old
17 years old
18 years old
19 years old
20 years or older
25 years or less
26 to 30 years old
31 to 35 years old
36 to 40 years old
41 to 45 years old
46 to 50 years old
51 to 60 years old

Marital Status
single
married
divorced
wi dowed
Not available
total

%

CD
00.7
AC O
46.3

"7

ooO

AO

AO/
iUU.0%
1

2

22
79
149
165
157
29

29
25

1.2
2.9
20.0
21.2
17.1
14.7

1

.6

2
5

34
36

Not available
total

n

170

3

148

100.0%

1

.6

1.8

of Children in the Famil y
No children
5
One or two children
29
Three or four children
54
Five or more children
69

O
O

3.5
12.7
2"^

4

9

26.4
25.2
4.6
1.4

15

2.4

624

99.9%

1.8
87.1

3
15

170

.

8.8
100.1%

;r

Not available
total

13

170

2.9
17.1

31.8
40.6
7.6
100.0%

39
190
369
26

624

6.3

30.4
59.1
4.2
100.0%

7
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P^^^ents
n

Parents' Education
No education
Traditional education
Few grades
Sixth grade
7th to 9th grade
10th to 12th grade
High school diploma
Few years of college
B. A. or equivalane
M. A. or equivalent
M. D. or equivalent
total

Fathers' Education
No education
Traditional education
Few grades
Sixth grade
7th to 9th grade
10th to 12th grade
High school diploma
Few years of college
B. A. or equivalent
M. A. or equivalent
M. D. or equivalent
Not available
total

Mothers' Education
No education
Traditional education
Few grades
Sixth grade
7th to 9th grade
10th to 12th grade
High school diploma
Few years college
B. A. or equivalent
M. A. or equivalent
M. D. or equivalent
Ph. D. or equivalent
Not available
total

students
%

5

12.3
5.3
6.5
17.6
10.0
12.9
13.5
3.5
14.7
2.9

1

.6

d.\

9

11

30
17
cc
23
6

25

170

n

%

^70

}?'p

80

12:8
23.1
9.0

99.8%

56
33
55

53
3*3

9

^'4

27
8
4
21

43
1*3
'5

3*4

624

99.9%

254
50
IO7
IO4
42

39.4
8!l
i7]2

13

26
5

15!

6.7
2!l
4.2
*.8

5

.8

2

.3

2

.3

1

.2

21

3.4

624

100.2%

496

parents
n

students
%

n

%

Education
9th grade
10th grade

]lt

nth grade
12th grade
Not available

^5

total

624

^1.4
26.4
29.7
20.2

100.0%

Country of Education
Iran

Germany
Not available
total

139

81.8

2

1*2

29

17^0

170

100.0%

Job (For parents; the responding parent's
employment is stated, and for
the students, the head of household's
employment is stated)
Professional or
technical
24
14.2
34
5.4
Administration or
management
11
6.5
32
5.1
Clerical and related
37
21.8
120
19.2
Sales and related
26
15.3
117
18.7
Service sector
6
3.5
49
7.8
Farmer and farm related
11
6.5
52
8.3
Production worker or
driver
14
8.2
95
15.2
Military or police
11
6.5
46
7.4
Housewifes
17
10.0
Other/not available
13
7.7
89
12.7
total

170

100.0%

624

100.0%

Family Income (In 1978, 70 Rials—
ils--abbr,
abbr Rls.-equalled $1.00).
Less than 39,000 Rls.
62
36.5
240
38.5
30,000 to 49,999 Rls.
53
31.2
174
27.9
50,000 to 74,999 Rls.
23
13.5
89
14.3
75,000 to 99,999 Rls.
13
7.6
39
6.3
100,000 to 124,999 Rls
6
3.5
28
4.5
125,000 to 149,999 Rls
3
1.8
14
2.2
150,000 to 199,999 Rls
1
.6
7
1.1
200,000 to 249,999 Rls
2
1.2
6
1.0
More than 250,000 Rls.
5
2.9
8
1.3
Not available
4
2.4
19
3.0
.

total

170

100.2%

624

100.1%
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parents

students
n

Place of residence
Tehran
Cities of over 100,000
Cities with population
from 25,000 to 99,999
Cities with population
from 5,000 to 24,999
Places with a population
of less than 5,000
Not available
total

57
20

33
41
16
3

170

Years at the city of residence
Less than one year
7
1 to 5 years
17
5 to 10 years
16
10 to 15 years
16
15 to 20 years
1 7
Over 20 years
91
Not available
D
total

3"^

R

11.7

352
69

56.4

19.4

103

16.5

24.1

64

10.3

9.4
1.8

36

5.8

99.9%

11.1

624

100.1%

72.9

4.1
10.0
9.4
9.4
in
iu.

r\
(J

53.5
3.5

170

Province of residence
Central incl. Tehran
Guilan
East Azarbaijan
West Azarbaijan
Kerman
Khorasan
Baluchistan
Bushehr
Zanjan
Yazd
Kohkiloyeh &
Boyer-Ahmad
Semnan
total
Rel igion
Shi ah

Sunni
Not available
total

71

41.8

455

2

1.2

3

.5

50

29.4

83

13.3

30

4.8

1

.2

11

1

.6

9

5.3

1

.6

12
7

7.1
4.1

8
4

4.7
2.4

10

1.8
1.6

5

2.9

10
21

3.4

170

100.1%

158
11

92.9
6.5

1

.6

170

100.0%

624

1.6

100.1%
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parents
n

Few times amonth
Once every few months
Seldom
Never
Not available
total

^^nI?ilL!?"

^""'^

%
*° "^"^

'^'of Iboit^our f"?s?en
3
1

25
2

170

students

^

n

%

-

-

television.

10

\
u
7
^^'^

iU
i

112

2

100.1%

624

f'^
ol-^
2

.0

100.0%

people read newspaper and magazine
articles about

hveryday
Few times a week
Few times a month
Once every few months
Seldom

mT'

-1 Ki
Not available

total

54
43
10

31^3
25.3
5.9

3

18

25
3°

14;7
17.6
2.9

5

170

100.0%

157
247
64
20
107

25 2
39 6
10 1

26
3

4:1

624

3 ?

17'2
5

100.1%

Variable 14: Some people think about political and
economic condition
of our country, how about you? I think about
it:
Everyday
25
14.7
114
18.3
Few times a week
18
10.6
104
16.7
Few times a month
16
9.4
58
9.3
Once every few months
12
7.1
32
5.1
Seldom
45
26.5
181
29.0
Never
50
29.4
128
20.5
Not available
4
2.4
7
1.1
total

170

100.1%

624

100.0%

Variable 15: Some people talk about political and economic condition of
Everyday
Few times a week
Few times amonth
Once every few months
Seldom
Never
Not available
total

19

25
15
3

50
55
3

170

11.2
14.7
8.8
1.8
29.4
32.3
1.8

100.0%

88
122
36
203
118

14.1
19.6
8.6
5.8
32.5
18.9

3

.5

54

624

100.0%
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P^^^"ts

students
^

^

Ind'^IL^ras^L^hlnHL
Agree strongly

45

Agree somewhat
Disagree somewhat

19

.^l^^g^ee

1^

6

Disagree strongly
Not available

*

n

^^^^^

,5.5

^^'^e

one's feeling

134
226

\ r

55

4

0*0

7?

2

i.l

{2

total

%

,,.3
36.2
^2.4
8.8
6-9
^'^

100.0%

624
99.9%
Variable 17: When a man is born,
the success he is aoina
ready in the cards, so he mav as wpII
accept it and not fight against
it.
Agree strongly
25
14.7
54
8.7
Agree
34
20.0
114
18.3
Agree somewhat
24
14.1
78
12.5
Disagree somewhat
7
4.1
33
5.3
Disagree
40
23.5
170
27.2
Disagree strongly
34
20.0
160
25.6
Not available
6
3.5
15
2.4
total

Agree strongly
Agree
Agree somewhat
Disagree somewhat
Disagree
Disagree strongly
Not available
total

170

65
47
26
8
16
5

3

170

99.9%

624

100.0%

38.2
27.7
15.3
4.7
9.4
2.9
1.8

169
197
121
46
50

27.1
31.6
19.4
7.4
8.0
2.9
3.7

100.0%

624

18
23

Variable 19: There is hardly anybody lower than a
person who
teel a great love, gratitude and respect for
his parents
Agree strongly
75
44.1
300
Ag>"ee
44
25.9
165
Agree somewhat
25
14.7
65
Disagree somewhat
3
1.3
22
Disagree
11
6.5
31
Disagree strongly
10
5.9
29
Not available
2
1.2
12
total

170

100.1%

624

100.1%
does not
48 1
26.4
10 4

3*5
5!o
4.7
l!9

100.0%

500

parents
n

students
%

n

%

Variable 20: The negative opinion
of others often keeps me from
seeing
a movie or a play I had
planned to attend
Agree strongly
13
75
32
5.1
Agree
23
13.5
116
18.6
Agree somewhat
23
13.5
140
22.4
Disagree somewhat
15
8.8
55
8.8
Disagree
55
32.4
203
32.5
Disagree strongly
24
14.1
56
9.0
Not available
17
10.0
22

total

Variable 21
ed.

170

99.9%

624

3.5

99.9%

The government should give money and food
to the unemploy-

Agree strongly
Agree
Agree somewhat
Disagree somewhat
Disagree
Disagree strongly
Not available

47
36
15
16
29

25
2

total

170

27.7
21.2
8.8
9.4
17.1
14.7
1.2

171
130

100.1%

624

80

27.4
20.8
13.0
7.7
16.2
12.8

13

2.1

81

48
101

100.0%

Variable 22: There is no satisfaction in any undertaking without
a
companion.
Agree strongly
40
23.5
149
23.9
Agree
54
31.8
175
28.0
Agree somewhat
16
9.4
89
14.3
Disagree somewhat
5
2.9
31
5.0
Disagree
33
19.4
108
17.3
Disagree strongly
19
11.2
57
9.1
Not available
3
1.8
15
2.4
1

total

170

100.0%

624

100.0%

Variable 23: Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated
a person like me can 't really understand what is going on.
Agree strongly
44
25.9
102
16.4
Agree
55
32.4
222
35.6
Agree somewhat
29
17.1
165
26.4
Disagree somewhat
9
5.3
36
5.8
Disagree
8.2
14
49
7.8
Disagree strongly
5.3
25
5
4.0
Not available
5.9
25
4.0
10
total

170

100.0%

624

100.0%

502

P^'^e^ts
n

Agree strongly
. .
A
Agree
Agree somewhat
Disagree somewhat
Disagree
Disagree Strongly
Not available
total

16
47
22
14
42
23
6

1/0

students
%

0

9.4
27.7
12.9
8.2
13.5
13.5
3.5

141
77
23

7.7
23.6
20.4
9.8
22.6
12.3
3.7

99.9%

624

100.1%

48
147
127
61

Variable 25: Respect is due an
older man no matter what kind
of
Agree strongly
53
31.2
196
31.4
Agree
43
28.2
156
25.0
Agree somewhat
19
11.2
101
16.2
Disagree somewhat
4
2.4
56
9.0
Disagree
32
18.8
67
10.7
Disagree strongly
10
5.9
41

total

170'

100.1%

624

a

person

6.6

100.0%

Variable 26: Our socio-political system
should be a blue-print for all
^"
^
other nations in the world.
Agree strongly
55
32.4
182
29.2
Agree
51
30.0
187
30.0
Agree somewhat
19
11.2
109
17.5
Disagree somewhat
10
5.9
37
5.9
Disagree
19
11.2
65
10.4
Disagree strongly
8
4.7
26
4.2
Not available
8
4.7
18
2.9
total

170

100.1%

624

100.1%

Variable 27: Real friendship is permanent friendship;
friends don't
change with circumstances.
Agree strongly
77
45.3
268
43.0
Agree
56
32.9
201
32.2
Agree somewhat
8
4.7
62
9.9
Disagree somewhat
4
2.4
29
4.7
Disagree
17
10.0
36
5.8
Disagree strongly
3
1.8
13
2.1
Not available
5
2.9
15
2.4
total

170

100.0%

624

100.1%

503

parents
"

students
/o

n

--''^

'"nlJl newsXe?^'"^^
Agree st^ong,,
Agree somewhat
Disagree somewhat
Disagree
Disagree strongly
Not available
total

,4.1

io5

33

?q1
ir

?J3

3
9

t^'t

15.8
35.1
23.2
8.5

?2

^^'l

21

3.4

?i

4
14

''[h^t^^af off\r^Iiirr!?!!

/

Agree somewhat
Disagree somewhat
Disagree
Disagree strongly
Not available
^otal

by what

41

170

Agree strongly

-^ed

27
43
32
17
33
12
-

100.0%

-

-^..-^^
ISQ

"5

624

read

100.0%

to have a watch or clock

mo
•

^5':

3'

I8.8
10. 0

19.4
7 1
-

-

09
75
133

H

10

170

I

100.0%

624

17*5

{on
pt*?
Ti'V
^^'^
1.6
100.0%

^^'^^ people believe that the government
is pretty much
nol^.f:by a few big
^
fluenced
interests looking out for themselves
Agree strongly
6*
25
14.7

85

^S"^^^

,

Agree somewhat
Disagree somewhat
Disagree
Disagree strongly
Not available
total

^^^ll^^^t
wnat people °lf^r
like

25.3
17.1

32

18. 8

11

6.5
4.7

8

170

12.*9

100.0%

181

133
55
113
29
23

624

3

29 0
22 1

3*8
18

1

4*7

37
100.0%

the government has paid no attention to
me think when i+ Mcr^-iA^^^ ...u^-t- 4.^ j„

Agree strongly
Agree
Agree somewhat
Disagree somewhat
Disagree
Disagree strongly
Not available
total

43
29
22

28

16.5
21.2
17.7

77

12

7.1

38

22.4
10.6
4.7

73
137
56
40

12.3
20.6
18.1
11.7
22.0
9.0
6.4

100.2%

624

100.1%

36
30

18
8

170

128
113

in-

504

P^i^ents

Variable 32: I set difficult
Agree strongly
37
Agree
51
Agree somewhat
28
Disagree somewhat
17
Disagree
24
Disagree strongly
7
Not available
6
total

go<

170

Variable 33: A child should nev(
told why he is asked to do it,
Agree strongly
80
Agree
67
Agree somewhat
10
Disagree somewhat
3
Disagree
5
Disagree strongly
l
Not available
4
total

170

students
%

r\

n

%

for myself which
115
30.0
216
16.5
134
10.0
54
14.1
62

I

attempt
18.4
34.6
21.5
8.7
9.9

4.1

13

2.1

3.5

30

4.8

100.0%

624

100.0%

be asked to do anything unl

47.1
39.4
5.9
1.8
2.9

356
247
45

41.0
39.6
7.2

18
19

2.9
3.0

.6

5

.8

2.3

34

5.6

100.0%

624

100.0%

34: A wealthy person cannot really learn how to behave in
a
er up-bringing.
Agree strongly
100
58.8
351
56.3
Agree
51
30.0
191
30.6
Agree somewhat
6
3.5
20
3.2
Disagree somewhat
3
1.8
7
1.1
Disagree
6
3.5
18
2.9
Disagree strongly
3
1.8
7
1.1

Not available
total

Variable 35: I think the
we pay in taxes.
Agree strongly
Agree
Agree somewhat
Disagree somewhat
Disagree
Disagree strongly
Not available
total

1

170

.6

100.0%

30
624

4.8

100.0%

government wastes needlessly alot of the money
32
29
18
13

44
25
9

170

18.8
17.1
10.6
7.7
25.9
14.7
5.3

81
115
107
60
148
76

37

13.0
18.4
17.2
9.6
23.7
12.2
5.9

100.1%

624

100.0%

505

parents

students

n

n

%

^'^ij^le 36: I work hard at everything
y^-xniy iI undertake until
I am satisfied
with the results.
Agree strongly
94
55.3
247
39.6
Agree
57
39.4
270
43.3
Agree somewhat
3
1.8
59
9.5
Disagree somewhat
1
.6
7
1.1
Disagree
1
.6
6
1.0
Disagree strongly
1
.6
3
.5
Not available
3
1.8
32

total

170

100.1%

624

5.1

100.1%

Variable 37: I enjoy a race or
a game better when I bet
on it,
Agree strongly
8
4.7
30
4.8
Agree
24
14.1
41
6.6
Agree somewhat
7
4.1
40
6.4
Disagree somewhat
9
5.3
43
6.9
Disagree
74
43.5
231
37.0
Disagree strongly
38
22.4
213
34.1
Not available
10
5.9
26

total

170

100.0%

624

4.2

100.0%

Variable 38: I think some people in the
government are crooked.
Agree strongly
56
32.9
169
27.1
Agree
56
32.9
159
25.5
Agree somewhat
22
12.9
134
21.5
Disagree somewhat
7
4.1
40
6.4
Disagree
18
10.6
62
9.9
Disagree strongly
6
3,5
23
3.7
Not available
5
2.9
37
5.9

total

Variable 39: No same ai
close friend.
Agree strongly
Agree
Agree somewhat
Disagree somewhat
Disagree
Disagree strongly
Not available
total

170

99.8%

624

100.0%

100
45

327
212

5

58.8
26.5
2.9

1

.6

52.4
34.0
4.2
2.6

3

1.8
1.8
7.7

3

13

170

100.1%

26
16
13
4
26

624

2.1
.6

4.2

100.1%

506

parents

students
n

Variable 40: The government usually knows
what is best for people
Agree strongly
50
29.4
110
17.6
Agree
56
32.9
192
30.8
Agree somewhat
23
13.5
123
19.7
Disagree somewhat
11
6.5
66
10.6
Disagree
9
5.3
76
12.2
Disagree strongly
7
4.1
28
4.5
Not available
14
8.2
29
4.7
total

170

99.9%

624

100.1%

wanted to^make a speech in this community
^^rl!?l!4.^i:iJ!,-LPur^?P
inst religion he s hould be allowed.
Agree strongly
15
8 .8
84
13.5
Agree
15
8 .8
115
18.4
Agree somewhat
13
7 .7
79
12.7
Disagree somewhat
3
1 .8
46
7.4
Disagree
39
22 .9
136
21.8
Disagree strongly
66
38 .8
129
20.7
Not available
19
11 .2
35
5.6
total

170

100 .0%

624

100.1%

Variable 42: People running the government are smart people who usually
know what they are doing.
Agree strongly
31
18.2
66
10.6
Agree
49
28.8
156
25.0
Agree somewhat
35
20.6
171
27.4
Disagree somewhat
12
7.1
87
13.9
Disagree
16
9.4
79
12.7
Disagree strongly
13
7.7
35
5.6
Not available
14
8.2
30
4.8
total

170

100.0%

624

Planning only makes a person unhappy since
out anyway.
Agree strongly
16
9.4
52
Agree
49
28.8
122
Agree somewhat
23
13.5
160
Disagree somewhat
18
10.6
92
Disagree
27
122
15.6
Disagree strongly
45
24
14.1
31
Not available
7.7
13

ible 43:

100.0%
plans

'k

total

170

100.0%

624

8.3
19.6
25.6
14.7
19.6
7.2
5.0

100.0%

507

parents

students

n

n

Variable 44: Nowdays with world
condition the wav it

Agree strongly
Agree
Agree somewhat
Disagree somewhat
Disagree
Disagree strongly
Not available
total

Agree strongly
Agree
Agree somewhat
Disagree somewhat
Disagree
Disagree strongly
Not available
total

Variable

46:

I

them.

8.8
12.4

ic:

tho ,mc

8.2
34.1
20.6
8.8

54
93
58
70
193
124
32

8.7
14.9
9.3
11.2
30.9
19.9
5.1

170

100.0%

624

100.0%

45

26.5
34.1
9.4
5.3
12.4
1.2
11.2

152
238
86
30
55

24.4
38.1
13.8
4.8
8.8
2.9
7.2

100.1%

624

58
16
9

21
2

19

170

7.1

18

45

100.1%

often do something just to prove to myself that

Agree strongly
Agree
Agree somewhat
Disagree somewhat
Disagree
Disagree strongly
Not available
total

15
21
12
14
53
35
15

%

29

17. 1
24. 7
15. 3

8

4. 7

38

22. 4

12
15

7. 1

109
197
106
60
94
28

8. 8

30

42
26

170

100. 1%

624

17.5
31.6
17.0
9.6
15.1

4.5
4.8

100.1%

I

can do

